Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial markets

Utilizing a model that allows for the welfare of the commercial NPO’s stakeholders directly in terms of their consumer surplus, and indirectly in terms of NPO profits, we explore the impact of changes in the NPO’s “social concern” for consumers on market efficiency. Three separate Cournot mixed market scenarios are analyzed: competition between the NPO and a private for-profit firm, competition between the NPO and a public firm, and a market scenario that includes all three firms. We find that the technical efficiency of the NPO vis-à-vis the profit maximizer is crucial in determining whether social welfare rises or falls as the NPO places more weight on their stakeholders’ surplus. In particular, if the NPO is less technically efficient than the profit maximizer or public firm, somewhat paradoxically social welfare may fall as the NPO shows a greater social concern for consumers. In other words, a movement away from pure profit maximizing behavior by a NPO may well be detrimental in these mixed commercial markets. We also show the additional sources of revenue available to a NPO may decrease the overall welfare in these mixed market situations.     

Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mixed oligopoly and spatial price discrimination with foreign firms

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of foreign competition in a mixed oligopoly set in a linear model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that the entry of a foreign firm often lowers domestic welfare. This results because the public firm locates largely independently of the presence of the foreign firm and because the profit earned by the foreign firm reduces domestic welfare. Privatization of the public firm typically lowers domestic welfare but can increase global welfare. Thus, domestic governments are unlikely to allow foreign entry and when they do, they are unlikely to privatize the public firm despite the potential rise in global welfare.     

Location decisions and welfare under spatial price discrimination

The welfare effects of regulation are of crucial importance to policy makers. To this end, we present a model of n firms with differentiated costs competing in a linear market within the framework of spatial price discrimination. We prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of firms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the distribution of consumers, firms' cost heterogeneity, the level of privatization, and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. We also provide an algorithm on how to find the unique Nash equilibrium in the case of uniformly distributed consumers.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Mixed Duopoly with Subcontracting

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between a public firm and a private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed‐duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible, the equilibrium without subcontracting is not socially optimal because subcontracting can lower total production costs. And if both firms engage in subcontracting, the existence of a public firm can guarantee the first best equilibrium, whether it is the low‐cost firm or not. But when a private firm is the low‐cost firm, it is more profitable for it to choose vertical foreclosure. And the consequent equilibrium is not socially desirable anymore. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Switching to Green: The Timing of Socially Responsible Innovation

We develop a timing game for adopting a product technology that features a public good. We investigate the effects of the degree of product market competition, product differentiation, the private benefits from contributing to the public good, and firm asymmetries on the timing of adoption. We then examine the effects of consumer subsidies on equilibrium timings and the proliferation of the public good.     

Price and Quantity Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with a Socially Concerned Firm

I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm, which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Equilibria with price and quantity contracts might co‐exist; welfare under price competition might be lower than under quantity competition; the firms' profit ranking might be different from that of a private duopoly or mixed duopoly with a public firm. Hence, if a firm follows a social strategy, the optimal market strategy crucially depends on the levels of social concern and competition in the market. The presence of socially concerned firms may change the mode of competition. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutional antecedents and performance consequences of employment security and career advancement practices: Evidence from the people's republic of China

In this study, we examine the provision of employment security and career advancement opportunities in firms of diverse institutional ownership and the impact of such practices on employee and firm outcomes. The sample included 478 state‐owned and non‐state‐owned firms (i.e., domestic private firms, Sino‐foreign joint ventures, and wholly‐foreign‐owned firms) in the People's Republic of China. We found that the provision of employment security was greater in state‐owned than in non‐state‐owned firms. The provision of career advancement opportunities in domestic private firms and Sino‐foreign joint ventures was similar to that in wholly foreign‐owned firms, but greater than that in state‐owned firms. The provision of career advancement opportunities was positively related to employee organizational commitment, citizenship behaviors, and firm performance. The provision of employment security was positively related to employee organizational commitment, but not to citizenship behaviors or firm performance. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Value Relevance of Multinationality: Evidence from Korean Firms

The purpose of this study is to examine the valuation effects of multinationality in Korean firms and to identify the role of multinationality in internalization theory. We hypothesize that the market positively values the multinational activities of Korean firms, which are operating in a small open economy in which firms have strong motivations for internationalization. We use Ohlson's (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research, 11, 661) value model and document the positive effect for multinational firms compared to domestic firms, as well as the positive effect of multinationality on firm value. These results are robust across studies, as indicated by Tobin's q measure, as well as across years. We also hypothesize that multinationality mediates or moderates the relationship between intangibility and firm value that is proposed in internalization theory. We do not find supporting evidence for a mediated influence of intangibility through multinationality on firm value nor for a moderated influence of intangibility on firm value. We find that multinationality and intangibility directly and independently influence firm value, without any interference from each other. These results are also robust across studies, as indicated by Tobin's q measure. Finally, we find that multinationality in Korean firms has never lost its importance, even during the global financial crisis in the year 2008.     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism

We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite holds.     

Financial Distress Prediction in an International Context: A Review and Empirical Analysis of Altman's Z‐Score Model

This paper assesses the classification performance of the Z‐Score model in predicting bankruptcy and other types of firm distress, with the goal of examining the model's usefulness for all parties, especially banks that operate internationally and need to assess the failure risk of firms. We analyze the performance of the Z‐Score model for firms from 31 European and three non‐European countries using different modifications of the original model. This study is the first to offer such a comprehensive international analysis. Except for the United States and China, the firms in the sample are primarily private, and include non‐financial companies across all industrial sectors. We use the original Z′′‐Score model developed by Altman, Corporate Financial Distress: A Complete Guide to Predicting, Avoiding, and Dealing with Bankruptcy (1983) for private and public manufacturing and non‐manufacturing firms. While there is some evidence that Z‐Score models of bankruptcy prediction have been outperformed by competing market‐based or hazard models, in other studies, Z‐Score models perform very well. Without a comprehensive international comparison, however, the results of competing models are difficult to generalize. This study offers evidence that the general Z‐Score model works reasonably well for most countries (the prediction accuracy is approximately 0.75) and classification accuracy can be improved further (above 0.90) by using country‐specific estimation that incorporates additional variables.     

Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility

In a duopoly model of vertical differentiation, we study market equilibrium and the resulting social welfare following an increase in the consumer's willingness to pay (WTP) for products sold by socially responsible manufacturers. Different types of such changes emerge depending on their effects on consumer heterogeneity. We show that, in most cases, increases in the consumers' social consciousness yield higher profits to socially responsible firms and may lead to higher levels of social welfare, provided that the market structure is left unchanged. However, when an increase in the consumer's social consciousness changes the market structure, welfare may fall, while the duopolists' profits rise. The resulting tension between private and social interest calls for a cautious attitude toward information campaigns aimed at increasing the consumer's social consciousness.     

Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by "other working conditions," e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.     

Ownership,firm size and rent sharing in Bulgaria

Using a unique three-digit firm-level data set of all medium and large manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997–1998, we investigate how wages are affected by ownership status, firm size and rent sharing. Our pooled OLS, panel and first-difference TSLS estimates clearly point to ownership structure as an important determinant of both the wage level (for given productivity) and the degree of rent sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.     

EPA enforcement,firm response strategies,and stockholder wealth: an empirical examination

We investigate the effect of EPA pollution control enforcement activities and firm response strategies on stockholders' wealth. We find that the market reacts negatively upon learning that the firm has been targeted, and that losing a contest with the EPA is very costly to stockholders. Apparently firms are not expected to recover a significant part of pollution control costs from their customers. Somewhat surprisingly, losses are only weakly related to the presence of (unregulated) foreign competition, suggesting that untargeted domestic competitors may restrain cost recovery. Our analysis also indicates that firms may benefit by cooperating with the EPA; i.e., compliant strategies reduce (but don't avoid) wealth losses. The losses of firms that settle are about 40% less than those of firms that fight and lose, and we find no evidence of value gains for firms that fight and win. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic R&D Location by Multinational Firms: Spillovers, Technology Sourcing, and Competition

This paper develops a model of strategic interaction in R&D internationalization decisions between two multinational firms, competing both abroad and in their home markets. It examines different incentives for foreign R&D faced by a technology leader and a technology laggard. The model takes into account the impact of local inter firm R&D spillovers, (noncostless) international intra firm transfer of knowledge, and the notion that internal R&D increases the effectiveness of incoming spillovers. Analytical results suggest that greater efficiency of intra firm transfers and greater R&D spillovers increase the attractiveness of domestic R&D for the technology leader if the technology gap with the laggard is large. The lagging firm, in contrast, increases the share of foreign R&D as foreign technology sourcing becomes more effective. Competition encourages the leading firm to engage in foreign R&D to capture a larger share of profits on the foreign market, whereas the laggard concentrates more R&D at home to defend its home market position.     

Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm‐specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm‐specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange‐listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two‐stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest—exactly as the logic of market competition predicts—that firms choose boards appropriate to them.