An evolutionary model of the size distribution of firms

An analytical study of the evolution of the distribution of firm size in an industry is presented. A drift-diffusion model is proposed to express the time-evolution of density of firm size within the industry. The model blends the conventional, more or less static, determinants with the kinds of dynamic considerations introduced by stochastic processes of evolutionary dynamics. The steady-state distribution as well as the dynamic behavior of the model are derived. Parameters in the resulting analytical expressions are then fit to a population of firms in the non-manufacturing service sector. The empirical portion of the paper validates the proposed evolutionary model.     

Optimal freeware quality in the presence of network externalities: an evolutionary game theoretical approach

New software products often face difficulty in achieving market penetration. A potential remedy is to offer a freeware version of the software to encourage initial adoption and establish a larger user base for the software, thereby increasing the commercial version's value to adopters in future periods. However, to avoid complete cannibalization of the commercial version, the freeware version's quality must be sufficiently low and the price of the commercial version must not be too high. We model the effect of these two decision variables, price and freeware quality, on the adoption of software using static and evolutionary game theory.     

When will payoff maximization survive?An indirect evolutionary analysis

Survival of payoff maximization is the usual as if-justification for assuming rational economic agents. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constellations of stimuli, and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that payoff maximization in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information, one can derive similar necessary conditions.     

On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

The hunt for S-shaped growth paths in technological innovation: a patent study*

Since the works by the business cycle theorists in the 1930s, no attempts have been made to study empirically the long term evolution paths of individual technologies starting with long time series. This is an empirical exploration and confirmation of the now almost assumed image or metaphor of the way technology develops; that it follows an S-shaped growth path which is commonly associated with a similar shaped diffusion function of entrepreneurial activity. The paper also confirms the diversity of technology dynamics and explores how technological cycle takeoffs appear to be clustered within certain historical epochs. The results have implications for our understanding of the evolution paths of individual technologies, and of the evolution of technological systems and waves of innovation. By use of computational statistics, logistic growth functions are fitted to US patent stocks, 1920–1990, at a detailed level of aggregation, including chemical, electrical/electronic, mechanical, transport and non-industrial technologies. Some practical considerations when developing an empirically testable model of innovation cycles are addressed in the paper as well.     

The denominations of US coins: a case of institutional evolution

Abstract. The system of denominations of US coins, which the paper treats as a quasi-genetic trait of the US monetary system, has not been constant since inception but rather has evolved over time in the sense of being subject to innovation and selection. However, all the innovations have disappeared, as have a number of the original denominations. Abstract theories of optimal systems of denominations provide a good explanation of one selection factor, but other important influences include limiting the number of separate denominations and accommodating the requirements of decimal counting. However, even some innovations that ultimately disappeared survived for decades.     

A resource-based view of Schumpeterian economic dynamics

This paper seeks to offer a theoretical platform where the modern “resource-based view” of the firm might meet with evolutionary economics and the study of entrepreneurship, and with the economics of industrial organization. It does so by proposing the concept of the “resource economy” within which productive resources are produced and exchanged between firms. This is presented as the dual of the mainstream goods and services economy – where the “resource economy” captures the dynamic capital structure of the economy. The paper is concerned to bring out the distinctive principles governing resource dynamics in the resource economy, capturing competitive dynamics in such categories as resource creation, replication, propagation, exchange and leverage; evolutionary dynamics in terms of resource variation, selection and retention; entrepreneurial dynamics in terms of resource recombination and resource imitation, transfer and substitution; and industrial organizational dynamics in terms of resource configuration, resource complementarities and resource trajectories.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

Convergences with Schumpeter: An essay Hirschman has yet to write

The paper explores the contributions of Joseph Schumpeter and Albert Hirschman to our understanding of the dynamics of modern democratic capitalist economies and suggests that much of their respective work displays intellectual overlap and complementarity. It is primarily focused upon the role of economic and political processes as forces of change and adjustment and the necessary degree of built-in inertia required to permit orderly rather than chaotic responses.     

Barriers to knowledge spillovers and regional convergence in an evolutionary model

This paper will present a multi-region/multi-country model in which inter-regional knowledge spillovers determine the growth of regions. Key parameters in the model are the learning capability of a region and the rate of knowledge generation (R&D). The intensity of spillovers depends on geographical distance between regions. The model is investigated by means of simulation techniques. What results is a core-periphery situation, the exact form of which depends on the assumed spatial structure. The impact of economic integration is investigated by introducing barriers-to-knowledge-spillovers in the model in the form of borders between countries. Contrary to the popular belief and some economic theories, we find that removing such spillover barriers may result in larger disparity of income levels between regions.     

The old and the new: the evolution of polymer and biomedical clusters in Ohio and Sweden

This paper examines the rapid growth of the polymer-based and biomedical clusters in Ohio and Sweden – two regions of similar size and with similar traditions undergoing similar industrial restructuring. Two issues are addressed: First, why has growth been so strong in these particular clusters, i.e., can we identify the sources of the growth and dynamics in these sectors? Second, why do these two clusters differ in Ohio and Sweden in terms of size, level and type of activity, number and composition of actors, size structure of firms and growth patterns over the last couple of decades? In particular, what is the role of public policies as well as cultural, historical, and geographic factors? Our main conclusions are (1) that there is strong path dependence in both clusters in both countries, and (2) that the key to rapid development is a high absorptive capacity combined with rapid diffusion to new potential users. Our policy discussion addresses these issues.     

Evolutionary economics and economic geography

This article attempts to explore how key notions from Evolutionary Economics, such as selection, path-dependency, chance and increasing returns, may be applied to two key topics in Economic Geography. The first issue is the problem of how to specify the (potential) impact of the spatial environment on new variety in terms of technological change. Evolutionary thinking may be useful to describe and explain: (1) the process of localized `collective' learning in a regional context, (2) the adjustment problems that regions may be confronted with in a world of increasing variation, and (3) the spatial formation of newly emerging industries as an evolutionary process, in which the spatial connotation of increasing returns (that is, agglomeration economies) may result in a spatial lock-in. The second issue is the problem of how new variety may affect the long-term evolution of the spatial system. We distinguish three approaches that, each in a different way, apply evolutionary notions to the nature of spatial evolution. This is strongly related to the issue whether mechanisms of chance and increasing returns, rather than selection and path-dependency, lay at the root of the spatial evolution of new technology.     

Beyond natural selection and divine intervention: The Lamarckian implication of Adam Smith's invisible hand

Adam Smith's invisible hand metaphor (IH) is examined in light of two different accounts of the origin of traits: Charles Darwin's theory of evolutionary optimization and William Paley's theory of divine intervention. Smith's stand supersedes both accounts. For Smith, intermediating drives, such as the sexual one, neither arise accidentally and favored according to their fitness à la Darwin nor planted by the Deity à la Paley. For Smith, such drives are adopted in light of their ultimate end. Smith did not provide an account of how the drives are connected to their far-reaching, invisible beneficial ends or why do agents become dimly aware of that causality.     

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

Abstract. Enrollment rates to higher education reveal a quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, will agents choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Cars Hommes, Florian Wagener, seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, participants of the workshop on ‘Skill Needs and Labor Market Dynamics’ at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) for helpful discussions, and an editor of this Journal and three anonymous referees for their comments. Tuinstra's research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under a MaG-Pionier grant. Neugart acknowledges financial support from the German Ministry of Education. Parts of the research were done while Tuinstra was visiting the WZB and when Neugart was visiting CeNDEF. Correspondence to: The research for this paper was done while the first author was affiliated with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.