Quality signaling via strikethrough prices

Why do firms often advertise their current price together with their past price? Although consumers expect high quality products to have high prices, such firms may optimally charge lower prices when faced with low production costs. Thus in markets in which quality is difficult to ascertain and costs often fall over time, for example technology products, high quality firms may face a challenge of signaling their quality through current price alone. In this paper we develop a price signaling model in which uninformed consumers draw inference not only from the current price but also the prior period's price (the “strikethrough price”) if the firm chooses to disclose it. We find that a high quality firm benefits from using strikethrough pricing when the prior probability of high quality is relatively low while the probability of costs falling is relatively high.     

Strategic Implications of Keeping Product Value Secret from Competitor’s Customers

Customers can sometimes learn unanticipated or hidden use value of a firm’s product whereas the non-customers remain uninformed about that extra value. A monopolist will increase its profit by informing the non-customers of its product’s hidden value. However, our analysis reveals that this may not be true when the firm faces competition in the market—the firm may actually make a higher profit if it keeps its hidden value secret from its competitor’s customers even if advertising to inform those customers is costless. This is because no advertising leads to information heterogeneity among consumers about the existence of the firm’s hidden value, which gives an incentive for both firms to continue targeting their own existing customers rather than poaching each other’s customers, alleviating price competition and increasing firms’ profits. This beneficial strategic effect of keeping some product value secret from the competitor’s customers can persist even when the firms anticipate the hidden value and compete more aggressively for customers in the early period. Our research suggests that firms can benefit from an “under-promise and over-deliver” strategy if they refrain from communicating their extra value to the competitor’s customers. Moreover, positive word of mouth about a firm’s product will not necessarily benefit the firm and can in fact make all firms worse off.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

Welfare and quality improvement in an international market

This paper analyzes the optimal uniform and discriminatory quality requirements under Cournot competition when two firms produce high-quality and low-quality products, respectively, in an international market. The quality requirements in our paper are not set for the foreign firm but are set to regulate products of different qualities, since in the real world a domestic firm could be a high- or low-quality producer. We find that whether the government should raise the quality requirements depends on the type of competition in which firms engage and the adopted quality requirements. By and large, the government should always set quality requirements raising both firms’ quality directly or indirectly, regardless of the quality of the product of the domestic firm. However, if the domestic firm is a high-quality producer, the government should set a quality requirement that enables the domestic firm to monopolize the market when a discriminatory quality requirement is adopted, and should not set any quality requirement when a uniform quality requirement is adopted. Moreover, we show that the quality requirement can actually improve global welfare in most cases.     

Posted price and name-your-own-price in a product line design problem

In this research, we address Name your own price (NYOP) as a mechanism to offer products with transparent, rather than opaque, quality levels. We compare posted price (PP) and NYOP in a product line design problem from a firm’s viewpoint. We first consider the firm offering two vertically differentiated products that each can be priced by NYOP or PP. The quality level of products is considered either as a decision variable or as a fixed predetermined value for the firm. A customer correspondingly decides which product to purchase and if applicable, the bid at NYOP. We characterize both the customer’s and the firm’s decisions under four possible pricing scenarios. The results show that, it is most profitable for the firm to use PP for both products. We then consider if each product is offered by a competitive firm, where quality levels might again be decision variables or fixed. Results show that both competitive firms prefer PP to NYOP when they can create quality differentiation. The firm that offers the product with a lower quality level prefers PP to NYOP for all combinations of fixed quality levels as well. The other firm, with a higher quality level, also usually prefers PP to NYOP; However, it can be better off using NYOP when fixed quality levels are large and close enough to each other. In this case, the preference of NYOP over PP increases as customers’ willingness to pay enhances.     

Product line competition and price promotions

Besides its familiar demand-redistribution effect, price promotion by a multi-product firm creates cannibalization, as lowering the price of one variety may erode the profits of its other varieties. We study endogenous product line selection and price promotions in a duopoly. In equilibrium, the ex ante symmetric firms may offer asymmetric product lines with unequal length. The two-product firm is more profitable. The single-product firm offers a larger mean discount and promotes more (less) frequently than its competitor when the former’s unit cost is relatively low (high).     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Selling Vertically Differentiated Products under One Roof or Two? A Signaling Model of a Retailer's Roof Policies

Retail firms commonly offer products of different quality levels to serve different consumer segments. In doing so, some firms adopt a “one-roof policy,” selling all of their products in one store, whereas others adopt a “two-roof policy” to better segment consumers, selling high-quality products in a high-end store and low-quality products in a separate, low-end store. Although roof policies are widely practiced and an important aspect of retail management, they are overlooked in the literature and thus not well understood. In this paper, we look at a multi-product retail firm and explore the implications of roof policy for its quality signaling strategies. In our model, the firm carries two vertically differentiated products to serve two consumer segments. We first demonstrate that when product quality is readily observable to consumers, a two-roof policy yields a greater profit than a one-roof policy if the benefit from segmentation outweighs the cost of an additional roof. Then, we assume that a proportion of consumers are uninformed about quality a priori. We show that under both policies, there exists an equilibrium in which the retailer uses both price and in-store services to signal quality. Surprisingly, now there are conditions under which a two-roof policy is outperformed by a one-roof policy, even if the cost of an additional roof is zero. This result sharply contrasts the conventional wisdom that segmentation is optimal as long as its associated marketing cost is low, and suggests the importance of quality information issues in roof policy decisions.     

Is brand alliance always beneficial to firms?

In this research, we develop a fresh analytical model to examine the impact of brand quality on the firms’ performances when two firms selling substitute products form a brand alliance. Our results indicate that when two products have equal brand qualities, brand alliance is always a beneficial strategy for two firms to employ. However, when two products have different brand qualities, brand quality differential shows a positive relationship with the profit of the firm with the low-quality brand but demonstrates a negative relationship with the profit of the firm with the high-quality brand in the brand alliance. Our results also show that brand quality differential has a greater effect on the profit of the firm with the high-quality brand than on that of the firm with the low-quality brand. In addition, we find that brand alliance becomes much more valuable to the firm with the high-quality brand when the brand quality differential decreases, but the value of brand alliance has a concave relationship with the profit of the firm with the low-quality brand when the brand quality differential increases.     

Quality disclosure in the presence of strategic consumers

Consider a market for short-life products, such as smartphones, where a firm and consumers have asymmetric quality information, the firm sells products in two periods, and consumers make purchase decisions strategically. We investigate when a firm should disclose quality and the interaction between consumers' strategic behavior and the firm's disclosure behavior. We obtain several findings. First, regardless of whether consumers have low or high patience, the firm should disclose quality information if product quality is high and conceal it if product quality is low. However, for products with moderate quality levels, the firm will disclose more quality information to consumers with relatively high or low patience levels than when consumer patience is moderate. Second, firms will disclose less information when consumers behave strategically than when they are myopic. Third, when concealing quality information is an equilibrium, product prices are affected only by disclosure costs and independent of true product quality. Finally, the firm can benefit from consumers' strategic behavior and a higher disclosure cost, but greater patience might be detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare.     

To Groupon or not to Groupon: The profitability of deep discounts

We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a relatively new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating firms’ goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms whereby a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated firms: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers with access to vouchers must generally be lower than those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers tends to be more profitable for firms that are patient or relatively unknown, and for firms with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of firm price reoptimization and multiple voucher purchases. We find potential benefits of online discount vouchers to certain firms in certain circumstances, but vouchers are likely to increase firm profits under relatively narrow conditions.     

Is price undertaking a more friendly protection policy than an anti-dumping duty?1

It is generally believed that price undertaking is a more amicable protection policy for a foreign dumping firm than an anti-dumping (AD) duty as the former allows the foreign dumping firm to keep the duty rents. However, this result contradicts the empirical finding in, who shows that only 41% of anti-dumping measures in EEC end up with price undertaking in 1981–2001, even though firms can commit to a minimum price instead of being imposed with an anti-dumping duty. From the perspective of the dumping firm, this paper shows that whether the price-undertaking police is more or less amicable than the AD duty is contingent upon the competition modes of the firms in the industry.     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two‐step auction

When an outside innovating firm has a technology to produce a higher quality good than the good produced at present, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fee in such a situation in an oligopoly with three firms under vertical product differentiation, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two‐step auction. We show that in the case of uniform distribution of consumers' taste parameter and zero cost when the quality improvement (the difference between the quality of the high‐quality good and the quality of the low‐quality good) is small (or large), the two‐step auction is (or is not) credible, and license to two firms without entry strategy (or entry without license strategy) is optimal depending on credibility of the two‐step auction.     

Consumer deliberation and quality signaling

Consumers are often uncertain about their product valuation before purchase. They may bear the uncertainty and purchase the product without deliberation. Alternatively, consumers can incur a deliberation cost to find out their true valuation and then make their purchase decision. This paper proposes that consumer deliberation about product valuation can be an endogenous mechanism to enable credible quality signaling. We demonstrate this point in a simple setup in which product quality influences the probability that the product has high valuation. We show that with endogenous deliberation there may exist a unique separating equilibrium in which the high-quality firm induces consumer deliberation by setting a high price whereas the low-quality firm prevents deliberation by charging a low price. Compared to the case of complete information, the price of the high-quality firm can be distorted upward to facilitate consumer deliberation, or distorted downward to avoid the low-quality firm’s imitation. In an extension we show that dissipative advertising can facilitate quality signaling. The high-quality firm can utilize advertising spending to avert imitation from the low-quality firm without distorting price downward, earning a higher profit than that without advertising. However, advertising mitigates the distortion at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.     

Impact of personalization and privacy concerns on information disclosure and pricing

Advances in IT have enabled some firms to offer personalized products according to the private information disclosed by consumers, while others are still offering standardized products, which brings about asymmetric competition. For consumers, disclosing private information for personalized products leads to reduced misfit cost as well as privacy loss. To illuminate the impact of consumers' trade-off between the benefit of information disclosure and the associated privacy concerns on firms' asymmetric price competition, we consider a setting where only one firm is capable of product personalization based on consumers' personal information. The capable firm makes a profit from selling the product and monetizing consumers' information. We demonstrate that as the capable firm becomes more adept at personalization, he may raise or lower the price depending on his profit foci, and an improvement in his capability does not always guarantee a higher profit. Counterintuitively, an increase in the unit misfit cost (i.e., greater product differentiation) can, under certain circumstances, intensity price competition, making both firms worse off and leading to higher consumer surplus. We also show that when consumers are more privacy-concerned, there exists an indirect effect that weakens the impact of an increase in price on the monetization of consumers’ information, and hence price competition can be mitigated and both firms can be better off. Furthermore, we demonstrate that product personalization with misfit-reducing effect always increases consumer surplus under the asymmetric competition. Our findings provide firms and policy-makers with great managerial insights.     

Stock Price Informativeness and Corporate Governance: An International Study

This study investigates the cross‐country relationship between firm‐level corporate governance and stock price informativeness. Using firm‐level data from 22 developed countries, we find that stock price informativeness, as measured by firm‐specific stock return variation and future earnings response coefficients, increases with the quality of a firm's corporate governance. Further analyses show that all mechanisms except board‐related governance relate positively to stock price informativeness. Finally, firm‐level corporate governance plays a more significant role in strengthening the stock return–earnings associations for firms in countries with strong institutional environments. This evidence highlights the role of country‐level legal investor protections in shaping the relationship between firm‐level corporate governance and stock price informativeness.     

基于保证金退还机制的零售商回收网络设计

工业企业和政府从消费者处回收废旧产品是相互影响的,当由企业自主回收时,回收率不足时,政府应提供回收补偿保证金。提出了设计一个离散敏捷网络和决定销售价格的连续模型结构使得企业的利润在给定的补偿保证金下最大化。消费者关于购买和退回产品的参数选择与带有随机效用的离散模型一致,通过参量分析,确定了从废旧产品中恢复的产品的净值是企业主动从产品回收的主要驱动力。发现最小的保证金要求将无法对低回收价值产品实现较高的回收率,政府必须采取相应的补偿政策工具。