Automatic stabilizers, fiscal rules and macroeconomic stability

This paper analyzes the effect of the fiscal structure upon the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization induced by technological shocks in a DGE model with nominal and real rigidities that also integrates a rich menu of fiscal variables as well as a target on the debt to output ratio. The channels through which fiscal policy affects macroeconomic stability include supply-side effects of distortionary taxes, the procyclical behavior of public spending induced by fiscal rules and the conventional effect of automatic stabilizers operating through disposable (permanent) income. The paper investigates these channels and concludes that, contrary to what has been found in RBC models, distortionary taxes tend to reduce output volatility relative to lump-sum taxes when significant rigidities are present. We also study the stabilization effect of alternative (distortionary) tax structures and find that these are only relevant if substantial rigidities are present.     

Budgetary policies in a DSGE model with finite horizons

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, capital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. The model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky wages and sticky prices

We determine the optimal degree of price inflation volatility when nominal wages are sticky and the government uses state-contingent inflation to finance government spending. We address this question in a well-understood Ramsey model of fiscal and monetary policy, in which the benevolent planner has access to labor income taxes, nominally risk-free debt, and money creation. Our main result is that sticky wages alone make price stability optimal in the face of shocks to the government budget, to a degree quantitatively similar as sticky prices alone. Key for our results is an equilibrium restriction between nominal price inflation and nominal wage inflation that holds trivially in a Ramsey model featuring only sticky prices. Our results thus show that when nominal wages are sticky, setting real wages as close as possible to their efficient path is a more important goal of optimal monetary policy than is financing innovations in the government budget via state-contingent inflation. A second important result is that the nominal interest rate can be used to indirectly tax the rents of monopolistic labor suppliers. Taken together, our results uncover features of Ramsey fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of a type of labor market imperfection that is widely-believed to be important.     

Supply side inflation persistence

We explore the role of the cost channel in accounting for inflation persistence in the New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing. Hump-shaped responses of inflation to monetary shocks are obtained under purely nominal rigidities.     

The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in Turkey: An estimated New Keynesian DSGE model

This paper estimates a New Keynesian open economy DSGE model for Turkey by using Bayesian estimation technique for the period of 2002:q1–2009:q3. It studies fiscal and monetary policy interactions and their role in stabilisation of the economy using a small-scale model following the methodology outlined in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007). The general features of the model can be summarised as follows: Calvo style nominal price rigidities, perfect exchange rate pass-through, complete international asset markets, rule of thumb price setters and distortionary taxation.     

The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy

Abstract.  This paper studies how the nature of shocks affects the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy. Three classic rules, fixed exchange rates, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting are studied and ranked by comparing with the optimal monetary policy under commitment. We find that the ranking of the simple rules can be mapped to the terms-of-trade variability that the rule allows relative to what a particular shock optimally calls for. It turns out that inflation targeting dominates the other two rules under productivity or velocity shocks, whereas monetary targeting is the best performer under fiscal shocks.     

Policy reform and optimal inflation rate for Japan in computable OLG economy

We build a computable OLG model with monetary growth to calculate the optimal level of inflation rate for Japan, and to study policy reforms make any quantitative impacts on it. Four main results were obtained: (i) the optimal inflation rate for Japan is calculated around 1.0%; (ii) the calculated underlying inflation rate is about 9% under the present Japanese economic and fiscal situation; (iii) to prevent high inflation, fiscal reconstruction needs to be implemented; and (iv) if fundamental fiscal reform is conducted, the optimal inflation rate might be achieved. These results are very robust to calibration.     

Interacting nominal and real labour market rigidities

The note analyses interactions between nominal wage stickiness and costly employment adjustment under rule-based and optimal monetary policy. Policy regimes affect and optimal policy lowers the welfare cost of rigidities. No quantitatively important second-best interaction between both rigidities is found.     

Liquidity traps, learning and stagnation

We examine global economic dynamics under learning in a New Keynesian model in which the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. Under normal monetary and fiscal policy, the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Large pessimistic shocks to expectations can lead to deflationary spirals with falling prices and falling output. To avoid this outcome we recommend augmenting normal policies with aggressive monetary and fiscal policy that guarantee a lower bound on inflation. In contrast, policies geared toward ensuring an output lower bound are insufficient for avoiding deflationary spirals.     

Wage rigidities and unemployment fluctuations in a small open economy

This study analyzes the implications of the monetary policy for the unemployment rate in a small open economy. We introduce nominal wage rigidities and unemployment into the small open economy version of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We derive three main findings. First, under nominal wage rigidities, the cyclical properties of the calibrated model, in response to a productivity shock, are consistent with the empirical evidence on a decrease in employment and an increase in real wages. Second, for all the variables considered, the Taylor rule tracks the optimal policy better than the simple rule with unemployment as an argument. Third, regardless of the output or unemployment gap being targeted, it is not optimal that central banks respond to nominal exchange rate variations.     

Real wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a small open economy

The main objective of the study is to provide a theoretical analysis of optimal monetary policy in a small open economy where households set real wage in a staggered fashion. The introduction of real wage rigidities plays a important role to resolve main shortcomings of the standard new Keynesian small open economy model. The main findings regarding the issue of monetary policy design can be summarized as three fold. First, the optimal policy is to seek to minimize variance of domestic price inflation, real wage inflation, and the output gap if both domestic price and real wage are sticky. Second, controlling CPI inflation directly or indirectly induces relatively large volatility in output gap and other inflations. Therefore, both CPI inflation-based Taylor rule and nominal wage-inflation based Taylor rule are suboptimal. Last, a policy that responds to a real wage inflation is most desirable.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Output gap measurement and the New Keynesian Phillips curve for China

The New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that the output gap, the deviation of the actual output from its natural level due to nominal rigidities, drives the dynamics of inflation relative to expected inflation and lagged inflation. This paper exploits the empirical success of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in explaining China's inflation dynamics with a new measure of the output gap. We estimate the output gap using the Bayesian multivariate Beveridge–Nelson decomposition method, based on a multivariate dynamic model featuring distinct interactions among inflation, money, and real output in China. The empirical results using quarterly data spanning 1979–2010 show that the new measure of the output gap outperforms the traditional measures in fitting the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This result provides useful insights for inflation dynamics and monetary policy analysis in China.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Second, small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates. Finally, price stickiness induces deviation from the Friedman rule.     

Government debt and optimal monetary and fiscal policy

How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policies? And what do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabilization response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements are largely unpredictable in nature.     

Inflation bias and markup shocks in a LAMP model with strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper investigates the effects generated by limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where monetary and fiscal authorities are independent and play strategically. It shows that: (i) both the long run and the short run equilibrium require a departure from zero inflation rate; (ii) in response to a markup shock, fiscal policy becomes more aggressive as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents increases and price stability is no longer optimal even under Ramsey; (iii) overall, optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardians, while liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.     

Optimal Monetary Policy

Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two sets of frictions—costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods—we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles. First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deflation on average. Yet, the Keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive. Second, as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should be largely stabilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deflationary trend path. Since expected inflation is roughly constant through time, the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants of the real interest rate. Although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy, it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were flexible. In our benchmark model, there is some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union

We consider monetary–fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary–fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal co-ordination, and without monetary commitment.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Determinants of fiscal multipliers revisited

We generalize a simple New Keynesian model and show that a flattening of the Phillips curve reduces the size of fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. The factors behind the flatting are consistent with micro- and macroeconomic empirical evidence: it is a result of, not a higher level of price rigidity, but an increase in the degree of strategic complementarity in price-setting – invoked by the assumption of a specific instead of an economy-wide labour market, and decreasing instead of constant-returns-to-scale. In normal times, the efficacy of fiscal policy and resulting multipliers tends to be small because negative wealth effects crowd out consumption, and because monetary policy endogenously reacts to fiscally-driven increases in inflation and output by raising rates, offsetting part of the stimulus. In times of a binding ZLB and a fixed nominal rate, an increase in (expected) inflation instead lowers the real rate, leading to larger fiscal multipliers. Conditional on being in a ZLB-environment, under a flatter Phillips curve, increases in expected inflation are lower, so that fiscal multipliers at the ZLB tend to be lower. Finally, we also discuss the role of solution methods in determining the size of fiscal multipliers.