环境规制对工业企业绿色创新效率的影响——基于空间杜宾模型的实证分析

对我国省域工业企业绿色创新效率的测算和财政分权条件下不同环境规制对企业绿色创新效率影响的分析表明,工业企业绿色创新效率具有明显的正向空间集聚效应,财政分权对工业企业绿色创新效率存在显著的抑制作用,不同环境规制工具存在明显差异,财政分权和环境规制的交互效应在“行政命令型”环境规制中尤为显著。不同地区的环境规制以及与财政分权的交互效应具有显著的区域异质性。我国应优化财政分权制度与地方官员绩效考核评价体系,充分考虑环境规制工具与地方财政分权的交互效应,在不同区域选择不同的环境规制工具,制定跨区域的环境规制政策,发挥东部地区绿色创新的优势,进一步完善中西部地区的绿色创新补偿机制。     

财政分权、环境规制与绿色全要素生产率

理解财政分权体制下我国环境治理对全要素生产率的影响对于我国经济和环境协调发展起到了重要作用,使用我国285个地级市2008-2015年的数据建立财政分权、环境规制与绿色全要素生产率的中介效应模型,并采用两阶段最小二乘和空间滞后解释变量模型处理内生性。研究表明：财政分权引起地方竞争以牺牲环境为代价换取经济增长,导致环境治理不足而影响绿色全要素生产率,财政分权不利于绿色全要素生产率的提升。     

财政分权、空间外溢与区域经济增长

分税制改革以后,税收体系被划分为中央与地方两大部分,正式建立起以分税制为中心的财政分权体制。各地区的财政分权程度不仅对本地经济增长有直接影响,还对其他地区的经济增长有间接影响,即存在空间溢出效应。利用我国2005年至2018年31个省（市、自治区）的面板数据,运用空间面板模型,估计和检验财政分权对经济增长的空间效应。研究结果表明：各地区的财政分权不仅促进本地经济增长,还对其他地区的经济增长有显著正向溢出效应。     

Does decentralization reduce income inequality? Only in rich states

We investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality using data from U.S. states over three and a half decades. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways in terms of empirical methodology and specification. First, we take into account integration and cointegration properties of the data and estimate the cointegrating relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality using Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares, following Pedroni (2000). Second, we investigate the direction of the causality. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we investigate if the relationship between fiscal decentralization and income inequality is conditional on income in each state. We find that fiscal decentralization does reduce income inequality, but only in rich states. We also find that causality runs from fiscal decentralization to income inequality, not the other way around.     

财政分权、金融分权与科技创新

央地间分权改革是我国调节不同层级政府间权责关系的一项制度探索,对于强化地方政府创新职能具有重要意义。文章基于我国城市面板数据,实证分析了财政与金融分权制度改革对科技创新的影响。研究发现,财政分权与金融分权均能有效促进城市创新,并且这种影响具有显著的时空异质性特征。动态分析发现,随着城市创新水平的提升,两种分权制度对城市创新的影响也存在着差异化的动态变化轨迹。此外,实证分析结果也表明,我国财政分权制度改革与金融分权制度改革的匹配性较差,两类分权制度缺乏有效协同。因此,在有序推动分权制度改革的同时,要提高财政与金融两个领域分权制度的匹配性,最大化分权制度改革对创新型经济发展的促进作用。     

财政分权的绿色经济增长效应研究

财政分权作为调控央地资源的重要手段,对地方绿色经济增长具有重要的影响.首先通过构建环境污染综合指数计算绿色GDP,再构建系统GM M模型,运用2007—2017年中国30个省(市、自治区)的数据,实证分析财政分权与绿色经济增长之间的内在关系.研究结果显示:财政分权对绿色经济增长有显著的促进作用;东部地区的财政分权对刺激绿色经济增长的效果要优于中西部地区.因此,为实现全国经济可持续发展,应持续推进财政分权改革,因地制宜地推动地区经济高质量发展.     

Local Governance: Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size and Spending Composition in Vietnam*

The study provides an understanding of the impacts of fiscal decentralization and local governance on government size and spending composition. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period. By estimating the spatial Durbin model, we find that local public spending and government size grow over time and have spatial spillovers. Fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public spending and government size, which supports the Leviathan hypothesis. More interestingly, combining local governance, the marginal spatial spillover effects of the fiscal decentralization on public spending and government size are intensified. Our findings imply that local governments should enhance interregional collaboration in fiscal management to limit duplicate public spending and promote regional sustainable development.     

Health risks of exposure to waste pollution: Evidence from Beijing

Waste pollution is a major environmental problem in big cities in China such as Beijing. The phenomenon of “cities besieged by waste” has received substantial attention of local residents, social media and policymakers. We investigate the causal impact of exposure to waste pollution on the health outcomes of migrants, who are in a more disadvantageous position than native residents of Beijing. Using administrative waste disposal data and the China Migrants Dynamic Survey, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the level of emission from the nearest waste disposal site (WDS) increases by 10–11 percentage points in the probability of a migrant's sickness, but we do not find significant evidence when using the proximity to waste disposal sites as an indicator of waste pollution exposure. Our flindings suggest residence near WDSs poses a health risk.     

Environmental (de)centralization and local environmental governance: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

It is of great importance for government to design effective incentive mechanisms in environmental governance. This paper investigates the causal effects of environmental (de)centralization on local governments' environmental governance. Based on stragged establishments timing of regional Supervision Centers for Environmental Protection (SCEPs) in China, we introduce a unique government administrative dataset on firm pollution in order to conduct gradual intensity difference-in-differences estimations. We present strong evidence that establishing the SCEPs significantly prompt firms to reduce emission pollution. Since the establishment of the SCEPs brings more effective information collection and supervision, promoting local firms reduce pollutant generation and increase investment in pollution control. Moreover, the SCEPs could coordinate adjacent provinces' incentives on reducing firms' emissions around provincial boundaries. Besides, this study provides clear policy implications that when fiscal decentralization carries the risk of aggravating environmental pollution, vertical management structures in environmental governance could effectively strengthen incentives and coordination.     

Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China

Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at the local levels, which may cause the common-pool problem in local governments' behavior. Using a large fiscal dataset at the county level from 1997 to 2006, this paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on local expenditure policy and analyzes how the vertical fiscal imbalance shapes these effects. The estimation results show that expenditure decentralization increases government spending and leads to a fund allocation with a larger weight on capital construction and smaller weights on education and administration. In contrast, revenue decentralization has little influence on local government expenditures. We show that the differences in the effects of expenditure and revenue decentralization can be attributed to the distortionary effects caused by the vertical fiscal imbalance and, thus, offer support to the importance of the common-pool problem at the county level of China's fiscal system.     

Foreign direct investment,fiscal decentralization and land conflicts in China

Land disputes have been an important risk to social stability in China since the turn of the century. This paper uses provincial data on illegal land uses during the period 1999–2010 as a proxy for the intensity of land conflicts to investigate the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and fiscal decentralization on jurisdictional land conflicts. The results show that the FDI growth rate has a positive and significant impact on the growth rate of illegal land use when there is a high degree of fiscal decentralization. We thus provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that regional competition for FDI, as shaped by fiscal decentralization, tends to raise conflicts over land in China.     

Fiscal decentralization,fiscal reform,and economic growth in china

In 1994, after a period of substantial fiscal decentralization that has been credited with leading to historically unprecedented growth rates but significant fiscal decline, China introduced a new fiscal system that recentralized the collection of tax revenues. The economic and political consequences of this new Tax Sharing System (TSS) have been debated extensively in the literature, especially because of the renewed interest in fiscal federalism and its interaction with political institutions and economic outcomes. The question central to this debate has been whether the TSS constitutes a significant departure from decentralization with adverse effects on fiscal federalism or whether the recentralization of revenues under the TSS corrects for the overshooting in decentralization with beneficial economic outcomes. This paper exploits the staggered introduction of the TSS across regions and over time for econometric identification purposes and finds robust causal evidence that the TSS had a positive impact on economic outcomes.     

分权式改革对经济增长影响的实证研究

中国的分权式改革是财政分权、行政分权和经济分权的三重分权过程,仅仅选择单一维度的分权指标,无法准确确认分权的经济增长效应。通过构建分权的多维衡量指标体系,并以1998-2011年省级面板数据为样本,全面分析了分权式改革对经济增长的影响。实证结果显示:分权整体上促进了地方经济增长,但不同维度的分权对经济增长的影响效应并不相同。此外,分权对经济增长的影响还存在显著的地区差异,东部地区分权的经济增长优势高于中西部地区。     

环境规制对南通市制造业绿色技术创新能力的影响效应

基于南通区县数据和面板模型,实证检验环境规制对南通市制造业绿色技术创新能力的影响效应。结果显示：南通市各地区间制造业绿色技术创新能力呈现阶梯式分布,地区间差距逐渐缩小;强化环境规制对制造业绿色技术创新能力具有显著正向效应;经济发展水平、人力资本等变量对制造业绿色技术创新能力有着不同程度的促进作用,外商直接投资表现为抑制作用,财政分权未能通过显著性检验。据此,从环境规制监管体系、联动式环境规制网络、差异化环境规制政策等方面提出针对性建议。     

地方财政支出的空间外部效应研究

财政行为的空间外部性是应用公共经济学的重要研究课题。目前，国内既有文献多是集中于对税收竞争的考察。对于地方财政支出空间外部效应的研究还非常缺乏。依据Case和Rosen（1993）的思路，本文采用空间计量方法对我国地方财政支出的空间外部性进行了经验研究。结果表明，总体上看，地方财政支出具有显著的正外部效应。但进一步对建设支出和教育科技支出这两个细分项目的分析则显示，后者并未表现出显著的空间外部效应。上述结论的得出为最优分权规模的确定提供了一个新的观察视角。     

“两型社会”经济运行制度研究——基于财政分权的视角

我国"两型社会"建设已由理论概念转变成现实行动,国家财政分权制度是促进经济快速增长和经济运行效率提高的一个重要因素。在财政分权与经济增长关系理论文献与经验研究进行回顾的基础上,分别从理论和实证角度证明:财政分权对经济增长的积极作用呈现边际递减;存在一个最优财政分权点(或者至少存在一个可判断的最优财政分权区间),与经济发展相协调,促进经济快速增长。在控制影响经济增长的其它变量后,得到68.58%是我国的最优财政分权点,这一结论也得到了现实的印证。希望这一结论在我国"两型社会"建设,经济发展方式转变和追求财政分权与集权的制度博弈中,给政府决策财政分权尺度提供有价值的建议。     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。     

Economic policy uncertainty and industrial pollution: The role of environmental supervision by local governments

This paper explores the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on industrial pollution using China's real-time pollution data and a novel news-based EPU index constructed by Davis, Liu, and Sheng (2019). Empirical results suggest that EPU can significantly promote sulfur dioxide (SO₂) readings in cities experiencing higher ex-ante fiscal pressure, and this effect is more profound during the daytime. Given that SO₂ is the main contributor to industrial pollution, and local governments have less incentive to monitor illegal pollutant discharges during the nighttime period, our findings indicate that rising EPU will harm the environment by motivating local authorities to reduce environmental supervision and thus increase industrial pollution. We also find that promoting regional innovation and strengthening external environmental regulations can mitigate the pollution effect of economic policy uncertainty.     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

俄罗斯财政分权程度

以财政自主权为主线,基于IMF和OECD不同的评估方法,对俄罗斯财政分权有效性提出了合理解释。虽然俄罗斯财政资源分权处于较高水平,但是定性评估却得出相反的结论。正是法律约束条件下的自主权不足才产生了较强的财政从属性以及非正式自主权的不良激励。这也是中国目前分权财政体制的重要特征。对该问题的研究对提高中国政府的治理效率具有重要的借鉴意义。