Structural breaks and the twin deficits hypothesis

Recent theoretical and empirical analyses of the relation between the current account and the government budget balance suggest that the “twin deficits” relation is subject to structural changes. Most previous empirical analyses impose the change point without resorting to econometric testing. In this paper we utilize time series data to evaluate the impact of structural breaks on the long- and short-run relation between current account, government balance and investment in 22 OECD countries. We found that when allowing for the possible existence of structural breaks of unknown date, the data reveal more clearly the long-run relation between the current account and its determinants. Moreover, the empirical results show that the degree of financial integration is generally increasing in most OECD countries, including the leading non-EU economies. This contrasts some recent evidence on the persistence of the so-called Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.

On trade creation and regional trade agreements: does depth matter?

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are usually classified according to their form into four broad categories: preferential arrangements, free trade agreements, customs unions and common markets. This paper investigates whether the form/depth of RTAs matters concerning their effect on trade. I use a proper specification of the gravity model with panel data on the 1960–2000 period, which specifically control for self-selection into agreements. Results show that creating any kind of RTAs providing trade preferences to their member countries significantly increases bilateral trade. Nevertheless, their average treatment effect on bilateral trade does not significantly differ according to the depth of agreements.

Trade policy and specialization in developing countries

This paper examines the impact of trade policy on specialization patterns in ten Latin American countries over the period 1985–1998. These countries are natural case studies because in the last decades they implemented comprehensive trade liberalization programs, both generally and preferentially, starting from relatively high tariff protection levels. Our econometric results suggest that reducing own most favored nation tariffs is associated with increasing manufacturing production specialization. Furthermore, we find that preferential trade liberalization and differences in the degree of unilateral openness have resulted in increased dissimilarities in manufacturing production structures across countries. These results are robust across specialization measures and estimation methods.

International Saving, Investment and Trade

Feldstein and Horioka (Econ J 90:314–329, 1980) observed that saving and investment move closely together in the major OECD countries. This finding is a puzzle if national economies are characterized by one sector neoclassical production functions—with diminishing returns to capital, a high level of savings in a country should create an incentive to export capital. In this paper, we show that this incentive disappears in the presence of multiple sectors with differing capital intensities. In a high saving country, national capital can be absorbed domestically without a decline in its marginal product through a shift in the sectoral composition of national production towards capital intensive sectors. This is nothing but the well-known Rybczynski effect. We present a modified version of the standard Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) Model to show that very small barriers to capital mobility are enough to force national savings to stay within the country of origin. We also argue that, while the assumptions of this model may appear special, they are not unrealistic for the developed countries in the Feldstein Horioka study. Some historical economic trends are also consistent with the picture presented in this paper. Finally, the paper shows that the conventional insights from the one sector neoclassical model can be completely overturned in a multi-sector setting when technological differences are introduced.

Multinationals: Too Many or Too Few?— The Proximity–concentration Trade-off

The paper builds an analytically tractable model that illustrates the “proximity–concentration trade-off” involved in horizontal multinationals. For low trade costs, firms are single-plant firms, for intermediate costs, some are single-plant firms whereas others are multinationals, for large trade costs, firms are multinationals. Because of the modeling strategy, the model is suited for a welfare analysis of multinationals. It shows that too many firms choose to concentrate their production in only one location. Also, for some transport costs, a reduction in transport costs worsens welfare.

The Lack of International Consumption Risk Sharing: Can Inflation Differentials and Trading Costs Help Explain the Puzzle?

The bulk of evidence on the lack of international risk sharing is based on regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth. This paper argues that the results from such regressions obtained from international data are, however, not directly comparable to those based on regional data: the standard practice of running such regressions on international data fails to account for persistent international differentials in consumer prices, whereas—implicitly—most of the literature based on regional data has accounted for these differences. When risk sharing regressions are set up in conceptually the same way in international and regional data sets, the estimated coefficients are also very similar. To explore this result further, we adapt the variance decomposition of Asdrubali et al. (Q J Econ 111:1081–1110, 1996) to allow for deviations from purchasing power parity across countries. While quantity (income and credit) flows are the dominant channel of risk sharing among regions, relative consumption and output price (internal terms of trade) fluctuations account for the bulk of the deviation from the complete markets outcome in international data. To the extent that persistent differences in consumer prices are an indication of goods market segmentation, our findings provide empirical evidence for the proposition by Obstfeld and Rogoff (NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 2000) that segmented international goods markets rather than asset market incompleteness may account for the (apparent) lack of risk sharing between countries.

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains from Cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503–36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.

Market structure and the link between migration and trade

Many recent studies have looked at the impact of international migration on trade and found a significant effect. They posit that migration fosters trade by lowering costs or by means of a preference bias. However, to my knowledge, market structure has not as yet been considered. Using data from Switzerland, this paper empirically assesses the extent to which migration affects trade, taking goods differentiation into account. A monopolistic model with a multisector economy (Chaney in Am Econ Rev 98(41):1707–1721, 2008) is then empirically estimated. The findings show that market structure explains the different channels through which migration affects trade.

Country size and the trade effects of the euro

This paper investigates whether small countries gain relatively more than large countries from an ‘expansion’ of their market through the creation of a single currency. The introduction of the euro offers a particularly valuable source to test this hypothesis, which we motivate using the theoretical model by Casella of the year 1996. Our results from a panel data analysis, using both aggregate and disaggregated trade data, point to a statistically significant but quantitatively moderate small country bonus. On average, the euro has led to an improvement of the small euro area’s relative export performance by 3–9%.

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Testing the Links between Institutional Integration and Trade Deepening: Clues from Europe

This paper investigates the interaction between institutional integration and trade deepening in the EU over the last 50 years. It uses Granger causality tests, a VECM and variance decompositions to further the understanding of this interaction. The evidence indicates two-way endogeneity. But the link from institution building to trade dominates. Yet, this link has weakened over time, possibly due to globalisation sidestepping institutions. Moreover, the sensitivity of institutional integration to trade deepening has risen, which suggests that economic forces have gained more strength in determining institutional steps.

Evaluating China’s Integration in World Trade with a Gravity Model Based Benchmark

This paper assesses China’s “natural” place in the world economy with a new set of trade integration indicators, which are used as a benchmark in order to examine whether China’s share in international trade is consistent with fundamentals such as economic size, location and other relevant factors. They constitute a better measure of trade integration that incorporates many more factors than traditional openness ratios. The model tracks international trade well and confirms that China is already well integrated in world markets, particularly with North America, several Latin American and East Asian emerging markets and most euro area countries.

Impacts of trade reform: sensitivity of model results to key assumptions

The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda has generated demand for estimates of the potential economic consequences of global trade reform. Recent improvements in the GTAP dataset have provided a much better representation of tariff restrictions as of 2001. However, despite its use by most global trade modelers, substantial differences in results emerge from different computable general equilibrium exercises. To help understand these differences, this paper examines the sensitivity of full global and regional trade liberalization results from the GTAP model, using the GTAP version 6.1 database, to different assumptions about factor mobility, fiscal neutrality, macro-economic closure, and trade (Armington) elasticities.

Shocks to Terms of Trade and Risk-premium in an Intertemporal Model: The Dutch Disease and a Dutch Party

In this paper, we analyze the impact of terms of trade and risk-premium shocks on a small open economy in an intertemporal Dutch disease model, with international capital mobility. Given that an improvement in the terms of trade is associated with a decrease in the risk-premium on lending to this economy, we find that this can lead to a Dutch party (rather than Dutch disease) in which real exchange rate appreciation is associated with an expansion of the capital-intensive traded sector, hence, pro-industrialization. The economy also accumulates more debt in the long-run in response to the lower borrowing costs.

Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

Implications of Monetary Union for Catching-up Member States

We examine the implications of monetary union for macroeconomic stabilization in catching-up participating countries. We allow member states’ supply conditions to differ, especially with regard to sectoral characteristics. Sectoral productivity shocks of the type associated with the Balassa–Samuelson effect tend to hamper the stabilization properties of a currency union. In the face of aggregate supply disturbances, the stabilization costs of renouncing monetary autonomy diminish with a steeper supply curve (as induced by higher trade openness) and—barring idiosyncratic shocks—with a larger reference country size, more homogeneous supply slopes and a higher preference for price stability.

Political regime and FDI from advanced to emerging countries

We investigate the effect of the political regime on bilateral FDI flows from advanced to emerging countries in the period 1992–2004. We control for country size, per capita income and privatization proceeds in the host country, and use a random-effect Tobit model to exploit information from zero entries. Our results suggest that democracy does have a positive effect on the amount and probability of FDI flows from developed to emerging countries. Moreover, we find that the effect of democracy on FDI also works through the total factor productivity channel, not only the political risk one as suggested in the literature.

Welfare State, Market Imperfections, and International Trade

Within a two-sector-two-country model of trade with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, a more generous welfare state in one country increases welfare in that country and can have positive spillover effects on the other. Furthermore, synchronised expansions of social security are more welfare enhancing than unilateral ones. Our results counter the fears that a race to the bottom in social standards may result from the ‘shrinking-tax-base’ entailed by international capital mobility. While affecting trade patterns and income distribution, capital mobility interacts with welfare state policies in increasing welfare, even when capital flows out of the country that initiates the shock.

International Risk Sharing and Government Moral Hazard

This paper analyzes incentive problems caused by international risk sharing. They arise because international risk sharing contributes to the insurance of domestic consumption and thus lowers governments’ incentives to increase output. We show that the resulting distortions can lead to substantial efficiency losses. Complete risk sharing is, therefore, undesirable and the optimal degree of risk sharing may be low. Furthermore, we show that households’ risk sharing decisions are socially inefficient and are effectively maximizing government moral hazard. As a result, financial innovation and integration may reduce welfare by increasing households’ risk sharing opportunities.

Saving–investment Correlations in Response to Monetary Policy Shocks: New Insights into the Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle?

In this paper, it is argued that the observed high positive correlation between national savings and investment which is found in the data can in part be explained by shocks to monetary policy. This hypothesis, which is established by reviewing some empirical findings, is tested in a two-country DSGE-model framework in the tradition of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics. The simulation results obtained support the idea that shocks to monetary policy might contribute to the explanation of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.