THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS AND THE EXCHANGE MARKET PRESSURE ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY

The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of different private capital inflows and the exchange market pressure (EMP) on the real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciation of the currency in Turkey. To that end, the paper first investigates the long‐run equilibrium relationship and then employs Granger causality analysis. Results of the bounds test for cointegration within the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) modelling approach of Pesaran et al. (2001 ) reveal level relationship between the diverse private capital inflows, EMP and REER. Granger causality analysis suggests that there is a unidirectional causality running from all the concerned private capital inflows and EMP to REER. The ARDL model shows first that the impact of bank liabilities and portfolio investment liabilities are almost equal, high and positive. Second, foreign direct investment and workers' remittances have a negative but statistically insignificant effect. Third, EMP mitigates REER appreciation of the currency in Turkey. The empirical results suggest that speculative portfolio investment liabilities but particularly bank liabilities with short maturities should be better managed; more flexibility should be introduced to the floating exchange rate regime to avoid loss of competitiveness related with capital inflows; whereas foreign direct investments and remittances should be encouraged.     

Why are currency crises contagious? A comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998

Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998.—This paper analyzes three channels through which currency crises are transmitted between countries: contagion based on unsustainable economic fundamentals; contagion resulting from herding behaviour in financial markets; contagion induced by close trade integration. The presented model that links currency crises with these three types of contagion is employed to analyze the transmission of the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 and the Thai crisis in 1997 to other emerging economies. The empirical results show that, first, the most important contagion channels were based on close financial and trade integration rather than on the weakness of macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, the vulnerability to capital flow reversals and weak financial sectors made countries particularly prone to a currency crisis, while external imbalances and currency misalignments were much less important. JEL no. F30, E60, E65, E44     

Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises with Borrowing Constraints and Domestic Currency Debt

This paper presents a model of self-fulfilling currency crises in economies that do not suffer from domestic liability dollarization but whose international borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. The model shows that when the collateral is a non-traded asset the expectation of a real exchange rate depreciation may trigger the constraint and cause a crisis in which the capital outflow and the real depreciation reinforce each other. Since in the model debt is denominated in domestic currency this paper highlights that borrowing constraints can cause self-fulfilling currency crises even in the absence of foreign-currency debt.     

Foreign devaluation as a coordinating device of heterogeneous investors: A game‐theoretic analysis of financial contagion

This paper investigates financial contagion by extending the Morris–Shin (1998) model of financial crises. It is assumed that before a devaluation in a foreign country, home investors have only private information on the state of the home country. It is demonstrated that the occurrence of a currency crisis in the foreign country may trigger a similar crisis in the home country by coordinating heterogeneous beliefs of home investors. The model is designed to describe the Asian currency crisis of 1997.     

Misalignments of real exchange rates and the credibility of nominal currency bands

Misalignments of Real Exchange Rates and the Credibility of Nominal Currency Bands. — This paper analyzes a sticky-price target zone model in which realignment risk is modeled endogenously as a function of the degree of real exchange rate misalignments. The implications of the model are used to investigate the credibility of selected nominal ERM exchange rate bands. We find that a lack of credibility of the ERM currency bands occurs mostly in countries with substantial swings and persistent misalignments of real exchange rates. These findings suggest that the major real appreciations in some European bilateral real exchange rates between 1987 and 1992 have been pivotal in triggering the ERM currency crises of 1992 and 1993.     

FORECASTING CURRENCY CRISES: WHICH METHODS SIGNALED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS OF JUNE 2006?

In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast South African currency crises with a special emphasis on their out‐of‐sample performance. We choose the latest crisis of June 2006 to conduct an out‐of‐sample experiment. The results show that the signals approach was not able to forecast the out‐of‐sample crisis correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but only with models, that were based on raw data. The Markov‐regime‐switching approach predicts the out‐of‐sample crisis well. However, the results are not straightforward. In‐sample, the probit models performed remarkably well and were also able to detect, at least to some extent, out‐of‐sample currency crises before their occurrence. The recommendation is to not restrict the forecasting to only one approach.     

Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks

A main challenge of understanding currency crises is explaining their puzzling timing. Most “second generation” currency crisis models are static models with multiple equilibria, and exogenous shifts between equilibria are interpreted as shifts of sentiments on financial markets leading to crises. This article develops a dynamic, continuous time model with a payoff structure similar to second generation models. We derive endogenous conditions under which shifts in sentiment occur over time, characterise them in terms the strategic risk associated with speculation, and provide comparative statics. Moreover, we show that the findings correspond almost exactly to the implications of global game currency crisis models, which are often used for equilibrium selection in the static context.     

Debt financing and sharp currency depreciations: wholly versus partially-owned multinational affiliates

This paper provides empirical evidence on two potential costs of shared ownership of German affiliates abroad. First, in periods of currency crises, wholly-owned affiliates, in contrast to partially-owned affiliates, seem to circumvent financial constraints by accessing capital from their parent companies. In terms of differences in performance regarding sales of both types of firms, wholly-owned affiliates have a significantly better sales performance than partially-owned affiliates in periods of crises. This finding contributes to the evidence that FDI helps in mitigating the negative consequences of sharp currency depreciation, and stresses that this effect works especially through capital inflows to wholly-owned affiliates. Second, the debt financing of partially-owned affiliates is less sensitive to the tax rate suggesting that partially-owned affiliates rely less on international debt shifting than wholly-owned affiliates. This indicates that partially-owned affiliates are less flexible to exploit tax efficient strategies.     

Enhanced Special Drawing Rights: How China Could Contribute to a Reformed International Monetary Architecture

Since the end of the Bretton Woods era, the world has operated on a de facto system of free‐floating exchange rates, with the US dollar as the dominant international currency. The system, characterized by large pro‐cyclical capital flows and chronic imbalances, is inherently unstable, and has contributed to repeated crises, recessions and geopolitical tensions. One potentially “least‐difficult” line of reform would be to allow the evolution of a multi‐currency system, underpinned by an expanded role for Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Attempts to promote wider use of the SDR have foundered on the liquidity premium. However, for Chinese corporations and institutions, at present restricted in their capital account activities, the SDR liquidity premium would appear less daunting. The Chinese authorities could provide policy encouragement for the use of SDRs by their institutions. This initiative, supported by China's Special Administrative Region Hong Kong, would kick‐start an international SDR ecosystem, and encourage even broader use of SDRs, to the benefit of international monetary stability.     

Comparing Exchange Market Pressure across Five African Countries

This paper compares the credibility of exchange rate arrangements for the five African countries which are members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and will be referred to as Afro-Luso. Our working hypothesis is that credibility necessarily implies low mean exchange market pressure (EMP), low EMP conditional volatility and low-severity EMP crises under financial-market integration. In addition, economic fundamentals must account for EMP dynamics. We also seek evidence of a risk–return relationship for mean EMP and of “bad news” (negative shocks) having a greater impact on EMP volatility than “good news” (positive shocks). Using our econometric models, we are able to rank Afro-Luso countries’ conditional volatility in ordinal terms. Our main conclusion is that countries with currency pegs, such as Guinea-Bissau (GB) and Cape Verde (CV), clearly have lower volatility when compared to those with managed floats and are therefore more credible. Moreover, EMP crises episodes under pegs are much less severe. We find that economic fundamentals correctly account for mean EMP in all countries and that the risk–return relationship is much more favourable for investors under currency pegs, as the increase in volatility is lower for the same rate of return. The exception to this finding is Mozambique (MOZ), which apparently has a risk–return profile akin to that enjoyed by countries with pegs. A plausible reason is that MOZ has the only managed float in our sample implementing monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an IMF framework, which establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central bank’s net domestic assets. This intuition needs to be tested, however. EMP conditional volatility, meanwhile, is generally driven by changes in domestic credit (lowers it) and foreign reserve changes (raises it). The first effect is more pronounced under currency pegs, but also under MOZ’s managed float. “Bad news” increases volatility more that “good news” only in the case of CV’s currency peg, which we take to be another sign of its credibility. A few striking cross-country comparisons also emerge in our analysis. Among countries with managed floats, Angola (ANG) has the most severe EMP crises, MOZ the least severe and São Tomé &; Príncipe (STP) lies between the two extremes but closer to MOZ.     

What we know,what we still need to know: the Asian currency crisis revisited

From the literature on currency crises, it is widely understood that weak economic fundamentals increase tremendously the probability of currency crises, especially in emerging markets. However, what was not known is that an accumulation of small problems interacting with each other can be equally damaging. Using a new technique, a combination of Classification and Regression Tree (CART) and Logit regression, this paper re‐examines the causes of the Asian currency crisis in 1997–98. The results indicate that although weak fundamentals were at the root of the crisis, only self‐fulfilling panic and herd behaviour can explain the severity of the crisis. Contrary to previous empirical research, our results indicate that the Asian crisis was caused by the accumulation of small fragilities rather than large deficiencies in the macroeconomic fundamentals. An important policy implication of such findings is the need for governments not to underestimate small problems, which, when they interact, can create chaos. Another novelty of this paper is the interpretation of the crisis in terms of the concepts of trigger and vulnerability, using an empirical model that captures the magnitude of the self‐fulfilling panic and its contribution to capital reversal and eventually to the collapse of the currencies.     

Nonlinear Capital Flow Tax: Capital Flow Management and Financial Crisis Prevention in China

How to promote capital account liberalization while preventing financial crises is a challenging task for policymakers. This study proposes a nonlinear (progressive) capital flow tax as a solution. We first demonstrate that the collateral requirement of international borrowing can give rise to multiple equilibria and self‐fulfilling financial crises. We then show that the crisis equilibrium characterized by large exchange rate depreciation, capital flight and welfare loss can be eliminated by imposing a nonlinear (progressive) tax scheme on capital outflows with the marginal tax rate increasing with the size of individual capital outflows. The implementation of such a tax scheme in China is also discussed.     

Surges and Sudden Stops of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

A characteristic of many of the recent emerging market currency crises is a preceding surge in capital inflows and their reversals or ‘sudden stops’ during the crises. The empirical investigation of 38 emerging market economies between 1990 and 2003 reveals that a surge in capital inflows significantly increases the probability of a sudden stop. In addition, a surge accompanied by a high current account deficit or an appreciated real exchange rate is more likely to be associated with a sudden stop. The paper also finds that a surge that is dominated by private loans and portfolio flows rather than direct investment has a higher probability to end with a sudden stop.     

Leading Indicators of Currency Crises: Are They the Same in Different Exchange Rate Regimes?

We investigate whether leading indicators of currency crises differ across exchange rate regimes using data for 88 countries in the period 1981–2010. Our estimates suggest that in fixed exchange rate regimes external indicators, such as deviations of the real exchange rate from trend and the growth of international reserves, have the strongest predictive power. In contrast, in floating exchange rate regimes monetary policy and credibility indicators, such as domestic credit growth and inflation, are the best leading indicators of currency crises. Both credibility and external economic indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange rate regimes.     

Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises, 1797–1994

We argue that recent currency crises reflect clashes between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, just as did crises in the past. We reject the view that crises reflect self-fulfilling prophecies that are not closely related to measured fundamentals. Doubts about the timing of a market attack on a currency are less important than the fact that it is bound to happen if a government's policies are inconsistent with pegged exchange rates. We base these conclusions on a review of currency crises in the historical record under metallic monetary regimes and of crises post-World War II under Bretton Woods, and since, in European and Latin American pegged exchange rate regimes.     

The Simple Analytics of Sudden Stops

Currency crises in emerging and developing countries have often been characterized by “sudden stops” of capital flows. A variety of mechanisms have been adduced to explain the emergence of this phenomenon. This paper integrates these mechanisms into a simple and transparent analytical model in which currency mismatches, large current account deficits, and large stocks of short-term debt interact with low reserve stocks to generate dual equilibria. In this context, the “panic” equilibrium is characterized by a currency crisis, a sudden stop, and an output collapse. The potential for various policies to avoid this outcome is explored, as are the implications of the analysis for reserve accumulation.     

Dual Exchange Markets for Countries Facing Financial Crises

In dual exchange markets there is an exchange market for capital transactions separate from the foreign exchange market for current transactions. Developing countries experiencing financial crises should avoid both a substantial decline in the exchange value of their currency and a reduction of their imports to the point at which their production and consumption of essentials are grossly impaired. It is suggested that a temporary system of dual exchange markets will prevent capital outflow from reducing foreign exchange for imports of goods and services. Both markets should be free of exchange controls except those needed to maintain separation of the markets.     

Extreme Bounds Analysis in Early Warning Systems for Currency Crises

Open Economies Review - Selecting early warning indicators to predict currency crises is not straightforward, because there are several mechanisms that lead up to currency crises and these...     

What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?

The paper explores the view that the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 and 1998 reflected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even if market overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The first part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial ‘overlending’, banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows. The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian crisis from the antecedents in 1995–1996 to the recent developments in early 1999 in parallel with a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international intervention, and the costs and benefits of capital controls.     

Testing the Unstable Middle and Two Corners Hypotheses About Exchange Rate Regimes

The recent rash of international currency crises has generated considerable interest in the role that exchange rate regimes have played in contributing to these crises. Many economists have argued that efforts to operate adjustably pegged exchange rate regimes have been a major contributor to “the unstable middle” hypothesis and some have argued that this unstable middle is so broad that only the two corners of hard fixes or floating rates will be stable in a world of high capital mobility—the two corners or bipolar hypothesis. Two recent empirical studies by researchers at the International Monetary Fund reach opposing conclusions on these issues. We examine the issue further and show that conclusions can be quite sensitive to how exchange rate regimes are grouped into categories and the measures of currency crises that are used. In general we find that the dead center of the adjustable peg is by far the most crisis prone broad type of exchange rate regimes, but that countries need not go all the way to freely floating rates or hard fixes to substantially reduce the risks of currency crises.