现金股利与公司治理的契合——基于代理理论

本文基于代理理论,研究上市公司现金股利政策与公司治理之间的关系。公司治理在根本上是时代理问题的治理,是对代理人机会主义行为的治理。现金股利能够缓解股东与经营者、大股东与小股东代理冲突,发挥公司治理效应。     

基于公司代理视角的机构投资者治理行为研究

基于我国上市公司面临的代理问题从机构投资者的视角探究了其在公司治理中的行为。研究发现:在所有权与经营权相分离的情形下,机构投资者通过补位的行为能够降低公司债权人与管理层、股东与管理层之间的代理冲突;当公司股权集中且存在控股股东的背景下,机构投资者采取股权制衡的行为能够缓解公司控股股东与中小投资者之间的代理冲突。研究结论表明,机构投资者在公司治理中能够积极有效地发挥治理作用以解决公司的代理问题并改善公司的治理状况。     

公司治理对代理成本影响的实证研究

自从所有权与经营权分离以来,代理成本问题成为了经久不衰的热点话题。笔者认为公司治理变量是影响代理成本的一个重要因素,主要对资本结构以及薪酬激励两个方面的公司治理变量进行研究。本文选取了2011-2013年上市的A股公司为样本数据,研究了股权集中度、股权制衡度、资产负债率、高管薪酬、高管持股比例等公司治理变量与代理成本之间的关系。实证检验结果发现：代理成本与股权集中度、高管薪酬显著负相关,与股权制衡度、资产负债率显著正相关,但并未发现高管持股比例与代理成本之间的相关关系。     

内部激励、代理成本与外部监督——基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究

根据代理理论,由于两权分离,所有者和经理人之间存在着严重的代理问题。上市公司从内部激励与外部监督来减轻代理冲突。内部激励手段主要是股权激励,而外部监督方式主要是外部审计。文章运用多元线性回归研究了股权激励、代理成本与外部监督之间的关系。结果表明:代理成本高的公司,更有可能选择高质量的外部审计;股权激励能明显改善内部治理机制,减小代理成本,从而降低公司对审计质量的需求。并且持股比例越高,公司对审计质量需求越低。     

家族上市公司的代理成本及治理机制研究

家族企业作为一个特殊的企业群体,其代理成本的产生与治理均有别于一般的企业。通过对我国沪深两市506家家族上市公司代理成本及其治理机制的实证研究,结果发现企业的内部控制质量与其代理成本之间呈显著的负相关关系;通过在过在董事会中引入职业经理人能够有效地抑制家族企业的代理成本,而家族管理者与职业经理人之间的薪酬差距则会加剧企业的代理冲突,增加其代理成本。     

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

代理冲突、激励约束机制与并购商誉

基于委托代理框架,主要研究管理层代理冲突及内外治理机制对企业并购活动中的商誉形成及其规模的影响。以2012—2017年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验发现,管理层代理冲突越严重的公司,通过并购形成的商誉规模越大,表明企业商誉确实包含了非经济的泡沫成分。深入研究表明,有效的内部激励机制与外部治理约束机制可以弱化管理层代理冲突与商誉规模之间的关系。进一步研究发现,代理冲突严重的公司,其商誉更可能在后续期间出现大的减值以及在公司绩效上有负的反映。该发现有助于进一步客观认识商誉的会计信息含量,帮助企业采取有效的公司治理机制来约束商誉中非合理部分的形成,从而降低企业风险。     

代理成本、公司治理与非效率投资

以2004至2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了公司内部治理、代理成本对非效率投资的影响。研究结果表明,经理与外部股东的代理冲突所产生的代理成本对过度投资存在显著影响,但代理成本对投资不足的影响不显著;股权治理、董事会治理和高管激励总体上未能有效发挥公司治理作用,抑制过度投资。     

集团控制、并购与上市公司现金持有

采用2007-2014年我国沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验并购战略对企业现金持有的影响,并进一步基于融资约束与代理冲突两个维度,考察企业集团经营对上述两者之间关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)企业会因并购战略持有更多现金,相对于独立企业,集团控制负向调节企业并购战略与现金持有水平之间的关系,且这种负向调节效应在非国有企业中更加突出,表明集团经营有助于缓解成员企业的融资约束;(2)集团代理冲突问题会影响集团控制缓解成员企业融资约束功能的发挥,在第二类代理冲突较小的企业中,集团控制对企业并购战略与现金持有水平关系的负向调节效应更强,且企业大股东持股比率越高,集团控制的这种效应越明显。研究揭示了集团控制对并购与企业现金持有关系影响的机理与路径,并从代理冲突与缓解融资约束相互作用的视角提供了影响公司并购决策的新证据,从而为改进公司治理与提升现金持有决策质量提供了具有实践指导意义的思路。     

三类主要代理成本影响因素的交叉研究

与公司治理有关的代理成本主要有3种：权益代理成本、债务代理成本和大股东代理成本。虽然这3种代理成本存在于4类不同的利益相关者之间,但是它们之间有着非常紧密的联系。本文在总结前人研究成果的基础上,对这3类代理成本的交叉部分进行了细致的研究和分析．对于代理成本的权衡和公司治理机制的有效设置有一定的意义。     

Democracy,rule of law,and corporate governance—a liquidity perspective

This study examines whether and how democracy and rule of law—two overarching country-level governance variables—influence corporate governance. Given that corporate liquidity (cash holdings) is a good channel for examining the quality of corporate governance, the effects of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance can be identified using the liquidity approach. A review of 67 countries from 1996 to 2010 demonstrates that democracy and rule of law indeed have bearings on corporate governance. More specifically, results indicate that firms are more inclined to hoard cash to take advantage of growth opportunities when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that agency costs are lower and interests of managers and shareholders are more aligned under such circumstances. In addition, the negative effect of debt issuance and dividend payment on cash is more pronounced when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that these two approaches become more effective in reducing agency costs and transitively cash holdings under such circumstances. Moreover, the positive effect of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance appears to be reinforced when rule of law is stronger and the level of democracy is higher, respectively. Furthermore, higher level of economic development helps reap the benefit of democracy and rule of law in terms of improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs.     

公司治理与绩效关系研究最新进展

公司治理的重要性已经得到理论界和实务界的认可。本文从两个方面论述了好的公司治理能够带来的影响,一方面好的公司治理能够提高管理效率,降低代理成本,进而提升财务绩效;另一方面,好的业绩使公司在资本市场上有更好的表现,即市场绩效,体现为公司治理溢价的存在。     

Social trust environment and firm tax avoidance: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of the social trust environment in which a firm is located on its tax avoidance in China and paying attention to the moderating effect of corporate governance and state-ownership. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work on firm tax avoidance and manager–shareholder agency conflict, we hypothesize that social trust can lower firm tax avoidance. It is because a high social trust environment can reduce agency conflict so that tax avoidance is less. Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and robust to a battery of robustness tests. Furthermore, we document that the association between social trust and firm tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and state-owned. Moreover, we find that firms in more trustworthy provinces present less general and administrative expenses and higher asset turnover, corroborating our theoretical foundations with respect to agency cost in our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that social trust and its interactions with corporate governance and state ownership are important internal and external determinants on the variations in tax avoidance.     

Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits,External Governance Quality,and Firm Performance

Private benefits of control (PBC) are benefits that controlling shareholders consume, but that are not shared with minority shareholders. Research focusing on the value protection role of corporate governance typically frames PBC as principal–principal (PP) agency costs, and interprets them as a form of minority shareholder expropriation that decreases firm performance. Taking a value creation perspective of corporate governance, however, we propose a more nuanced role for PBC. Specifically, we see them also as PP agency benefits that compensate controlling shareholders for their monitoring and advisory services, which can increase firm performance. Since both PP costs and benefits affect firm performance, we theorize that PBC enhance firm performance at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we show that the effect of PBC on firm performance is more positive when country‐level external governance mechanisms are strong.     

董责险对企业非效率投资的抑制机理 ——基于监督与信号传递效应的共同中介作用

董事高管责任保险作为一种分散企业经营风险的工具,也是保险公司以非投资者身份参与上市公司治理的一种重要形式.本文以2007—2018年A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用中介效应分步检验法,研究表明董责险通过降低企业内部代理成本和加剧外部融资约束来抑制企业的非效率投资和过度投资行为,代理成本和融资约束在其中发挥部分中介作用,说明董责险一方面能够完善企业的监督机制,另一方面又向外界传递企业存在风险的信号.进一步检验发现,董事高管责任保险的抑制作用在成熟期企业和国有企业中表现得更加显著.本文为上市公司购买董责险、健全和完善公司治理机制提供参考.     

代理问题及其缓解机制——兼论会计信息及公司治理的作用

股东和经理人之间代理问题形成的根源在于所有权与经营权的分离。由于经理人和股东在目标函数、风险偏好、期限视野上的不一致导致经理人的行为偏离股东的最优目标。缓解代理问题的机制包括公司内部的经理人报酬设计、公司治理结构安排,外部机制包括经理人市场、资本市场、公司控制权市场及产品市场的约束。文章还讨论了信息,尤其是会计信息在缓解代理问题中的作用。     

Hedge funds versus private equity funds as shareholder activists in Germany — differences in value creation

We investigate the valuation effects of German firms targeted by hedge funds and by private equity investors. We argue that both types of investors differ from other blockholders by their strong motivation and ability to actively engage and reduce agency costs. Consequently, we find positive abnormal returns following a change in ownership structure. However, these effects differ markedly between both investors, as proxy variables for agency costs only explain the market reaction for our private equity subsample. We conclude that private equity funds seem to be more successful at creating shareholder value, which could be due to their longer-term perspective and a higher adaptability to the surrounding corporate governance system.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

企业代理成本与环境信息披露——基于管理层家乡情怀与市场化进程的调节效应

选取2012—2017年重污染行业上市公司的数据,基于企业内部管理层家乡情怀和外部市场化进程的调节作用,研究企业代理成本对环境信息披露质量的影响。研究结果表明：企业代理成本与环境信息披露质量负相关,环境信息披露质量会随着企业代理成本的提高而降低,而且这一效应在国有企业中更加显著;引入调节变量后,企业管理层家乡情怀与市场化进程均会对代理成本与环境信息披露之间的关系起到反向调节作用,有助于抑制企业代理成本提高所带来的不利影响。所得研究结论可以为如何降低企业代理成本、提高环境信息披露质量提供一些有益的借鉴和参考。     

物联网技术应用影响企业费用粘性吗?

物联网应用带来生产力的跨越式发展,将引起企业成本结构的系统性变化.本文基于2009～2019年间与物联网有关的公司公告,采用多时点动态双重差分方法探讨物联网技术应用如何影响企业的成本行为.研究发现:企业应用物联网技术可以通过降低调整成本与代理成本、弱化管理层乐观预期,降低费用粘性.这说明物联网技术应用显现出较强的正面效应.进一步分析发现,物联网技术应用显著降低了国有企业的费用粘性,而对非国有企业费用粘性的降低作用并不明显,说明物联网技术应用对不同产权性质企业的影响存在差异.本文的研究有利于丰富信息技术经济后果文献与费用粘性影响因素文献,对我国推行物联网技术发展具有借鉴意义.