Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model

A perfectly competitive vintage-knowledge model of Schumpeterian growth is introduced to study the relation between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and productivity-dispersion. The incentive to innovate is generated by the productivity-dispersion (latent in traditional vintage models) between new and old plants, rather than by monopoly rents. The model has a unique steady-state REE with endogenous growth. The endogenous extent of entry constitutes a buffer, dampening the effect of research-efficiency and completely neutralizing the effect of population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates. Variations of research-efficiency lead to a negative relation between growth and vintage-lifetime and a non-monotonic relation between growth and productivity-dispersion.     

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

Constant returns to scale and competitive equilibrium under uncertainty

This paper considers the implications of the assumption of constant returns to scale in expected utility maximizing models of the competitive firm or industry in which markets for risk are absent. Under widely used assumptions about risk preferences it is shown that with constant returns to scale average profits are more than necessary to cover the implicit costs of risk-bearing. When the free entry of identical firms is possible this assumption about technology is shown to be incompatible with the assumption that entrepreneurs are risk averse.     

Incentive compatibility and the quantity-setting competitive firm under demand uncertainty

This paper examines the tie between the popular black box neoclassical quantity-setting firm under demand uncertainty and a firm with a rudimentary but explicit employee relation organizational structure in which workers are offered fixed wages for following management directives. Surprisingly, the quantity-setting firm unambiguously mimics optimal employment relation hiring and work rules when the contract is incentive-compatible ex post. The attitude toward risk is shown to be the key determinant of whether or not the quantity-setting firm replicates the optimal employment relation contract when ex post incentive-compatibility is relaxed.     

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

A variant of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered, where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign, subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm's customers. Such non-discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome. This outcome is that of Miyazaki and Spence i.e., the incentive-compatible pair of zero-profit contracts, if efficient; and the incentive-compatible, zero-profit pair of contracts maximizing low-risk utility, otherwise.     

Timing of decisions and the competitive firm under input price uncertainty

This paper studies the behavior of a competitive firm faced with input price uncertainty when the ex ante decision variable is output, not the quantities of the inputs. Highly unconventional results are obtained about the effects of uncertainty and of marginal increases in risk.     

The optimal insurance contract in a competitive market

The author reviews some earlier work on optimal insurance contracts by Arrow and Mossin. He then shows that some results in this work carry over to any premium system which satisfies the additivity condition inherent in a competitive market.     

Respondent uncertainty in a contingent market for carbon offsets

The main objective of this paper is to provide additional empirical evidence of what explains respondent uncertainty in contingent valuation (CV) and how this in turn affects stated willingness to pay (WTP). Air travelers asked to pay a carbon travel tax to offset carbon emissions from flying were asked how likely it is that they will actually pay if the tax is voluntary. When changing the market compliance imperative from a mandatory carbon tax to a voluntary contribution, a third of all air travelers consider it unlikely they will actually pay their stated WTP amount. An ordered probit estimation approach is applied to identify the sources of respondent uncertainty. Besides the bid price, respondent sense of responsibility and belief in the effectiveness of the voluntary carbon market are among the main reasons for the experienced uncertainty.     

Quality uncertainty and time inconsistency in a durable good market

In a durable good monopoly where consumers cannot observe quality prior to purchase and product improvement occurs exogenously over time, I show that uncertainty in quality may resolve the time inconsistency problem (even for low levels of product improvement). Higher dispersion in quality creates greater demand for future product by increasing the incentive of buyers with inferior quality realizations to repeat purchase and this, in turn, reduces the incentive of the seller to cut future price. For various levels of product improvement, I characterize the range of quality uncertainty for which the market equilibrium is identical to one where the monopolist can credibly precommit to future prices. I also show that the presence of quality uncertainty can lead to no trading in the primary good market. Further, in contrast to the literature on the Coase conjecture, inability to precommit to future prices can reduce social welfare as a result of the market closure.     

Modelling investment and disinvestment decisions under competition,uncertainty and different market interventions

A real options market model is developed, which derives the firms' optimal investment and disinvestment thresholds simultaneously in a competitive environment. It combines genetic algorithms and stochastic simulation, whereby vast modelling flexibility is gained. For example, different market interventions can be integrated and their effects on the firms' investment behaviour and the sectoral welfare can be assessed. The model is validated for its application to competitive markets by numerically replicating the optimality property of myopic planning. According to the results, production ceilings and investment subsidies are preferable to price floors because the welfare is less reduced for a given stimulation of the willingness to invest. Moreover, it is shown that not considering disinvestment options, which in reality often exist, can lead to incorrect valuations of investment strategies at firm level and incorrect policy impact analyses at macroeconomic level.     

Endogenous factor market distortion, risk aversion, and international trade under input uncertainty

In the context of non-diversifiable and sector-specific risks in labour markets, we show that the resulting factor market distortion – attributable to an endogenous intersectoral wage differential – can provide a possible rationale that explains why larger wage dispersion prevails in developing nations. We also demonstrate how endogenous wage distortions spill over to capital markets, with capital-poor economies offering lower rates of returns. In addition, we show that inequality in the distribution of wealth further deviates factor allocation away from first-best and impairs intersectoral mobility of the poor.
Ce mémoire montre que la distorsion dans le marché des facteurs qui résulte de risques non diversifiables et spécifiques à certains secteurs (et qui se traduit par un différentiel de salaire endogène entre secteurs) peut expliquer pourquoi on observe une dispersion plus grande des salaires dans les pays en voie de développement.On montre aussi comment des distorsions endogènes de salaires débordent vers les marchés de capitaux,ce qui fait que les pays pauvres en capital ont des rendements plus faibles.De plus, on montre que l'inégalité dans la distribution de la richesse contribue à faire dévier l'allocation des ressources de son optimum de premier ordre et nuit à la mobilité inter-sectorielle des pauvres.     

市场导向下林产品结构调整的政府机能

近年来我国的林业建设取得了较大成就,但也存在一些制约的因素,其中比较明显的的就是产品结构问题。产品结构的好坏,不仅关系到产品能否满足消费者的需求和市场上的竞争力的大小,还影响着资源利用效益和企业的利润。林产品已成为我国商品的重要组成部分,林产品结构是否合理直接影响到林农的经济收入和林业生产的可持续性。市场机制的不断完善对林产品结构的影响越来越大,但市场调节有其必然的先天性不足,因而在林业生产中市场导向必须与政府机能相结合,充分发挥政府在发展政策、投入政策、价格政策和税收政策上的作用,实现林产品结构的调整与优化。     

Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game

Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects’ risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i) the level of strategic sophistication, which has a positive impact on entry decisions, and (ii) the impact of time pressure, which has a (partly) negative influence on entry rates. Furthermore, when ranks are determined using a real effort task, differences in entry rates are explainable by higher competitiveness of males. Additionally, I show that individual characteristics are more important for the entry decision in more competitive environments.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty

This paper analyzes a Hotelling-type game in a mixed oligopoly, where firms can either enter the market in period 1, facing demand uncertainty, or postpone their entry, in order to acquire complete information. It is shown that, for a high (low) level of uncertainty, there is a pure (mixed)-strategy equilibrium. Moreover, the standard result in the literature—that uncertainty is a differentiation force, is only possible when the degree of uncertainty is small. An increase in the degree of uncertainty could force firms to delay their entry and lead to a socially optimal outcome.     

Competition and bargaining in vertical relationships with market uncertainty

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or its opposite, outsource, in an uncertain environment. We consider two different market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two different vertical relationships: an (imperfectly) competitive one following Stackelberg mode and a more cooperative one with bargaining. In the first scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If a bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain. Price setting turns out to be more equitable for firms and preferable even by consumers.

International joint ventures and tax competition in an integrated market

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it develops a theoretical model of international joint ventures to suggest a new approach to the determination of profit allocation between the partners in the joint venture. Second, we examine the issue of tax competition between two countries for an international joint venture. We find that even in the absence of any bargaining power for the domestic firms, the foreign firm would like to give up more than half of profits to its partner. Furthermore, the foreign firm would like to locate in a country in which the partner firm is more efficient. We also find, with numerical simulations, that the domestic firm will accept the joint venture if the foreign firm's technology is significantly more superior than its own.     

The design of a consumption tax under capital risk

This paper focuses on the design of a consumption tax in a world of capital risk. The certainty literature discusses two standard options, namely the cash flow method and the pre-payment method (i.e., the wage tax), and finds the two approaches to be equivalent. Models that consider capital risk (via asset choice) reach different conclusions. This discrepancy arises in part due to a different choice of the social discount rate. In light of the failure of the discount-rate argument to resolve the issue at hand, we explore the market certainty equivalence of risky government revenue. We let revenue risks stay in the private sector, and examine the market value of the feasible transfer (e.g., in the form of a public good) back to households. We reach three broad conclusions. First, we find that if the state returns to each household its own tax-revenue risks, equivalence will be re-established as in certainty models. Next, we show that if the state engages in intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., through a system of stochastic tax transfers), the wage tax cannot be construed to be a valid pre-payment alternative to the cash flow or a modified wage-tax-ation system. Efficient risk allocation across generations under a cash flow tax (or, one that includes future capital gains as well as wages in the tax base) leads to a Pareto improvement over the simple wage tax. Finally, a major policy implication follows; in order to be practicable, a consumption tax would have to be implemented via registered savings accounts much in the fashion of the Canadian registered retirement savings plans program rather than through the pre-payment route.