Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics

We examine how access to bank credit affects trade credit in the supplier–customer relationships of U.S. public firms. For identification, we use exogenous liquidity shocks to supplier firms in the form of staggered changes to interstate bank branching laws. Using a variety of tests, we show that supplier firms with greater access to banking liquidity offer more trade credit to their customers. We also show that when bank branching restrictions are relaxed in the supplier’s state, the supplier–customer relationship is more likely to survive.     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。     

Connected lending and concentrated control

Banks’ controlling owners may exploit business relationships with other firms so as to tangibly or intangibly benefit themselves. This paper uses data from more than 2600 firms across 25 countries to study whether the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners are associated with whether firms need special connections with banks in order to obtain loans. I find that the control rights of the controlling owners increase the need for special connections. I also find that supervisory power raises the need for special connections and intensifies the adverse effect induced by concentrated control. No evidence is found that shareholder rights protection reduces the need for special connections, nor that bank officials become less corrupted as the control rights of the controlling owners increase. The results thus indicate that an increase in the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners only reduces the integrity of bank lending.     

银行与企业交叉持股的理论与依据——基于国际比较的研究

本文通过文献回顾分析了世界主要国家银行与企业交叉持股的经济后果。从银行持有企业股份的角度而言,一方面银行持有企业股份能降低委托代理成本,另一方面银行同时作为股东和债权人会产生利益冲突。从企业持有银行股份的角度看,企业持股银行最直接的后果是关联贷款。但是,关联贷款既可能是掏空银行的手段,也可能是因为银行对企业股东更为了解,所以发放关联贷款。本文的结论表明,银行与企业交叉持股既有积极的一面,也要严密防范金融风险。本文的结论对于促进产融结合具有积极的意义。     

企业债“信用价差之谜”的最新研究与未来展望

企业债的信用价差和预期违约损失之间的巨大差异,正在引起人们对“信用价差之谜”的日益关注。对“信用价差之谜”的代表性解释之一为信用价差分解理论,该理论的最新研究已经触及到了税收、风险溢价和流动性溢价等方面;代表性解释之二为信用风险分散困境理论,包括系统风险的不可分散性和可分散风险的难以分散性。此外,对“信用价差之谜”的探讨已经从发达债券市场过渡到新兴债券市场,并仍有待于进一步的研究。     

社会信用体系建设与国家开发银行商业化转型

征信系统建设是社会信用体系建设的基础和重要组成部分,随着市场经济的发展,征信系统在防范信贷风险方面发挥愈来愈重要的作用。国家开发银行立足国情,以开发性金融为工具,积极推进信用建设,弥补制度缺失,为征信系统建设、进而社会信用体系建设做出重要贡献。     

The impacts of Gramm–Leach–Bliley bank diversification on value and risk

Combined abnormal returns from U.S. bank holding company acquisitions during 2001–2011 suggest that diversification into investment banking, securities brokerage and insurance under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 creates value. Exceptional returns depend on contributing factors; the most robust are that the acquirer is large and has experienced negative returns over the prior year (characteristics consistent with models of optimal diversification). Results are inconclusive on whether the impact of acquirer size is a too-big-to-fail effect, but acquirer characteristics are associated with adverse consequences: large size is associated with increasing systematic risk, and falling acquirer values are associated with increasing idiosyncratic risk.     

银行信贷、货币供应与经济增长的模型关系检验

以我国银行信贷余额、货币供应和经济增长作为研究对象,通过构建长短期方程找出三者之间的关系,同时进行格兰杰因果检验,证实了我国投资拉动型的经济增长模式,同时也发现经济增长不是货币供应的原因,但是反向却存在因果关系。并据此对我国银行信贷和货币供应提出相应的政策建议。     

What happens after corporate default? Stylized facts on access to credit

In this paper, we investigate what happens to firms after they default on their bank loans. We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of corporate default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset from Portugal, we observe that half of the corporate default episodes last 5 quarters. Most firms continue to have access to credit immediately after resolving default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more difficulties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting firms record another default in the future. We observe that firms with repeated defaults are, on average, smaller and experience longer and more severe defaults.     

An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies

This study explores multiple means of governance and monitoring in bank holding companies and their impact on performance and executive compensation. We exploit variables unique to the banking industry to aid in our understanding of this simultaneous relationship. Our primary finding is that after controlling for both regulatory oversight and capital market discipline, a strong board is associated with higher firm performance, lower levels of executive pay and lower growth rates of executive pay. The findings support the fundamental role of corporate governance in overseeing management and ultimately firm performance.     

授信额度核定的逻辑:一个共生理论的视角

现有研究授信额度问题的文献,或是从理论研究角度分析授信额度在银企关系中的角色与作用,或是从实证分析角度对授信额度的各种影响因素进行实证分析.对定量模型的研究依赖客户信用等级的先行确定,存在影响因素的多重共线性不能得到有效解决的方法论缺陷.本文从共生理论这一新的视角审视授信额度的核定模型,从理论上解决了影响因素的多重共线性问题.在归纳研究文献的基础上,本文提出了基于共生度主参量与共生度特征分析逻辑的授信额度核定的逻辑框架,并通过一个简单的实证模型验证了共生理论对授信额度核定具有较强的解释能力.