首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 250 毫秒
1.
What really works   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.  相似文献   

2.
To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.  相似文献   

3.
When employees believe they are being treated fairly-when they feel heard, when they understand how and why important decisions are made, and when they believe they are respected-their companies will benefit. Research shows that practicing process fairness reduces legal costs from wrongful-termination suits, lowers employee turnover, helps generate support for new strategic initiatives, and fosters a culture that promotes innovation. What's more, it costs little financially to implement Yet few companies practice it consistently. Joel Brockner examines this paradox, exploring psychological and other reasons that cause managers to resist embracing process fairness. The fact that it's relatively inexpensive to implement, for instance, may be why some numbers-oriented executives undervalue it. Many managers believe that they practice process fairness, but 360-degree feedback tells another story. Some corporate policies actually undermine it--such as when the legal department won't let managers fully explain decisions for fear that disclosure could expose the firm to lawsuits. And, frequently, managers simply follow the all-too-human tendency to avoid uncomfortable situations. But the good news is that organizations can take concrete steps to promote greater process fairness. Many studies have shown that training programs make a big difference, and the author describes the most effective format. In addition, warning your managers that they may experience negative emotions when practicing fair process will help prepare them to cope with those feelings. Finally, role modeling fair process on the executive level will help spread the practice throughout the organization. The fact is, process fairness is the responsibility of all executives, at all levels and in all functions; it cannot be delegated to HR. The sooner managers realize that and work to make it a company norm, the better off the organization will be.  相似文献   

4.
Turnaround champions--those leaders who manage to bring distressed organizations back from the brink of failure--are often acclaimed for their canny financial and strategic decision making. But having studied their work closely, Harvard Business School's Rosabeth Moss Kanter emphasizes another aspect of their achievement. These leaders reverse the cycle of corporate decline through deliberate interventions that increase the level of communication, collaboration, and respect among their managers. Ailing companies descend into what Kanter calls a "death spiral," which typically works this way: After an initial blow to the company's fortunes, people begin pointing fingers and deriding colleagues in other parts of the business. Tensions rise and collaboration declines. Once they are no longer acting in concert, people find themselves less able to effect change. Eventually, many come to believe they are helpless. Passivity sets in. Finally, the ultimate pathology of troubled companies takes hold: denial. Rather than volunteer an opinion that no one else seems to share, people engage in collective pretense to ignore what they individually know. To counter these dynamics, Kanter says, and reverse the company's slide, the CEO needs to apply certain psychological interventions--specifically, replacing secrecy and denial with dialogue, blame and scorn with respect, avoidance and turf protection with collaboration, and passivity and helplessness with initiative. The author offers in-depth accounts of how the CEOs at Gillette, Invensys, and the BBC used these interventions to guide their employees out of corporate free fall and onto a more productive path.  相似文献   

5.
If there's one thing that most U.S. executives agree on, it's the need for higher productivity in American workplaces. So far most efforts at raising performance have concentrated on factory and office employees-partly, one assumes, because their output is easily measured. However, the increases in productivity at the shop or office level will mean nothing in the long run, if, for instance, new products aren't designed, new structures aren't put in place to accommodate change, or new equipment isn't conceived to improve product quality. In other words, a company's productivity depends to a great degree on how innovative its middle managers are. In this article, the author describes a study she conducted of 165 middle managers in five companies to determine what managers contribute to innovation and what factors the most innovative companies have in common. She found that, among other things, innovative managers tend to be visionary, comfortable with change, and persistent. Innovation flourishes in companies where territories overlap and people have contact across functions; information flows freely; numbers of people have excesses in their budgets; many managers are in open-ended positions, and reward systems look to the future, not the past.  相似文献   

6.
The assumption today is that new value in a company can be created only when people shed their suits, don khakis and Hawaiian shirts, and think and act like the most passionate entrepreneurs. The problem is, they're rarely told when it makes sense to do those things--or how to do them. With help from a team of ethnographers and senior organization specialists, authors Mark Maletz and Nitin Nohria recently conducted a unique research project that attempted to full those gaps. Their project focused on whitespace: the large but mostly unoccupied territory in every company where rules are vague, authority is fuzzy, budgets are nonexistent, and strategy is unclear--and where entrepreneurial activity that helps reinvent and renew an organization most often takes place. The researchers shadowed entrepreneurial managers operating in the whitespace and met with top managers about their efforts to oversee whitespace activities. Using examples from the financial services, computer, and e-commerce industries, the authors explain when it's imperative to operate in the whitespace--and when it's wiser to stay in the traditional blackspace. They describe how effective whitespace managers subtly and resourcefully lead successful efforts, and how senior executives nurture whitespace projects by putting aside their traditional planning, organizing, and controlling techniques. Finally, they examine the ultimate issue for any successful whitespace project: should it be moved into the blackspace, kept in the whitespace indefinitely--or, despite its apparent success, killed off? If companies leave this valuable territory to the scattershot whims and talents of individual managers, the authors say, they are likely to miss out on many of the opportunities that come from exploring the next frontier.  相似文献   

7.
Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.  相似文献   

8.
The innovation value chain   总被引:17,自引:0,他引:17  
The challenges of coming up with fresh ideas and realizing profits from them are different for every company. One firm may excel at finding good ideas but may have weak systems for bringing them to market. Another organization may have a terrific process for funding and rolling out new products and services but a shortage of concepts to develop. In this article, Hansen and Birkinshaw caution executives against using the latest and greatest innovation approaches and tools without understanding the unique deficiencies in their companies' innovation systems. They offer a framework for evaluating innovation performance: the innovation value chain. It comprises the three main phases of innovation (idea generation, conversion, and diffusion) as well as the critical activities performed during those phases (looking for ideas inside your unit; looking for them in other units; looking for them externally; selecting ideas; funding them; and promoting and spreading ideas companywide). Using this framework, managers get an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts. They can pinpoint their weakest links and tailor innovation best practices appropriately to strengthen those links. Companies typically succumb to one of three broad "weakest-link" scenarios. They are idea poor, conversion poor, or diffusion poor. The article looks at the ways smart companies - including Intuit, P&G, Sara Lee, Shell, and Siemens- modify the best innovation practices and apply them to address those organizations' individual needs and flaws. The authors warn that adopting the chain-based view of innovation requires new measures of what can be delivered by each link in the chain. The approach also entails new roles for employees "external scouts" and "internal evangelists," for example. Indeed, in their search for new hires, companies should seek out those candidates who can help address particular weaknesses in the innovation value chain.  相似文献   

9.
Moore GA 《Harvard business review》2004,82(7-8):86-92, 187
As commercial processes commoditize in a developed economy, they are outsourced or transferred offshore, leaving onshore companies with unrelenting, Darwinian pressure to come up with the next wave of innovation. But innovation is a broad term. There are many types, from the ballyhooed disruptive innovation to more mundane forms such as process and experiential, which might involve, respectively, doing such things as streamlining the supply chain and delighting customers with small modifications of products. Many executives find it hard to decide which kind to focus on. The best way to choose is to consider the phases of a market's life span. In a market's earliest phase, a new technology attracts enthusiasts and visionaries. Eventually, the market reaches the Main Street section of its life, when growth slows, flattens, and finally subsides. Different types of innovation produce more bang for the buck at different points in the life cycle. Disruptive innovation, for example, is rewarded most during the earliest phase. Once the life cycle advances to Main Street, however, the marketplace is no longer willing to yield the revenue or margin gains necessary to fund that type of innovation, so other forms, including process and experiential, yield better returns. But attempts to change the company's direction are often thwarted by the inertia that success creates. To overcome the inertia demon, managers must introduce new types of innovation while aggressively extracting resources from legacy processes and organizations. By running the two efforts in parallel, they can defeat the demon and renew the company.  相似文献   

10.
The discipline of innovation.   总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9  
As managers recognize the heightened importance of innovation to competitive success, they face an apparent paradox: the orderly and predictable decisions on which a business rests depend increasingly on the disorderly and unpredictable process of innovation. How can managers expect to plan for--or count on--a process that is itself so utterly dependent on creativity, inspiration, and old-fashioned luck? Drawing on his many years' experience studying innovative and entrepreneurial companies, the author argues that this paradox is apparent only, not real. Most of what happens in successful innovations is not the happy occurrence of a blinding flash of insight but, rather, the careful implementation of an unspectacular but systematic management discipline. At the heart of that discipline lies the knowledge of where to look for innovation opportunities and how to identify them. It is to this study of the sources of innovation that Mr. Drucker here addresses himself.  相似文献   

11.
For years, small companies have experimented with forms of open-book management. Open-book systems have smoothed change efforts by giving workers the why instead of just the how of initiatives; they have enabled employees to think like owners. Now divisions of large organizations such as R.R. Donnelley & Sons and Amoco Canada are finding opening the books can work for them, too. It isn't easy, and companies must adapt the principles to their own situations. AES Corporation, for example, found that it had to declare all its employees "insiders" when it went public. One of the reasons for large companies' interest in open-book management is the success of a role-model company, Missouri-based Springfield ReManufacturing. Leaders of divisions of large companies have been able to visit and ask questions. Other early adopters are also showing competitive advantages. Among them are Wabash National, now the nation's leading truck and tractor manufacturer, and Physician Sales & Service, a distributor of supplies to doctors' office. Open-book principles are the same whether a company is large or small: every employee must receive all relevant financial information and be taught to understand it; managers must hold employees accountable for making their unit's goals; and the compensation system must reward everyone for the overall success of the business. Hexacomb Corporation is one large organization that has done well. Workers at the company's seven plants are inspired by a system of splitting profits over budget fifty-fifty: half goes to the company and half to the bonus pool. Such companies are learning the benefits of having everyone work to push the numbers in the right direction.  相似文献   

12.
Growing talent as if your business depended on it   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Traditionally, corporate boards have left leadership planning and development very much up to their CEOs and human resources departments-primarily because they don't perceive that a lack of leadership development in their companies poses the same kind of threat that accounting blunders or missed earnings do. That's a shortsighted view, the authors argue. Companies whose boards and senior executives fail to prioritize succession planning and leadership development end up experiencing a steady attrition in talent and becoming extremely vulnerable when they have to cope with inevitable upheavals- integrating an acquired company with a different operating style and culture, for instance, or reexamining basic operating assumptions when a competitor with a leaner cost structure emerges. Firms that haven't focused on their systems for building their bench strength will probably make wrong decisions in these situations. In this article, the authors explain what makes a successful leadership development program, based on their research over the past few years with companies in a range of industries. They describe how several forward-thinking companies (Tyson Foods, Starbucks, and Mellon Financial, in particular) are implementing smart, integrated, talent development initiatives. A leadership development program should not comprise stand-alone, ad hoc activities coordinated by the human resources department, the authors say. A company's leadership development processes should align with strategic priorities. From the board of directors on down, senior executives should be deeply involved in finding and growing talent, and line managers should be evaluated and promoted expressly for their contributions to the organization-wide effort. HR should be allowed to create development tools and facilitate their use, but the business units should take responsibility for development activities, and the board should ultimately oversee the whole system.  相似文献   

13.
Increasingly, it seems, there are just two types of companies left in the world: dot-coms, born on the Internet, and "wanna-dots," established organizations that are seeking to incorporate the Internet into their businesses. Some wanna-dots manage the deep mind-shift required to cross the digital divide. These are the pacesetters--the first movers and fast followers that exhibit organizational curiosity and the desire to innovate. But most wanna-dots are laggards; they don't rise to the challenge with the same resolve. In a global research effort involving more than 800 companies, the author uncovered so many wanna-dots making the same kinds of mistakes that it almost seemed they were following a How Not to Change guide. In this article, Kanter creates just such a guide, offering ten pieces of antiadvice that expose the tendency of wanna-dots to make only cosmetic changes when deep transformation is required. Beyond delineating what not to do, Kanter serves up two examples of wanna-dots that got it right. First, Williams-Sonoma, which successfully made up for a slow start to create a strong Web presence. Second, Honeywell, a pacesetter led by e-believers from the start, which still found the road to the Web a challenging one. For companies not born digital, the fundamental problem is change. And the real place to look for change is not on the Internet but inside your company--at your own organizational culture and your attitude toward change.  相似文献   

14.
When CEOs push decision making out to the far reaches of an organization, good things happen: fleeting business opportunities are seized quickly and workers are motivated to innovate and take risks. But it's tricky to achieve both decentralized decision making and coherent strategic action at a company. If everyone is a decision maker, things can spin out of control. In this article, Bain consultants Orit Gadiesh and James Gilbert explore the concept of the strategic principle--a memorable and actionable phrase that distills a company's corporate strategy into its unique essence and communicates it across an organization. If it's devised and disseminated properly, a strategic principle can empower employees to seize business opportunities but also focus everyone in an organization--executives and line managers alike--on the same strategic objectives. The authors outline the three defining characteristics of a good strategic principle--it should force trade-offs between competing resource demands, it should serve as a test for the strategic soundness of a particular action, and it should set clear boundaries for employees to operate within even as it grants them freedom to experiment. They explain how managers can create a strategic principle, how they should test it, and when they should revisit it. The authors present real-world examples of how companies use their strategic principles. For instance, they describe how South-west Airlines stopped flying to Denver after it measured the high costs of providing flight service in that part of the country against its strategic principle of offering customers short-haul air travel at fares competitive with the cost of automobile travel. This tool is increasingly useful in today's rapidly changing business environment, the authors conclude, and it is likely to become even more crucial to corporate success.  相似文献   

15.
How do some firms produce a pipeline of consistently excellent managers? Instead of concentrating merely on strengthening the skills of individuals, these companies focus on building a broad organizational leadership capability. It's what Ulrich and Smallwood--cofounders of the RBL Group, a leadership development consultancy--call a leadership brand. Organizations with leadership brands take an "outside-in" approach to executive development. They begin with a clear statement of what they want to be known for by customers and then link it with a required set of management skills. The Lexus division of Toyota, for instance, translates its tagline--"The pursuit of perfection"--into an expectation that its leaders excel at managing quality processes. The slogan of Bon Secours Health System is "Good help to those in need." It demands that its managers balance business skills with compassion and caring. The outside-in approach helps firms build a reputation for high-quality leaders whom customers trust to deliver on the company's promises. In examining 150 companies with strong leadership capabilities, the authors found that the organizations follow five strategies. First, make sure managers master the basics of leadership--for example, setting strategy and grooming talent. Second, ensure that leaders internalize customers' high expectations. Third, incorporate customer feedback into evaluations of executives. Fourth, invest in programs that help managers hone the right skills, by tapping customers to participate in such programs. Finally, track the success of efforts to build leadership bench strength over the long-term. The result is outstanding management that persists even when individual executives leave. In fact, companies with the strongest leadership brands often become "leader feeders"--firms that regularly graduate leaders who go on to head other companies.  相似文献   

16.
Everyone knows that the way things are formally organized in most companies (their processes) is not the same as the way things are actually done (their practices). The difference between the two creates tension that can be very difficult for managers to handle. Lean too much toward practice and new ideas may bubble up and evaporate for lack of a structure to harness them. Lean too much toward process and you may get no new ideas at all. The goal, then, is to tap into the creativity at work in every layer of an organization with a combination of process and practice. Take, for example, the community of people who fix Xerox machines. Large machines, it turns out, are not as predictable as Xerox's documentation would suggest. So when following the service manual is not enough, the reps come together--over breakfast, at breaks, at the end of the day--and talk about their own best practices. So far so good. But Xerox goes a step further. It has set up a process similar to an academic peer-review system to gather, vet, and share those best practices across the company. The reps get much-welcome recognition for their creativity, and local best practices are deployed companywide. Dot-com companies are a hotbed of innovative practices. But as they mature, they, like Xerox, may find that they need seasoned managers who can harness those practices through the judicious application of constructive processes.  相似文献   

17.
Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.  相似文献   

18.
The living company   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
What can explain the longevity gap between a company that survives for centuries--the Swedish company Stora, for example, which is more than 700 years old--and the average corporation, which does not last 20 years? A team at Royal Dutch/Shell Group explored that question. Arie de Geus, a retired Shell executive, writes about the team's findings and describes what he calls living companies-organizations that have beaten the high mortality rate of the average corporation. Many companies die young, de Geus argues, because their policies and practices are based too heavily on the thinking and language of economics. Their managers focus on producing goods and services and forget that the organization is a community of human beings that is in business--any business--to stay alive. In contrast, managers of living companies consider themselves to be stewards of a long-standing enterprise. Their priorities reflect their commitment to the organization's long-term survival in an unpredictable world. Like careful gardeners, they encourage growth and renewal without endangering the plant they are tending. They value profits the same way most people value oxygen: as necessary for life but not the purpose of it. They scuttle assets when necessary to make a dramatic change in the business portfolio. And they constantly search for new ideas. These managers also focus on developing people. They create opportunities for employees to learn from one another. Such organizations are suited for survival in a world in which success depends on the ability to learn, to adapt, and to evolve.  相似文献   

19.
More and more small and midsize companies are joining corporate giants in striving to exploit international growth markets. At the same time, civic leaders worry about their communities' economic future in light of the impact of global forces on the operation and survival of business. How can communities retain local vitality yet still link their business to the global economy? Harvard professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter addresses that question in this classic HBR article, orginally published in 1995. To avoid a clash between international economic interests and local political interests, globalizing business must learn how to be responsive to the communities in which they operate, Kanter says. And communities must determine how to create a civic culture that will attract and retain footloose companies. The author surveyed five U.S. regions with direct connections to the global economy--Boston, Cleveland, Miami, Seattle, and the Spartanburg-Greenville region of South Carolina--to determine their business and civic leader's strategies for improving their constituent's quality of life. She identified ways in which the global economy can work locally by capitalizing on the resources that distinguish one place from another. Kanter argues that regions can invest in capabilities that connect their local populations to the global economy in one of three ways: as thinkers, makers, or traders. She points to the Spartanburg-Greenville region as a good example of a world-class makers, with its exceptional blue-collar workforce that has attracted more than 200 companies from 18 countries. The history of the economic development of this region is a lesson for those seeking to understand how to achieve world-class status and bring local residents into the world economy.  相似文献   

20.
The why, what, and how of management innovation   总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9  
Hamel G 《Harvard business review》2006,84(2):72-84, 163
For organizations like GE, P&G, and Visa, management innovation is the secret to success. But what is management innovation? Why is it so important? And how can other companies learn to become management innovators? This article from expert Gary Hamel answers those questions. A management breakthrough can deliver a strong advantage to the innovating company and produce a major shift in industry leadership. Few companies, however, have been able to come up with a formal process for fostering management innovation. The biggest challenge seems to be generating truly unique ideas. Four components can help: a big problem that demands fresh thinking, creative principles or paradigms that can reveal new approaches, an evaluation of the conventions that constrain novel thinking, and examples and analogies that help redefine what can be done. No doubt there are existing management processes in your organization that exacerbate the big problems you're hoping to solve. So how can you learn to identify them? Start by asking a series of questions for each one. For instance, Who owns the process? What are its objectives? What are the metrics for success? What are the decision-making criteria? How are decisions communicated, and to whom? After documenting these details, ask the people involved with the process to weigh in. This exploration may reveal opportunities to reinventyour management processes. A management innovation, the author says, creates long-lasting advantage when it meets at least one of three conditions: It is based on a novel principle that challenges the orthodoxy; it is systemic, involving a range of processes and methods; or it is part of a program of invention, where progress compounds over time. So far, management in this century isn't much different from management in the previous one, says Hamel. Therein lies the opportunity. You can wait for a competitor to come upon the next great management process and drive you out of business-or you can become a management innovator right now.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号