Loan growth and riskiness of banks

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.     

Concentrated control,institutions, and banking sector: An international study

Using a broad sample of listed commercial banks in East Asia and Western Europe, this paper investigates the relations among concentrated control, a set of bank operating characteristics, and legal and regulatory regimes. We find that banks with concentrated control exhibit poorer performance, lower cost efficiency, greater return volatility, and higher insolvency risk, relative to widely held ones. We also document that legal institutions and private monitoring effectively reduce the detrimental effects of concentrated control and that official disciplinary power plays a weak governance role, whereas government intervention exacerbates the adverse effects. Further evidence shows that the relations between control concentration and bank operating characteristics are curvilinear and vary according to the types of controlling owners. Overall, our findings support the contention that country-level institutions play important roles in constraining insider expropriation, and that private monitoring mechanisms are more effective than are public rules and supervision in governing banks.     

Efficiency and productivity growth in the banking industry of Central and Eastern Europe

We employ the directional technology distance function and provide estimates of bank efficiency and productivity change across Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and across banks with different ownership status for the period 1998–2003. Our results demonstrate the strong links of competition and concentration with bank efficiency. They also show that productivity for the whole region initially declined but has improved more recently with further progress on institutional and structural reforms. Input-biased technical change has been consistently positive throughout the entire period suggesting that the reforms have induced favorable changes in relative input prices and input mix. However we find evidence of diverging trends in productivity growth patterns across banking industries and that foreign banks outperform domestic private and state-owned banks both in terms of efficiency and productivity gains. Overall, we find that productivity change in CEE is driven by technological change rather than efficiency change.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Finance and growth in the EU: New evidence from the harmonisation of the banking industry

This paper presents an investigation of the finance–growth nexus by analysing the growth effect of the harmonisation of banking laws in the EU-15 over the period 1960–2001. The main findings point to the existence of a positive growth impact from banking harmonisation. These results are robust to controlling for other growth determinants, unobserved heterogeneity, potential simultaneity bias and business-cycle effects. The analysis of the transmission channels indicates that the harmonisation process influences economic growth mainly through the increase in the efficiency of financial intermediation.     

Government, taxes and banking crises

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of different government policies to prevent the emergence of banking crises. In particular, we study the impact on welfare of using taxpayers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial transactions (the Tobin tax). We illustrate the trade-off between these policies and derive policy implications.     

On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries

This paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies. It sheds light on the competition-stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators: the degree of market power, bank cost and profit efficiency, and overall firm stability. The results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency losses. The findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability, and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies.     

Portfolio maturity choice of Australian cash management trusts

Money Market Mutual Funds, known in Australia as Cash Management Trusts (CMTs), provide potential benefits for retail investors from pooling of funds and superior portfolio (maturity) management skills. The average maturity of CMT assets exhibits significant variation both cross sectionally and over time, but there is significant correlation between the asset maturities of different CMTs. These variations could reflect decisions about optimal asset maturity by CMT management, given their expectations of future interest rate movements. This paper examines (and rejects) the hypothesis that CMT management has superior interest rate forecasting ability by testing whether asset maturity of CMTs provides any information about future interest rate movements. The correlation between CMT maturity decisions appears to reflect the tendency of some CMTs to adjust maturity in response to current changes in market interest rates.     

The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability

This paper shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures. This is because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an amount of new risk that more than offsets the positive direct impact on stability.     

Corruption,soundness of the banking sector,and economic growth: A cross-country study

This paper explores the impact of corruption on both the banking sector and economic growth; we determine the impact using 76 macroeconomic data from various countries over the period 2002–2004. The results of various cross-sectional regressions provide substantial evidence that corruption significantly aggravates the problems with bad loans in the banking sector. In this study, we also find some evidence of a new channel through which corruption lowers economic growth: Corruption distorts the allocation of bank funds from normal projects to bad projects, which decreases the quality of private investments, hence it decreases economic growth.     

Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives’ trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.     

The determinants of reputational risk in the banking sector

What determines reputational loss following operational losses in banking? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. We estimate the reputational risk for a large sample of banks in Europe and the US between 2003 and 2008. We have two main results. First, we provide evidence that there is the probability that reputational damage increases as profits and size increase. Second, we show that a higher level of capital invested and intangible assets reduce the probability of reputational damage.     

Parliamentary election cycles and the Turkish banking sector

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary election cycles on the Turkish banking system. Using annual bank-level data representing all banks in Turkey during 1963–2007, we present evidence of meaningful differences in the structure of bank assets, liabilities and financial performance across different stages of the parliamentary election cycle. However, we find that government-owned banks’ behavior does not meaningfully differ from that of either domestic and foreign-owned private-sector banks before, during or after elections. Our estimates also show that government-owned banks underperform both domestic and foreign-owned private-sector counterparts.     

Pandemics of the poor and banking stability

We first develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases, as the joint prevalence of large pandemics such as AIDS and malaria increases. We also show that the optimal bank reserves increase as the prevalence increases. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider a large dataset of developing countries, and we exhibit a causality effect from combined prevalence to deposit turnover, as well as causality effect from an increase of combined prevalence to an increase in bank reserves. Those empirical facts therefore support our theoretical findings.     

Money, intermediation, and banking

The business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that of intermediation. Yet, these two activities are frequently—but not always—combined together in the form of a banking system. We develop a simple model to examine the question: When is banking essential? There is a role for money due to a lack of record-keeping and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private information: both money and intermediation are essential. When monitoring costs associated with intermediation are sufficiently low, the two activities can be separated from one another. However, when monitoring costs are sufficiently high, a banking system that combines these two activities is essential.     

Ownership structure,risk and performance in the European banking industry

We compare the performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999–2004 period and evaluate the impact of alternative ownership models, together with the degree of ownership concentration, on their profitability, cost efficiency and risk. Three main results emerge. First, after controlling for bank characteristics, country and time effects, mutual banks and government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability than privately owned banks, in spite of their lower costs. Second, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks while mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. Finally, while ownership concentration does not significantly affect a bank’s profitability, a higher ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk. These differences, along with differences in asset composition and funding mix, indicate a different financial intermediation model for the different ownership forms.     

Shareholder value efficiency in European banking

This paper advances the studies of [Hughes, J.P., Lang W.W., Mester L.J., Moon C.G., Pagano M.S., 2003. Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? Managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 417–447] by developing a new measure of bank performance which we refer to as “shareholder value efficiency” – a bank producing the maximum possible Economic Value Added (EVA), given particular inputs and outputs, is defined as “shareholder value efficient”. This new efficiency measure is estimated using the stochastic frontier method focussing on the French, German, Italian and UK banking systems over the period 1997–2002 and includes both listed and non-listed banks. We find that European banks are, on average, 36% shareholder value inefficient. Shareholder value efficiency is found to be the most important factor explaining value creation in European banking, whereas cost and profit efficiency only have a marginal influence.     

Securitization and systematic risk in European banking: Empirical evidence

Using a unique dataset of 592 cash and synthetic securitizations issued by 54 banks from the EU-15 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a positive impact on the increase of European banks’ systematic risk. Baseline results hold when comparing estimated beta coefficients with a control group of similar non-securitizing banks. Building several sub-samples we additionally find that (a) the increase in systematic risk is more relevant for larger banks that repeatedly engage in securitization, (b) securitization is more important for small and medium financial institutions, (c) banks have a higher incentive to retain the larger part of credit risk as a quality signal at the beginning of the securitization business in Europe, and (d) the overall risk-shifting effect due to securitization is more distinct when the pre-event systematic risk is low.     

The determinants of shareholder value in European banking

This paper examines the determinants of shareholder value creation for a large sample of European banks between 1998 and 2005. As the recent turmoil in global banking systems has illustrated, bank performance can have a substantial influence on efficient capital allocation, company growth and economic development. We use a dynamic panel data model where the bank’s shareholder value is a linear function of various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. We show that shareholder value has a positive relationship with cost efficiency changes, while economic profits are linked to revenue efficiency changes. Credit losses, market and liquidity risk and leverage are also found to substantially influence bank performance. These results are robust to a variety of different model specifications.     

Anatomy of banking crises in developing and emerging market countries

This paper uses a Binary Classification Tree (BCT) model to analyze banking crises in 50 emerging market and developing countries during 1990-2005. The BCT model identifies three conditions (and the specific threshold of the key indictors) at which the vulnerability to banking crisis increases—(i) very high inflation, (ii) highly dollarized bank deposits combined with nominal depreciation or low bank liquidity, and (iii) low bank profitability—which highlight that foreign currency risk, poor financial soundness, and macroeconomic instability are important drivers of banking crises. The results also emphasize the importance of conditional thresholds in triggering crises, in that banking crises are underlined by a combination of vulnerabilities—or a sequence of (non-linear) conditions—rather than the deterioration of a unique factor.