Does internationalization make a difference? Stock market reaction to announcements of international top executive appointments

In recent years, there has been an increasing scholarly and practical interest in the internationalization of top management teams. It is argued that international firms need international top managers to meet the challenges arising from operating across borders. However, the few existing studies that focus on the link between top managers’ internationalization and firm performance yield inconclusive results. Thus, it is an open question if and to what extent international firms can benefit from international top managers. Drawing on upper-echelons theory, resource-dependence theory, and signaling theory, this paper examines how the stock market reacts to the appointment of an international top manager. Our empirical study of German firms employs an event study to analyze the direct impact of internationalization on a firm's stock price. Piecewise regression analysis reveals that a top manager's internationalization needs to exceed a certain threshold before investors incorporate this individual characteristic into their investment decisions. Furthermore, our analysis shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between internationalization and abnormal returns, suggesting that internationalization may have both positive and negative effects on a firm's stock price. We present several explanations for our empirical findings and discuss future research directions.     

Trade liberalization and organizational change

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We show that, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by the liberalization of product markets can lead to changes in ownership structures within countries. The removal of barriers to factor mobility can also induce widespread restructuring, which can lead to increases in product prices (or declines in quality), hurting consumers worldwide.     

Uniform or spatially differentiated? Pricing Strategies for Information Goods under simultaneous and sequential decision-making in multi-market context

Product pricing has been one of the central issues in the field of marketing and consumer services for managers and researchers alike. However, pricing of information goods has not been paid much attention in literature. For information goods the marginal costs of production and transportation of information goods (online movies, video games, etc.) is almost zero. Hence, the pricing decisions need to be thought of purely in competitive profit maximizing terms. This paper proposes mechanisms for managers to evaluate and base their pricing decisions on rational frameworks that takes into account various situations when they enter a new market and when they are incumbent in a new market. This paper addresses the research gap of spatially differentiated pricing strategy for information goods that has not been studied in literature so far. We create stylized theoretical models under both, sequential and simultaneous decision-making conditions. We determine the equilibrium price and the equilibrium profit for the two firms for each of the four possible scenarios based on their pricing strategies. Our analysis reveals that the dominance of one pricing strategy over the other depends on product differentiation factor capturing joint effect of the product substitutability and consumer's price sensitivity under sequential decision making and the market size along with consumer's price sensitivity for simultaneous decision making. As an extension, we propose a generalized model demonstrating the uniform and spatially differentiated pricing strategies of the firms under simultaneous and sequential selection for multiple domestic and international markets.     

Transfer pricing for aligning divisional and corporate decisions

Discussions about transfer pricing normally presume the firm's objective is to maximize profit while making the best use of existing capacity. This article differs by exploring the impact of transfer pricing on capital budget decisions. In decentralized firms, decision authority for investment is assigned to division managers whose capital budgets include revenues from internal transfers. When a selling division is under capacity, economic theory recommends a transfer price based on differential cost. Here the seller generates sufficient revenues to recoup operating costs, but not enough to recover capital costs. Consequently, division managers will reject some investments that otherwise would have increased corporate shareholder value. Market-based transfer pricing overcomes this conflict by allocating savings on inter-company transactions to the selling division. However, market transfer pricing may result in shortfalls to corporate profit. Nonetheless, we argue in favor of the use of transfer pricing on the presumption that long-term value creation takes precedence over short-term profit.     

Strategic trade and delegated competition

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.     

Managers and their not-so rational decisions

Today's corporate environment requires managers to be excellent decision makers. Their ability to make fast, widely-supported, and effective decisions will, in large part, shape the performance of their firms. In this article, we describe two cognitive systems that influence decision making. System 1 refers to a process that is fast, effortless, and intuitive. System 2 is a slow, controlled, and rule-governed decision-making process. Both are important to a wide variety of managerial decisions, and they interact with each other. There are, however, a number of forces at work that hinder the effectiveness of these processes. For example, we know from prospect theory that managers are unwilling to incur loss, so much so that they often make irrational decisions based on a small probability that they could avoid such loss. Another example, the escalation of commitment, explains why managers may continue to dedicate resources to failed projects. We describe these and other biases, with a view toward helping managers better understand the problems of decision making and improve the effectiveness of their decisions.     

Channel Management Through Selective Announcement of Reward and Punishment Decisions

Purpose: Although channel influence strategies such as reward and punishment are useful for firms to manage certain channel partners, the social effect of these strategies has not been examined in the literature. In practice, firms selectively announce their reward and punishment decisions, hoping that these announcements can help encourage or prevent the channel behaviors of other channel members. The main purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical understanding of this business practice in channel management.

Methodology: The authors conducted interviews and a scenario experiment with sales managers. The experiment is a 2 (degree of institutionalization: high vs. low)?×?2 (power of distributors: powerful vs. less powerful)?×?2 (influence strategy: punishment vs. reward) design.

Findings: The authors found that firms are more likely to announce their reward decisions than punishment decisions. Also, when institutionalization of marketing channel is low, firms tend to announce all their reward decisions, but they are reluctant to announce their punishment decisions regarding powerful channel members. When institutionalization of marketing channel is high, we find that firms are more likely to announce rewards and punishments regarding less powerful channel members.

Contribution: An important contribution of this research is that we are among the first to explore the social effects of power exercise in channel management. We extend the channel power literature by arguing that selective announcements of power exercise (reward and punishment) can influence more channel members. In addition, we combine institutional theory and channel power theory to explain the underlying mechanisms. That is, the degree of institutionalization in marketing channel influences how firms make selective public announcements of their channel decisions.     

Whisper forecasts of earnings per share: Is anyone still listening?

Whisper numbers—unofficial forecasts of earnings per share—were widely reported alongside analyst forecasts and actual earnings in the late 1990s. Bagnoli et al. (1999) showed that whispers appeared to be more accurate than analyst earnings forecasts for a small sample of high-tech firms. We extend their study and investigate whether the superior accuracy of whisper numbers extends to a broader sample, whether whispers have incremental information vis-à-vis analyst forecasts and whether the market rationally uses the information available in whispers. We find that analyst forecasts are more accurate than whispers; however, whisper forecasts contain value-relevant information incremental to analyst forecasts. We also find that the incremental information in whispers is fully incorporated into share price. Lastly we find that whispers are common for firms with lower forecast accuracy, and also that the presence of whispers improves the information environment of firms. Our findings imply that while analyst forecasts are the more accurate expectation of earnings, whispers play a complementary role in providing information about the firm. To the extent that managers convey information to the market in the form of whispers, this study shows that the private information is captured in the share price.     

Leveraging Distribution to Maximize Firm Performance in Emerging Markets

Despite the rise of emerging markets as lucrative destinations for business expansion, marketing literature in this area is largely anecdotal and conceptual. Further, owing to the largely unorganized retail structure in emerging markets, managers tend to make sub-optimal marketing-mix decisions by taking an aggregate view of their distribution network. In this study, we develop an econometric model to help firms develop a multichannel distribution strategy in emerging markets while accounting for (a) own-marketing mix, (b) competitive actions, (c) brand-level heterogeneity, and (d) dependencies that may arise between product offerings. The proposed model is tested on longitudinal data from a large Indian CPG manufacturer. The results indicate that firms must consider store format-specific distribution elasticities (as opposed to aggregate effects), especially in an emerging market, where the role of distribution is critical in brand success. Further, depending on the offering, price (own- and cross-) and advertising elasticities could vary even though the brand is essentially the same. Also, we find that there are significant dependencies between product forms that need to be considered when designing the marketing mix. Finally, we provide re-allocation recommendations to help managers choose the level of store format distribution in order to maximize profits. The proposed distribution re-allocation strategy resulted in an average of 7.7% increase in profits across three product forms for the focal firm.     

Quality signaling via strikethrough prices

Why do firms often advertise their current price together with their past price? Although consumers expect high quality products to have high prices, such firms may optimally charge lower prices when faced with low production costs. Thus in markets in which quality is difficult to ascertain and costs often fall over time, for example technology products, high quality firms may face a challenge of signaling their quality through current price alone. In this paper we develop a price signaling model in which uninformed consumers draw inference not only from the current price but also the prior period's price (the “strikethrough price”) if the firm chooses to disclose it. We find that a high quality firm benefits from using strikethrough pricing when the prior probability of high quality is relatively low while the probability of costs falling is relatively high.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Financing Decisions: Evidence from Stock Market Liberalization

We analyze the impact of firm‐specific stock market liberalization events on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms from emerging market economies. We differentiate between firms based on their ownership structures at the time of liberalization and analyze their post‐liberalization behavior regarding corporate financing decisions. Our empirical results show that single–class‐share firms (typically with stronger corporate governance and better information environments) respond differently to their dual–class‐share counterparts. Liberalization results in lower debt reliance for the former group while the latter lengthen the maturity of their debt portfolios. Jel Classification: F30; G15; G32.     

Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter’s Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Players’ access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country’s policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter’s reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country’s optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country’s government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country’s government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.     

Performance of professional service firms from emerging markets: Role of innovative services and firm capabilities

Professional service firms (PSF) from emerging markets face a financial dilemma: PSFs tend to utilize high-wage labor, yet their emerging market status makes foreign clients cautious regarding quality and less willing to pay high prices. To allay these concerns, PSFs may be able to develop attractive, highly innovative services, but as the resource-based view (RBV) notes, this requires emerging market firms to possess critical capabilities to support such a competitive advantage. Relying on services theory, we propose that entrepreneurial orientation (EO) of management and expert human capital (HC) are critical capabilities, enabling a PSF to develop and market innovative services profitably. In testing our model on 201 Indian PSFs, we find a mediating role for innovativeness whereby EO and HC drive service innovation which, in turn, accounts for financial performance. Further, we find EO positively moderates the innovative service–performance relationship as proactive, risk-tolerant managers improve foreign marketing. Insights for theory and practice are provided that enable PSFs to overcome the constraints and challenges of their emerging market origin.     

Input Pricing and Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market: Is the Timing Order Relevant?

This paper adds to the literature on the strategic use of managers’ contracts in competition by examining whether market‐share delegation, in which managers receive rewards based on a combination of profits and market share, and the order of moves affect input pricing in a vertically related market. It shows that: (i) input pricing is not affected by delegation form and the order of moves between upstream and downstream firms under quantity competition; (ii) downstream firms obtain the same profit as in the simple Nash equilibrium regardless of delegation forms in a delegation–input price–quantity competition game; and (iii) the upstream monopolist will set input price beforehand regardless of the delegation form. Since the outcomes in our model create higher quantity and lower price in a Cournot product market, it lessens the double‐marginalization problem in such a vertically separated industry.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Corporate social responsibility disclosure in China: Do managerial professional connections and social attention matter?

We examine the effect of managerial professional connections and social attention on corporate social responsibility disclosure. Using a unique sample of Chinese listed firms that includes 7462 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2017, we hypothesize and provide supporting evidence that in emerging markets such as China, firms whose top managers have professional connections are more incentivized to improve corporate social responsibility disclosure. This is particularly the case when firms face significant public and media attention. Additional analysis shows that firms with professional connections tend to be more conservative when choosing accounting policies to maintain their professional reputations. Professional connections bring value to both firms and managers in that professionally connected managers are valued by external investors, have greater job security, and are better compensated. Our results are robust to a series of endogeneity tests and perform well in various robustness tests. Overall, our study suggests that corporate social responsibility decisions are shaped by managerial idiosyncratic characteristics and external institutions.     

Combining value and price to make purchase decisions in business markets

The authors investigate how purchasing managers combine information about product offerings' values and prices to make purchase decisions. The results of two field studies show that managers do not regard monetarily-equivalent changes in value and price to be the same. Using reference-dependent theory, the authors show that, rather than a single utility function, separate functions for value and price appear to underlie purchasing managers' decisions. The authors also address means of inducing managers to choose higher-valued, higher-priced product offerings.     

Information Sharing,Price Negotiation and Management Buy-outs of Private Family-owned Firms

Perspectives relating to agency theory, information asymmetries and game theory were utilized to explore two outcomes associated with the management buy-out (MBO) or management buy-in (MBI) of former private firms: whether information was shared equally between vendors (i.e., family firm owners) and purchasers (i.e., MBO/I management teams) and whether a mutually agreed price was achieved. With reference to the themes of company ownership structure, governance structure and company objectives several hypotheses were derived. Survey evidence was gathered from the managers of 114 former private family-owned firms located across Europe that recently reported an MBO/I. Multiple logistic regression analysis detected that respondents in founded (first generation) family firms and those reporting a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment were more likely to report that ‘information was shared equally between vendors and purchasers’. Respondents reporting no suitable family successor had been identified, a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment, and the involvement of venture capitalists in succession planning were more likely to report that a mutually agreed sale price had been achieved. Implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed.      

Strategic reference points in family firms

Family firms are classically seen as risk averse organizations, and this is evident in their generally lower R&D investments compared to non-family firms. Recent research, however, challenges this predominant view and suggests that family firms can embrace higher strategic risk when faced with threats to their family-centered goals. Still, the internal and external conditions that drive variations in the strategic risk taking behaviors of family firms are little known and understood. This article adds to this literature by developing and testing a conceptual model of strategic risk taking that incorporates behavioral theory, family business literature, and the logic of the strategic reference point theory. With recognition that the interplay between family and economic goals determines heterogeneity in strategic actions of family firms, this model suggests that family managers respond differentially to the feedback information regarding internal and external reference points, and consequently identifies key drivers of variation in the R&D investment behavior of family firms. By examining the pattern in R&D investments of 437 Spanish private manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2006, this study shows how strategic inputs, strategic outputs, and external benchmarks produce variations in strategic decisions about R&D investments in family and non-family firms. The findings offer insights into how internal and external reference points are considered in family firms’ decision making, thereby contributing a deeper understanding into the circumstances under which family goals cope or collide with the economic goals of the firm, and how this influences strategic risk decisions in family firms.     

The externalities of credit default swaps on stock return synchronicity

We examine the externality effect of customer firms’ credit default swap (CDS) trading on the stock price informativeness of supplier firms. Our empirical results show that firms with a high proportion of sales to CDS referenced customers tend to have more firm-specific embedded information in their stock prices and thus higher stock price informativeness, which is associated with a lower level of stock return synchronicity. We provide new evidence of CDS trading externality on equity market information environments along the supply chain.