United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected.     

Budget uncertainty in a monetary union

Governments in a monetary union fear spending disturbances. We distinguish them according to their ability to hedge against these disturbances and assume that they derive their optimal fiscal decisions by using a robust control approach. Results show that governments being highly vulnerable to spending disturbances set excessive tax rates, thereby exacerbating the fiscal pressure detrimental to output and obliging the central bank to conduct an expansionary monetary policy. Countries whose governments have higher ability to hedge against spending disturbances then suffer from the inflationary consequences of this monetary policy.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.     

Monetary Stabilisation Policy in a Monetary Union: Some Simple Analytics

We do two things in this paper. First, we look at some simple models of monetary decision making in a monetary union and ask how much more variable a country's output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. We answer this analytically and then go on to 'calibrate' the simple model. The model has few structural equations, but it is useful in allowing us to examine how the variability of output and inflation are likely to change as key parameters change. Our conclusions on this front are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, we also identify a second best issue concerning the optimal make–up of the monetary union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values (and shocks are perfectly correlated) will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Government expenditure composition and fiscal policy spillovers in small open economies within a monetary union

We examine the implications of government expenditure that is complementary to private consumption, and government investment that can improve the productivity of private capital, in a global DSGE model. We show that government investment can improve an economy’s external competitiveness and stimulate private investment. If governments can finance this investment by reducing consumption that is not complementary to private consumption, then this is ex-ante budget-neutral, provides a small, but persistent stimulus without a deterioration in competitiveness, and leads to lower debt in the medium run. We also examine the cross-border transmission channels of government expenditure shocks in a monetary union when government consumption is complementary to private and public investment is productive. While both assumptions enhance cross-border spillovers, a direct import content is required to generate spillovers similar to those found in the empirical literature.     

Improving competition in the non-tradable goods and labour markets: the Portuguese case

This study assesses the macroeconomic impacts of increasing competition in the non-tradable goods and labour markets in Portugal. We lean on evidence that the maintenance of low competition in these markets may have contributed to the recent poor performance of the Portuguese economy. The analysis is performed using PESSOA, a dynamic general equilibrium model for a small-open economy integrated in a monetary union, featuring non-Ricardian characteristics, a multi-sectoral production structure and a number of nominal and real rigidities. We conclude that measures aimed at increasing competition in the Portuguese non-tradable goods and labour markets could induce important international competitiveness gains and be valuable instruments in promoting necessary adjustments within the monetary union framework. However, in the short run, real interest rates are likely to increase, driving consumption and output temporarily downwards.     

The Stability of the Demand for Money in Monetary Unions: Some Empirical Evidence from WAEMU

Previous studies of the stability of the demand for money have been largely conducted in the context of individual countries. To the extent that these countries have control over their monetary policies, such an approach is well justified. However, for monetary unions, where the control over monetary policy is usually vested in a central or outside authority, it is more appropriate to examine the stability of the money demand for the union as a collective entity. This paper follows this approach with respect to a West African monetary union, the WAEMU, whose monetary policies are largely dictated by the French authorities. Using cointegration theory and CUSUM stability tests, we find evidence that the demand for broad money is stable in this union. Given the empirical results, the paper draws inferences regarding their implications for the formulation of optimal monetary policy for the WAEMU.     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.     

Eastern and Southern Africa Monetary Integration: A Structural Vector Autoregression Analysis

This paper uses VAR techniques to investigate the potential for forming monetary unions in Eastern and Southern Africa. All countries in the sample are members of various regional economic organizations. Some of the organizations have a monetary union as an immediate objective whereas others consider it as a possibility in the more distant future. Our objective is to sort out which countries are suitable candidates for a monetary union based on the synchronicity of demand and supply disturbances. Although economic shocks are not highly correlated across the entire region, we tentatively identify three sub‐regional clusters of countries that may benefit from a currency union. We find some tentative evidence that some, though not all, sub‐regions may benefit from a link to the Euro.     

Assessing the effects of financial heterogeneity in a monetary union a DSGE approach

The aim of this article is to analyze how financial heterogeneity can accentuate the cyclical divergences inside a monetary union that faces technological, monetary, budgetary and financial shocks. To this purpose, this study relies on a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, where the two countries are supposed to be differently sensitive to the bank capital channel. The model allows us to demonstrate how a given symmetric shock causes cyclical divergences inside a heterogeneous monetary union. On this point, it allows reproducing some stylized facts recently observed in the Euro Area. Moreover, it appears that the more heterogeneous the union, the larger the effects of financial asymmetries on the transmission of shocks. Finally, we show that a common monetary policy contributes to worsen cyclical divergences, in comparison with monetary policies that would be nationally conducted.     

On the feasibility of monetary union: Does it make sense to look for shocks symmetry across countries when none of the countries constitutes an optimum currency area?

Usually, a monetary union is not considered feasible between countries if the correlations of shocks are positive but weak. This may not be so if the country with the larger output gap converges to full-employment equilibrium faster than the country with the smaller gap. We argue that common monetary policy can be destabilizing when countries' responses to non-monetary shocks are perfectly symmetric with a correlation of 1 but exhibit differing investment sensitivities to the real interest rate. We use Canada, Mexico and the United States to test the feasibility of a monetary union by documenting whether: 1) gross investments in Canada and Mexico are equally responsive to the real fund rate, and 2) Canada and Mexico's output growth and inflation respond differently to US monetary policy shocks and oil price shocks. This approach implicitly dictates whether the shocks themselves are symmetric or asymmetric. Using quarterly data and SVAR methodology, we conducted two layers of analysis. We estimated SVARs for the periods 1970–2008, 1970–1990 and 1991–2008 to find that a monetary union is feasible between Canada and the US for the first two sample periods. For Canada and Mexico, we find similar responses of output growth to US monetary policy shocks. We conducted further robustness tests by estimating two identified VARs with common US variables and oil prices for Canada and Mexico to assess commonality in responses to shocks with the US. These results affirm that a monetary union is also feasible between Canada and the US.     

FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY IN A MONETARY UNION

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country sticky‐price model to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity and government spending shocks in a monetary union. Financial market integration has a small effect on the propagation of these shocks if households can only trade in risk‐free bonds. However, financial market integration has a more substantial effect on the propagation of these shocks in a monetary union with a complete market for state‐contingent claims. This result indicates that it may be important to account for threshold effects in empirical analyses of the impact of financial market integration on business cycle volatility in a monetary union.     

Fiscal risk in a monetary union

We present a dynamic and quantitative model of a fiscal solvency crisis in a monetary union. Diverse fiscal policies, which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks, can threaten a monetary union. The fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will. Stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit. In equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits, creating a fiscal solvency crisis. The dynamics leading to the crisis depend on the policy response to restore lending. We focus on two responses, default and policy switching. We simulate our model to quantify the probability of a fiscal solvency crisis in the European Monetary Union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values. Our model predicts the Greek crisis which occurred and warns of an Italian one.