中日两国间贸易与投资的新动向及发展前景

经过几十年发展,中日两国之间的贸易投资关系已密不可分。在经历了全球金融危机和东日本大地震后2,011年中日贸易及两国之间的投资出现一些新动向。在欧美经济萧条、日本灾后重建将持续五到十年、中国经济虽有放缓迹象但仍将保持相对较快增长的情况下,预计中日两国间的贸易与投资总体将会进一步发展,中国仍将是日本一个最重要的贸易伙伴和出口地,中日之间相互投资的严重失衡状态会继续改善,中国面临日本结构调整和产业转移的新机遇。     

China＇s FDI Net Inflow and Deterioration of Terms of Trade： Paradox and Explanation

Starting from the contradiction between China's sustained growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflow and deterioration of the terms of trade, this paper analyzes the characteristics of FDI sectoral structure since the 1990. Moreover, considering the international market competitive environment, this paper gives a concrete analysis of the influence mechanism and concludes that the flowing of FDI into labor‐intensive export sectors caused the deterioration of China's terms of trade. To improve its terms of trade, China needs to direct FDI inflow into capital‐ and technology‐intensive sectors and service sectors. (Edited by Xiaoming Feng)     

Remedy or Poison: Impacts of China's Outward Direct Investment on Its Exports

During the past decade, China's outward direct investment (ODI) and exports have experienced rapid growth, drawing increasing attention to the relationship between them. Using the gravity model based on panel data on China's ODI and trade to 174 countries and regions during 2003–2012, the present paper investigates the impacts of China's ODI on exports. We find that China's ODI to a host country significantly promotes China's trade with that economy: a 10‐percent increase in ODI stock can lead to a 2.14‐percent increase in exports, a 2.07‐percent increase in imports and a 2.87‐percent increase in net exports. The scale of the host country's economy, its infrastructure and its distance to China also have significant impacts on China's exports. Therefore, growth in ODI will facilitate China's trade and integration into the global economy, and enhance industrial upgrading in China by transferring the low‐end industries abroad.     

Trade in factor income and the US-China trade balance

US multindoational enterprises sell considerable amounts of products to China's domestic consumers that are “made” in either China or other countries. However, these sales are not counted as US exports to China. To account for this, we propose a beyond-borders approach to measuring trade flows that explicitly considers firm ownership, termed “trade in factor income (TiFI),” that defines the US-owned factor income induced by China's final demand as US exports to China. Applying this approach to OECD data, we find that on average from 2005 to 2016 in TiFI terms, US exports to China were 20.34% and 8.21% greater, China's exports to the US were 1.64% and 16.04% less, and the US trade deficits with China were 17.4% and 32.0% less than the trade figures reported in value added and gross terms, respectively. The concept of TiFI transforms trade measures from a territory-based “made in” label to a factor income-based “created by” label.     

Expansion of EU's Free Trade Agreements into Asian Countries and Its Impact on the Chinese Economy

Abstract

This study investigates the macroeconomic impact of EU's free trade agreements with Asian countries and the US on the Chinese economy. In addition we examine the impacts on the Chinese industry output based on the framework of production network and production fragmentation. The expansion of the EU's economic reach toward ASEAN and Japan through free trade agreement will generate a positive macroeconomic effect on negotiation participants while it generates a negative effect on the Chinese economy: Some portions of existing trade and foreign direct investment will be shifted to partner countries from non-partner countries. However, according to a sectorial analysis, EU's free trade agreements with three countries result in a positive impact on China's electronics and machinery industry, because China's industry is linked to the production fragmentation and foreign affiliates play a crucial role.     

Why does so much FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan go to Mainland China?

While the European Union, the US, and Japan (the Triad) supply 90% of global foreign direct investment (FDI) and China is the second largest FDI recipient in the world, most FDI into China did not come from the Triad but from Hong Kong and Taiwan (HKT). Evidence presented in the paper reveals that the unusually large amount of Hong Kong–Taiwan direct investment (HKTDI) cannot be fully appreciated without understanding China's location characteristics and differences between HKTDI and the Triad FDI. Four determinants of the dominant HKTDI in China are identified: China's export-promotion FDI strategy, its large pool of cheap labor, HKT's specific advantages in export-oriented FDI, and their unique links with China (the Chinese connections). Empirical results suggest that HKTDI was primarily motivated by low labor costs while FDI from the Triad was market-oriented. As China's domestic markets become more open to foreign investors, the share of HKTDI may shrink and the importance of FDI from the Triad may rise.     

What are China's real gains within global value chains? Measuring domestic value added in China's exports of manufactures

This paper aims to investigate China's gains of participating in global value chains (GVCs) in terms of GDP in exports (DVA - domestic value added) and the factors affecting China's gains. The paper decomposes the gross exports of China so as to get the components that make up total GDP in the exports of the country, namely the value-added exports and DVA that are returned from abroad. Then the two components are measured to obtain the scale of GDP in China's exports both on country and sector level. The results show that, firstly, both value-added exports and the GDP in China's exports are less than the traditional gross trade statistics, indicating that there is a gap of real trade gains under GVCs. Secondly, comparing whether the proportion of DVA in total exports, the proportion of DVA in exports of manufactures or the proportion of RDV in total DVA, the gaps between China and the developed countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan do exist. Especially, considering the RDV of China, the proportion is significantly lower than that of major developed countries such as the United States and Germany, indicating that China lags far behind developed countries in the capabilities of supplying high value-added intermediate goods. Lastly, the empirical results suggest that DVA in China's exports has progressively increased in response to the productivity enhancement; research and development (R&D) inputs and capital formation, and the synergies between R&D and vertical specialization affect China's DVA growth in exports positively.     

China's Overinvestment and International Trade Conflicts

For a long time, China's impressive growth performance has been driven by investment and high productivity gains. Based on a discussion of possible overcapacities and overinvestment in China, this paper investigates the sustainability of China's investment and export‐driven growth model. Since the turn of the millennium, buoyant capital inflows and low interest rates have been at the root of overinvestment and misallocation of capital, which necessitated export subsidies to clear markets. The overinvestment boom is argued to have ended around 2014. Since then, the overcapacities have weakened China's bargaining position in the US–Chinese trade conflict and have tempted Chinese authorities to postpone the restructuring of the Chinese economy by providing low‐interest credit. The gradual reemergence of quasi‐soft budget constraints is seen to undermine China's long‐term growth potential.     

Vanishing of China's Twin Surpluses and Its Policy Implications

This paper argues that the twin surpluses in China's balance of payments will disappear in the future as a result of external and internal structural changes. China's current account surplus will diminish as a result of the decline in the goods trade surplus, the expanding service trade deficit and negative investment income. China's capital account might shift from surplus to deficit as a result of shrinking net direct investment inflows and more volatile short‐term capital flows. When the twin surpluses no longer exist, the normalization of the US treasury bond yields will be sped up, terminating the one‐way appreciation of the RMB exchange rate; the People's Bank of China's pressure to sterilize inflows will be alleviated, and new problems for the People's Bank of China's monetary operation will emerge; new financial vulnerabilities for the Chinese economy will arise. Finally, the present paper provides some policy suggestions for the Chinese Government to deal with the declining twin surpluses.     

Ties Binding Asia,Europe and the USA

We investigate changes in Asia's regional and global trade linkages and their influence on macroeconomic relationships among Asia, Europe and the USA. We first document changes in tripartite trade patterns and discuss stylized facts about East Asia's trade structure, with particular focus on the role of China. China plays a critical role in the rapidly expanding intra‐Asian trade as an assembly and production center that supplies final goods for the advanced economies. However, China's trade shares in final goods with East Asia and in parts and components with Europe and the USA are rising, suggesting that the region's production chains are becoming increasingly integrated into the global business network. Empirical results from a panel vector autoregression model generally confirm increasingly mutual macroeconomic interdependence among East Asia, Europe and the USA. The findings suggest a future role for Asia as an important trade partner and balancing power in the world economy.     

China and the World Trade Organization

For nine long years China made determined but unsuccessful efforts to rejoin GATT, having gone through 21 rounds of protracted negotiations. China failed to become a founding member of WTO when it superseded GATT in January 1995. In 1989 GATT was about to work out the final terms of protocol for China's entry as a reforming socialist economy. But the Tiananmen event made the developed country members, led by the US, politicize the issue of China's membership. They also wanted to prise open the vast China market as a condition for China's entry; i.e. China to be admitted as a developed economy. China for its part regarded the price of its WTO membership as too exorbitant without being allowed a reasonable timetable for adjustment. Minister Wu Yi considered the US demands ‘absolutely unacceptable’. Hence the impasse over China's WTO membership continued. Apart from the imperative of trade diplomacy, however, the perceived benefits of WTO membership to China are difficult to capture. They are mainly general and long-term in nature, e.g. facilitating China's further economic reform and integrating China into the global economy. However, the costs and risks to China could be considerable, much depending on the exact protocol terms of China's membership. In general many state-owned enterprises and township-village enterprises would suffer from stiffer foreign competition. The effect of WTO on Chinese agriculture would be minimal, while the impact on the manufacturing sector could be quite disruptive. The service sector could fare even worse if no protective measures were to be taken. That explains why China needs to insist on developing-country terms of entry. Without doubt, China will eventually accede to WTO. It is a gross anomaly for this global multilateral trade body to continue excluding China, the world's 11th largest trading nation, on which also hinge the two other great trading entities of Hong Kong and Taiwan. There is increasing awareness of this point in the EU; and it will sooner or later also prevail in Washington.     

Host countries’ growth opportunities and China's outward FDI

In 2014, China proposed the Belt and Road policy, which has pushed China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) to over tens of billions of US dollars. However, existing studies have not reached a consensus about the decisive factors in China's OFDI. To verify whether China's OFDI activities are motivated by profits, this paper applies a measure of country‐specific growth opportunities adopted by Bekaert et al. (2007) to measure the growth opportunities of the target countries for China's OFDI. A multinational panel data model, based on data from 51 countries from 2003 to 2012, is used to explore the relationship between host countries’ growth opportunities and China's OFDI. Overall, the analysis finds that China's OFDI does not follow the host countries’ growth opportunities but exhibits different features toward developed countries and developing countries. For developed countries, China's OFDI follows host countries’ growth opportunities to some extent. In the case of developing countries, China's OFDI does not follow host countries’ growth opportunities. When we consider factors such as a host country's financial development and political stability, improvement in these factors improves the attractiveness of the host country to China's OFDI. It is also found that the 2008 global financial crisis did not have a very significant impact on China's OFDI activities.     

Singapore's Bilateral Merchandise Trade Linkages with Japan and the United States: Trends,Patterns and Comparisons*

This paper analyses and compares trends and patterns in Singapore's bilateral merchandise trade relations with its two largest trading partners, Japan and the United States (US). Over the period 1976–1992, the analyses reveal that both Japan and the US have been relatively over-represented as Singapore's trade partners. However, whereas Singapore's trade with Japan has become more intensive in recent years, that with the US has become less so. Computations reveal that the degree as well as level of Singapore's intra-industry trade with the US has exceeded that with Japan. Nevertheless, while the degree of Singapore's intra-industry trade with Japan has been consistently increasing since 1981, bilateral trade with the US since 1987 has become increasingly inter- rather than intra-industry. The important nexus between trade and FDI is also highlighted.     

Vertical Specialization and Trade Growth in Northeast Asia

As the global economy has become further integrated, the international production chain has become more sophisticated, with diversified stages of production located in different countries. Economic theorists have argued that the fragmentation of the global production chain is partly attributable to the high growth in international trade over the past several decades. In this study, we examine vertical specialization in China, Japan and Korea, and its contribution to these nations' trade. Using a multilevel model, it is illustrated that vertical specialization has encouraged increases in trade among all three countries. In particular, China's outcome is remarkable considering how recently it became a member of the WTO.     

Global Spillovers of China's Monetary Policy

Spillovers from China's monetary policy have become increasingly obvious with China's growing importance in the global economy and its close economic and trade ties with the world. This study establishes a proxy structure vector autoregression model to investigate the magnitude and transmission channel of spillovers from China to global and regional economies, taking advantage of high-frequency changes in asset prices in the financial markets to identify monetary policy shocks. The analysis reveals that China's monetary policy can affect the global economy by influencing international trade and commodity prices but there is no evidence of China's monetary policy affecting global financial variables. Tightness in China's monetary policy can cause a decline in world output whereas expansion in monetary policy can support global trade and output. This study also finds that the response of emerging Asian economies to China's monetary policy shock was nearly twice that of developed economies, while the transmission path did not change. The results of this study are consistent with the stylized fact that China's monetary policy plays an important role in the global trade and commodity cycle, although it does not drive the global financial cycle.     

Forest endowment,logging restrictions,and China's wood products trade

This paper uses the gravity model to investigate determinants of China's wood products trade from 1995 to 2004. The results suggest that trade partners' forest resource endowment and China's own logging restrictions policy affect its wood products imports and exports. China's exported wood products are shown to be inferior goods while China's imported wood products are labor intensive for the exporting countries. Due to rises in Chinese currency against other major currency, transportation costs, and foreign trade actions, China's wood products exports and imports may slow down. The results may have implications on trade and global forest resource conservation.     

Impact of RMB Appreciation on Trade and Labor Markets of China and the USA： A Multi-country Comparative General Equilibrium Model

Since the recent economic crisis, the undervaluation of China's exchange rate has been a focus in the debate on the global policy mix. Using a non‐competitive input–output table, we establish a comparative‐static general equilibrium model to simulate the impact of real exchange rate changes on Sino–US trade and labor markets. The simulation shows that the impacts of a 10‐percent RMB revaluation on the trade surplus of China and the labor market of the USA are more modest than is generally perceived, and the negative impact on the output of the non‐processing industry in China is more significant than that on the processing industry. The Sino–US trade imbalance will continue to deteriorate, China's non‐processing trade surplus will decline and the processing trade will increase, with the combined effect being small. For the USA, labor‐intensive goods imported from China will shift to different Asian countries instead of transferring back to the US market. The simulation results indicate that the impacts of an RMB revaluation on both Chinese and US labor markets would be limited.     

What India Can Learn from China and Vice Versa

A partial convergence of the Indian and Chinese growth models is likely. Judging from China's experience, sustaining India's impressive economic performance of recent years will require a significant further opening of its economy (externally and internally), higher savings and investments, especially in physical infrastructure and social services, and stronger labor absorption in the modern sectors. The base of India's current economic boom - software, IT-related services and high-end manufacturing - is narrow compared to China's. Poor performance in agriculture is responsible for still significant poverty in many parts of rural India. Bilateral India-China ties, including trade and investment, are increasing rapidly and could help to bring about the structural economic changes India needs. Through its exports to China, India is becoming linked to global supply chains centered on China. The notion that India-China relations are, or are bound to become, fundamentally antagonistic, held by many in the USA, is mistaken and potentially dangerous.     

A comprehensive economic partnership between India and Japan: Impact,prospects and challenges

This paper examines the benefits and challenges of the 2011 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and Japan, specifically the ways to maximize gains from their complementary economies, trade and FDI relations. It also measures the partnership's economy-wide impact empirically, and its role in regional and global integration. An analysis of the trade intensity indices shows that the bilateral trade flow is small considering the other country's importance in world trade, suggesting the existence of great potential for improving trade relations. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the economy wide impact of the CEPA suggests that tariff reductions will create a marginal increase in output growth for both India and Japan as compared to the business as usual scenario. In terms of the effect on exports, India's exports to Japan would increase more than those of Japan to India while positive net welfare gains are expected for both countries as a result of trade liberalization. This is in contrast to the study by Ahmed (2010), which finds welfare gains only for Japan, not for India. Furthermore, one of the striking results of the paper is that Japan will not reduce its heavy reliance on the Chinese market, though India will. In general, India, compared to Japan, will gain more, if CEPA materializes by 2020. Japan too will have welfare gains in spite of opening up the agriculture sector with 100% tariff reduction by 2020. Both countries need to accelerate structural reforms to remove the border barriers in addition to reducing tariffs, in order to reap maximum benefit of their economic partnership.