How suboptimal are linear sharing rules?

The objective of this paper is to analyze criteria for portfolio choice when two investors are forced to invest in a common portfolio and share the proceeds by a linear sharing rule. A similar situation with many investors is typical for defined contribution pension schemes. The restriction implies two sources of suboptimal investment decisions as seen from each of the two investors individually. One is the suboptimal choice of portfolio, the other is the forced linear sharing rule. We measure the combined consequence for each investor by their respective loss in wealth equivalent. We show that significant losses can arise when investors are diverse in their risk attitude. We also show that an investor with a low degree of risk aversion, like the logarithmic or the square root investor, often applied in portfolio choice models, can either inflict or be subject to severe losses when being forced to participate in such a common investment pool.     

When are outside directors effective?

This paper uses recent regulations that have required some companies to increase the number of outside directors on their boards to generate estimates of the effect of board independence on performance that are largely free from endogeneity problems. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases when outsiders are added to the board, and when the cost of information is high, performance worsens when outsiders are added to the board. The estimates provide some of the cleanest estimates to date that board independence matters, and the finding that board effectiveness depends on information cost supports a nascent theoretical literature emphasizing information asymmetry. We also find that firms compose their boards as if they understand that outsider effectiveness varies with information costs.     

When are dividend increases bad for corporate bonds?

Employing an event study approach, we examine 5,574 bond return reactions to unexpected quarterly dividend change announcements in the U.S. corporate bond market over the period 2002–2014. On average, bond price reaction is in the same direction as dividend changes, which supports the hypothesis that dividend changes signal future firm performance. However, the price reaction varies significantly in the spectrum of bond's risk. Importantly, we document that some bondholders react negatively to unexpected dividend increases, indicating a wealth transfer effect. Such wealth transfer effect is most likely to occur in very high risk bond approaching maturity issued by firms with a low level of cash and incorporated outside Delaware.     

When are investment projects in the same risk class?

If two investments have the same pay‐off covariance with the market but one has higher expected pay‐off, which asset according to the CAPM has most risk? One answer is that as far as risk goes the two assets are the same, because they have the same covariance with the market. The correct answer, pointed out nearly four decades ago by Eugene Fama, but long overlooked, is that investments have the same risk, the same returns beta and the same CAPM discount rate if and only if they have the same ratio of ex ante pay‐off covariance to pay‐off mean. This insight clarifies much of the conventional wisdom that surrounds capital budgeting and ‘risk‐adjusted’ discount rates, while also displaying the mechanics by which information arrival affects the CAPM cost of capital.     

When are Options Overpriced? The Black--Scholes Model and Alternative Characterisations of the Pricing Kernel

An important determinant of option prices is the elasticityof the pricing kernel used to price all claims in the economy.In this paper, we first show that for a given forward priceof the underlying asset, option prices are higher when the elasticityof the pricing kernel is declining than when it is constant.We then investigate the implications of the elasticity of thepricing kernel for the stochastic process followed by the underlyingasset. Given that the underlying information process followsa geometric Brownian motion, we demonstrate that constant elasticityof the pricing kernel is equivalent to a Brownian motion forthe forward price of the underlying asset, so that the Black–Scholesformula correctly prices options on the asset. In contrast,declining elasticity implies that the forward price processis no longer a Brownian motion: it has higher volatility andexhibits autocorrelation. In this case, the Black–Scholesformula underprices all options.     

When Is External Debt Sustainable?

The article empirically examines the determinants of debt distress,defined as periods in which countries resort to any of threeforms of exceptional finance: significant arrears on externaldebt, Paris Club rescheduling, and nonconcessional InternationalMonetary Fund lending. Probit regressions show that three factorsexplain a substantial fraction of the cross-country and time-seriesvariation in the incidence of debt distress: the debt burden,the quality of policies and institutions, and shocks. The relativeimportance of these factors varies with the level of development.These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications,and the core specifications have substantial out-of-sample predictivepower. The quantitative implications of these results are examinedfor the lending strategies of official creditors.     

When it comes to the crunch: What are the drivers of the US banking crisis?

This article considers how permissive regulatory conditions helped change the size and scope of the US mortgage market. Asset backed securitization facilitated an expansion of the US mortgage market and modified the structure of the value chain within which financial assets, risk and liquidity were managed. New sophisticated mortgage products, indulgent lending practices, loose credit assessment and flimsy documentation increased the probability of mortgage default in an economic downturn. US banks were not in a position to absorb mark-to-market losses on mortgage assets and goodwill impairment resulting from a credit crunch because they operate with narrow profit margins and a limited equity cushion in the balance sheet. This article questions the viability and sustainability of this banking business model.     

When is upstream collusion profitable?

Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.     

Women are scaredy-cats and men are conquerors?

The European legal framework requires that financial consultants assess their clients’ risk tolerance before advising them on investments. The study aims at further testing an alternative measure to quantify the risk attitudes of investors: The Implicit Association Test (IAT). This study examines differences in implicit, unconscious, and explicit cognitive attitudes of men and women. The results of the IAT are compared with their answers from a risk tolerance questionnaire used by practitioners and self-selected asset allocation (portfolio). The data show that implicit attitude, and, thus, unconscious and uncontrolled thinking, can differ from conscious processes. Furthermore, in this study, there is no gender gap in risk attitude and risk tolerance. The findings suggest that experience and financial knowledge are likely the most important determinants of risk attitudes with no significant difference between men and women.     

When Is Sticky Information More Information?

This paper uses sectoral data to study survey‐based balance indices designed to capture changes in the business cycle in real time. The empirical framework recognizes that when answering survey questions regarding their firm's output, respondents potentially rely on infrequently updated information. The analysis then suggests that their answers reflect notable information lags, on the order of 7^1/2 months on average. Moreover, information stickiness implies that noisy output fluctuations will be attenuated in survey answers and, consequently, helps explain why balance indices successfully track business cycles. Conversely, in an environment populated by fully informed identical firms, as in the standard RBC framework, for example, balance indices instead become degenerate. Finally, information regarding changes in aggregate output tends to be sectorally concentrated. The paper, therefore, illustrates how this feature of the data may be relevant for the construction of balance indices.     

When Do Vertical Mergers Create Value?

This paper studies the market reaction to vertical mergers and explores the many rationales for vertical integration proposed in the industrial organization literature. Abnormal returns for vertical merger announcements are positive until the late 1990s, and turn negative afterward. Acquirers suffer most of the losses. We find support for the most fundamental insight in the industrial organization literature, namely, that vertical mergers generate the greatest value when undertaken in imperfectly competitive markets. We find some evidence to support ideas of asset and site specificity, that is, creating value when market exchange is difficult. We do not find support for information‐based or price uncertainty theories.     

Why are firms unlevered?

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms. The debt initiation decisions of these firms are not preceded by shocks to their entrenchment, such as takeover threats or the emergence of activist blockholders. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that these firms are financially constrained. Zero-debt firms are small, young, conserve cash from cash-flow, and are more likely to lease their assets. When they have access to a line of credit, they face stricter covenants and higher all-in costs than comparable control firms. They lose market share in economic downturns, consistent with the financial constraints explanation, but inconsistent with theories of predation which suggest that they may be voluntarily stockpiling debt capacity.     

When does uncovered interest parity hold?

A consensus is emerging that returns to the currency carry trade are driven by two factors. One of these is probably consumption risk but there is widespread disagreement about the identity of the remaining factor. This paper bolsters the case for volatility being the unknown factor. A structural model that specifies that monetary volatility is the second factor is tested for 56 monetary regimes using the artificial economy methodology. The negative slope in the Fama regression arises when monetary volatility is low and the precautionary savings motive dominates the intertemporal substitution motive. When monetary volatility is high, the Fama slope is positive in line with uncovered interest parity. We conclude that, given the predominance of precautionary savings, the degree of monetary volatility explains whether uncovered interest parity holds.     

When do jumps matter for portfolio optimization?

We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on quantities known only in the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model. Our findings are threefold: Jumps matter more, i.e. our approximation is less accurate, if (i) the expected jump size or (ii) the jump intensity is large. Fixing the average impact of jumps, we find that (iii) rare, but severe jumps matter more than frequent, but small jumps.     

When fund management skill is more valuable?

Does fund management skill allow managers to identify mispriced securities more accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices resulting in superior fund performance when noise trading – a natural setting to detect skill – is more prevalent? We find skilled fund managers with superior past performance to generate persistent excess risk‐adjusted returns and experience significant capital inflows, especially in high sentiment times, high stock dispersion, and economic expansion states when price signals are noisier. This pattern persists after we control for lucky bias, using the ‘false discovery rate’ approach, which permits disentangling manager ‘skill’ from ‘luck.’     

When does a firm disclose product information?

A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and consumer types, full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full‐disclosure profit.     

When does investor sentiment predict stock returns?

We examine the asymmetry in the predictive power of investor sentiment in the cross-section of stock returns across economic expansion and recession states. We test the implication of behavioral theories and evidence that the return predictability of sentiment should be most pronounced in an expansion state when investors' optimism increases. We segregate economic states according to the NBER business cycles and further implement a multivariate Markov-switching model to capture the unobservable dynamics of the changes in the economic regime. The evidence suggests that only in the expansion state does sentiment perform both in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power for the returns of portfolio formed on size, book-to-market equity ratio, dividend yield, earnings-to-price ratio, age, return volatility, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and 11 widely documented anomalies. In a recession state, however, the predictive power of sentiment is generally insignificant.     

When can you immunize a bond portfolio?

This paper presents a condition equivalent to the existence of a Riskless Shadow Asset that guarantees a minimum return when the asset prices are convex functions of interest rates or other state variables. We apply this lemma to immunize default-free and option-free coupon bonds and reach three main conclusions. First, we give a solution to an old puzzle: why do simple duration matching portfolios work well in empirical studies of immunization even though they are derived in a model inconsistent with equilibrium and shifts on the term structure of interest rates are not parallel, as assumed? Second, we establish a clear distinction between the concepts of immunized and maxmin portfolios. Third, we develop a framework that includes the main results of this literature as special cases. Next, we present a new strategy of immunization that consists in matching duration and minimizing a new linear dispersion measure of immunization risk.     

When does relationship lending start to pay?

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank–firm relationship, allowing for the identification of nonlinear pricing patterns in the bank–firm relationship. We show that firms only start capitalizing the gains of relationship lending when the relationship extends beyond two years. This reduction in the loan rate spread charged is driven by the opaque firms, for which the acquisition of “soft” information is especially relevant. Finally, we find that relationship lending significantly mitigates the increased costs of refinancing loans along two dimensions: relationship duration and having additional contracts—other than loans—with the bank.     

When does low interconnectivity cause systemic risk?

We analysed a systemic liquidity crisis by using a unique money market data-set in which the coded identity of the counterparties of each trade is known. Contrary to recent findings, we did not observe a positive relationship between interconnectivity and systemic risk. We have concluded that our conflicting findings can be related to the degree of market concentration on the borrowing side of the funding market. High level of concentration in the borrowing side led to lower interconnectivity but higher systemic risk prior to the crisis. We conclude that measures of market heterogeneity should be used to generalize the relationship between systemic risk and interconnectivity.