Does founder ownership affect foreign investments? Evidence from India

We study the effect of founder ownership on foreign investments for Indian firms. We show that foreign investors underinvest in firms with higher level of founder ownership, since these firms are more vulnerable to information problems and expropriation risk. This effect is particularly stronger when founder ownership exceeds a threshold beyond which founders hold effective control on firms. We exhibit that information problems are the main cause of the relation between foreign investments and founder ownership. This is because the relationship is more pronounced in case of business group firms and firms that are engaged in more earnings management.     

R&D expenditures,ultimate ownership and future performance: Evidence from China

This study examines the relationship between R&D expenditures and future performance, as well as the moderating effects of ultimate ownership on the relationship. Using a sample of 772 Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2012, this study shows that R&D expenditures are positively related to firms' future performance and that the R&D expenditures of SOEs lead to better future performance than those of non-SOEs. In addition, the results also reveal that voting rights of ultimate owners positively moderate the R&D-performance relationship. We also adopt fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to reveal the interdependent and interrelated nature of the explanatory predictors of future performance. The results of fsQCA further indicate that large-sized SOEs with concentrated ownership could attain higher future performance on R&D investments if there are more patent applications and capital and operating spending. These findings complement the R&D performance literature by simultaneously considering the combinatory effect of ultimate ownership and control ability.     

Feelings of ownership and volunteering: Examining psychological ownership as a volunteering motivation for nonprofit service organisations

Given many nonprofit service organisations rely on volunteers to provide valued services to their communities, examining the factors that impact the retention and recruitment of volunteers is of central importance for the success and longevity of many community-based services. Psychological ownership is a phenomenon whereby objects that are not physically or legally possessed can be the target of ownership feelings. While such psychological ownership has been examined in the paid-employment literature as an antecedent for prosocial behaviours, there has been no examination of psychological ownership within the volunteering literature. As such, this paper examines the role of psychological ownership as a factor in volunteer retention for predominantly community-based nonprofit service organisations by examining how the sense of ownership over the nonprofit service provider affects volunteering attitudes and intentions. Alongside ownership, previous volunteering behaviours, and time pressures are also examined as contributing factors. Results indicate that volunteering does increase ownership perceptions, and those ownership perceptions have positive outcomes for volunteering behaviours. However, time pressure is a significant moderator of these relationships and different volunteering behaviours can be observed for high and low time-pressured volunteers.     

外资进入与所有制约束下的劳动力价格差异

文章利用1998-2006年我国30个省市的面板数据,对我国劳动力市场化改革过程中外资与劳动力价格所有制差异变动间的关系进行了实证分析。研究表明,样本期间内港澳台商投资和外商投资的增加都会通过就业渠道扩大我国劳动力价格的所有制差异,且前者的作用要大于后者。但整个样本期间内我国劳动力价格所有制差异扩大的最主要的原因在于就业人员人力资本水平的所有制差异的扩大。分时间段回归结果表明,2001年以后外资才对我国劳动力价格的所有制差异产生显著的正向影响。     

How Do Ownership Concentration and Family Control Affect R&D Investments? New Evidence from Taiwan

This study finds a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Specifically, ownership concentration is positively related to R&D investments at a low level of ownership concentration; the relationship becomes negative when ownership concentration is at a high level. However, the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investments is lessened in family‐controlled firms; that is, family control moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Overall, this study suggests that the ownership concentration's nonlinear impact on R&D investments differs between family‐controlled firms and nonfamily‐controlled firms.     

Enlightened Corporate Governance: Specific Investments by Employees as Legitimation for Residual Claims

While much has been written on specificity (e.g., in texts on new institutional economics, agency theory, and team production theory), there are still some insights to be learnt by business ethicists. This article approaches the issue from the perspective of team production, and will propose a new form of corporate governance: enlightened corporate governance, which takes into consideration the specific investments of employees. The article argues that, in addition to shareholders, employees also bear a residual risk which arises due to their specific investments. This residual risk presents a valid and legitimate basis for residual claims. In this way, employees can be seen as residual claimants due to the fact that their income depends upon a hazardous quasi rent. Therefore, this article will call on the fiduciary duty of board members to protect those employees who are exposed to such residual risks and may thus be vulnerable as a result. This leads to a fundamental change of perspective on the “theory of the firm” – a change which will adopt the theories of new institutional economics, agency theory, and team production theory in order to promote business ethics research. Against this background, enlightened corporate governance aims to follow the criterion of specific investments as a legitimate basis for residual claims. Furthermore, it seeks to understand the consequences for board members, and to promote the sharing of control and ownership. The article will close with some discussion of the implications and future prospects for business ethics.     

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

We extend research on transaction cost theory that shows that vertical integration enables firms to protect their investments in exchange relationships better than market mechanisms. However, extant research finds ownership to exacerbate, rather than limit, exchange partner opportunism. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate conditions under which ownership can be effective for constraining an exchange partner's opportunism. Using matched dyadic data for 296 hotel brands, we conduct multi-level hierarchical linear modeling and identify conditions under which common ownership limits hotel opportunism. Findings indicate that ownership can limit hotel opportunism when brand headquarters can easily monitor the hotel's activities.     

The Drivers of Responsible Investment: The Case of European Pension Funds

We investigate what drives responsible investment of European pension funds. Pension funds are institutional investors who assure the income of part of the population for a long period of time. Increasingly, stakeholders hold pension funds accountable for the non-financial consequences of their investments and many funds have engaged in responsible investing. However, it appears that there is a wide difference between pension funds in this respect. We investigate what determines pension funds’ responsible investments on the basis of a survey of more than 250 pension funds in 15 European countries in 2010. We use multinomial logistic regression and find that especially legal origin of the country, ownership of the pension fund and fund size-related variables are to be associated with pension funds′ responsible investment. For fund size, we establish a curvilinear relationship; especially the smallest and largest pension funds in the sample tend to engage with responsible investing.     

Can minority state ownership influence firm value? Universal and contingency views of its governance effects

Drawing on the literature of corporate governance and privatization, this study explores the elusive roles of a specific owner identity, namely, state ownership in its minority. With a sample of 68 Taiwanese companies with 5 to 49% state ownership during 1999-2003, the study examines the value-shaping effects of minority state ownership (MSO) and, furthermore, seeks to establish a contingency perspective suggesting that the internal and external contexts may moderate the influence of MSO on firm value. Using first-order autoregressive models to mitigate the problems of endogeneity, the study shows that the governance effect of MSO associates not only in a curvilinear relationship with firm value but also strengthened by corporate ownership ties and market competition. The non-monotonic performance effect and the context-dependent nature of MSO yield significant implications for government investments in the private sector.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

The impact of FDI on the performance and entrepreneurship of domestic firms

This paper examines how foreign direct investments influence the performance and entrepreneurship of domestic firms, a crucial question for economies driven by incursion of exogenous factors and especially transition economies. The intent is to investigate the way foreign direct investments shape the capabilities of domestic firms; hence, for this purpose, we take Macedonia, a Southeast European economy, as a case study. We find that (i) foreign ownership has helped restructure and enhance the productivity of domestic firms, (ii) FDI has positive influence in reinforcing the creation of new firms, and (iii) in line with the established literature, a foreign investment is likely to influence the job seeker to get employed rather to start their own business. Overall, the results confirm the influence of foreign firms in assisting entrepreneurial activity. The impact of foreign investment is, in general, positive and tends to influence the restructuring process of domestic enterprises.     

Unfolding China’s state-owned corporate empires and mitigating agency hazards: Effects of foreign investments and innovativeness

Integrating agency and institutional perspectives, we describe how China’s socio-political institutions create state-owned corporate empires with unique agency conflicts. We develop a framework demonstrating how economically unjustified firm expansion, i.e. empire building, mediates the relationship between state ownership and performance. We uncover the instrument in empire building and appropriate corporate governance and strategic management remedies. An empirical study on 29,638 Chinese firms evidences that (1) increased state ownership drives higher management expenses and lower firm profitability though empire building; (2) long-term debt is used to finance empire building; and (3) foreign capital investments and innovativeness can mitigate these agency conflicts.     

Shareholder protection, ownership concentration and FDI

Host country's weaker legal shareholder protection may make it costlier for parent shareholders to monitor the foreign subsidiary and hold managers accountable in case of misconduct. This prospect may motivate the managers to invest in such foreign environments. However, the agency costs associated with such investments can increase as well. The latter would tend to discourage such FDI. We test this ex ante uncertain relationship using a sample of publicly quoted UK parents that established new, majority owned joint venture subsidiaries in Continental Europe. We find that host country's weak legal shareholder protection discourages FDI. This negative relationship, however, is less important for firms with higher ownership concentration, implying that parent's ownership concentration may be a substitute for host country's weak legal shareholder protection.     

The moderating effect of bilateral investment treaty stringency on the relationship between political instability and subsidiary ownership choice

We investigate whether the degree to which a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) protects against expropriation (i.e., its “stringency”) influences the international strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as they invest in countries with varying levels of political instability. We draw on institutional logic and insights from political economics to hypothesize that BIT stringency will moderate the established positive relationship between host country political instability and minority ownership. Analysis of a sample of 289 foreign investments made by AEX-listed Dutch MNEs in 34 countries between 2004 and 2013 provides support: a more stringent BIT will encourage the MNE to choose a majority stake as political instability rises. Robustness tests provide further support for our argument. The results have both managerial and policy implications relating to the role that BIT stringency plays in determining MNE strategy.     

Owner as Manager,Extended Horizons and the Family Firm

Previous work on firm ownership structure suggests that organizations in which ownership and control are combined may be undervalued relative to the market investment rule because decision makers have an incentive to forgo investment projects that managers in firms with specialized ownership find profitable. However, the specialization of ownership and decision-making functions may result in substantial agency costs. This paper shows that these tradeoffs may not exist in family firms. The extended horizons characteristic of family businesses may provide the necessary incentives for decision makers to invest according to the market rule while limiting agency costs that arise when ownership and control are separated. Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.     

Remittance Receipt and Business Ownership in the Dominican Republic

Using household‐level data from the Dominican communities in the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP‐DR7), we examine the links between remittance receipt and business ownership. We find that while the existence of a family business attracts remittance inflows, these monetary funds are associated with a reduced likelihood of business entrepreneurship. These results are consistent with various hypotheses regarding remittances and business investments. First, remittances may be motivated by the availability of investment opportunities in the home community. Second, remittances may respond to a bequest motive on the part of the emigrant, who may wish to lay claim on family assets when returning home. Lastly, remittances may cause an income effect that reduces family labour force participation and, correspondingly, the likelihood of family‐run business investments.     

Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (FIIs and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005–2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms’ international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as FIIs and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.     

Ownership structures of norwegian foreign subsidiaries in manufacturing

This article explores how Norwegian multinational companies select ownership structures for their foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. Hypotheses are drawn from various theoretical perspectives on the choice of wholly owned versus partly owned affiliates. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 174 foreign direct investments made by Norwegian companies. One main finding is that political risk of the host country strongly increases the probability that ownership of a foreign subsidiary is shared. The results also suggest that cultural distance between the home and the host countries leads to a higher propensity to joint venture. Other results were less conclusive and little support was found for a transaction coast approach to choice of ownership structures.     

The characteristics and performance of Japanese FDI in less developed and developed countries

Data on 26,857 Japanese foreign investments in 150 countries and regions over the 1991–1999 period reveal that there are stark differences in the characteristics and performance of Japanese FDI (JFDI) between less developed countries (LDCs) and developed countries (DCs). JFDI in LDCs has been growing more rapidly over the period, and it is concentrated in the Secondary industrial sector, with a lower level of control within a subsidiary, and has been initiated by parent firms with market-seeking and labor-seeking purposes and with relatively weak ownership advantages. In contrast, JFDI in DCs has maintained relatively stable growth over the period, is concentrated in the Tertiary industrial sector, with a higher level of control within a subsidiary, and has been initiated by parent firms with market-seeking and strategic-seeking purposes and with relatively strong ownership advantages. JFDI in LDCs tended to attain a higher financial performance and a lower exit rate, yet with a greater variance, than those in DCs.     

How Do Franchise Ownership Structure and Strategic Investment Emphasis Influence Stock Returns and Risks?

Franchisors seek to maximize firm value by managing investments both in tangible and intangible assets and in the mix of company and franchised outlets, yet little is known about how investors respond to shifts in these strategic decisions. Our goal is to assess the impact of these decisions on shareholder value within franchise systems through panel-data models. Specifically, we provide evidence on how investors in publicly traded franchises evaluate both the ownership structure and the strategic investment emphasis between intangible assets (e.g., brand) and tangible assets (e.g., plant and property). We find that an increase in the proportion of franchised units is negatively associated both with stock returns and idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, an increase in the emphasis on strategic investments in intangible assets is positively associated both with stock returns and idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, strategic investment emphasis moderates the strength of the effect of franchise ownership structure when firms franchise internationally. Overall, this research provides a novel empirical examination of franchising economics and has managerial implications for franchised channel structure.