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1.
Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Akihiko Yanase 《Journal of Economics》2009,97(2):121-140
This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in
a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered.
A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting”
effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home
country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in
the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces
a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.
相似文献
2.
Frédéric Lordon 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):1-21
The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies,
and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing
that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
“productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path.
Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by
the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as
long term and endogenous outcomes. 相似文献
3.
We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures.
When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their
products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on
either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of
third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis
to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the
government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling
schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat
effect”.
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4.
Armin Schmutzler 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(3):511-535
The paper introduces a simple framework for analyzing the environmental effects of local transportation policies, and it reviews
some evidence. In several cases, subsidies for local public transportation have led to substantial reductions in road transportation and have thereby reduced externalities.
Some but not all estimates suggest positive overall welfare effects of such policies. In the rare cases where road pricing has been applied, it has helped to reduce automobile transportation, and it has led to environmental improvements. The experience
with specific driving restrictions like “days without cars” and “low emission zones” has been mixed. Local transportation policy can have a useful role to play
as a complement to national policy instruments, but neither efficiency nor effectiveness can be taken for granted. 相似文献
5.
6.
Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Viktor J. Vanberg 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(3):199-222
The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing
on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market
players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed,
a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing
rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior.
And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative
economic regime.
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Viktor J. VanbergEmail: |
7.
Eyüp Özveren 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2000,10(1-2):49-65
This paper evaluates Schumpeter's grand vision as reflected in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and elaborates it in conjunction with the so-called “globalization” trends characteristic of the wake of the twenty-first
century. In addition to the evolutionary nature of his methodology, the institutionalist dimension of Schumpeter's definitions
are brought to light. A case is made for a fundamental process of “uncreative destruction” as far as the institutional setup
of the economy is concerned. The contention of this paper is that there is ample support in Schumpeterian analysis for a counterpoint
to the liberal thesis that envisages the worldwide spread of individualism, market economies, and democratic forms of government. 相似文献
8.
Thomas O. Nitsch 《Forum for Social Economics》1994,24(1):1-40
From Aristotle to Scitovsky the nature and scope of human economy and economics have remained essentially the same, viz. the
prudent/efficient/welfaremaximizing administration/utilization of the scarce resources (chrèmata, “choses utiles,” etc.) comprising the household and the expertise there-of. Aristotle’s protégé, Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.),
went to the extent of counseling that, for the “health and well-being” of all its members (including the livestock), theoikos “should be airy in the summer and sunny in the winter,” it no doubt going without saying that its roof should be kept in
good repair. Today, it behooves us to critically re-examine our traditional concepts of wealth, “land,” “the environment,”
and the socioeconomic unit whose storehouse of resources is to be managed aright, particularly along the history-of-thought
lines presented here.
Address delivered at a session on March 25, 1994 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics,
Chicago. The author thanks Tom Coffey (Latin), Brace Malina and Plinio Prioreschi (Italian) for linguistic assistance. 相似文献
9.
In their recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Bagus and Howden (2010) present “quibbles” with fractional-reserve free banking. Specifically, they raise what they call “unaddressed issues” in
this system, with a particular emphasis on Selgin (1988). We deem their arguments to be more substantial than “quibbles” and see them as part of a longstanding debate about fundamental
aspects of monetary theory. We respond to their objections and attempt to specify how debate between the two sides might proceed
more productively. 相似文献
10.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Economics》2007,91(1):1-40
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing
(“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become
highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and
lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher
GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation
between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively
high growth. 相似文献
11.
Virgil Henry Storr 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(3):293-298
In The Invisible Hook, Leeson argues that by devising a complex system of rules (called the “pirate code”) and procedures for electing their leaders,
pirate societies created governance structures where the leaders were strong enough to “control the governed” but were not
strong enough to break the constraints that bound them. There is, however, a “hidden catch” within The Invisible Hook. There are important differences between pirate crews and societies, between pirate captains and political leaders, and between
the pirate code and constitutions. Moreover, understanding these differences is critical for understanding how criminal bands
were able to accomplish a feat that still proves problematic for many societies. 相似文献
12.
Antonio Quesada 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):623-627
Summary. Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are “almost
unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are “appropriately heterogeneous”, with preferences
similar to those generating the “paradox of voting”.
Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001 相似文献
13.
Abstract Most existing studies examine the home market effect (HME) in a framework with immobile labour as the only production factor and the assumption of a freely traded homogeneous good is known to be crucial for the HME to emerge. This study explores the HME in the presence of mobile capital by use of a footloose capital model allowing for positive transport costs of the homogeneous good. The mobile capital generates a channel to offset the trade imbalance of a country. As a result, the HME always appears for arbitrary transport costs in both sectors of differentiated and homogeneous goods. 相似文献
14.
Jason Potts 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2007,20(2-3):123-135
This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework
of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination
and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value
paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the
economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination,
adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general
“generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.
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15.
Maria-Soledad Castaño 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(2):139-145
The main goal of this paper is to analyse the relationship between social capital and economic growth taking into account
the role of fiscal policy from theoretical and empirical points of view. To achieve this goal, “Human Capital and Public Capital
Effects on Economic Growth” is focused on the effects of two traditional factors: human capital and public capital effects
on economic growth. “Social Capital Effects on Economic Growth” considers qualitative variables introducing some socioeconomic
effects on economic growth process analysis. In this case, social capital the main variable will be considered. “Empirical
Analysis,” an empirical analysis is developed considering the case of European countries prior to the EU enlargement. Finally,
in Conclusions,” the main conclusions will be resumed.
相似文献
16.
Michael C. Munger 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(2):169-175
The use of the “principal–agent” model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or
“general will.” This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong
an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley’s book is a very strong contribution to that literature.
Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical “comparative statics” approach to
analyze dynamics.
相似文献
17.
Stability of risk preference parameter estimates within the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Duncan James 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):123-141
This paper reports new data from both selling and buying versions of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. First, when
using the selling version of BDM, the cross-sectional mean of CRRA risk preference parameter estimates shifts from a value
consistent with “as if” risk-seeking behavior in the early baseline to a value closer to “as if” risk neutrality in the late
baseline. Second, when using the buying version of BDM, the cross-sectional mean of CRRA risk preference parameter estimates
does not appear to change over time in a statistically significant manner. The cross-sectional mean from the late baseline
of the buying version of BDM is closer to “as if” risk neutrality and to the late baseline estimates from the selling version
of BDM than it is to either early baseline estimates from the selling version of BDM or typical estimates from the first price
auction. Use of dominated offers is correlated with deviations from “as if” risk neutrality; this suggests the possibility
that the early deviations from “as if” risk neutrality reflect errors.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification D80 相似文献
18.
Ferdinando Meacci 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(4):333-348
The Austrian notion of stages of production and the related principle of the greater productivity of roundabout methods, plus
the neo-Austrian notions of vertical integration and vertical division of labour, are utilized in this paper in an attempt
to reconstruct Smith’s convoluted arguments on the different employment of capitals in chapter 5, book 2, of the Wealth of Nations. Smith’s arguments are first clarified in the light of the two concepts of capital (money capital and productive capital),
of the two aspects of productive labour (living labour and dead labour) and of the two viewpoints (of an individual and of
society) on which Smith’s theory is based. The results of this clarification are then used to prove that, independently of
Smith’s own words but in consistency with his theory, the notions of “quantity” and “productivity” of productive labour have
a “vertical”, as well as a “horizontal”, dimension so that they fit both the input–output scheme and the Austrian framework
of time-consuming methods of production. 相似文献
19.
Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the “span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is
the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his m/2^m/_2 neighbors to the left, and with his m/2^m/_2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides
whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of
the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental
to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated
with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated
conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population,
that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another. 相似文献
20.
In a context of constitutional choice of a voting rule, this paper presents an economic analysis of scoring rules that identifies
the golden voting rule under the impartial culture assumption. This golden rule depends on the weights β and (1−β) assigned
to two types of costs: the cost of majority decisiveness (‘tyranny’) and the cost of the ‘erosion’ in the majority principle.
Our first main result establishes that in voting contexts where the number of voters n is typically considerably larger than the number of candidates k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule for almost any positive β. Irrespective of n and k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule if β ≥ 1/2 .. This hitherto almost unnoticed rule outperforms any other
scoring rule in eliminating majority decisiveness. The golden voting rule is, however, the plurality rule, the most widely
used voting rule that does not allow even the slightest ‘erosion’ in the majority principle, when β=0. Our second main result
establishes that for sufficiently “small size” voting bodies, the set of potential golden rules consists at most of just three
rules: the plurality rule, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule. On the one hand, this finding provides a new rationalization
to the central role the former two rules play in practice and in the voting theory literature. On the other hand, it provides
further support to the inverse plurality rule; not only that it is the golden rule in voting contexts, it also belongs, together
with the plurality rule and the Borda method of counts, to the “exclusive” set of potential golden voting rules in small committees.
We are indebted to Jim Buchanan, Amichai Glazer, Noa Nitzan, Ken Shepsle, and an anonymous
referee for their useful comments. 相似文献