Are N+1 heads better than one? The timing and selectivity of Australian-managed investment funds

Many studies find that mutual funds exhibit differential and persistent performance. This differential performance could arise from superior managerial decisions regarding security selection, market timing, or both. We directly test security selection and market timing ability using opposing decision-making models, the classical and behavioural decision-making theories. Empirical results are consistent with the classical decision-making theory and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).     

Are short sellers positive feedback traders? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Short sellers are routinely blamed for destabilizing stock markets by exacerbating deviations from fundamental values. In response, regulators periodically impose short sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines. One explanation is that policy makers regard short sellers as behaving like positive feedback traders. Relying on the theoretical model put forward by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which stresses the conditional nature of returns’ persistence, bans on selected financial stocks in six countries during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis are examined. These provide us with a setting to analyze the impact of short sale restrictions on feedback trading. Our findings suggest that, in the majority of markets examined, restrictions of this kind amplify positive feedback trading during periods of high volatility and, hence, contribute to stock market downturns. On balance then, short selling bans do not contribute to enhancing financial stability.     

Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments

We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.     

Can SRI funds better resist global financial crisis? Evidence from Japan

This paper compared Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds in the Japanese market with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. Taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as a particular event, we estimated the average cumulative abnormal returns of both funds by event study methodology using a Fama–French three-factor model and EGARCH model. Our results suggest that SRI funds better resisted the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers than conventional funds. We also found that this result can be attributed to the existence of international funds, possibly because investors might evaluate the CSR activities of international firms more than those of domestic firms. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the universe of domestic SRI funds is too limited to enjoy risk diversification.     

Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis

Analyses of bank performance around the 2007–2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assistance from TARP.     

Will the crisis “tear us apart”? Evidence from the EU

We examine the synchronisation of the European Union (EU) financial markets before and during the 2007 global financial crisis. We use an Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-GARCH framework to control for the time-varying correlations and a Markov-Switching model to identify regime changes. Our sample considers 27 EU nations for the period 2000–2011. For each nation we formulate several characteristics of the crisis such as, synchronicity, duration and intensity measures. We find that the more recent EU members had a lagged entry to the crisis regime, were less adversely affected, show higher correlation between their stock markets and have their credit scores being revised more frequently relative to established EU members. We also find that higher levels of sovereign debt and lower levels of industrialisation positively impact crisis duration and intensity. Our results refute the notion of uniform integration of EU financial markets as evident from the highly non-synchronised observed crisis experience among the EU members. As such, one-size fits all policies are likely to be ineffective.     

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Did the banking sector foresee the financial crisis? Evidence from risk factor disclosures

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Beginning in December 2005, the SEC required registrants to discuss “the most significant factors that make the company risky” under the...     

Is less information better information? Evidence from the credit rating withdrawal

This paper examines the stock market reaction to two different types of credit rating withdrawals by Moody’s. The first type of withdrawal occurs when a firm stops being rated. This happens, for example, when firms choose to no longer pay for a rating. We find that the stock market reaction depends on the information which remains available. The second type of withdrawal is due to Moody’s policy of removing the issuer rating and keeping the corporate family rating for the same firm. The corporate family rating is usually more favorable than the issuer rating. The paper shows that the removal of the issuer rating leads to positive stock market reaction. We conclude that lower disclosure of rating information is not necessarily associated with higher cost of equity. Instead, our findings emphasize the incentive for firms to engage in ratings shopping by publishing only the most favourable ratings.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines

Do remittances sent by overseas migrants serve as insurancefor recipient households? In a study of how remittances fromoverseas respond to income shocks experienced by Philippinehouseholds, changes in income are found to lead to changes inremittances in the opposite direction, consistent with an insurancemotivation. Roughly 60 percent of declines in household incomeare replaced by remittance inflows from overseas. Because householdincome and remittances are jointly determined, rainfall shocksare used as instrumental variables for income changes. The hypothesiscannot be rejected that consumption in households with migrantmembers is unchanged in response to income shocks, whereas consumptionresponds strongly to income shocks in households without migrants.     

How Are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

We investigate investment managers' use of derivatives by comparing return distributions for equity mutual funds that use and do not use derivatives. In contrast to public perception, derivative users have risk exposure and return performance that are similar to nonusers. We also analyze changes in fund risk in response to prior fund performance. Changes in risk are substantially less severe for funds using derivatives, consistent with the explanation that managers use derivatives to reduce the impact of performance on risk. We provide new evidence regarding the implications of cash flows and managerial gaming for the relation between performance and risk.     

Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market

Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from REITs

This paper uses intraday short sale data to examine whether short sellers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are informed. We find strong evidence that short selling predicts future returns of REITs. Heavily shorted REITs significantly underperform lightly shorted REITs by approximately 1% over the following 20 trading days. This predictive relation holds for both small and large trades, but is stronger for large short trades. We also document a positive relation between shorting activity and volatility. Our results are consistent with the view that short sellers of REITs are informed and contribute to market efficiency by impounding information into prices.     

Does CSR matter in times of crisis? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

The debate over how firm stakeholder engagement is tied to preserving shareholder wealth has received growing attention in recent years, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, we examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stock market returns during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced market crash and the post-crash recovery. Using a sample of 1750 U.S. firms and two major sources of CSR ratings, we find no evidence that CSR affected stock returns during the crash period. This result is robust to various sensitivity tests. In additional cross-sectional analysis, we find some supporting evidence, albeit weak, that the relation between CSR and stock returns during the pandemic-related crisis is more positive when CSR is congruent with a firm's institutional environment. We also find that Business Roundtable companies, which committed to protecting stakeholder interests prior to the pandemic, do not outperform during the pandemic crisis. We conclude that pre-crisis CSR is not effective at shielding shareholder wealth from the adverse effects of a crisis, suggesting a potential disconnect between firms' CSR orientation (ratings) and actual actions. Our evidence suggests that investors can distinguish between genuine CSR and firms engaging in cheap talk.     

Are Dividends Disappearing or Shrinking? Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

This paper examines the dividend payment decision of publicly owned firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) from 1991 through 2006. There is a decline in the percentage of net dividend payers, accompanied by a decline in the aggregate level of net real dividends paid. Contrary to the situation in developed markets, earnings and dividends concentration have declined over the sample period. The first mandatory dividend payment regulation pushed some firms to collect the distributed dividends back through rights issues and this resulted in low net dividend payments. One of the striking findings of this paper reveals that a majority of ISE firms prefer dividend omissions rather than dividend reductions. Once a firm keeps paying dividends, it puts much effort into increasing dividend payments rather than reducing them. Further, dividend payment and reduction decisions are affected by the current earnings of the firm and financial crisis significantly explains both the dividend payment and dividend reduction decisions.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Two currencies,one model? Evidence from the Wall Street Journal forecast poll

We use the foreign exchange forecasts of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) poll to analyze the expectation formation process of forecasters for the exchange rates of the euro and the yen vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar for the period 1999–2005. We also compare the expectation formation process with the actual exchange rate process. We find that most forecasters have contrarian exchange rate expectations, but our results also indicate significant heterogeneity between forecasters. While the actual exchange rate process of the yen/dollar exchange rate shows negative autocorrelation, the dollar/euro exchange rate exhibits positive autocorrelation.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.