McCloskey, economics as conversation, and Sprachethik

In writing about the 'rhetoric of economics' - particularlyabout the standards which prevent situations where 'anythinggoes' in argument - McCloskey takes an eclectic approach totwo philosophical positions, based on Rorty and Habermas respectively.But these positions, despite sharing some common aspects, alsodifferentiate themselves from each other sharply in importantways. In this paper, it is argued that this eclecticism of McCloskeyis not coherent, as a result of her not completely graspingthe fundamental differences between these two positions, andthat this incoherence has damaging implications for her projectof the rhetoric of economics.     

Ecological economics in relation to democracy,ideology and politics

Two recent studies and policy documents are discussed in the present article. One is a UN report prepared by experienced politicians as input into the 2012 Rio de Janeiro Conference, the other a study about the ecological economics of biodiversity.The UN report is of interest in informing about the thinking of politicians and their recommendations for action. It is however a consensus report where more fundamental changes in perspectives are not considered but rather avoided. A number of ecological economists participated in the second study on biodiversity. They demonstrated consciousness about many of the critical arguments about Cost–Benefit Analysis but finally argued in favor of relying on the conceptual framework of neoclassical economics with its CBA. The present author is criticizing this idea of “mainstreaming” the economics of biodiversity contending that radical change in perspectives is needed.     

Direct democracy in Australia: Voter behavior in the choice between constitutional monarchy and a republic

Opinion polls conducted throughout the 1990s indicate most Australians favor a republic. A referendum making that constitutional change, however, was defeated. This paper investigates whether voters employ a loss-minimization rule, as opposed to a value-maximization rule, when making political decisions. Based on the predictions of each rule, political strategies are devised and compared to the official arguments employed by republicans and monarchists during the period preceding the vote. Empirical research relates voting outcomes at the individual voter level to influences that are likely to be correlated with political risk aversion. The results are consistent with the conclusion that voters do not employ value-maximization rules.     

On the inconsistent behavior in voting for incumbents and for term limitation

This paper considers the seemingly inconsistent behavior of individuals who simultaneously vote for incumbents and for limitations on their terms in office. We argue that such behavior may occur even if voters pursue their self-interests in both candidate and term-limitation elections. First, we formulate elections for Congressional candidates as a two-person game, where each candidate maximizes votes by proposing a distribution of benefits to voters. Then we discuss the term limitation at the state level, where voters in each district compare, over time, the average benefits obtained from two alternative series of campaign games: one with a longer tenure associated with no term limit and the other with a shorter tenure created by the introduction of a term limit. In elections of candidates for Congress, the incumbent is successful because he can generate more aggregate benefits for voters. We show, however, that at some critical point of the tenure, his behavior will be less beneficial to his core constituents. In term-limitation elections, those voters tend to support a term limit. In some cases, they represent a majority in the state, and term limits are enacted. Received: February 23, 1999; revised version: January 24, 2000     

Unemployment and the economics of gradualist policy reform

This paper investigates the efficiency of adjustment to economic reform programs when the cost of adjustment arises from high unemployment that can be generated as contracting sectors shrink faster than expanding sectors grow. Under plausible assumptions on the adjustment process, the speed of adjustment to “shock therapy” reforms is shown to be excessively rapid, and the rate of unemployment to be excessively high during the transition to the new equilibrium. The authorities can improve the efficiency of the adjustment by removing the distortion gradually, rather than abruptly. Gradualism has beneficial income distributional, as well as efficiency properties, because it improves welfare of the unemployed, who are necessarily the least advantaged social group in this model.     

Religion,economics and politics: The Bishops and Keynes in the post-Keynesian ERA

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life.     

Religion,economics and politics: The Bishops and Keynes in the post-Keynesian ERA

The present is adapted from Bruce J. Malina and Thomas O. Nitsch, “The Bishops' Pastoral Letter and the Poverty Problem: Early vs. Contemporary Concerns and Doctrines,” presented at the Fourth World Congress of Social Economics, Toronto, Canada, 15–18 August 1986, 34 pp. The author is deeply indebted to colleagues Malina, professor of theology at Creighton University, and John E. Elliott, professor of economics at the University of Southern California, for helpful critical insights and comments.     

Between a rock and a soft place: Ecological and feminist economics in policy debates

The field of ecological economics includes both economic analysis on the one hand, and discussions of normative values and visions for society, on the other. Using feminist insights into cultural beliefs about the relative “hardness” and “softness” of these two sides, this essay discusses how ecological economists can use this unique “between” space in order to better inform policy. The current crisis of global climate change, it is argued, requires that economists move beyond modeling and measurement, while ecological thinkers need to re-examine beliefs about markets and profit.     

The economics and politics of output volatility: evidence from Indian states

Employing data for 1981–2009, this paper examines the factors influencing the volatility of state output, using India as a case study. The analysis appears to suggest that high income states exhibit relatively higher output volatility. At the state-level, the proximate determinants of a decline in output volatility can be traced to financial deepening, government expenditures and institutional quality. Also, state-level political factors are also found to play an important role. In addition, at the macroeconomic level, monetary policy considerations are observed to be the most important factor impacting output volatility.     

Competitive politics, simplified heuristics, and preferences for public goods

This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in the formation of preferences for public goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use simplified heuristics based on the positions of familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and to cast a vote in line with their interests and values. Here, we use a two-stage field-survey experiment to investigate how knowledge of party positions affects policy choices. We followed standard procedures in developing an attribute-based choice experiment on alternative land-use policies in Switzerland. In contrast to the usual formulation, however, the hypothetical costs of the proposed policies were formulated as a percentage change in taxes. The benefit of this formulation relative to the usual absolute money amounts is that the credibility of the (hypothetical) costs for respondents does not depend on respondent income. Furthermore, the formulation allowed us to solicit party positions on the proposed policies. Six out of eight contacted parties provided their positions. We then conducted a split-sample mail survey where we included a table of the party positions with a subsample of the questionnaires. We report six main experimental results. (1) The response rate of the survey was unaffected by the party positions. (2) The proportion of no-choice answers was decreased by forty percent relative to the control. (3) The party information significantly affected the choices directly and in interaction with respondents' general attitudes towards public spending for nature and landscape conservation and thus affected the way how individuals mapped from general attitudes to preferences for specific policies. (4) The information interacted with educational level in only eight out of forty choice sets, suggesting that even the more educated relied on simplified heuristics. (5) Respondents who knew the party positions were more sensitive to the tax attribute. (6) For respondents with medium and higher tax bills, the resulting willingness-to-pay estimates were decreased by a factor of two to ten relative to the control. These findings suggest that the party information helped the respondents to articulate more consistent preferences than in the treatment without the party information.     

Ecological economics and the politics of knowledge: the debate between Hayek and Neurath

Hayek's epistemic arguments against planning were aimed notjust against socialism but also the tradition of ecologicaleconomics. The concern with the physical preconditions of economicactivity and defence of non-monetary measures in economic choicewere expressions of the same rationalist illusion about thescope of human knowledge that underpinned the socialist project.Neurath's commitment to physicalism, in natura calculation andplanning typified these errors. Neurath responded to these criticismsin unpublished notes and correspondence with Hayek. These highlightedthe epistemological premises his work shared with Hayek's, representinga response to Hayek from Hayek's own assumptions. This paperexamines the cogency and continuing relevance of the argumentsin this debate.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Ethics,human behavior and the methodology of social economics

Social economists differ among themselves but are united in rejecting the rational actor model. They insist that individuals are more than economic actors; they arepersons with ethical values who live in community. That agreement over fundamentals leads social economists to embrace a methodological approach that differs substantially from the mainstream of economics. They (sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly), engage in a special form of storytelling known in the philosophy of social science as pattern modeling. Instead of using a pre-existing theoretical framework, such as rational choice theory, to logically construct a story, this type of story is constructed empirically from the bottom up through the use of case studies. The article concludes with a specific consideration of Albert Hirschman's methodology to illustrate the storytelling approach of a first rate and well-recognized social economist.     

Complex ballot propositions,individual voting behavior,and status quo bias

One concern about direct democracy is that citizens may not be sufficiently competent to decide about complex policies. This may lead to exaggerated conservatism in the voting decision (status quo bias). To investigate how complexity affects individual voting behavior, we develop a novel measure of proposition complexity (using official pre-referendum booklets) and combine it with post-referendum survey data from Switzerland. Using Heckman selection estimations to account for endogenous variation in participation rates, we find that an increase in proposition complexity from the 10th to the 90th percentile would decrease voters' approval by 5.6 ppts, which is often decisive: an additional 12% of the propositions in our sample would be rejected.