基于BARY曲线的基本电价测算模型研究

本文针对目前两部制电价中基本电费按容量计费导致基本电价水平偏低、不能合理配置电力资源的问题,以长期边际成本理论为基础,结合描述电力系统负荷特性同时率与负荷率关系的BARY经验曲线,构建了容量成本在基本电费和电度电费中的分摊模型,并用某市电力局提供的有关数据,依据该模型测算了按电压等级和负荷特性划分的分类用户的基本电价。结果表明,该模型是确定基本电价的一种可行工具。     

关于IC卡电量式电表用户执行阶梯电价的电费追补方法应用实践

本文探讨了关于IC卡电量式电表用户执行阶梯电价的电费追补方法应用实践。结果表明该管理方法还是令人满意的,在售电与MIS系统统一平台未能建设达成之前,不失为一项解决实际问题的一种有效方法。     

燃煤电厂脱硝电价研究——基于经营期电价与模拟退火算法

本文在经营期电价方法计算脱硝电价的基础上,为了简化该法复杂的计算过程,提出运用模拟退火算法思想对脱硝电价的计算进行优化,并建立了基于经营期电价与模拟退火算法的脱硝电价计算模型,最后,以新建电厂国华太电四期(2×600MW)烟气脱硝工程为例,验证了模型的合理性。     

浅谈电力系统负荷预测与电价预测

电力系统是一个运行高度统一的大系统，由于电能不能大量储存，其生产和消费必须同时进行，因此预知负荷的需求对于电力系统运行具有十分重要的意义，负荷预测是能量管理系统及配网管理系统的重要组成部分，是电力系统规划和运行调度的依据，也是电力市场化商业运营必需的基本内容。     

差别电价的交叉补贴策略对产业结构调整的影响

无论是企业生产还是居民生活都离不开电力消费,因此抓住电价这个指挥棒,合理设计交叉补贴政策,将有利于推动供给侧结构性改革。针对中国差别电价与惩罚性电价改革,本文利用CGE模型对多种终端电价交叉补贴情境进行了模拟分析,研究结论和政策建议如下:第一,中国现行的差别电价交叉补贴策略,即以工商业用户补贴居民用户,适合经济新常态背景下改善居民福利、促进国内消费增长、推动产业结构转型升级、持续节能减排的要求,不宜简单模仿某些发达国家以居民用户补贴工商业用户的交叉补贴模式,尤其在社会保障与环境保护等其他公共政策配套没有跟上的条件下更是如此。第二,可以在差别电价的基础上进一步引入惩罚性电价,发挥其调整结构,优化布局的作用。第三,引入惩罚性电价可导致交叉补贴余额提升,于是可以利用这部分提升空间补贴服务业,这不仅能够促进服务业的发展,而且也有利于经济绩效的改善。     

电价改革的思考

价格改革是电力市场化改革的核心。伴随电力工业体制改革和电力市场的发展,现行电价政策、制定电价的方法等已越来越不适应新形势的要求,暴露出了诸多弊端,在一定程度上已阻碍了电力工业的健康发展。如何进行电价改革是大家关注的问题。     

电价管理存在问题及对策研究

电价管理是电力市场营销的关键环节之一。对电价进行科学管理是供电公司提高盈利水平和深入市场渗透的重要保证,并且通过电价的杠杆调节作用有利于促进节能降耗目标的实现。本文分析了目前关于销售电价的规定,指出供电公司在销售电价管理中普遍存在的电价预测、电价监管、电价风险控制、用电量审核等问题,并针对性的提出了相应具体解决措施,最后以某市供电分公司2009年的电价管理状况为例进行了实证研究。     

电价管理存在问题及对策研究

电价管理是电力市场营销的关键环节之一.对电价进行科学管理是供电公司提高盈利水平和深入市场渗透的重要保证,并且通过电价的杠杆调节作用有利于促进节能降耗目标的实现.本文分析了目前关于销售电价的规定,指出供电公司在销售电价管理中普遍存在的电价预测、电价监管、电价风险控制、用电量审核等问题,并针对性的提出了相应具体解决措施,最后以某市供电分公司2009年的电价管理状况为例进行了实证研究.     

电力市场化与电价改革的基本取向

电力市场化改革取向决定了电价改革要发挥市场机制的基础性作用,但由于市场机制本身的局限性以及电能商品的公共产品属性,政府对电价实行管制具有不可避免性。电价管制的关键是平衡各类市场主体的利益关系,通过价格杠杆促进生产性节能和消费性节能,反映国家节能战略意图。考虑到我国农业生产和居民生活用电的特殊性和水电资源的可获得性,从制度上对水力发电进行用途管制,专门用于农业生产和居民生活,非水电资源形成的发电量实行电价市场化,让发电企业直接面对工商业用户开展市场营销,走“部分市场化”电价改革的路子。     

浅谈电力用户终端价格的确定

我国电力市场化改革初期是建立大区电网的区域电力市场，逐步发展大用户直接自发电企业购电。电力交易的主要形式是：电网公司向各发电公司（集团）购电，然后通过自身电网向电力用户销售电。电力用户的电价是发电电价、输电电价和配电电价三部分之和。本文从这三部分来分析电力用户终端价格的确定。     

Determinants of the premium in forward contracts

Whilst the benefits of forward contracting for goods and services have been extensively researched in terms of mitigating market power effects in spot markets, we analyse how the risk in spot price formation induces a counteracting premium in the contract prices. We consider and test a wide-ranging set of propositions, involving fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components, on a long data set from the most liquid of European electricity forward markets, the EEX. We show that part of what is conventionally regarded as the market price of risk in electricity is actually that of its underlying fuel commodity, gas; that market power has a double effect on prices, insofar as it increases spot prices and induces a forward premium; that oil price sentiment spills over and that the premium reacts to scarcity and the higher moments of spot price uncertainty. We observe that considerations of the scale and determinants of the forward premium are at least as important as the market power effects in spot market price formation when evaluating the efficiency of wholesale power trading.     

理顺价格机制彻底解决电荒

近年来,随着我国经济高速发展,能源需求日益增加,“电荒”现象愈演愈烈。主要原因是由于价格机制不顺,包括电网与电源企业利益分配失衡,火电与新能源价格、电煤与煤电价格、高油价与电价、电价与CPI等机制的不协调。只有理顺价格机制,才能彻底解决电荒危机。     

基于小波自适应支持向量机的短期电价预测

电价预测对于发电商、供电企业以及市场监管者都具有重要的意义。提出一种小波自适应支持向量机预测模型,先将电价时间序列作小波分解得到低频和高频分量,再采用自适应调整法,自动地为支持向量机选择较好的参数对电价小波分量逐一预测,最后通过小波重构得到电价最终预测结果。实例证明前述方法得到的预测精度高于BP、RBF、SVM等传统预测模型。     

我国景区门票价格上涨的调控对策

我国景区门票价格的轮番上涨引发了社会各界人士的紧密关注,各类涨价理由招致了大众的质疑。文章通过各类数据分析,阐述了我国景区门票价格现存问题、分析了我国景区价格上涨的内在原因。最后从经营目标、资金渠道、景区管理、资源保护、听证制度五个方面提出了调控价格上涨建议。     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Intraday hedging with financial options: the case of electricity

As market intermediaries, electricity suppliers purchase electricity from the wholesale market or self-generate to deliver their customers. However, electricity suppliers are uncertain about how much electricity their residential customers will use at any hour of the day until they actually turn switches on. While demand uncertainty is a common feature of all commodity markets, suppliers generally rely on storage to manage it. Singularly, electricity suppliers are exposed to joint volumetric and price risk on an hourly basis given the physical attributes of electricity. In the literature on electricity markets, few articles compare the efficiency of forward contracts, options and physical assets (i.e. power plants) within intraday hourly hedging portfolios, whereas electricity markets are precisely hourly markets. We analyse portfolios made of forwards, options and/or power plants for specific hourly clusters (9 am, 12 pm, 18 pm, 9 pm) based on electricity market data from 2013 to 2015 from the integrated German–Austrian spot market. Through a VaR model, we prove that intraday hedging with forwards is structurally inefficient compared to financial options and physical assets, no matter the cluster hour. Moreover, our results demonstrate the contribution of ‘out of the money’ options for all hours within volatile spot markets.     

中美小麦期货价格与现货价格传递关系的比较研究

为研究我国小麦期货市场价格发现功能的发挥程度及此功能对现货市场价格的影响,本文运用Johansen协整检验、误差修正模型、脉冲响应函数和方差分解等对中美小麦期货与现货价格传递关系进行了实证研究。结果显示：中美两国国内小麦期货与现货价格之间均存在明显的双向引导关系和长期均衡关系;我国小麦期货价格和现货价格对一个标准差信息冲击的反应均稍强于美国;我国小麦期货市场价格发现功能的发挥程度要优于美国。     

The volatility of prices in the English and Welsh electricity pool

The volatility of spot prices has been a notable feature of the English and Welsh Electricity Pool since its formation in 1990. This study investigates the possibility that the volatility of spot prices is strongly affected by the functioning of the contract market for electricity. This paper suggest that generators with market power may have an incentive to create volatility in the spot market in order to benefit from higher risk premia in the contract market. A simple theoretical model is used to illustrate this argument. Nonparametric techniques are used to test for changes in volatility after the expiry of the coal contracts in 1993 and during the price cap of 1994–1996. Strongly significant increases in volatility are found in the latter period.