Bayesian consistent belief selection

A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.     

Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed.     

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Resolving Indeterminacy in Coordination Games: A New Approach Applied to a Pay-as-you-go Pension Scheme

This paper shows that when players ignore what outcome will emerge because of the presence of multiple equilibria, they can coordinate their expectations by forming an initial belief based on the principle of indifference followed by a process of reasoning that updates this belief. Since this procedure describes a natural way to form beliefs under indeterminacy, it is reasonable for every agent to conjecture that all the others form their beliefs according to the same logic. Exactly the fact that agents are aware that they form their beliefs following the same procedure allows them to successfully coordinate their expectations.      

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who most like the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information and heterogeneous preferences, by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A trade‐off between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

Ideological spillovers across the Atlantic? Evidence from Trump's presidential election

Ideological spillovers refer to the modification of an individual's core beliefs after learning about other people's beliefs. We study one specific international ideological spillover, namely, the effect of the unexpected election of a United States (US) president (Donald Trump on the 9^th of November 2016), who openly questioned the so-called ‘core liberal consensus’, on European's core political beliefs. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) around the election event, we show that the Trump presidential election (TPE) gave rise to a ‘backlash effect’. That is, it steered core European beliefs in two specific domains, making Europeans more favourable to (i) globalisation and (ii) international mobility (about 10% change in the overall Likert scale range of the statement that immigrants contribute to a country). Contrasting with the hypotheses of ‘belief contagion’, we do not find evidence that TPE steered illiberal beliefs. Furthermore, TPE improved (deteriorated) the view Europeans had of their own country (the United States).     

A model of noisy introspection

We present a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about …, etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions coincide with decision distributions. Noise is injected into iterated conjectures about others' decisions and beliefs, which causes the predictions to differ from those of deterministic models of iterated thinking, e.g., rationalizability. The paper contains a convergence proof that implies existence and uniqueness of the outcome of the iterated thought process. In addition, estimated introspection and noise parameters for data from 37 one-shot matrix games are reported. The accuracy of the model is compared with that of several alternatives.     

A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory

In game theory, four dynamic processes converging towards an equilibrium are distinguished and ordered by way of agents' decreasing cognitive capacities. In the eductive process, each player has enough information to simulate perfectly the others' behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium. In epistemic learning, each player updates his beliefs about others' future strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions. In behavioral learning, each player modifies his own strategies according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past actions. In the evolutionary process, each agent has a fixed strategy and reproduces in proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions. All along the spectrum, longer term dynamics makes up for weaker rationality, and physical relations substitute for mental interactions. Convergence, if any, is towards an always stronger equilibrium notion and selection of an equilibrium state becomes more sensitive to context and history. The processes can be mixed if associated to different periods, agents or mechanisms and deepened if obtained by formal reasoning principles.     

Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games

I study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the players' signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. The same condition also determines the convergence of common p-belief to common knowledge, which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence

Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in “theory of mind” and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices and form beliefs. In equilibrium, there is little difference in neural activity across choice and belief tasks; there is a purely neural definition of equilibrium as a “state of mind.” “Strategic IQ,” actual earnings from choices and accurate beliefs, is negatively correlated with activity in the insula, suggesting poor strategic thinkers are too self-focused, and is positively correlated with ventral striatal activity (suggesting that high IQ subjects are spending more mental energy predicting rewards).     

Universal type structures with unawareness

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the playerʼs awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness.     

Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs

We present a theory of interactive beliefs analogous to Mertens and Zamir [Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information, Int. J. Game Theory 14 (1985) 1-29] and Brandenburger and Dekel [Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, J. Econ. Theory 59 (1993) 189-198] that allows for hierarchies of ambiguity. Each agent is allowed a compact set of beliefs at each level, rather than just a single belief as in the standard model. We propose appropriate definitions of coherency and common knowledge for our types. Common knowledge of coherency closes the model, in the sense that each type homeomorphically encodes a compact set of beliefs over the others’ types. This space universally embeds every implicit type space of ambiguous beliefs in a beliefs-preserving manner. An extension to ambiguous conditional probability systems [P. Battigalli, M. Siniscalchi, Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230] is presented. The standard universal type space and the universal space of compact continuous possibility structures are epistemically identified as subsets.     

The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination

Beliefs about other players’ strategies are crucial in determining outcomes for coordination games. If players are to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, they must believe that others will coordinate with them. In many settings there is uncertainty about beliefs as well as strategies. Do people consider these “higher-order” beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) when making coordination decisions? I design a modified stag hunt experiment that allows me to identify how these higher-order beliefs and uncertainty about higher-order beliefs matter for coordination. Players prefer to invest especially when they believe that others are “optimistic” that they will invest; but knowledge that others think them unlikely to invest does not cause players to behave differently than when they do not know what their partners think about them. Thus resolving uncertainty about beliefs can result in marked efficiency gains.     

Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning

We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Belief in Mean Reversion and the Disposition Effect: An Experimental Test

The disposition effect refers to investors' tendency to disproportionately sell more winning than losing assets. The literature mostly offered indirect evidence regarding its cause. Using a lab experiment, the author directly evaluates the two competing behavioral mechanisms for this effect: belief in mean reversion and dual risk attitudes of prospect theory. The participants were endowed with some hypothetical assets, observed price charts, and made selling decisions. Sixty-one percent of them exhibited significant disposition effect. The author elicited the participants' risk attitude parameters and beliefs about price movements, and found that beliefs, especially those in the loss domain, but not the dual risk attitudes, significantly contributed to the between-subject variation of the disposition effect. The results from a goodness-of-fit test also favor the belief mechanism.     

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Aumann (1995) showed that for games with perfect information common knowledge of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Substantive rationality is defined in epistemic terms, that is, in terms of knowledge. We show that when substantive rationality is defined in doxastic terms, that is, in terms of belief, then common belief of substantive rationality implies backward induction. Aumann (1998) showed that material rationality implies backward induction in the centipede game. This result does not hold when rationality is defined doxastically. However, if beliefs are interpersonally consistent then common belief of material rationality in the centipede game implies common belief of backward induction.     

Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information

The quality of information in financial asset markets is often hard to estimate. Reminiscent of the famous Ellsberg paradox, investors may be unable to form a single probability belief about asset returns conditional on information signals and may act on the basis of ambiguous (or multiple) probability beliefs. This paper analyzes information transmission in asset markets when agents?? information is ambiguous. We consider a market with risk-averse informed investors, risk-neutral competitive arbitrageurs, and noisy supply of the risky asset, first studied by Vives (Rev Financ Stud 8:3?C40, 1995a, J Econ Theory 67:178?C204, 1995b) with unambiguous information. Ambiguous information gives rise to the possibility of illiquid market where arbitrageurs choose not to trade in a rational expectations equilibrium. When market is illiquid, small informational or supply shocks have relatively large effects on asset prices.     

Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest

Speculators buy an asset hoping to sell it later to investors with higher private valuations. If agents are uncertain about the distribution of private valuations and about the beliefs of others about this distribution, a beauty contest with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs arises. Under Harsanyi's assumption of a common prior the infinite beliefs hierarchy is readily solved using Bayes' law. This paper shows that common knowledge of the "beliefs formation rule," mapping the private valuation of each gent into his first-order belief, also simplifies the beliefs hierarchy while allowing for disagreement among agents. We analyse the resulting speculation in a stylized asset market. Several statistics, computed only from readily observable quote, return and volume data, are evaluated in terms of their power to discriminate between genuine disagreement and the Harsanyian case. Only statistics that relate volume and volatility, or volume and changes in best offers, have the necessary discriminatory power.