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1.
POLLUTION AND POLLUTION ABATEMENT IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Building on the approach of Weitzman, as extended by Hartwick and Mäler, five models of national accounts in a dynamic competitive economy with pollution externalities are constructed: flow pollutants, stock pollutants, fossil fuels and CO2 , living resources and acid rain, and household defensive expenditures. The results measure welfare rather than national product per se . The general conclusions are that abatement expenditures should be treated as intermediate consumption, that adjustments need to be made for both pollution emissions and natural pollution dissipation processes, that marginal social costs should be used to value emissions, and that the level of environmental services must be valued in measuring welfare. Not only should household defensive expenditures not be subtracted from the welfare measure, under plausible assumptions the adjustment to welfare (as opposed to NNP) includes a value greater than the level of household defensive expenditure. 相似文献
2.
Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this
assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects
of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance
function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement
costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than
command-and-control policies.
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3.
Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation
The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection
of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate
the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope
of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative
review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit
functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of
corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit
curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates
in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting
fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation
on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations
regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.
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4.
Technology-forcing through environmental regulation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Andries Nentjes Frans P. de Vries Doede Wiersma 《European Journal of Political Economy》2007,23(4):903-916
This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard. 相似文献
5.
《Ecological Economics》2001,36(3):461-473
Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter. 相似文献
6.
In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting a second-best emissions tax to control a uniformly
mixed pollutant under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally
efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes
will deviate from expected marginal damage if marginal damage is increasing and there is uncertainty about the slopes of the
marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable
firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary. 相似文献
7.
This paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case. 相似文献
8.
Electricity generators accept that emissions trading is fundamental to meeting CO2 reduction targets. But unless a percentage of permits are allocated, existing generators will face non-trivial wealth transfers. Seldom contemplated in academic works are the adverse economic consequences of an all-auction approach to emissions trading. Using Victoria to illustrate, we find that once CO2 prices exceed $17.50/t, the marginal coal generator facing large wealth transfers will withhold generating capacity to raise prices and recoup stranded investments, thus becoming a 'wounded bull' in the market place. This has material welfare implications with modelling results indicate an intermediate-run 300 per cent increase in wholesale power prices. 相似文献
9.
A. D. Rikun 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1992,2(6):593-604
This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data. 相似文献
10.
Sofia Ahlroth 《Review of Income and Wealth》2003,49(3):425-440
The theoretical and the practical studies in the field of environmental accounting are often two separate lines of work. In this study, we develop an optimal control theory model for adjusting NDP for the effects of SO2 and NOx emissions, and subsequently insert empirically estimated values. The model includes correction entries for the effects on welfare, real capital, health and the quality and quantity of renewable natural resources. In the empirical valuation study, production losses were estimated with dose-response functions. Recreational and other welfare values were estimated by the contingent valuation (CV) method. Effects on capital depreciation are also included. For comparison, abatement costs and environmental protection expenditures for reducing sulfur and nitrogen emissions were estimated. The theoretical model was then utilized to calculate the adjustment to NDP in a consistent manner. The estimated damage value of sulfur is close to the Swedish sulfur tax. 相似文献
11.
Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses. 相似文献
12.
All environmental policies involve costs of implementation and management that are distinct from pollution sources’ abatement costs. In practice, regulators and sources usually share these administrative costs. We examine theoretically an optimal policy consisting of an emissions tax and the distribution of administrative costs between the government and regulated sources of pollution. Our focus is on the optimal distribution of administrative costs between polluters and the government and the optimal level of the emissions tax in relation to marginal pollution damage. We demonstrate how the policy variables affect aggregate equilibrium administrative costs and show that these effects are generally indeterminate, as is the effect of the distribution of administrative costs on aggregate emissions. Consequently, the optimal sharing of administrative costs and whether the optimal emissions tax is higher or lower than marginal damage depend on specific contexts. 相似文献
13.
The production analysis literature is increasingly concerned with estimating marginal abatement costs. Yet, most studies do not emphasize the ways in which pollutants may be reduced and their costs, which makes them unable to identify the least costly compliance strategy. This paper utilizes the materials balance principle to relate pollution to the employment of material inputs. A production model which allows input and output substitution, downscaling of operations, pollution control, and emission permits purchases as compliance strategies is proposed, and the implications of joint and non-joint pollution controls for the trade-off between pollutants and desirable outputs are considered. Marginal abatement costs, reflecting the least costly way of compliance, are derived by exploiting the duality between the directional distance function and the profit function. 相似文献
14.
Masayuki Shimizu 《Review of Development Economics》2020,24(2):668-690
Since the 2000s, China has been trying to strengthen emission controls in response to increasing pollution problems. However, strict implementation of emission controls generates pollution abatement costs. Using regional data for 29 provinces in the Chinese industrial sector from 1995 to 2010, this study estimated the pollution abatement costs for each province through the measurement of environmental efficiency, by applying a directional distance function approach. Moreover, using panel data analysis, this study clarified whether there is a nonlinear relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulations. The empirical results are as follows. The study confirmed that the burden of abatement costs tended not only to occur in the central and western regions but also to increase in the eastern region. Moreover, the nonlinear relationship is inverted U‐shaped; thus, pollution abatement costs increase, as a negative effect of environmental regulations, until a certain inflection point, after which they decrease. 相似文献
15.
This paper describes and assesses a policy to slow the increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the atmosphere. Policy governing new CO2 sources would either prevent emissions, procure compensating emissions reductions, or sequester emissions in sinks. The paper uses electric power plants to demonstrate the mechanics of the policy and the control or offset choices. Offset options include scrubbing, fuel switching, investments in energy conservation and efficiency, and afforestation.
Costs per ton ofC02 sequestered range from $1.35 for planting shade trees to $59.41 for scrubbing. All options except scrubbing cost less than $11.00, and the median cost is around $6.00 per ton removed. Planting trees on erodible cropland in conjunction with the Conservation Reserve Program combines the goals of reduced erosion, surplus agricultural production, and greenhouse warming. This policy is a first sane step toward reducing the accumulation of greenhouse gases. Having an international framework for managing emissions is most desirable. In the interim, however, the United States can demonstrate environmental leadership, generate substantial conservation benefits, and spark ingenuity in searching for alternatives, broadening the options, and lowering the ultimate costs of reducing CO2 emissions. 相似文献
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16.
We study how uncertainty about climate change severity affects the relative benefits of early abatement and a portfolio of research and development (R&D) in lowering future abatement costs. Optimal early abatement depends on the curvature of the marginal benefit and marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions and how the uncertain parameter affects marginal benefits. R&D in a particular technology depends on whether uncertainty increases early abatement; whether investment lowers marginal costs for that technology; whether R&D lowers the slope of that technology's MAC function; and the shape of that technology's MAC function. We illustrate, focusing on the role of backstop technologies. 相似文献
17.
We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large. 相似文献
18.
George E. Halkos 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1994,4(2):127-150
This study presents a mathematical model for determining cost-effective emissions' control strategies in Europe, by minimizing sulphur abatement costs subject to different pollution control targets. The purpose is to compare the efficiency of a uniform percentage emissions reduction with a scenario that takes variation in environmental conditions into account. Underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost-benefit analysis of acid rain abatement is infeasible. The model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an estimation of the gains (or losses) that countries could achieve if they co-operate in their policies rather than act independently. 相似文献
19.
Katarina Elofsson 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(2):143-162
Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim
of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake
unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country
might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect,
i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution
reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement
if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty
would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in
a sequential game.
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20.
Ian A. MacKenzie 《Resource and Energy Economics》2011,33(1):268-278
This paper investigates initial allocation choices in an international tradable pollution permit market. For two sovereign governments, we compare allocation choices that are either simultaneously or sequentially announced. We show sequential allocation announcements result in higher (lower) aggregate emissions when announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). Whether allocation announcements are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the relationship between the follower’s damage function and governments’ abatement costs. When the marginal damage function is relatively steep (flat), allocation announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). For quadratic abatement costs and damages, sequential announcements provide a higher level of aggregate emissions. 相似文献