South Africa’s economic prospects after the elections

South Africa looks back to half a decade of fundamental changes: apartheid laws have been abolished, sanctions have been lifted and finally at the end of April 1994 the black South African majority was allowed to vote for the first time. How has the political and economic environment to be judged after the election in South Africa? What need for action can be identified for the new South African government to improve the economic prospects of the country?     

Measuring Vulnerability to U.S. Foreign Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy. While politicians look favorably on unilateral economic sanctions as a policy instrument, many scholars attribute significant long-term economic costs to the United States and have doubts about their effectiveness. We outline a simple approach to assess the vulnerability of target countries to sanctions in order to develop focused sanctions and reduce unnecessary costs to U.S. business, avoid the imposition of sanctions on countries when sanctions are unlikely to have the desired effects, and determine what other countries must join the United States in imposing sanctions if they are to be effective.JEL Classification K330,F190     

Conform or challenge? Adjustment strategies of sanction-torn companies

The literature on sanctions often neglects the role of domestic firms in sender states, although sanctions only have a real economic effect when senders’ firms reduce their activities on the target's market. In contrast, sanctions avoidance and increasing investments in the target country (the observed behaviour of many companies facing the EU sanctions against Russia imposed in 2014) mitigate the impact of these restrictive measures. While sanctions increase the political risk for companies, they also offer economic opportunities—and previous studies could not settle the debate on which factor prevails. By evaluating responses from British, French, German, Italian and Polish enterprises to an online survey distributed in 2017, we analyse at the firm level how sanction-torn companies adjust to new political orders and what drives their strategic decisions. We find evidence that resource dependency induces strategies that challenge sanction policies: in particular, non-fungible assets in the target country incentivise companies to further increase their engagement. These defiance strategies diminish the real economic effect of sanctions and generate a new economic equilibrium, which has negative long-term implications on the choice set of policymakers to further pursue the imposition of sanctions and which even outlasts the lifting of these restrictive measures.     

US Economic Sanctions Against China: Who Gets Hurt?

The United States maintains a broad spectrum of economic sanctions against China ranging from export controls to prohibitions on certain imports. Our study finds that, although from a macroeconomic perspective, US sanctions have had no significant adverse effect on China's overall economic growth and trade between the two countries, they do have a negative impact on producers and consumers in both countries. US economic sanctions have hindered technology transfer to China and US investment in China. US restrictions on imports from China have caused deadweight losses for the US due to higher domestic production costs for import substitutes and a reduction in consumption. US export controls have hindered US exports to China and contributed to large US trade deficits with China. The export controls have also caused losses of high‐paid jobs in the United States and benefited competitors from other countries. In addition, US economic sanctions against China have had significant third‐party effects. China's diversification of imports to sources other than the United States may have a long‐term effect on US exports to China even after US economic sanctions against China are lifted.     

Why economic sanctions always fail — the case of Rhodesia

Demands for the imposition of economic sanctions under UN auspices on South Africa have been voiced for quite some time. Rhodesia was the first country ever to be subjected to a full obligatory embargo by the UN Security Council. An analysis of the embargo against Rhodesia will therefore help to answer the question whether an embargo on South Africa stands a chance of success.     

Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran

This article presents a case study of the effectiveness of the US unilateral trade and financial sanctions on Iran. To assess the trade sanctions’ effect, the US–Iran historical trade data are examined, and the economic cost of trade sanctions is measured by applying the concept of welfare loss. The financial sanctions’ impacts are evaluated by assessing the extra charges Iran has paid on its foreign debt obligations and for financing its oil development projects. At the end, the efficacy of the US sanctions policy towards Iran is evaluated. It is found that the financial sanctions have had a more powerful impact than the trade sanctions. The analysis also shows that the unilateral import sanctions on the fungible crude oil have been ineffective. It is concluded that, overall, the sanctions’ economic effect has been significant, while its political effect has been minimal. This article suggests that targeting the sanctions towards the ruling clergy can improve their effectiveness while lessening their side effects on the Iranian population. Precise smart sanctions to force the ruling clerics to step down will calm down Islamic fundamentalisms throughout the region and will contribute to peace and better relations with the West.     

How Do US Economic Sanctions Affect EU's Trade with Target Countries?

We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a two‐level framework. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total, imports and exports). We argue that unilateral sanctions, if extensive in nature, would have a depressing impact on target countries’ trade, especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. Over time, both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU, lending support to the third‐country effect of sanctions.     

Effect of consumer animosity on boycott campaigns in a cross-cultural context: Does consumer affinity matter?

Global companies have often suffered from unexpected boycott campaigns in foreign markets owing to consumer animosity toward a country of origin. This study aims to empirically investigate how consumer animosity (toward economic sanctions) and affinity predict consumer boycotts. We conduct a country comparison, employing the PROCESS macro to test the moderated mediation hypothesis, using data from 571 and 500 consumers in South Korea and Japan, respectively. The results find a negative indirect effect of animosity on purchase amount via boycott attitude and intention in both countries. The direct impact of animosity on purchase amount (in the case of South Korea) and the moderated mediation effect of consumer affinity (in the case of Japan) are partially supported. Therefore, the offsetting influence of consumer affinity in mitigating the effects of consumer animosity in the context of boycott campaigns is highlighted, offering novel managerial implications.     

冷战后美国经济外交中的单边经济制裁

随着冷战的结束,两极对峙终结,国际政治经济结构发生变化,经济外交成为总体外交中最重要的组成部分之一.中国作为一个社会主义国家,奉行独立自主的和平外交政策,主张在平等互利的基础上与各国开展经济外交.在出现经济摩擦的情况下,中国从来都避免采取武力或经济制裁等硬性手段,主张在平等协商和谈判的基础上解决分岐.而作为冷战后世界上唯一的超级大国的美国,受其资本主义经济外交理念的支配,却将经济制裁作为其经济外交政策的核心.经济制裁是把"双刃剑",有可能在国际政治中得以延续.但是如果不转变传统的制裁思维,经济制裁的最终破产又将是历史的必然.     

Sanctions against Iran,political connections and speed of adjustment

This study examines the effect of intensifying economic sanctions against Iran on speed of adjustment (SOA) in firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange during 2001–2018. We find evidence that firms adjust their leverage toward the target at a lower speed in high-intensity sanctions than low-intensity sanctions. Moreover, we indicate that the negative impact of the intensification of sanctions on SOA is stronger for politically connected firms than other firms. Our results are robust to an alternative set of leverage determinants, two alternative definitions for sanctions intensity, an alternative measure for political connections, and an alternative two-step process for hypotheses testing.     

WTO Dispute Settlement and the EU–US Mini Trade Wars: A Commentary on Fritz Breuss

Economic theory suggests that some of the trade remedies allowed by the WTO may lead away from liberal trade and impose costs on those that apply them. Breuss has provided evidence in the case of four EU-US mini-wars that the policy that created the trade conflict was not clearly in the economic interest of the offending country and that the sanctions imposed exacerbated rather than alleviated the problem. Breuss builds a case for compensation payments rather than trade sanctions for rule violations and for targeting of the recipients of those payments.If trade policy were a matter of economic rationality then this approach would be convincing. For better or worse, the trade rules are an unruly mix of economic, political and legal constructs. The commentary expands on this to explore the role of the dispute settlement process itself and the sanctions designed to give it teeth. The conclusion is that the economic calculations, while a good measure of the costs of legal or political decisions, are not central to the dispute settlement and sanctions processes. The dispute settlement process is also about preserving the balance of political advantage from negotiated rules and schedules, and the sanctions process is as much to do with preventing abuse as correcting it. So a full economic analysis would have to compare politically balanced alternative scenarios and the incorporate the effect of the threat of sanctions on government behavior.     

International business under sanctions

Sanctions are a tool used by political actors to induce foreign countries, firms or individuals to alter their behavior. As nonmilitary coercive measure, they have the potential to disrupt the international business environment, often on short notice, and change the rules of the game. Synthesizing the available evidence on the economic and political impacts of sanctions, we explore how sanctions disrupt the institutional framework for international business and how firms respond to sanctions. Based on a review of available scholarly evidence, we discuss how theories of international business, such as institution-based view, resource- and knowledge-based view, resource dependency theory, and behavioral theories of the firm, can contribute to explaining the impact of sanctions. At the same time, we discuss how sanctions, as politically motivated disruptions, challenge some assumptions underlying these theories. Going forward, our research agenda on sanctions is likely to help firms and governments to strategize in a geopolitically sensitive world.     

Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Is the Third Decade a Charm?

This paper provides background and history of economic sanctions on Iran. Particular attention is paid to the effectiveness of the sanctions and to factors that have mitigated their effectiveness. The United States and other countries have joined in a coalition to impose the sanctions, but it will be difficult to maintain the coalition and get cooperation of nonparticipant countries if there is a major oil price increase. Measures are recommended to reduce this risk and maintain the effectiveness of the sanctions.     

关于金融战的理解

“金融战”不仅指一个经济体对另一个经济体发动的金融制裁,还包括一个强大的国际金融资本突然对一个金融体系存在严重漏洞的主权国家或关税经济体发动的货币狙击。长期的金融战会引发一个国家的金融危机,摧毁其经济体系,使其经济发展陷入长时间停滞。回顾近几十年的历史,美国非常擅长通过金融战操纵全球经济,从而达成自己的战略目的,其常用的武器是金融制裁。为了在关键时刻能够顺利发动金融制裁,美国还准备了一系列法律依据。美国发动金融战的底气在于美元霸权、支付清算垄断与无可替代的发达金融市场。以美国曾经发动的金融战为样本,对金融战进行一些前瞻性的分析与研究是十分必要的。     

Modified vendettas as a method of punishing corporations

Methods of punishing corporations have changed from self-regulation to economic sanctions by government as corporations have evolved from small groups of entrepreneurs to multinational entities. It is proposed that the next stage in the evolution of punishment methods is modified vendettas, or organized attempts by non-government groups to influence corporations through the application of economic and non-economic sanctions. This paper develops the concept of modified vendettas as a complement to government-initiated economic sanctions. The effectiveness of modified vendettas is analyzed through two case examples. As with any punishment method, however, the usefulness of a modified vendetta depends not only on its effectiveness but also on how well it meets society's needs to monitor and check corporate activity while preserving corporations' rights to operate. To resolve this issue, modified vendettas are assessed using a philosophical framework incorporating both retributive and utilitarian principles. It is found that modified vendettas extend society's ability to control corporate behavior while corporations have legal and public relations means to protect themselves from frivolous use of the technique. Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked? (Baron Thurlow)     

Corporate social monitoring in South Africa: A decade of achievement,an uncertain future

Corporate social monitoring has reached its most systematic form and has had the most practical impact with regard to companies doing business in South Africa. The Sullivan Principles have guided the monitoring system for U.S. companies, of which about 166 remain in South Africa and about 140 have withdrawn. However, corporate social monitoring in South Africa is currently subject to certain tensions. The Rev. Sullivan has called for the withdrawal of U.S. companies, and has himself withdrawn from the monitoring effort.This paper discusses the economic climate for U.S. business in South Africa both historically and currently, the conflicting pressures experienced by U.S. companies remaining there, and the effectiveness of strategies aimed to create pressure for companies to withdraw, including divestment resolutions, purchasing restrictions, and sanctions.Current attempts to retain a form of corporate social monitoring are described. The potential politicization of the system is discussed, with particular attention paid to the formation of a new structure which could come to provide the moral leadership formerly provided by the Rev. Sullivan. However, corporate social monitoring could become confused with an anti-sanctions lobbying effort on the part of corporations, and would lose credibility if this were to occur.Karen Paul is an Associate Professor of Management at Rochester Institute of Technology. The research for her article was completed while she was 1987–88 Peace Fellow at the Bunting Institute of Radcliffe College, and was also supported by a Fulbright Senior Research Grant.     

高技术产业缘何成为美国对华贸易摩擦的角力场?

2018年美国以"寻求贸易平衡"为由对中国进口产品实施单边贸易制裁,制裁的产品集中在《中国制造2025》计划发展的高技术产品。基于2000-2017年中国海关总署以及《中国高技术产业统计年鉴》数据对中美高技术产业贸易现状和贸易竞争力进行了分析,同时依据《中国制造2025》中的创新能力指标对中国高技术产业五大行业的创新能力进行了测度,研究发现贸易顺差只是美国对华贸易摩擦集中于高技术产业的表象原因,遏制中国技术创新和维持全球经济体系治理话语权才是其真实目的。中国应通过提升高技术产业在全球价值链上的位置、加强与日本欧盟的经贸联系、积极申请加入CPTPP来应对美国对中国高技术产业产品的进口限制。     

Business Schools and the Development of Responsible Leaders: A Proposition of Edgar Morin’s Transdisciplinarity

The subprime mortgage crisis which was caused to a large degree by questionable mortgage lending and securitization practices that were furthered by deregulatory policies devastated the economy, led to large scale unemployment, and caused the foreclosure of millions of homes. There is evidence that numerous mortgage companies, financial firms, rating agencies, and high-level professionals were involved in unethical and often fraudulent business practices leading to the most severe economic meltdown since the Great Depression. In spite of the great economic and social harm, there was a lack of criminal sanctions against those companies and individuals, who were involved in creating the crisis that reached even global dimensions. This article analyses the reasons for and the possible social impacts of the lack of criminal sanctions against those who crossed the line between unethical and criminal business practices.     

Sources of knowledge and process innovation: The moderating role of perceived competitive intensity

Global competition means that firms are under pressure to systematically develop the efficiency of their manufacturing processes. However, little has been said in the international business literature about how firms, especially those subject to severe barriers, can search for knowledge within and across national boundaries to help in the development of process innovation. We build on key aspects of the innovation and search strategy literature to develop our conceptual model and hypotheses, which we test in the context of a less-developed, isolated, and closed economy, using data from 171 automotive component suppliers in Iran. We find that foreign knowledge search is positively related to process innovation, even in an economy that operates under severe economic sanctions. This contributes to the international business field by providing evidence that, while economic sanctions are increasingly used in modern geopolitics by the world’s most powerful countries, these actions may fail to achieve their goals with respect to individual businesses.     

Strukturelle Schwäche der russischen Wirtschaft

The economic situation in Russia is dramatic. GDP decreased by alarming 3.7 per cent in 2015. The imposed economic sanctions as well as the fall in oil prices have contributed to the downward spiral. However, the real weaknesses of the Russian economy are more structural in nature. The strong dependence on the oil and gas business, corruption problems, setbacks in privatisation efforts and the inefficient use of the existing human capital require greater commitment on the part of the government to commit to a return to a sustainable growth path. Individual sectors and companies in Germany suffered considerable losses of revenue in the course of the economic crisis in Russia. Overall, however, the effect on the German economy has been rather moderate.