Strategyproof Cost Sharing of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

In a model of cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods, we examine the properties of mechanisms satisfying strategyproofness, no subsidy, outcome non‐bossiness, budget balance, individual rationality and consumer sovereignty. We show that such mechanisms in general will not satisfy the equity property of equal treatment of equals. This contrasts with the single excludable public good case.     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Policy Assignments for Central Bank Activities

This paper contrasts different policy assignments for central bank operations. Two types of asset market transactions (domestic, foreign) and two policy targets (interest rate, exchange rate) are examined within a portfolio-balance model. It is demonstrated that assigning domestic asset transactions to the internal target, and foreign asset transactions to the external target, produces stable policy paths, while the opposite assignment does not. [310]     

政府间财政收支责任安排的地区经济增长效应

本文运用面板数据模型全面考察改革开放以来我国政府间财政收支责任安排对地区经济增长的影响,以期从地区经济增长效应视角,对我国政府间财政收支责任安排是否合理作出科学判断。研究表明,改革开放以来我国政府间总支出和社会性支出责任安排对地区经济增长具有显著抑制作用,经济性和维持性支出责任安排有助于地区经济增长但显著性较差,收入责任安排的影响则较为模糊。这些影响总体上具有显著的非线性特征,且主要与地区经济发展水平和总支出特别是社会性支出责任安排有关:当地区经济发展和总支出特别是社会性支出分权程度超过一定阀值时,适当集权将有助于优化收支责任安排,促进地区经济增长;1994年分税制改革以来,我国总支出和社会性支出责任安排不合理状况得到明显改善,但经济性支出分权和维持性支出集权进程偏快,总体上不利于地区经济增长。     

Modeling Nonrenewable Resources Use with Multiple Demands and Multiple Sources

The theoretical literature following Hotelling (J Polit Econ 39:137–175, 1931) assumed that all nonrenewable resource needs are satisfied by one type of resource (e.g. “oil”), extractible at different per-unit costs. This formulation implicitly assumes that all users are the same distance from each resource pool, that all users can switch costlessly from one type of resource to another (e.g. liquid fossil fuels to coal or vice-versa), and that all users are subject to the same regulations. These assumptions imply, as Herfindahl (Extractive resources and taxation. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp 63–90, 1967) showed, that in competitive equilibrium all users will exhaust a lower-cost resource completely before beginning to extract a higher-cost resource: simultaneous extraction of different grades of oil or of oil and coal should never occur. In trying to apply the single-demand curve model during the last twenty years, several teams of authors have independently found a need to generalize it to account for users differing in their (1) location, (2) resource needs, or (3) regulatory environment. Each research team found that Herfindahl’s strong, unrealistic conclusion disappears in the generalized model; in its place, a weaker Herfindahl result emerges. Since each research team focussed on a different application, however, it has not always been clear that everyone has been describing the same generalized model. The goal in this paper is to integrate the findings of these teams and to present an easily accessible generalization of the nonrenewable resource model to multiple demand curves.     

Bayesian Estimation of Entry Games with Multiple Players and Multiple Equilibria

Entry game models are often used to study the nature of firms' profits and the nature of competition among firms in empirical studies. However, when there are multiple players in an oligopoly market, the resulting multiple equilibria have made it difficult in previous studies to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static and discrete games without using unreasonable assumptions. To overcome this difficulty, the present paper proposes a practical estimation method for an entry game with three players using a Bayesian approach. Some mild assumptions are imposed on the payoff function, and the average competitive effect is used to capture the entry effect of the number of firms. Our proposed methodology is applied to Japanese airline data from the year 2000, when there were three major airline companies, ANA, JAL and JAS. The model comparison is conducted to investigate the nature of strategic interaction among these Japanese airline companies.     

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agentsituations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to theprincipal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signalabout their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agentsreduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile downto the first-best level, even though the principal cannot observe theagents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a"simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of nomore than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments tothe agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An importantimplication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiationand proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemesthat utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways.     

Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products

We study the optimal ( i.e. revenue maximizing) auction of multiple products. We make three major points. First, we extend the relationship between price discrimination and optimal auctions from the single-product case to the multiple-product case. A monopolist setting prices for multiple products may offer discounts on purchases of bundles of products; similarly, the optimal auction of multiple products facilitates price discrimination by allocating products inefficiently to customers who are willing to purchase both products. Second, we demonstrate that optimal auctions are qualitatively distinct from monopoly sales of multiple products. Because of uncertainty about the values of other consumers, two products are bundled probabilistically in an optimal auction for a customer who is willing to buy both of them. A customer may then receive a discount on a lower-valued product without receiving a higher-valued product. Third, we show that in an optimal auction of two products the allocation of one product may vary with the amount of competition for the other product.     

Multiple equilibria, coordination, and transitional growth

We study a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production. In one of the sectors, external economies of scale are generated through the industry-level capital input. This leads to a divergence between private and social production possibility frontiers as well as to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem that arises is solved by agents who follow a simple trial-and-error learning rule. The growth path of the economy as agents learn lies below the production possibility frontier and may display cyclical transitional dynamics. We also show that coordination problems which may prevent the economy from attaining the “good” equilibrium may be alleviated by the temporary use of policy instruments that shape the allocation of resources.     

Estimation and Forecasting in Models with Multiple Breaks

This paper develops a new approach to change-point modelling that allows the number of change-points in the observed sample to be unknown. The model we develop assumes that regime durations have a Poisson distribution. It approximately nests the two most common approaches: the time-varying parameter (TVP) model with a change-point every period and the change-point model with a small number of regimes. We focus considerable attention on the construction of reasonable hierarchical priors both for regime durations and for the parameters that characterize each regime. A Markov chain Monte Carlo posterior sampler is constructed to estimate a version of our model, which allows for change in conditional means and variances. We show how real-time forecasting can be done in an efficient manner using sequential importance sampling. Our techniques are found to work well in an empirical exercise involving U.S. GDP growth and inflation. Empirical results suggest that the number of change-points is larger than previously estimated in these series and the implied model is similar to a TVP (with stochastic volatility) model.     

Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation

We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.     

市场界定与企业多元化经营的战略选择

本文通过回顾和总结前人在企业多元化经营方面的研究成果和存在的缺点,联系实践分析了市场界定战备的含义,过程等重要因素,并说明市场界定这一营销战略中的重要概念是我们界定相关行业的有效手段。     

Multiple equilibria and hysteresis in simple exchange models

This paper presents a simple two-good general equilibrium model of exchange in which demands are linear functions of relative prices. The solution of the model is represented by a cubic equation which can have either a single root which corresponds to a unique equilibrium price or three roots corresponding to multiple equilibria. The major properties of the model are that the relative price can make large discrete jumps in response to small parameter changes, and can display hysteresis. The paper shows how recent developments in non-linear methods can be used to examine the equilibrium properties of the model and establish conditions under which multiple equilibria can arise. The model is compared with that used by Shapley and Shubik.     

多边投资框架:趋势与评价

根据2001年12月WTO多哈部长宣言,多边投资框架谈判将在第五届部长会议之后启动,距今只有不到两年的时间。无论情愿与否,WTO成员国不得不为这一谈判做好准备。关于指导FDI的国际投资框架应该如何规划的问题,不同的国家有不同的观点和方法。在全球化迅速发展的世界经济中,国际上对FDI所讨论的问题也越来越广泛。那些在目前较少受到关注的问题,将会得到越来越多的重视。而且,值得指出的是,国际社会已对需要处理的主要问题取得了广泛共识。本文对我国政府决策部门和有关企业了解将要全面启动的多边投资框架谈判,积极参与多边投资框架的设计和拟定工作,制定相关的对策,具有非常重要的参考意义。     

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting

Infinite horizon dynamic optimization problems with non-exponential time preferences may not only exhibit time inconsistency but may also have multiple solutions with distinct payoffs. We here show that such multiplicity is generic in the sense that it occurs in an open set of such decision problems, even with small state- and action-spaces. Non-exponential discounting allows for an “addictive” equilibrium alongside a “virtuous” equilibrium. We also provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems with general action spaces. Authors thank Philippe Jehiel, Maria Saez-Marti and Bill Sandholm for comments to an earlier version, and the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Research Foundation for financial support.     

Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.     

Economies with Multiple Public Projects

This paper discusses a general equilibrium model of an economy with multiple separately provided public projects. We assume an additively separable cost structure and consider valuation equilibria with separated finance systems, one for each collective good. Under non-Euclidean representation we show the decentralization of Pareto efficient allocations by valuation equilibria and the equivalence of the core and the set of nonnegative valuation equilibria. In the case of Euclidean representation, every Pareto efficient allocation is shown to be supported as an affine valuation equilibrium that is characterized by a personalized price per unit of each public good and a personalized lump sum tax or subsidy. These results complement and clarify already established insights into Lindahl pricing and its generalizations developed in the literature.