高管薪酬激励的经济外部性实证研究--基于债权人利益保护视角

会计稳健性是短期债务契约的重要需求。文章通过考察不同高管薪酬激励形式对会计稳健性和债务期限的影响,来研究高管薪酬激励给债权人带来的经济外部性。研究发现,高管现金薪酬越大,会计稳健性越低,会导致公司短期债务比例越小,债权人对会计稳健性的需求会降低,故高现金薪酬的经济外部性较小;高管持股越多,会计稳健性越低,会导致公司短期借款比例越大,从而债权人对会计稳健性的需求会更大,因而高管持股的经济外部性较大。文章还检验了高管薪酬激励与公司债务违约概率的关系,研究结果进一步证实了上述结论。     

我国创业板354家上市公司高管团队背景分析

高管团队(Top Management Team,简称TMT)对企业战略决策和战略执行有显著影响.高管团队特征及其在战略管理中作用的研究受到学术界和企业界的广泛关注.本研究以我国创业板354个上市公司高管团队背景信息为样本,分别从高管团队职能背景、团队规模、受教育水平等3个维度研究团队异质性因素,并与现有理论比较.     

高管团队异质性与企业成长性——动态能力的中介效应

文章以2015—2019年中国制造业A股上市企业为样本,通过实证研究分析了高管团队（TMT）异质性对企业成长性的具体影响,并在此基础上引入动态能力的三个构成要素作为中介变量,分析了高管团队异质性对企业成长性的具体影响路径。研究表明：企业高管教育背景异质性和职能背景异质性对企业成长性有显著的正向影响;适应能力在教育异质性对企业成长性的影响过程中发挥中介作用;吸收能力和财务柔性在高管职能经验异质性对企业成长性的影响过程中发挥中介作用。据此,建议上市制造业企业组建高效的高管团队、合理配置企业资金以及储备合理的财务柔性。     

创业团队异质性对创业绩效的影响研究综述北大核心CSSCISSCI

创业团队异质性是指团队成员在人口特征、教育背景、技能、经验、认知观念、价值观等方面的差异。随着团队创业成为主要创业形式,创业团队异质性对创业绩效的影响成为创业研究中的重要问题。在对创业团队异质性进行综述的基础上,本文将创业绩效分为融资、创新和成长性三个方面,围绕创业团队异质性对三者影响这一主题,对相关文献进行了梳理,分析了创业团队异质性影响创业绩效背后的理论逻辑。未来研究应进一步深化对创业团队异质性的理解,重视创业团队区别于高管团队的特性以及由此产生的影响。文章最后讨论了相关研究对创业实践的启示。     

基于高阶理论视角的战略双元研究

文章以高阶理论和资源依赖理论为基础,探讨了制度转型期中国企业高管团队行为整合、政治联系、中庸思维与战略双元之间的关系。通过问卷调查的方式进行实证研究,研究结果表明,高管团队行为整合、高管团队政治联系对战略双元有正向影响。高管团队中庸思维弱化了高管团队行为整合与战略双元之间的关系。     

知识异质性与团队创造力——创意效能感与心理安全感的调节作用

文章基于信息多样化观点和社会认同理论对知识异质性影响团队创造力的不同解释,探讨了两种互补的团队共同信念——创意效能感和心理安全感对两者关系的调节作用。研究采用问卷调查方式,以194名企业员工为研究对象,采用层级回归的数据分析方法。结果发现:团队创意效能感调节知识异质性与团队创造力之间的关系;团队心理安全感也调节知识异质性与团队创造力之间的关系。     

高管团队断层对企业创新能力提升的影响和对策研究

在经济转型的过程中,为了适应竞争日益激烈、技术革新逐步加快的环境,企业创新能力已经成为企业核心竞争力之一。现有研究表明,企业高管团队的群体异质性,以及由此引发的群体断层是影响企业创新能力的重要因素。文章在回顾高管团队断层理论渊源的基础上,通过分析发现高管团队断层对企业创新能力的提升有重要影响,并以此为基础提出了相关的对策建议。     

董事长-总经理的价值观差异与企业创新战略

囿于数据可得性,现有研究集中于考察高管人口特征差异等浅层异质性对企业创新的影响,而对价值观差异等深层异质性的影响则缺乏关注,而后者更能影响高管团队在认知上的差异,进而影响企业行为。有鉴于此,论文利用价值观差异来测度高管团队深层异质性,基于中国上市公司的数据,重点分析并考察了董事长与总经理的价值观差异对企业创新战略的影响。研究发现,董事长与总经理的价值观差异越大,企业研发强度就越高。进一步研究发现,在国有企业和股权集中度较高的企业,董事长与总经理的价值观差异对企业研发强度的正向影响减弱,而在组织冗余更多的企业,董事长与总经理的价值观差异对研发强度的正向影响增强。论文的贡献在于,首次探讨并实证检验了高管团队价值观差异对战略决策的影响,拓展了高阶理论中高管价值观的相关研究;利用董事长与总经理的价值观差异测量高管团队深层异质性,也拓展了高管团队异质性的相关研究;;还为从微观层面探索文化差异对企业战略的影响提供了新思路,也为洞悉中国区域文化对企业发展的影响提供了新的实证依据。     

高校上市公司高管团队异质性与公司成长能力关系研究

高校上市公司高管团队异质性与公司成长能力之间存在相关关系,这种关系的验证与应用将能为促进公司成长能力提升提供重要理论依据。在文献分析的基础上,选择年龄、教育程度和任期等三个方面来考察高管团队的异质性,而采用主营收入同比增长、净利润同比增长、主营收入环比增长、净利润环比增长等指标来考察公司的成长能力。在获取数据的基础上,采用多元线性回归分析方法对高校上市公司高管团队异质性与公司成长能力之间的相关关系进行检验。结果显示:年龄异质性与主营收入同比增长、主营收入环比增长、净利润环比增长呈正相关关系;教育程度异质性与主营收入环比增长呈正相关关系,与净利润同比增长呈负相关关系;任期异质性与主营收入同比增长呈负相关关系;其它的相关关系假设不成立。     

上海市制造业人力资本特征与企业创新能力关系的实证研究

以上海市制造业为研究对象,利用深市和沪市主板、创业板和中小板上市公司2012-2014年的数据,实证研究高管团队人力资本特征对企业创新能力的影响。得出以下结论：高管平均年龄对企业创新能力有负向显著影响;高管团队平均受教育水平对企业创新能力有显著正向影响;高管团队平均任期对企业创新能力有负向显著影响;高管团队女性占比对企业创新能力没有显著的影响。     

TMT异质性及其替换率与创业型战略决策——环境不确定性的权变效应研究

研究表明,高层管理团队（TMT）特质的相关研究并未揭示这些特质与组织流程的关系,尤其是与战略决策的关系,而TMT替换情况与战略决策的相关研究也相对匮乏。文章基于此探究TMT异质性之经验异质性和教育背景异质性、TMT替换率与创业型战略决策的关系并分析环境不确定特性的权变效应。基于上市公司178份有效问卷,文章利用层级回归分析方法得出如下结论：TMT替换率负向影响创业型战略决策,环境不确定性对此关系具有显著的调节作用。而TMT的经验异质性和教育背景异质性与创业型战略决策显著正相关,并且环境不确定性分别对上述关系具有正向权变效应。文章从组织决策视角出发突破了TMT异质性的研究不足,对于企业高层的战略决策具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Conditional Conservatism and Debt versus Equity Financing

Extant research suggests that conditional conservatism reduces information asymmetry between a firm and its shareholders as well as its debtholders. However, there is little evidence on whether conditional conservatism reduces information asymmetry differentially for shareholders and debtholders. We use the setting of a firm's choice between equity versus debt when it seeks a significant amount of external financing to examine this research question. We find that when firms raise a significant amount of external financing, the use of equity (versus debt) increases with the level of conservatism. We also find that the reduction in cost of equity associated with conservatism is greater for equity issuers than for debt issuers, but find no such difference when we examine cost of debt. In addition, we find that the positive effect of conservatism on the choice of equity issuance (versus debt issuance) is accentuated when the information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders is more severe. Overall, our results suggest that conservatism reduces information asymmetry more between firms and shareholders than between firms and debtholders.     

会计稳健性与投资效率研究综述——基于三类不同代理成本的视角

会计稳健性作为一项有效的治理机制对投资效率产生了重要的影响。在委托代理的基础上将代理成本细分为监督成本、担保成本和剩余损失,从这3个层面对会计稳健性与非投资效率的关系进行梳理、总结以及分析。研究发现,会计稳健性与投资过度的关系较为明确,即稳健性可通过作用于3类不同代理成本来缓解股东与经理人以及股东与债权人的冲突,进而抑制投资过度,降低非效率投资。对于会计稳健性与投资不足的关系,现有研究并未达成一致结论。     

上市公司社会资本、研发投入与创新产出——来自TMT和互联网企业的证据

基于社会资本效用异质性视角,运用132家TMT和互联网企业8年的数据,研究了连结型、桥接型和结合型社会资本对创新产出的影响及其过程机理。经验证实,社会资本的存在使研发行为支持关系型创新的观点,连结型社会资本同创新产出的正相关关系最为密切。研发投入在社会资本与创新产出之间发挥了不完全的中介作用。公司属性和融资约束的差异显著影响产出规模,在融资约束宽松或国有TMT和互联网企业中,R&D投入的积极效应更明显。     

Accounting Conservatism and Performance Covenants: A Signaling Approach

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.     

Loan Sales and Borrowers’ Accounting Conservatism

We examine whether initial loan sales in the secondary loan market relate to borrowing firms’ accounting conservatism. We find that borrowing firms exhibit a significant decline in accounting conservatism after the initial loan sales. We show that the decline in borrower conservatism is more pronounced for firms that borrow from lenders with lower monitoring incentives and for firms that have lower incentives to supply conservatism. The baseline results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Collectively, we provide corroborative evidence that lead lenders’ monitoring incentives enforce accounting conservatism in the private debt market, and that lead lenders play a more prominent role than secondary loan market participants in shaping corporate (conservative) reporting.     

基于和谐管理理论的企业TMT战略执行过程研究

高层管理团队（TMT）作为企业的战略制定与执行层,对企业核心竞争力与绩效的提升起着至关重要的作用。文章苦于和谐管理理论,分析了企业战略与发展主题之间的区别与联系;分析了发展主题的辨识与判定,以及以“和则”、“谐则”为两大工具库的和谐机制的设计与构建,给出了企业TMT战略执行过程的新模式。     

Optimal Conservatism with Earnings Manipulation

This paper examines the role of conservatism when an agent can manipulate upcoming earnings before all uncertainty is resolved. An increase in conservatism, by reducing the likelihood of favorable earnings, requires steeper performance pay to maintain the same level of incentives, which in turn increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. Trade‐offs between inducing effort and curbing manipulation predict an interior level of conservatism as optimal. The optimal level of conservatism is positively associated with enforcement, economic profitability and earnings quality, and negatively associated with agency frictions. In particular, we show that more economically profitable firms choose to be more conservative. We also establish that the association between performance pay and manipulation identifies whether conservatism is optimally chosen or exogenously imposed. In an application to debt contracting, we show that optimal conservatism is negatively associated with borrowers’ bargaining power.     

The Use of Debt Covenants Worldwide: Institutional Determinants and Implications on Financial Reporting

This study investigates how the use of debt covenants around the world varies with legal institutions. On the basis of syndicated loans in 36 countries, we find that debt covenants are more prevalent in countries with stronger law enforcement and weaker creditor rights, suggesting that law enforcement facilitates, and creditor rights substitute for, the use of covenants. We also find that the substitution effect between covenant use and creditor rights exists mainly in countries with strong law enforcement, and the effect of legal institutions on covenants is primarily driven by covenants that preserve seniority and capital. In addition, timely loss recognition increases with the use of debt covenants and strong creditor rights attenuate this relation. Overall, our study is the first to provide comprehensive evidence on how the use of debt covenants responds to legal institutions and how it bridges the previously documented link between legal institutions and accounting conservatism.     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.