Size and earnings volatility of US bank holding companies

We examine whether bank earnings volatility depends on bank size. Using quarterly data for bank holding companies in the United States for the period 1995Q1–2010Q3 and controlling for the quality of management, leverage, and diversification, we find that bank size reduces return volatility. However, the effect is non-linear: when bank size exceeds a certain threshold (about US$5 billion) size is positively related to earnings volatility. The recent financial crisis decreased the threshold beyond which the impact of size on volatility turns positive.     

Cyclicality of liquidity creation: Nonlinear evidence from US bank holding companies

Using a panel smooth transition regression framework on a new proxy of the business cycle (BC) index and quarterly data of US bank holding companies from 1993Q1 to 2020Q1, our results provide empirical support for the theory that the BC has a nonlinear effect on liquidity creation. We find a positive and highly significant nonlinear effect of the BC on liquidity creation, which not only supports the pro-cyclicality of liquidity creation but also improves the liquidity creation estimation compared to previous studies. The results are robust to different proxies of the BC and model specifications. We also document that US bank holding companies create liquidity more during the expansion phase (normal times) than during the recession phase (crisis times) of the BC, suggesting an asymmetrical effect of BC changes on liquidity creation. Our findings have important implications for financial market participants by suggesting that banks should keep alternative sources of funding on hand during the BC recession phase. Insights from our study also provide policy implications for central banks and prudent supervisors to consider when incentivizing banks, for instance, by lowering regulatory requirements, adjusting the policy rate, or implementing any other quantitative easing policy during the BC recession phase to keep the financial system efficient.     

Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies

The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about bank governance. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between board governance and performance using a sample of banking firm data that spans 34 years. We find that board independence is not related to performance, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. However, board size is positively related to performance. Our results are not driven by M&A activity. But, we provide new evidence that increases in board size due to additions of directors with subsidiary directorships may add value as BHC complexity increases. We conclude that governance regulation should take unique features of bank governance into account.     

Diversification and the cost of debt of bank holding companies

In this study, we investigate the relationship between various dimensions of diversification and the cost of debt for publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that both domestic geographic diversification of deposits and diversification of assets lead to a lower bond yield-spread. Diversification of non-traditional banking activities leads to a lower cost of debt only when yield-spread and diversification are estimated simultaneously. In addition, we find that medium-sized BHCs experience a greater reduction in bond yield-spread than small-sized and large-sized BHCs. This is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) effects in the banking industry. Furthermore, we document that the association between diversification and yield-spread is bidirectional with higher yield-spreads being associated with greater asset and activity diversification and lower geographic deposit dispersion. The effect of diversification on bond yield-spread is robust after accounting for cross-sectional and serial correlation, and the endogeneity of diversification.     

The effect of stock-for-debt swaps on bank holding companies

Twenty-two of the numerous stock-for-debt swaps that have taken place since August 1981 have been by bank holding companies. Although the most oft-quoted reason for making the swap is its positive effect on reported earnings, we argue that the effects of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 on the tax treatment of early retirement of discount debt often makes stock-for-debt swaps a preferable alternative to cash repurchases of discount debt for sinking fund obligations. Furthermore, for bank holding companies, the swaps allow them to adjust their capital positions to new optimal levels ad dictated by the more stringent capital standards promulgated by the regulatory authorities in 1981. For 99 non-banking firms we found a significant and negative abnormal average return on the swap announcement date of ?0.49 percent. For the 22 bank holding companies, however, we found no significant abnormal average return on the announcement date of the swaps. The results suggest that swaps may be reducing the potential costs of regulatory interference for bank holding companies if they are overlevered, which offsets whatever other force is driving down stock prices on new issue announcement dates.     

Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is life insurance purchased by bank holding companies (BHCs) for key employees, whose proceeds can be shared by the...     

Valuation effects of new capital issues by large bank holding companies

Bank regulators in the United States and other major industrial nations have agreed on a framework for regulating bank capital, proposing that all banking organizations maintain common equity and perpetual preferred capital equal to 4 percent of risk-adjusted assets. This proposal raises important questions about the effect of different capital definitions on banking organizations. This article examines the stock market valuation effects of banks' issuing securities that are considered regulatory capital over the 1982–1986 period. The results are consistent with Myers and Majluf's securities overvaluation hypothesis.     

The effect of capital adequacy guidelines on large bank holding companies

The United States federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in 1981. If these guidelines are binding on bank holding companies, then theoretical evidence suggests that banking organizations may be increasing asset risk. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that the guidelines are binding. Two models of changes in bank holding company equity capital to assets ratios are developed and tested using maximum likehood estimation: a regulatory model and a market model. The results indicate that most large bank holding companies are influenced by regulatory forces.     

Dividends and financial health: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies

Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2020, we show that there is a positive relationship between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter. We also find that this positive relationship is more pronounced for banks with lower capital adequacy and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, indicating that it is more necessary for banks with these characteristics to use dividends to convey information regarding their financial health. Our additional analyses suggest that total payout is also positively associated with bank financial health, and that the positive relationship between dividends and financial health applies to private banks as well, but that the magnitude is weaker for them than for public banks. Our overall findings primarily complement a risk reduction hypothesis in corporate finance and bank payout policies.     

Scale economies,X-efficiency,and convergence of productivity among bank holding companies

Are the less productive banks catching up to the more productive ones and, if so, how quickly and by what means? The objective of this study is to answer these questions by looking for convergence in productivity among bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US Past research has identified two major factors governing productivity in the banking sector – scale economies and X-efficiency. If the gains from scale economies decline with firm size and if the only difference between BHCs lies in their initial size, then the initially smaller BHCs should eventually catch up to the initially larger ones because the former tend to grow more quickly. However, the findings from this study do not support this hypothesis of “absolute convergence”. Indeed, the findings show strong evidence for “conditional convergence”, which means that the steady-state productivity to which a BHC is converging is conditional on the BHCs own level of X-efficiency. Conditional convergence implies that initial differences in X-efficiency among BHCs can, between them, create permanent differences in steady-state productivity.     

The dark side of diversification: The case of US financial holding companies

Potential diversification benefits are one reason why US financial holding companies are offering a growing range of financial services. This paper examines whether the observed shift toward activities that generate fees, trading revenue, and other non-interest income has improved the performance of US financial holding companies (FHCs) from 1997 to 2002. We find evidence that diversification benefits exist between FHCs, but these gains are offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more volatile but not necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities. Within FHCs, however, marginal increases in revenue diversification are not associated with better performance, while marginal increases in non-interest income are still associated with lower risk-adjusted profits. The key finding that diversification gains are more than offset by the costs of increased exposure to volatile activities represents the dark side of the search for diversification benefits and has implications for supervisors, managers, investors, and borrowers.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

Mutual holding companies: Evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends

The mutual holding company (MHC) structure establishes a dual-class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor–owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends. We show that MHCs are priced higher than comparable non-MHCs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation. We also show that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non-MHC thrifts and that an Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends. These results have policy implications of special significance given that the OTS reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the MHC structure in the financial service industry.     

Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies

This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings and earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States. We first find that performance, earnings management, and corporate governance are endogenously determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased coefficients and a simultaneous equations approach is used. We find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), board independence, and capital are positively related to earnings and that earnings, board independence, and capital are negatively related to earnings management. We also find that PPS is positively related to earnings management. Finally, PPS and board independence are positively related and the relationship is bidirectional. While both PPS and board independence are associated with higher earnings, our results indicate that more independent boards appear to constrain the earnings management that greater PPS compels.     

Dividend payouts: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies in the context of the financial crisis

We study dividend payouts of 462 U.S. bank holding companies before and during the 2007–09 financial crisis. Fama and French (2001) characteristics (size, profitability and growth opportunities) explain dividend payouts before and during the financial crisis. The agency cost hypothesis explains dividend payouts before and during (more pronouncedly) the financial crisis. The signaling hypothesis explains dividend payouts during the financial crisis. Regulatory pressure was ineffective in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis. Our findings have implications for corporate finance and governance theories, and also for the regulatory reforms that are being discussed among policymakers.     

Market reaction to the formation of one-bank holding companies

This study examines the question of whether or not the formation of one-bank holding companies is of such importance as to materially affect the return generating process for the associated common stock issues. As such this study attempts to provide the security analyst with answers as to how best to define the parameters of the distribution of firm returns, that is, which past observations are relevant to the firm's present return generating mechanism. The results of the tests performed indicate that the formation of a one-bank holding company generally does not have a significant impact on the return generating mechanism for the underlying stock of the affected bank. Thus, the market does not appear to attach any real significance to this particular shift in organizational form by the commercial banks studies.     

Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies

This paper focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008 period between firms with levered owners and other firms. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the pyramidal entities.     

金融控股公司风险与控制问题分析

在金融一体化进程中,金融控股公司是有代表性的金融体制变革和制度创新的产物,也是我国金融由分业经营向混业经营渐进转变的现实选择.然而金融控股公司在经营过程中也存在着一些特殊的风险,如内部关联交易风险、资本重复计算的风险、结构复杂化带来的管理风险等.为此要尽快研究相关的约束和监管制度,构建金融控股公司的风险控制体系.     

银行控股模式下银行与信托公司的战略协同

商业银行经营信托业务是国际主流模式,在银行控股模式下银行与信托公司的协同效应显著增强。信托公司自身业务创新发展,以及加强与银行及其子公司的整合和协调是实现战略协同的关键。我国银行应该对控股信托子公司加强一级法人治理结构建设和严格业绩管理;推动信托公司专业化经营,实现银信协同发展;接轨银行整体战略目标,稳步推进综合经营工作。