公司治理、资本结构、资本成本关系的实证研究

本文结合理论研究及中国制度背景,探求公司治理与资本结构及资本成本的关系。应用三阶段最小二乘法实证支持以下论点:发放现金股利、CEO持股比例与资产负债率正相关,第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东是国有时与资产负债率负相关;资产负债率、第一大股东是国有时与资本成本正相关,发放现金股利、第一大股东持股、CEO薪酬、信息披露质量与资本成本负相关;独立董事比例、董事会素质及监事会素质与资本成本、资产负债率相关性均不显著。总的来说,提高公司治理有利于提高企业价值,在一定程度上利于提高负债率,且现金股利政策、资本结构与资本成本三者间存在互动效应。     

浅谈资本结构与公司治理的关系

人们在资本结构理论研究方面取得了丰硕的成果,在公司治理实践过程中也获得了丰富的经验。本文从理论上分析了二者的一致性,从现实角度揭示了二者的差异性。     

融资结构和资本结构与公司治理的关系探讨

企业融资结构，是指企业所采用的融资方式以及各融资方式的比例构成。企业可以选择的融资方式很多，主要可以分为内源性融资和外源性融资。内源性融资是指企业通过内部积累的方式实现的融资，包括原始资本投资，利润转投资和折旧；外源性融资是企业通过一定的途径或借助某种金融工具获得他人的资金，包括企业直接融资（主要是股票和债券）和间接融资（主要是银行信贷）及其它融资方式实现的融资。企业的融资决策就是要合理的选择融资方式，不断优化融资结构，恰当安排融资的比例构成。     

调整资本结构与完善公司治理结构

规范公司治理结构是我国上市公司目前所面临的众多问题之一，解决这一问题途径有很多，比如建立有效的激励与约束措施、完善公司治理结构中的组织机构和相互制衡关系等等。但笔者认为逐步完善公司的资本结构才是解决问题的根本，应该从融资方式入手来实现上市公司治理结构的优化。一、公司的资本结构是公司治理结构的核心内容公司的融资方式从公司建立之初就同公司治理结构紧密联系在一起。公司治理结构是指公司权利机关设置、运行及权力机关之间、公司交易行为的责权利之间的法权关系，它是以董事会、监事会和高层经理人员以及职工之间的责…     

资本结构、控制权配置与公司价值关系研究

一、资本结构与公司控制权配置资本结构的选择影响着公司控制权的配置,公司控制权配置好后,随着公司经营决策的持续,所面临的接管、兼并与代理权争夺等公司控制权竞争与转移的形式又反过来改变现有资本结构的构成,调整公司控制权的配置。因此,公司控制权的配置与资本结构之间存在密切的联系:谁掌握公司控制权谁就能决定公司的资本结构;公司既有的资本结构形成既定的各利益相关人的权益,进一步影响着公司控制权的配置。     

公司价值、资本结构与公司治理研究

资本结构和公司治理结构是公司价值的驱动因素，本文以公司价值为导向提出二者的关联模型。研究二者之间的关联性，对于优化我国上市公司资本结构、改善上市公司治理结构进而实现公司价值最大化具有很强的现实意义。     

公司价值、资本结构和公司治理

公司制企业这种组织形式在资本主义数百年的发展历史中,被证明是企业存在的最好形式。因为它不仅为投资者如股东和债权人提供其得以持续投资所要求的回报率和信心,而且为诸如供应商、员工和政府等利益相关者创造价值。公司存在的目的就是为股东和其利益相关者提供价值,但其首要目标还是为股东创造价值,因为只有为股东创造更多的价值才有可能给那些利益相关者提供他们所愿望的价值。显然,在我们寻找如何增加企业价值的途径之前,探讨一下企业价值的衡量问题显得十分必要。估     

资本结构与完善公司治理

资本结构是指企业的权益资本的构成及其比例关系。它具体包括三方面的内容;一是公司内部融资(未分配利润、累计折旧、减值准备等等)和外部融资(股权融资、长短期债务融资)的比例关系;二是股权融资与债务融资的比例关系;三是各种资本的构成关系。资本结构主要受企业融资成本、经营特征如公司业绩、企业规模和企业所处的生命     

公司治理与资本市场关系探讨

一、公司治理理论 伯利和米恩斯在其《现代公司与私有财产》一书中，对所有者主导型企业和经理主导型企业做了区分．提出了所有权与控制权分离的理论，从而为公司治理的基本理论——“代理理论”奠定了基础，引起了人们对股份公司存在的代理问题可能引起公司管理效率缺失的怀疑。学者对于如何通过对经理实施有效的激励和约束．使其行为能符合所有者的利益，并在无法避免的情况下如何减少代理成本．有着不同的理解。     

公司治理结构与财务困境相关性探究

公司治理结构特征是探究企业陷入财务困境原因不可忽略的重要范畴。对来自中国上市公司近期数据的研究表明,股权集中度和高管薪酬两个因素与企业陷入财务困境的可能性显著负相关,第一大股东较高的持股比例和管理层待遇有助于企业避免陷入财务困境。这种结果体现了中国转型经济背景下企业在公司治理和财务管理衔接上的特殊性。企业应该重视并构建符合自身的公司治理结构,以有效规避财务困境。     

The analysis of corporate governance policy and corporate financial performance

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the quality of corporate governance policy and the firm financial performance and. Data were collected from Corporate Library. A sample of 3,068 firms from the database of 2010 Corporate Library was analyzed. Logistic regression models were employed and SPSS statistical package was utilized to perform the analysis. Our results show that when firms have better corporate governance policies, they are more likely to perform better. Specifically, when firms have a better board rating, compensation policy, takeover defense strategy, accounting practice, and a formal governance policy, they are more likely to perform better than their counterparts without such quality corporate governance policies.     

公司治理结构与会计信息失真防范

我国会计信息失真严重，与其自身的背景有相当大的关系，部分是技术上的原因，大部分则是制度或体制上的原因，公司治理不完善就是一个最重要的方面，因此，仅仅靠会计是不能从根本上解决会计信息失真问题的，而必须完善我国的公司治理结构。     

公司治理结构与会计信息失真防范

我国会计信息失真严重,与其自身的背景有相当大的关系,部分是技术上的原因,大部分则是制度或体制上的原因,公司治理不完善就是一个最重要的方面,因此,仅仅靠会计是不能从根本上解决会计信息失真问题的,而必须完善我国的公司治理结构。     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

Carbon emissions,corporate governance,and staggered boards

Carbon emissions have been identified as a major cause of global warming and are harmful to the environment. Given the seriousness of climate changes, businesses are encouraged to adopt corporate strategies to improve environmental performance. Staggered boards (or classified boards) are one of the controversial corporate governance devices being employed by corporations that protect managers from the market for corporate control. This paper explores whether staggered boards can be a useful business strategy to improve carbon emissions. Relying on a novel data set in which the presence of a staggered board is identified through advanced machine learning algorithms and textual analysis, we find that staggered boards bring about significantly worse emission performance by 10.67%. Our results corroborate the premise that staggered boards insulate self-interested managers from market discipline and thus exacerbate agency problems, resulting in more unfavorable outcomes. Further analysis validates the results, that is, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis, and generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimation. Importantly, we include firm fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that de-staggered boards may help improve emission performance.     

Institutional investors,corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds—are rising across all OECD countries. Meanwhile institutions are becoming more influential in corporate governance, even in bank-dominated countries, inter alia due to international investment, pension reform and EMU. We provide two forms of evidence on the effects of institutional corporate governance on corporate performance. First we offer a literature survey on micro evidence, the outcome of which is mixed, but on balance suggesting a positive effect on equity returns. We contend that these micro studies face a difficulty that they cannot capture effects of governance initiatives whose effects go wider than “target firms”. Accordingly, we present results for the reduced form empirical relationship between institutional share holding and corporate sector performance at an economy-wide level. These are consistent with significant effects which differ between “Anglo-Saxon” and “relationship banking” countries. For example, institutions appear to accompany lower investment and higher dividends in the former.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

Transaction cost economics and corporate governance: the case of CEO age and financial stake

Agency theory provides a valuable lens for understanding the role and importance of many varied governance mechanisms. We argue that transaction cost economics (TCE) provides a complementary theoretical lens for studying corporate governance because it illuminates the various contingencies that moderate the importance of alternative governance mechanisms. Using agency theory, we argue and find evidence that the confluence of advancing CEO age and large CEO stock holdings will cause the CEO to become overly risk‐averse. Moreover, we use TCE to more fully explicate the ensuing performance consequences as well as the contextual factors that critically moderate this relationship. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.