Endogenous Comparative Advantage*

We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms; therefore, firms use aggregate country investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country's skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no‐trade equilibria can be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade can be Pareto‐improving even if it leads to an equilibrium between rich and poor countries, with no special advantage regarding country size.     

Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments

We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria s obtained; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price–quantity supergames.     

Democratic Accountability,Regulation and Inward Investment Policy

We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders' strategies for attracting foreign direct investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, whereas autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm‐level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.     

International joint ventures and tax competition in an integrated market

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it develops a theoretical model of international joint ventures to suggest a new approach to the determination of profit allocation between the partners in the joint venture. Second, we examine the issue of tax competition between two countries for an international joint venture. We find that even in the absence of any bargaining power for the domestic firms, the foreign firm would like to give up more than half of profits to its partner. Furthermore, the foreign firm would like to locate in a country in which the partner firm is more efficient. We also find, with numerical simulations, that the domestic firm will accept the joint venture if the foreign firm's technology is significantly more superior than its own.     

Negative network effects and asymmetric pure price equilibria

Portuguese Economic Journal - We show that in finite settings with identical firms and consumers, asymmetric pure price equilibria with positive profits exist. We consider a price competition...     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

Capital accumulation of a firm facing an emissions tax

In this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a firm that is subject to environmental regulation. It is assumed that, in order to prevent firms from polluting the environment excessively, the government imposes an emissions tax. We determine how an emissions tax influences the firm's decisions concerning investments and abatement efforts. In the model we incorporate the realistic property that a given abatement expenditure leads to more pollution reduction when pollution is large. This property implies increasing returns to scale with respect to pollution reduction. It turns out that, together with the usual assumption of decreasing returns to scale with respect to production, this property leads to the occurrence of history-dependent equilibria in case the pollution tax rate is sufficiently large. It is possible to derive an explicit formula for the threshold tax rate above which these history-dependent equilibria can occur. We show that an investment grant by the government can influence the firm so as to approach the equilibrium with a higher capital stock. Finally, we compare our results with those of a related model where the firm faces a strict pollution standard rather than an emissions tax. Among other things, we show that growth is more suppressed under a tax than under a standard when the firm is small.     

Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation

Abstract Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect.     

Shift from gross profit taxation to distributed profit taxation: Are there effects on firms?

This paper investigates the consequences of the corporate tax reform in Estonia in 2000. This unique reform nullified the taxation of retained earnings and maintained corporate income tax only on distributed profits. We investigate the outcome of the reform by comparing the performance of the affected firms in Estonia with that of firms from Latvia and Lithuania, the two other Baltic countries. We use firm-level financial data and the difference in differences approach for our analysis. The results are consistent with an increase in holdings of liquid assets and lower use of debt financing after the reform. A positive relationship of the reform with post-reform investment and productivity has also been found. The results point to a stronger effect on smaller firms.     

The effects of company taxation in EU accession countries on German FDI1

This article investigates how company taxation affects German foreign direct investment (FDI) in European Union (EU) accession countries. In 2004 and 2007, 10 former socialist eastern European countries joined the EU. Although the EU integration is associated with increasingly favourable investment conditions, accession countries also pursue active strategies to attract foreign firms. In particular, taxes on corporate income have been significantly reduced during the last decade. We analyse whether corporate tax policies of eastern European countries affect three aspects of multinational activity: the location decision, the investment decision and the capital structure choice. The results suggest that local taxes are negatively related to both location and investment decisions. The analysis of the capital structure confirms that higher local taxes imply higher debt‐to‐capital ratios.     

The demand for tax haven operations

What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R and D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2% greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.     

中国企业对外直接投资影响了劳动力市场的就业极化吗?

在中国企业"走出去"步入新常态和就业压力持续加大的复杂背景下,探寻对外直接投资影响劳动力市场中的就业极化及其作用机理,对缓解我国当前的就业矛盾具有重要意义.基于此,文章利用匹配后的中国工业企业数据,基于倾向得分匹配和倍差法实证检验了对外直接投资的就业极化效应.研究发现,对外直接投资总体上显著增加了母国劳动力市场上的就业,但影响程度具有显著差异,对高技术和低技术企业的就业水平的影响更为明显,而对中等技术企业的提升作用相对较小,即存在"两端高、中间低"的就业极化现象.进一步研究发现:(1)企业对"一带一路"沿线国家的直接投资有利于缓解我国劳动力市场的就业极化;(2)与投资中低收入国家相比,对高收入国家的直接投资在一定程度上会加剧母国劳动力市场的就业极化趋势;(3)与外资企业相比,国有企业和民营企业的对外投资加剧了劳动力的低技术"极化"趋势.上述研究为实现中国企业更好地"走出去"与就业优先战略的良性互动提供了有益的启示和借鉴.     

Equilibrium audit strategies against tax treaty shopping

This paper examines game‐theoretic models of tax treaty shopping. An investor can choose a direct or indirect investment route across countries to minimize tax. A tax agency can audit the investor. The audit is costly but it can give additional revenue to the tax agency. In simultaneous‐move games, regardless of whether incomplete information exists and whether a home country allows foreign tax credits, there are mixed‐strategy equilibria where the investor may choose tax‐minimizing indirect routes and the tax agency may audit the investor. This equilibrium random audit strategy helps the tax agency raise revenue and reduce treaty shopping. Comparative statics yields an implication consistent with empirical evidence. However, if the home country has a foreign tax credit system with a high tax rate, or if the tax agency observes the investor's action in a sequential‐move game, the investor always chooses the direct route, and no treaty shopping occurs in equilibrium.     

Inflation and Investment

This paper argues that inflation curbs investment because depreciations for tax purposes are at historical costs and because it renders firms liquidity constrained by lowering accounting profits of levered firms. Using panel data for the OECD countries, the empirical estimates show that investment in non‐residential buildings and structures and in machinery and equipment is strongly negatively related to inflation, which suggests that the low inflation environment in the 1990s has been an important contributor to the high investment activity over the past decade in the OECD countries.     

异质性与跨国公司的战略选择

新新贸易理论将公司异质性引入到国际贸易理论中,从微观层面解释了公司国际化的战略选择。但它们通常假定两国是同质的,所以公司国际化的选择仅局限于出IZl贸易和水平型直接投资。本文构建了三国模型,考察了跨国公司的三种战略选择模式。理论研究表明,生产率最高的公司选择水平型直接投资,生产率较高的公司选择出口平台直接投资,生产率较低的公司选择出口贸易,生产率最低的公司只供应国内市场。发达国家的相对工人工资水平越高、发展中国家建厂成本越小,选择出口和水平型直接投资的公司会越少,而选择出口平台的直接投资公司会越多。     

Labor Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment*

In this paper, we analyze the implications of the effective taxation of labor for profits and, hence, the decisions made by multinational enterprises concerning the location of their headquarters. If a higher employee‐borne tax burden reduces manager effort, it should also negatively affect firm profits and the location of the headquarters. We compile data on personal income tax profiles for 52 economies and the year 2002 at different moments of the distribution of gross wages. Our findings suggest that higher employee‐borne labor taxes are less conducive to the location of headquarters and foreign direct investment stocks in a given host economy.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

The choice and timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty

This paper sheds new light on why timing and entry mode should be considered simultaneously in the international investment literature. We derive the profit levels at which it is optimal to switch from exporting to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, creating a joint venture, or licensing production to a local firm. The preferred entry mode depends on uncertainty about future profits, tax differentials between the home and the foreign country, the cost advantages of local firms, institutional requirements, and the degree of cooperation between partners in a joint venture.     

A theory of mutual migration of polluting firms

Abstract.  Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0     

Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition

The literature identifies linkages between domestic environmental policies and trade, the treatment of imports being an important issue in administration of domestic environmental excise taxes. With the aim of ensuring foreign exporters do not attain a competitive advantage, border tax adjustments are used. Since most environmental excise taxes apply to intermediate goods, the relevant border tax adjustment applies to final imported goods. However, when both intermediate and final goods markets are oligopolistic, border tax adjustments may be non‐neutral. Moreover, even if market access is unchanged, border tax adjustments can still lead to redistribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms.