The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.     

Innis Lecture: Environmental crises: past, present, and future

Abstract .  Environmental crises are distinguished by rapid and largely unexpected changes in environmental quality that are difficult if not impossible to reverse. Examples would be major extinctions and significant degradations of an ecosystem. I argue there are three preconditions for crisis: failures in governance, an ecological system exhibiting a tipping point, and an economy/environment interaction with positive feedbacks. I develop a simple model to illustrate how a crisis may arise, and draw on our knowledge of past and present crises to highlight the mechanisms involved. I then speculate as to whether climate change is indeed a crisis in the making.     

Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview*

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.     

Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey

The determination of international reserve balance for emerging economies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study, the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However, early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any future economic and/or financial shocks.     

银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

Narrating Crisis,Constructing Policy: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in Syria

During crises, ideas play a decisive role in shaping radical paradigm shifts in economic governance. However, not all crises immediately produce such ‘great transformations’. Why do some ideas result in incremental rather than abrupt change after crisis? To identify mechanisms potentially explaining this variation, I conduct an exploratory process tracing of an understudied case of incremental institutional change: post-independence Syria. Competing political actors in Syria converged on identical policy responses to crisis despite their very different interpretations of its causes. Although power oscillated between these increasingly bitter rivals in the early 1950s, their ideational consensus on economic issues nevertheless led to a decade of steady institutional change that transformed previously fragile government institutions into powerful vehicles of statism. I derive from this analysis the potential causal significance of two new variables – crisis narrative and crisis response – and hypothesise that their configuration can explain variation in post-crisis patterns of institutional change. Ideas can explain not only the new direction of economic governance after crisis, but also the speed and scale of its movement.     

关于货币危机后经济衰退的经验分析

文章以1990年以来的近200次货币危机为样本,对货币危机后的经济衰退进行了经验分析.研究发现,危机前的经常账户状况、外债余额占GDP比例、国际流动性指标等经济变量以及危机后的汇率制度都不会显著影响到危机后的经济衰退.另外,危机后的经济衰退与危机国政府在危机中是否抛售外汇储备、是否采取汇率贬值都没有明显关系.但是经济分析的结果表明,危机前的失业率和汇率制度以及危机中是否提高利率等因素对危机后的经济衰退有显著作用.     

Anatomy of a financial crisis

This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for understanding the nature of financial crises. It provides the following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform well to one in which output declines sharply. The asymmetric information framework explains the patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain. It indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank in which the central bank uses the discount window to provide liquidity to sectors outside of the banking system.     

The structure of man-made organizational crises: Conceptual and empirical issues in the development of a general theory of crisis management

Analyses of a nationwide questionnaire sent to the public affairs officers of the Fortune 1,000 corporations reveals that the crises their organizations experienced in the last three years and the preventative actions they are undertaking to blunt potential crises cluster together in a relatively small number of distinct factors or families. The differences in the factor scores between those organizations with a crisis management unit (CMU) and those without one are statistically significant. The paper suggests that organizations would do well to consider forming dual crisis portfolios: one made up of a set of preventative actions drawn from the action clusters and another composed of a set of crises drawn from the crisis clusters. In this way, organizations could not only begin to insure themselves with minimal coverage across a broad family of crises, but they could also add a significant component of needed rationalization to their CM programs. The paper discusses the broad implications of the results for an emerging general theory of CM.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

Macroeconomic narratives in a world of crises: An analysis of stories about solving the system crisis

Since the financial crisis in 2008, a series of publications on macroeconomic responses to the compound crises of the economy and the environment have emerged. Under labels such as green new deal, green growth and the great transition, attempts at offering coherent responses to the crises have been made. These responses have in common that they all present a large number of policy proposals for ways in which to solve the current crises and achieve a sustainable economy. This article provides a mapping of a selection of such responses and an analysis of their content. The analysis combines discourse theory and narrative analysis and investigates discourses by studying the narratives they produce. The study thus contributes to the long line of analyses on discourses on sustainable economy: empirically, by investigating and analysing a number of macroeconomic proposals for solving the system crisis, and theoretically, by elaborating on the concept of narrative dynamics in relation to persuasive strength in political decision-making.     

The Reasons and Symptoms of Failure in SME

In analyzing the sources and processes of failure, one can see a certain pattern. Namely, management does not notice the critical situation in time, which due to delayed or incompetently carried out repair actions, ends in company collapse. Development thresholds are occurring in the process of the growth and development of the company. They are often tied with crisis in the company. Their occurrence is preceded with symptoms of future crises in many cases. The analysis and understanding of these symptoms by entrepreneurs may help reduce the number of crises in companies of the SME sector and unintentional economic failure.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Impact of FDI in the Fiscal Adjustment Process

Economic history, particularly the history of the Eurozone, is full of cases of countries experiencing severe economic crises. These crises may have different causes and effects and may be transmitted differently among the affected countries. However, the type of crisis that has the most widely spread political, economic, and social impact is the recession crisis. As a rule of thumb, a recession crisis is the result of a separate crisis, such as a country’s debt crisis (e.g. Greece, Portugal and Spain), a financial and banking crisis, or a crisis due to various bubbles (e.g. the real estate crisis in the United States). The main purpose of this paper is to study the course of a series of countries, which were or currently are in a crisis and a supervised adjustment program, in terms of managing the exit from the crisis, the implementation of macroeconomic and reform policies, the policy applied for attracting foreign direct investments, and the impact of such policy on the countries that were affected by the crisis.     

基于极值相依性的金融危机共生强度研究

共生性危机是金融危机研究的热点之一,经验表明不同国家同时爆发两种危机的可能性不同,但尚缺乏对危机共生强度的定量研究;copula是刻画变量之间非线性相互关系的重要方法,但函数选择目前仍缺少依据。针对这两个问题,文章由极值相依性模型推导出数十种生存copula函数的共同渐近形式,基于此构建危机共生指数,并给出一套系统检验共生性强弱及度量共生强度的方法。对1994-2009年十个新兴经济体的实证研究表明:各国的危机共生强度各异,俄罗斯、新加坡、智利和中国的金融危机具有弱共生性;爆发共生性危机的可能性很大程度上由金融自由化决定;外汇市场或金融市场遭受攻击时的极端风险更易在两者之间传导;通过本币升值稳定物价的宏观调控政策将增加双重危机爆发的可能性;控制外汇市场和银行业经营的不稳定因素是抑制共生性危机的重要途径,但在印度和中国的效果可能有限。     

A study on KLR financial crisis early-warning model

The financial crisis early-warning models were improved gradually with the continued regional financial crises that provided a wealth of empirical data by the end of last century. However, none of the crisis early-warning models correctly predicted the global financial crisis in 2008. Previous researches show the KLR model have better performance, so we reviewed the crisis early-warning system based on the KLR model using the recently data. This paper first tested the KLR model, and made some amendments based on the actual economic environment. Then we re-test the modified model, which show an improved performance. At last, the future crisis probabilities of some selected countries are predicted by using the amendatory model.     

Once Bitten: The Effect of IMF Programs on Subsequent Reserve Behavior

Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the accumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought to self‐insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of using IMF credits. This paper offers an empirical investigation of these ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. We find that IMF programs have had a significant positive effect on subsequent reserve accumulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this effect endures over time. We also find that the effect differs between Latin America and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.     

What crises could teach us about complexity and systemic management: The case of the Nestucca oil spill

In this article we attempt to uncover some systemic management principles for the better management of complex issues. Taking a pragmatic approach we have expanded the case methodology proposed by John Dewey to the case study of a major crisis. By proposing that crises allow for a better apprehension of complexity, we study the changes which were carried out or not, to this day, after the 1988 Nestucca oil spill that occurred in Canada only three months prior to the Exxon-Valdez disaster. After conducting a linear and systemic analysis of the crisis, we propose that the changes institutionalized thus far spring mostly from what we call “behavioral” and “paradigmatic” learning which are weak for addressing complex issues. Proposing that 15% of the people we have interviewed where able to derive a “systemic learning” from this crisis, we suggest several unlocking strategies that allow these systemic lessons to be institutionalized.