产业垂直关联、转售价控制与合谋非效率：来自中国公司的经验证据*

产业组织间合谋问题包含产业垂直间及水平间合谋。转售价控制作为产业垂直间合谋竞争者地位主要差异表现,其整体经济价值的决定在动态竞争环境下面临着原有合谋解的瓦解和新合谋解达成的可能。本文理论证明,动态竞争环境下两家同质化的制造商分别使用各自的服务商体系其结果可能会带来更大的行业整体利润。本文应用动态面板技术,以中国最具活力的两个三角地区为实证对象进行验证,从社会整体福利角度证明这种非合谋方式是更有效率的。本文得出的结论主要有两个：一是从组织间的垂直联系看,合谋是一种非效率活动,且各自服务商有非合谋的冲动,其冲动能力大小与企业创新外部性和服务商的谈判力密切相关;二是间接证明了制造业与服务业的合谋更多的是一种经济价值分割而非创造,现有的产业间垂直关联是脆弱非平衡态,这种非平衡态存在着临界条件。本文基于上述结论提出了相应的建议和对策。     

Efficiency versus collusion: a reformulation of the Weiss test

The weiss test has been used to discriminate between the efficiency and collusion hypotheses. Using a conventional oligopoly model, we show that the test is valid for the former hypothesis but not the latter. Contrary to recent emperical studies, we find that a negative coefficient on concentration in profitability equations does not refute the collusion hypothesis. In fact, this finding supports the hypothesis if the sample is dominated by small firms.     

Testing for profitability and contestability in banking: evidence from Austria

The paper investigates the determinants of banking profitability and banking market conditions in Austria. We conduct a panel econometric analysis which allows for testing the hypotheses which have become the most prominent in the literature on bank profitability: the structure–conduct–performance hypothesis, the efficient‐structure hypothesis and the relative market‐power hypothesis. Further, we test whether Austrian banking markets are, on average, contestable. A newly compiled dataset covering more than 700 Austrian banks ranging over the period from 1995 to 2002 is used to carry out these econometric analyses. The empirical findings support the view that the Austrian banks do exert, on average, some local market power. However, the gains in terms of excess profits are rather minor as a result of low deterrence powers of the incumbent banks.     

Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry

Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has both more to gain from deviations and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and characterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies. We stress that firms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally punish even the most efficient firm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry; efficient collusion, however, remains more difficult to sustain when costs are asymmetric. Finally, we show that in the presence of side payments cost asymmetry facilitates collusion.     

控制权私利、公司业绩与CEO变更——兼评上市公司内部治理机制的效率

文章在理论分析的基础上,提出大股东控制框架下CEO变更的五大假设,并以此为视角,基于上交所上市公司2004-2006年公司治理的实践,在运用Logistic回归模型进行实证检验的基础上,对上市公司内部治理机制的效率进行评价。研究发现:(1)能力假设获得证实,表明内部治理机制治理效应的存在;(2)合谋假设获得支持,大股东控制权私利弱化其对CEO的监督;(3)董事会独立性假设得以证实,且董事会履职倾向保守和谨慎;(4)就现阶段的股权结构而言,大股东的利益协同与利益模糊假设同时获得证实。     

The competitive conditions in the OECD manufacturing industry

The goal of this study was to assess the intensity of competition in the OECD manufacturing industry by using the Panzar and Rosse index over the period 1970–2011. For this purpose, we use the fully modified OLS method and second-generation unit root analysis to investigate the level of competition across two-digit manufacturing sectors. The results are robust and consistent with similar studies, leading to the rejection of perfect collusion and perfect competition, while providing evidence in favour of monopolistic competition. Similarly to other empirical studies, H-statistics are shown to be heterogeneous across manufacturing sectors. We argue that more concentrated sectors such as food and beverages, motor vehicles and furniture have low levels of H-statistic being thus less competitive than other industries (i.e. computers transportation equipment, printing and chemicals), where the H-statistic is closer to unity. Lastly, our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural micro-economic goals.     

Technical efficiency and returns to scale in Austrian commercial banking: 1987–1991

In a pooled time-series cross-section study covering the period 1987–1991, the technical efficiency of Austrian all-purpose banks is analysed. The sample covers banks of all size classes, among them the largest 18 banks as well as some of the very small banks. The empirical results show that local banks and nationwide operating banks are technically most efficient while regional banks are least efficient. Moreover, it can be shown that the technical efficiency of nationwide operating banks improved substantially in the period analysed relative to that of local and regional banks.I wish to thank an anonymous referee for his helpful comments. Financial support from the Vienna Chamber of Commerce is gratefully acknowledged.     

Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis in the Italian Banking Industry

In this paper we test the so‐called ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (QLH), according to which firms with market power are less efficient. Using data on the Italian banking industry for the period 1992–2007, we apply a two‐step procedure. First we estimate bank‐level cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices. Then we use the estimated market power measures, as well as a vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Our empirical evidence supports the QLH, although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly remarkable in magnitude.     

The influence analysis on public expenditure to the technique efficiency of China

In this paper, we use SFA to estimate the time-variant stochastic frontier model of 31 cities in China. The results tell us that raising the proportion of public expenditure in GDP can lower the technological efficiency, but raising some parts of public expenditure in GDP can promote the technological efficiency. Its realistic meaning is that it is excellent to turn the public expenditure structure to promote the technological efficiency. We computed the technological efficiency of 31 provinces/cities and the results show that the gap between the eastern region and western region is growing much. Finally, we decompose total factor productivity (TFP) and get the following result: from three regions, the biggest influence factor on technological efficiency is the scales economy. Technological progress and allocation efficiency have a smaller influence. From our results, we suggest that technological progress and allocation efficiency from public expenditure and income be raised to influence the TFP rate of change, and have a more efficient public expenditure. __________ Translated from Journal of Finance and Economics (财经研究), 2005, (12) (in Chinese)     

Seasoned equity offerings by all-equity firms

Previous studies on the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings document an average two-day common stock abnormal return of approximately −3%. The overall results from these studies suggest that capital structure hypothesis, information hypothesis, and/or price-pressure hypothesis offers a potential explanation for the abnormal reaction around the announcement date. This paper controls for capital structure related effects by examining the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings made by all-equity firms. Our results show that the average two-day common stock abnormal return is −0.82% (significant at 5% level). This result suggests that capital structure related effects constitute a major portion of the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings studied in the previous literature. Furthermore, the negative abnormal returns following equity issues cannot be attributed entirely to capital structure related effects. Our cross-sectional tests indicate that the information hypothesis is significant in explaining the abnormal reaction. While our results do not support the price-pressure hypothesis, we find that the negative reaction around the announcement date is significantly mitigated if a firm has issued stock more frequently during our sample period.     

MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP,COLLUSION AND UNUSUAL RESULT PATTERNS IN SOCCER

Expanding on the literature on antitrust, multiple ownership, and collusion in sports, this paper finds a very unusual result pattern between two clubs competing in the Croatian soccer league—Lokomotiva and Dinamo Zagreb. Their close sporting and business relationship has raised many questions about the possible collusion between them, potentially affecting the integrity of the competition. We analyze all matchups in the competition's 25‐year history to single out those characterized by biggest under‐ and overperformances by competing clubs. Our findings provide some support to the allegations of a possible collusion between the clubs as Lokomotiva's underperformance against Dinamo is so far in the tail of normal distribution that it has a lower occurrence probability than a random person being hit by lightning. (JEL Z29, K21, L83).     

Pure numbers effects, market power, and tacit collusion in posted offer markets

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no-power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.     

Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis

The 1992 Cable Act requires cable systems to carry local broadcasters. Noncarriage of local stations may represent an attempt by cable systems to disadvantage rivals, and thereby raise the prices of advertising and cable service. Alternatively, noncarriage might represent the efficient replacement of low-valued channels with more highly-valued programming. This study attempts to discriminate between these hypotheses with data on cable carriage decisions. The results support the efficiency hypothesis. Systems selling advertising are less likely to drop local stations than nonadvertisers. Dropped stations tend to have low audience ratings, and tend to originate in a different geographic market from the system.     

政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据

矿难成为中国最大的公共治理难题之一。本文首次利用1995—2005年省级层面的国有重点煤矿死亡事故样本,检验了地方政府和煤矿企业之间的合谋以及其他因素对矿难的影响。特别地,本文主要用三个变量度量政企合谋的程度:主管安全生产的副省长是否本地人、是否在任期的第五年以及任现职时是否超过50岁。结果表明,1995—1997年,当国有重点煤矿由中央政府管理时,政企合谋没有对煤矿死亡率产生显著影响;1998—2002年,当国有重点煤矿下放到省级政府管理时,政企合谋显著地增加了煤矿死亡率;2003—2005年,当负责煤炭安全监察的国家安全生产监督管理总局和国家煤矿安全监察局升级为国务院直属机构,从而与地方政府以及煤炭生产脱钩时,政企合谋的影响变得不显著。本文的结果说明,选择年轻的异地主管官员并且增加其流动性、提高安监机构的独立性对于降低煤矿死亡率具有非常重要的作用。     

The Italian Banking Structure in the 1990s: Testing the Multimarket Contact Hypothesis

The multimarket contact hypothesis holds that more contacts between firms competing in the same markets may induce more collusion. This paper tests the hypothesis for the Italian banking market, analysing the behaviour of the largest Italian banks from 1990 to 1996. Market rivalry is gauged by changes in loan market shares and interest rates in each Italian province. We estimate the effects of increasing multimarket contacts, concentration indicators, banks' costs and loan demand on variations in market shares and interest rates. No support is found for the multimarket contact hypothesis. Geographical overlap in banking is positively correlated with changes in market shares, confirming the thesis of an overall increase in competition within the Italian banking system. Greater multimarket links also seem to correspond to lower lending rates.
(J.E.L.:G21, C33, L40.)     

管理者交易的市场择时能力对市场有效性的影响

管理者卖出和买入公告对股票市场具有一定的影响,以管理者卖出交易和买入交易为公告样本进行实证分析,检验公告当日及给定事件期超额收益的显著性.结果显示:卖出公告样本反对半强式有效假说,管理人能够“卖高”,获得超额收益；而买入公告样本支持半强式有效假说,管理者不能够“买低”,在公告日和事件期都不能获得超额收益.     

Testing the efficiency of the Athens Stock Exchange: Some results from the banking sector

In this study we test the efficient market hypothesis in the Athens Stock Exchange for a number of selected stocks from the banking sector. We distinguish between a “weak” and “semistrong” version of the hypothesis depending on the agents' information sets. For the “weak” version we apply a recently developed test by Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1987) to test for the presence of nonlinear structure in the residuals of rates of return regressions of these stocks. To test the “semistrong” form of the efficiency hypothesis we carry out tests of cointegration following the methodology of Granger and Engle (1987). We find no noticeable presence of nonlinearties in the standardized residuals for these series. Also we find no evidence of cointegration and hence no Granger causality between the different stocks. Our findings support the “weak” and “semi-strong” versions of the efficient market hypothesis.     

Außenhandelsstruktur und Faktorintensität 1962/1977

Summary As a supplement to the findings presented in an article in volume 2/1978 of this journal byG. Fink andJ. Skolka some further results concerning the capital and labour intensity of Austria's trade are provided. These results are based on a more disaggregated input-output approach and on modified ways to measure direct capital and labour inputs and seem to strenghten the hypothesis that in 1964 the capital and labour intensity of Austria's foreign trade was more or less neutral.The same approach was used to investigate the effects of the changing composition of export and import bundles on the factor intensities for the period 1962/1977. Although the structure of both exports and imports changed remarkable over this period the total content of labour and capital remained rather stable and the evolution was almost paralell for exports and imports.     

Semicollusion vs. Full Collusion: The Role of Demand Uncertainty and Product Substitutability

We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: full collusion, under which firms collude on both price and quality, and semicollusion, under which firms collude on price only. We show that, in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement, firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only. However, a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and the relative profitability of semicollusion exists only for low levels of demand substitutability. The converse is true for high levels of demand substitutability. Therefore, if demand substitutability is sufficiently high, no level of demand uncertainty will make semicollusion the optimal organizational form. In contrast, semicollusion is guaranteed to be optimal for a sufficiently low level of demand substitutability. The market structure described is motivated by and closely parallels that of shipping cartels. Received September 29, 2000; revised version received December 10, 2001 Published online: November 11, 2002     

Is assortative matching efficient?

Summary. This paper develops some general conditions under which complementarities between individual agents imply that assortative matching is efficient. Our analysis has four main findings. First, when agents are organized into equal-sized groups, just as in Becker (1973), the presence of within-group complementarities is sufficient for stratification to be efficient. Second, if group sizes vary, assortative matching may not be efficient even though complementarities are present, unless particular functional form assumptions are imposed. Third, the connection between assortative matching, complementarities and efficiency reemerges if one considers sequences of replications of the economy in which individual coalitions are uniformly bounded in size. Fourth, the presence of feedbacks from the composition of group memberships has important effects on efficient allocations and breaks any simple link between assortative matching and efficiency. Together, these results suggest that the characterization of the cross-section evolution of an efficiently sorted economy is likely to be highly complex. Received: September 25, 2001; revised version: February 26, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank William Brock for many helpful conversations and Scott Page for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The National Science Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Center for Urban Land Economic Research have generously provided financial support. Correspondence to: S. N. Durlauf