法国公开要约收购制度的最新改革——以2006年《公开要约收购法》为中心

2006年3月31日，依欧盟转化《要约收购指令》之要求，法国颁布了《公开要约收购法》，对现有的公开要约收购制度进行了多方位、深层次的改革。从宏观上看，此次改革主要涉及四个方面，即金融证券管理局监管范围的改革、强制要约收购制度的改革、要约透明机制的改革以及反要约收购防御措施的改革。尽管改革的效果仍有待评估，但法国在此次改革中所体现的提高欧盟范围内企业竞争力的决心和表率作用无疑为欧盟经济一体化注入了新的活力。     

要约收购：资产重组市场化的必然选择

要约收购是成熟证券市场上公司收购的典型方式，也是各国证券法调整的核心范畴。与协议收购相比，要约收购要经过较多的环节，操作程序比较繁杂，收购人的收购成本往往比较高。     

基于新证券法的上市公司要约收购制度优化

上市公司要约收购制度是优化资本市场资源配置的主要形式,如何切实保障要约收购过程中中小股东的利益一直都是各国证券立法和监管的重要任务。自2020年3月1日实施的新证券法对我国上市公司要约收购制度在实施过程中出现的问题进行了立法层面上的回应。鉴于新证券法对上市公司要约收购制度的修订和实施过程中的不足,该制度在未来的立法及修订过程中要注重区分持股目的,建立多层次的持股披露制度,适当约束要约义务豁免的权利并更加尊重收购双方的意愿。     

论要约收购

要约收购这种企业并购行为在西方资本市场上比较普遍,在我国尚属新生事物。由于我国资本市场的特殊性和复杂性,一些相关的管理制度还需在调整要约收购标准、建立部分要约收购制度、修改要约收购的定价方式、实施反收购和信息披露监管等方面加以改进和完善。     

我国收购要约立法及国际比较

目前中国证监会出台的《上市公司收购管理办淑征求意见稿》，是我国对收购要约进行系统规范的专门法规，对以往立法有许多突破和创新，同时也有不足之处。……     

我国证券法中关于上市公司收购的立法缺欠

对我国证券法有关上市公司收购中存在的缺欠提出了自己的观点。     

论证券市场要约收购风险

自我国证券市场建立以来,要约收购从无到有,逐步完善,成为我国证券市场的一项重要的公开收购制度。本文探讨了我国公司作为要约收购方在要约收购中可能出现的企业风险和法律问题,以及基本的应对方法。旨在为我国日益发展的要约收购制度给予一定的建议,并对公司在进行要约收购时应怎样应对和合理利用该要约收购作了进一步的探讨。该制度的研究对完善现行我国证券法律制度具有重要的现实意义。     

上市公司收购中的要约收购

上市公司收购指收购人通过在证券交易所的股份转让活动持有一个上市公司的股份达到一定比例、通过证券交易所股份转让活动以外的其他合法途径控制一个上市公司的股份达到一定程度,导致其获得或者可能获得对该公司的实际控制权的行为.收购人可通过协议收购、要约收购或者证券交易所的集中竞价交易等三种方式对上市公司进行收购.其中,要约收购指收购人向目标公司同一类别股东或全体股东发出,约定一段时间后以一定的价格购买其所持有股份的意思表示行为.根据法律对要约收购过程中收购人收购义务的差异,要约收购分为全面强制要约收购和部分主动要约收购.要约收购制度起源于上世纪50年代的英国,该制度为上市公司收购过程中维护广大中小投资者合法权益以及现代企业制度下强化管理层约束机制提供了有效的制度保障.     

市场呼唤主动型的流通股要约收购

主动型流通股要约收购指高于市场价的流通股要约收购，目的在于实际取得流通股份，属于实质性收购，在香港及国外很普遍。     

《证券法》规制外资收购我国上市公司的制度选择

随着我国改革开放的深入，外国投资者被允许收购我国上市公司除A股流通股之外的所有股票，由此暴露出现行《证券法》存在的立法缺陷，外资收购方与我国上市公司股东之间的利益严重失衡。《证券法》应通过重点完善信息披露制度和强制要约收购制度，来强化对外资收购我国上市公司的规制。     

法人治理结构的缺陷与我国《公司法》关于恶意收购的规定

公司管理层发起恶意收购的动因是多方面的,而其中很多是与公司财富的增加和股东利益的改善相背离的。因此,如果没有相对完善的法人治理结构有效约束管理者行为,恶意收购将有可能导致公司财富与股东利益的损失。在我国法人治理结构尚不十分健全的情况下,《公司法》与《上市公司收购管理办法》对恶意收购的鼓励可能是不适当的。     

The Effect of Golden Parachutes on Shareholder Wealth and Takeover Probabilities

This study seeks to determine whether stockholders experience increases in wealth due to a company's adoption of a golden parachute and resulting increased takeover bid probability. Market reaction to golden parachute adoption is examined by employing event analysis, logit analysis and metric regression. Our findings indicate that the adoption of a golden parachute does not signify an increased probability of a takeover bid, and stockholders experience a decrease in wealth.     

Takeover activity in Australia: endogenous and exogenous influences

The present paper analyses the population of takeover bids for listed Australian companies using quarterly data over a 25-year period to re-examine the predictability of takeover activity and to determine if there is a flow on impact on macroeconomic variables. We examine whether takeover activity: (i) is endogenous; that is, determined by own activity; (ii) is jointly determined by macroeconomic and capital market variables; and (iii) has an exogenous spillover impact across the economy. We find that stock prices and takeover activity share a long-term common trend, the relative success of takeover bids is independent of sharemarket activity, and conclude that aggregate takeover activity is driven by fundamental economic factors rather than by speculative activity.     

Takeover duration and negotiation process

We study the relations between takeover negotiations duration, competition and learning, focusing on the private phase of bidder-initiated transactions. While the negotiation goes on, both parties learn about true deal synergies. At any moment, rival bidders can show up and compete for the target. Using a discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium relations between the negotiation duration, the pressure of potential competition and the learning process. Next, we perform a calibration exercise on a large sample of merger negotiations with hand-collected data from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Our results provide evidence of a very competitive M&A (Mergers and acquisitions) market.     

Takeover vulnerability and the credibility of signaling: The case of open-market share repurchases

There is debate in the literature focuses on whether open market repurchases can be taken as a signal of stock undervaluation. This research argues that takeover pressures before a repurchase announcement can be a credible signal of undervaluation. The empirical results indicate that repurchasing firms with a higher probability of takeover experience greater announcement effects, improvements in operating performance and long-run abnormal return, positive forecast revisions by financial analysts, and enhanced agreement between management and shareholders. These findings suggest that takeover probability and open-market share repurchases appear to constitute a double-signal for conveying stock undervaluation to the market.     

Takeover Defences and IPO Firm Value in the Netherlands

The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defences and IPO firm value. We report that management frequently uses takeover defences before taking the firm public. The use of takeover defences is primarily motivated by managerial entrenchment. IPO investors anticipate potential conflict of interests with management and reduce the price they pay for the IPO shares if takeover defences are adopted. Although managers internalise this cost of takeover defences to the degree they own pre‐IPO stock, they are likely to gain through private control benefits. Non‐management pre‐IPO owners lose. Their shares are worth less, but different from managers, they do not get offsetting private control benefits. We infer that managers use takeover defences to protect private control benefits at non‐management pre‐IPO owners’ expense.     

Takeover Prediction and Portfolio Performance: A Note

This paper empirically tests whether it is possible to generate abnormal returns from investing in a portfolio of predicted successful takeover targets. Portfolios are formed on the basis of predictions from models similar to those estimated by Palepu (1986). However, unlike Palepu (1986), the portfolios in this paper are formed using a decision rule that results in smaller portfolios with higher average takeover probabilities. This provides a stronger test of whether share prices reflect future takeover probabilities. The results show that while the models have significant explanatory power, the portfolios fail to beat the return on the market over a 12-month holding-period.     

The Loser's Curse: Accounting for the Transaction Costs of Takeover and the Distortion of Takeover Motives

Studies for major stock markets of share price movements in the period around a takeover show that target company shareholders typically experience large gains in wealth but that acquiring company shareholders do not. The reasons for this asymmetry–and, in particular, for the absence of gains for the shareholders of the companies which initiate the deal–are imperfectly understood. This note suggests one factor contributing to those results. It argues that accounting practice prescribed by the main standard setters is non‐neutral towards ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ bidders with respect to reporting the transaction costs of bidding. It shows how the prescribed accounting treatment of these costs affects performance measures used in salary contracts as well as in the markets for executives and for corporate control. The result is that the managers of bidding companies will have an ‘arti ?cial’ incentive to in ?ate their bid price or to go ahead with a bid which offers no bene ?t to their shareholders. Ironically, the main standard setters seem minded soon to prohibit the only accounting technique which does not distort these incentives.     

National Culture and Takeover Contest Outcomes

We examine the effects of cultural differences on the outcome of takeover contests. Our main focus is on individuality, which we posit to have an effect on firm behavior in international takeover contests. In a sample of international acquisitions with bidders from multiple countries, we find that individuality positively relates to the probability of placing the winning bid. We further find that takeover contest winners with high individuality scores experience lower announcement returns. Our results are consistent with the literature that links individuality to overconfidence. Our evidence suggests that firms should control culture‐related behavioral biases in their mergers and acquisitions activity.     

欧盟视阈下在线平台中个人数据的增值税处理

近年来,在线平台的迅猛发展推动了全球经济数字化加速转型,但同时也引发了包括增值税政策适用在内的诸多挑战.通过研究《欧盟增值税指令》和欧州法院的判例法,以及分析个人数据与在线平台运行之间的关系可以推断出,个人数据是在线平台提供访问服务构成的增值税应税范围内的供应,且与消费者是否向在线平台支付金钱形式的对价无关.在实践中,使用客观价值方法来确定在线服务供应的应税金额存在实际困难,而使用直接联系标准解决易货交易问题,会导致增值税税基在本质上得到扩张.因此,建议当前不要将在线平台访问服务的供应视为一项应税交易.此外,对于商家为获得消费者数据而向平台付款的情形,因其不符合直接联系标准,也不应被视为服务对价.