补贴对中国企业出口行为的影响——基于配对倍差法的经验分析

文章利用配对倍差法控制内生性后,基于新新贸易理论,利用1999-2007年中国工业企业微观数据,经验分析了补贴对企业是否出口及出口规模的影响。分析结论是,补贴显著提升了企业的出口可能性和出口规模;相对于未补贴企业,补贴企业出口概率增长率高出30%-110%,出口规模增长率高出30%-50%;对外资企业的影响大于本土企业,对私营企业的影响大于国有企业;但补贴对出口规模的影响在入世后特别是近年来才显现。这意味着补贴对出口的影响可能存在门槛效应。从政策层面看,尽管政府可以通过补贴等政策手段帮助企业走出国门,但要在国际市场实现持续增长仍要靠企业自身的核心竞争力。     

An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies

R&D subsidies are a common tool of technology policy, but little is known about the effects they have on the behavior of firms. This paper presents evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on the R&D effort of recipients, and on the probability that a firm will participate in a program granting R&D subsidies. The empirical model consists of a system of equations: a participation equation; and an R&D effort equation. Endogeneity of public funding is controlled for. Estimates are obtained with a cross-section sample of Spanish firms. The main findings are that: 1) small firms are more likely to obtain a subsidy than large firms, probably reflecting one of the public agency's goals; 2) overall, public funding induces more private effort, but for some firms (30% of participants) full crowding out effects cannot be ruled out, and 3) firm size remains related to effort, whether or not a firm gets public funding.     

产业政策中的资金配置:市场力量与政府扶持

产业政策具有重要的国家战略意义,如何有效引导经济资源流向政策支持产业,是产业政策发挥成效的关键.现有相关研究未深入考察经济资源在扶持行业之间及行业内部配置的规律,而且没有综合探讨不同资金配置的关联.文章考察了市场力量与政府扶持两种机制如何引导产业政策下的资金配置.研究发现,产业政策支持的企业获得了更多的债务融资和政府补助.其中,债务融资更多地流向了成长行业中规模较大的企业,政府补助使成长行业中的小规模企业和成熟行业中的大规模企业受益更多.研究结果表明,市场看重企业的增长机会,政府补助则会顾及当前成长性较弱而相对不受市场青睐的企业,对产业政策下的市场化资金配置起到了补充作用.文章的研究为如何协调市场机制和政府扶持两种力量提供了一定的借鉴.     

International trade agreements, environmental policy, and relocation of production

This paper studies the influence of free trade agreements on national environmental policies and location strategies of polluting firms. It is shown that banning export subsidies makes relocation of production more attractive for firms. When export subsidies are banned relocation is profitable because: (1) the rival firm reduces output due to more stringent emission regulation in the host country of the investment and (2) relocation leads to lower emission tax rate in the original home country of the investing firm. When export subsidies are used, the first effect is absent because the host government is able to use the export subsidy to compensate the negative effect of more stringent emission taxation on domestic shareholders.     

产业政策如何影响企业绩效：不同政策与作用路径是否存在影响差异?

文章将产业政策分成供给型、需求型与环境型,依托中国战略性新兴产业分析了不同政策通过政策资源的直接配置以及企业间配置两种作用路径对企业(产业)绩效的影响。研究发现：与供给型政策相结合的补贴行为通过以上两个路径抑制了企业绩效提升;产业政策对不同大小企业的影响存在差异,供给型政策资源的配置在小企业间并未呈现显著的集中特征,但在大企业间政策资源更为集中;供给型政策主要通过政策资源在企业间的配置路径降低大企业绩效,而通过补贴直接配置路径抑制小企业绩效提升;整体看环境型政策对投资、补贴等行为没有显著影响,但对大企业而言,其对政策资源在企业间的分散配置具有负向作用,而这一影响在小企业中则为促进作用。研究还发现,需求型政策有利于资源再配置,供给型政策则尚未显示出积极的资源再配置作用。     

Buyer Subsidies in an Equilibrium Model of Price Dispersion

Abstract. We present a model of equilibrium price dispersion in which a per-unit subsidy to buyers can reduce average prices. The reason is that subsidies have two effects on average prices that work in opposite directions. First, subsidies raise buyers' willingness-to-pay, and by itself this causes firms to charge higher prices. However, since a higher willingness-to-pay lowers the relative cost of search, subsidies also induce more search. This creates a second effect that puts pressure on firms to reduce prices. We show that the second effect can dominate, thus causing an overall reduction in average price.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Subsidizing public inputs

If production–cost savings associated with successful research and development are freely disseminated to other firms as soon as they are realized, too few resources may be allocated to this activity. Subsidies to this activity, a public input, can lead to optimal input use. The effectiveness of four alternative subsidy instruments in stimulating firms’ R&D spending are examined. Two are incremental subsidies and two are level subsidies. One of the incremental subsidies and one of the level subsidies crudely capture characteristics of incentive mechanisms used in many countries. A laboratory implementation of these instruments confirms that incremental subsidies are inferior to level subsidies.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

Effectiveness of R&D subsidies during the crisis: firm-level evidence across EU countries

This paper is one of the first attempts in the literature to evaluate the effectiveness of R&D policies in Europe during the great crisis of the late 2000s. Using homogenous firm-level data for the largest EU Member States over the period 2007–2009, we test whether manufacturing firms receiving public subsidies spent more on R&D. The analysis is performed using both non-parametric techniques and parametric estimation methods accounting for the possible endogenous selectivity of R&D subsidies. The hypothesis of full crowding-out is rejected in all countries under exam as firms did not replace their own resources with public grants. However, these firms did not allocate additional funds to research and hence, differently from earlier works, we do not find evidence for additionality effects of R&D subsidies. Our estimates indicate that, albeit not expansive, public subsidies to R&D thwarted the reduction of firm R&D efforts in the aftermath of economic crisis.     

Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export Performance? Evidence from Firm‐level Data*

This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms’ export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm‐level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity at the intensive margin, although this effect is conditional on firm characteristics. In particular, the positive relationship between subsidies and the intensive margin of exports is strongest among profit‐making firms, firms in capital‐intensive industries, and those located in non‐coastal regions. Compared to firm characteristics, the extent of heterogeneity across ownership structure (SOEs, collectives, and privately owned firms) proves to be relatively less important.     

Multinational Firms and Strategic FDI Subsidies

A simple three‐stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly, consisting of domestic and foreign multinational firms, is exploited to examine strategic FDI subsidies. While in the first stage the governments decide the optimal FDI subsidies, the firms endogenously choose their FDI levels (or subsidiary plant sizes) in the second stage and their output–export levels in the third stage. Thus, this paper finds that while the outflow and inflow FDI subsidies have different effects on firms’ FDI choices, the FDI subsidies are used as tools for the implementation of strategic policies and that the optimal FDI subsidies vary, depending on whether the governments assess labor employment.     

CROSS SUBSIDIZATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR WAGES

ABSTRACT 1 : This study has examined wage determination in the presence of cross‐subsidization of firms in the telecommunications industry. How variations in cross subsidies received, via the separations mechanism used in the industry, influence some firms to pay a greater level of wages is assessed. The firms studied have been almost the entire population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1995 and 2000. The analysis has established that firms which are able to obtain greater cross‐subsidies, on average, in fact pay higher wages and the elasticity of the relationship is quite high. The study is the first of its kind assessing the relationship between an important regulatory variable that measures a ubiquitous process, such as cross subsidization, and the impact on employee wages.     

Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry.     

Who wins and who loses from state subsidies?

China is perceived to rely on subsidizing firms in targeted industries to improve their performance and stay competitive. We implement an approach that allows for the joint estimation of direct and indirect effects of subsidies on subsidized and non-subsidized firms. We find that firms that receive subsidies experience a boost in productivity. However, our approach highlights the importance of indirect effects, which are generally neglected in the literature. We find that, in general but not always, non-subsidized firms experience reductions in their productivity growth if they operate in a cluster where other firms are subsidized. These negative externalities depend on the share of firms that receive subsidies in the cluster. Aggregating direct and indirect effects into a (weighted) total effect shows that this negative indirect effect tends to dominate. We interpret our results in light of a simple heterogenous firm model, which highlights that subsidization in a competitive environment of firms may potentially harm non-subsidized firms.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

The governments of most advanced countries offer some type of financial subsidy to encourage firm innovation and productivity. This paper analyzes the effects of innovation subsidies using a unique Swedish database that contains firm level data for the period 1997–2011, specifically informa tion on firm subsidies over a broad range of programs. Applying causal treatment effect analysis based on matching and a diff-in-diff approach combined with a qualitative case study of Swedish innovation subsidy programs, we test whether such subsidies have positive effects on firm performance. Our results indicate a lack of positive performance effects in the long run for the majority of firms, albeit there are positive short-run effects on human capital investments and also positive short-term productivity effects for the smallest firms. These findings are interpreted from a robust political economy perspective that reveals that the problems of acquiring correct information and designing appropriate incentives are so complex that the absence of significant positive long-run effects on firm performance for the majority of firms is not surprising.     

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND PUBLIC FUNDING

This paper presents microeconometric evidence on financing constraints for research and development activities in German small‐ and medium‐sized firms (SME). Special attention is paid to the role of public research and development (R&D) subsidies. For this purpose SMEs in West and East Germany are compared because these regions are very different in their supply of public R&D funding. The empirical evidence suggests that West German SMEs are financially constrained in their R&D activities by both internal and external resources. In East Germany, firms are not sensitive to external constraints, possibly due to high public R&D subsidies. The results show that R&D in East Germany is to a large extent driven by public subsidies and that the usual financial market mechanisms are dysfunctional with respect to R&D in this region.     

SUBSIDIES AND INEFFICIENCY: STOCHASTIC FRONTIER APPROACH

U.S. urban transit systems receive operating and capital subsidies from various levels of government. Each firm minimizes its cost net of subsidies subject to its production function. The first order conditions from this minimization give a set of equations that are estimated using a stochastic frontier approach. From the results are calculated technical and allocative inefficiencies. The allocative inefficiencies are further decomposed among two sources, subsidies and factors internal to the firm. The analysis reveals large allocative inefficiencies between labor, fuel, and capital. Furthermore, it finds that subsidies lead to excess use of labor relative to capital and excess use of fuel relative to capital and labor. Also, most allocative inefficiencies in firms are due to internal factors and not subsidies, and the sizes of the inefficiencies vary substantially among transit firms.     

Contingent wage subsidy

This paper proposes a policy aimed at tackling unemployment that arises from macroeconomic coordination failure. The policy offers firms wage subsidies payable only if the total number of new hires made across the economy is below a prespecified threshold. Subsidies provide incentives for firms to create jobs but the policy's goal is to generate a sufficiently large amount of employment spillovers to set off hiring complementarities taking employment beyond the threshold. Thus, subsidies are not distributed but the policy achieves a Pareto improvement. The market structure is important for policy design. Aggregative game techniques prove useful for the oligopsonistic case.