Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity

We use a model of vertical relations between two congestible airports and an airline oligopoly to examine, both analytically and numerically, how deregulation may affect airports prices and capacities. We find that: (i) unregulated profit-maximizing airports would overcharge for the congestion externality and, compared to the first-best, would induce large allocative inefficiencies and dead-weight losses. They would restrict capacity investments but, overall, would induce fewer delays; (ii) Welfare maximization subject to cost recovery performs quite well, achieving congestion levels similar to a private-unregulated airport but without inducing such large traffic contraction; this puts a question mark on the desirability of deregulation of private airports; (iii) Increased cooperation between airlines and airports provides some improvements, but the resulting airport pricing strategy leads to a downstream airline cartel; (iv) When schedule delay costs effects are strong and airline differentiation is weak, it may be optimal to have a single airline dominating the airports, but this happens only when airports' pricing schemes render the number of airlines irrelevant for competition.     

Convenient flight connections vs. airport congestion: Modeling the ‘rolling hub’

This paper provides the first analysis of the trade-off between convenient flight connections and airport congestion, a fundamental but untreated element in the economics of hub-and-spoke networks. A continuous spatial model illustrates this trade-off in a framework where a small gap between flight operating times raises congestion while also shortening a connecting passenger’s layover time. When the passenger’s cost per unit of layover time rises, the monopoly airline chooses to narrow the gap between its flights, yielding shorter layovers but more congestion. A discrete spatial model, where flights congest one another only if they operate in the same discrete period, makes this layover-cost effect discontinuous: the monopoly carrier concentrates (deconcentrates) its flights when this cost is high (low) relative to the costs of congestion. When fringe carriers are present, however, the hub carrier always concentrates its flights, either partially or fully. But the presence of a second hub carrier leads to an equilibrium mirroring the monopoly outcome: the carriers concentrate their flights in different periods when the layover cost is high and deconcentrate them otherwise. The paper also presents a welfare analysis, showing that movement from the equilibrium to the social optimum typically requires greater carrier separation.     

Airport Concentration and Market Power: An Events Study Approach

This paper presents independent confirmation of the results obtained in recent studies that suggest mergers and acquisitions creating airline dominance at the airport level lead to market power. Using a different methodology – an events study for the 1986 merger of Northwest Orient Airlines and Republic Airlines – this paper confirms those results, indicating that concentration in the context of the sunk costs associated with the operation at a particular airport facility allows market power in the airline industry.     

The Meaning of Size: Output? Scope? Capacity? The Case of Airline Hubs

The size of a production facility has different specific meanings depending on the nature of the business decision at issue. We present a general theoretical model illustrating the profit-maximizing firm's interrelated choice of plant size in long-run, medium-run and short-run contexts. The model is then estimated for U.S. airline hubs. The results suggest that competition operates primarily via the capacity (long-run) size decision. A game-theoretic simulation based upon the results is consistent with the argument that the smaller of two hubs sharing an airport is at a significant competitive disadvantage.     

Competition and Service Quality in the U.S. Airline Industry

The U.S. government, media, and flying public have expressedgreat concern in recent years over both airline market concentration and flightdelays. This study explores potential connections between the two by examining whetherthe lack of competition on a particular route results in worse on-time performance.Analysis of data from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics in 2000 indicatesthat both the prevalence and duration of flight delays are significantly greater onroutes where only one airline provides direct service. Additional competition iscorrelated with better on-time performance. Weather, congestion, and schedulingdecisions also contribute significantly to explaining flight delays.     

The Determinants of Pricing in the Mexican Domestic Airline Sector: The Impact of Competition and Airport Congestion

Low-cost airlines in Mexico affect the lowest-quoted fares of one of the two principal incumbent carriers, but have no effect on the lowest-quoted fares of the other incumbent carrier. The same conclusion holds for competition between incumbent carriers where the lowest-quoted fares of one of the incumbent carriers is lower when incumbents compete. Congestion at the Mexico City airport is limiting potential competition, with carriers being able to charge a significant price premium. This suggests that the societal costs of airport congestion can go well beyond the negative congestion externality and should also include the effects of reduced competition. These findings raise important public policy issues.     

航空联盟对国际枢纽机场间机票价格的影响——以我国主要非经停国际航线为例的实证研究

本文通过构建多元回归模型,实证分析了航空联盟对我国主要非经停国际航线客运价格的影响。结果发现,在控制其他一些影响因素之后,航空联盟的存在并不一定会引起航线票价的上升。本文最后依据实证结果,给出相关对策建议。     

City-Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs: A Market-Definition Methodology for the Airline Industry

This paper provides a methodology for deciding which airports warrant grouping in multi-airport metropolitan areas. The methodology is based on the comparability of incremental competition effects from nearby airports on average fares at a metropolitan area’s primary airport. Results from a quarterly panel data set for the period 2003–2009 provide strong evidence that city-pairs, rather than airport-pairs, are the appropriate market definition for analyses of passenger air transportation involving many (but not all) large metropolitan areas. Based on the proposed method, we offer a recommended list of airports that should be grouped when creating city-pairs for the analysis of competition in the US domestic airline industry.     

Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets

In the absence of an effective antitrust law, both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in China's airline markets, causing concern for both airlines and consumers. A study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically, as well as price collusion. Both tend to be short-lived. The fact that collusion is more likely to occur in January and April when demand is high, as revealed by China Eastern's and China Southern's price-war and collusion models, has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines' sales managers. However, there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low. High airport concentration measured by the HHI may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances, but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions. Concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated. We also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti-competitive role in China's airline markets.     

Airline hubs in the Single European Market: A benchmark analysis

‘Liberalization’ of European air markets could allow the formation of airline hubs to obtain the associated economies of scope and scale. This study simulates the formation of these hubs. A model of U.S. hub location, estimated as a function of demographic and economic characteristics, is applied to European cities to identify likely hub locations. The results provide a benchmark for evaluating future airline competition in the Single European Market. However, the study is only an approximate prediction of hub location because political and structural constraints will keep the European air market from developing the competitive atmosphere found in the U.S..     

The Effects of Market Structure and Technology on Airline Fleet Composition after Deregulation

The present study examines the effects of market structure and technology on airline fleet composition in the deregulated airline industry. To capture the effects of market structure and technology on airline fleet acquisition and use, a profit function which allows airline fleet in its specification is applied to derive the fleet composition function of an airline. The results show a steady pattern in airlines' adoption of two-engine wide-bodied aircraft during the post-deregulation era, providing evidence that the airlines have responded consistently to changes in market structure and technology in acquiring two-engine wide-bodied aircraft after deregulation.     

The competitive consequences of hub dominance: A case study

Hub-and-spoke has become the predominant configuration of airline routes, with individual hubs typically dominated by single carriers. These operations have characteristics of natural monopoly; but dominance is a consequence also of advantages that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of superior efficiency. The carrier with the strongest presence attracts a grossly disproportionate amount of traffic and, secondarily, of the high fare-paying traffic originating at the hub. While the welfare consequences of the consequent price discrimination are ambiguous, United's acquisition of 50 additional slots at the slot-constrained O'Hare airport raised a legitimate Clayton Act Section 7 issue.Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Cornell University; Special Consultant, National Economic Research Associates, Inc. I acknowledge with gratitude the indispensable assistance of Gary J. Dorman in assembling the data presented here and offering criticisms, and of Scott Thomas. They bear no necessary responsibility, however, for the article itself.     

Airline fleet composition and deregulation

Airline responses to deregulation have been analyzed using a variety of models. This paper presents and empirically tests a model of airline behavior which explicitly treats hub-and-spoke route structures which emerged after deregulation. The change to hub-and-spoke route structure implies an alteration of airline fleet use and acquisition of aircraft after deregulation. The empirical section of this paper investigates the nature of these changes using a data panel for airlines from 1970 to 1989. The changes observed in airline fleet use and composition indicate that the primary distortion of regulation on aircraft was inhibiting their use over efficient networks.This paper has benefited from the suggestions of Kenneth Boyer, Bruce Allen, Charles Ballard, and Stephen Martin at MSU, my colleagues Djeto Assane and Bernard Malamud at UNLV, and an anonymous referee. Any errors remaining are my own.     

Barriers to Mobility in Europe's Civil Aviation Markets: Theory and New Evidence

A questionnaire-based survey is applied to investigate the perception of mobilitybarriers by European airline managers. Whilst the liberalisation of Europe's airline markets removed regulatory mobility barriers, we find that mobility impediments still appear to exist. Potential entrants moreover, perceive some mobility barriers as significantly more effective than others. The perceived effectiveness of a particular mobility barrier varies considerably among airline managers. We also provide an overview of previous studies on the contestability hypothesis and the effectiveness of endogenous (strategic) mobility barriers. Our results support earlier findings for the U.S. to the effect that barriers to mobility are perceived to exist and matter. Whilst our results are clearly subjective, as they are based on the perceptions of managers, we believe such perceptions matter as they inform managerial actions. In this sensewe believe our results are of value.     

Price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines

This paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non-refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel. Our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved. Using an original data set from U.S. airline markets, we find strong evidence supporting our model. Price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand.     

Market structure and quality determination for complementary products: Alliances and service quality in the airline industry

This paper explores the effect of market structure on quality determination for complementary products. The focus is on the airline industry and the effect of airline alliances on flight frequency, an important element of service quality. With zero layover cost, the choice of flight frequencies has the same double-marginalization structure as in the usual alliance model, leading to a higher frequency in the alliance case as double marginalization is eliminated, along with a lower full trip price and higher traffic. The surprising result of the paper emerges with high-cost layover time, where double marginalization in frequencies is absent and where an alliance reduces service quality via a lower frequency, with the full price potentially rising (in which case traffic falls).     

HOW DOES THE INTERNET INFLUENCE PRICE DISPERSION? EVIDENCE FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

I estimate the Internet's effect on the level and dispersion of airline fares on a given route within and across firms. The results suggest that increases in Internet penetration reduce average price and lead to higher intrafirm price dispersion, while increases in Internet penetration do not affect interfirm price dispersion on a given route. Internet penetration affects average fares most in competitive markets. These results suggest that the Internet has significantly but subtlely influenced domestic airline competition. The effect of the Internet on prices and price dispersion is larger on direct flights.     

Predatory reputation in US airline markets

Despite its long history in antitrust policy, predation remains a poorly understood phenomenon. The main difficulty is in empirically identifying predatory intent. I propose a method for measuring the effect of reputation, whose significance would enable us to infer predatory intents. Maximum likelihood estimation using simulated annealing algorithm is conducted with a sample of US airline markets. The results provide some support for the presence of entrants learning and reputation effect. As an application, I discuss how the outcomes of my empirical model could help analyze such antitrust cases as the American Airlines Case.     

Deregulation, Business Strategy, and Wages in the Airline Industry

This study assesses empirically the relationship between business strategy and wages within the context of a significant environmental change—deregulation of the airline industry. Regression results provide limited support for the hypotheses that firms' business strategies would lead to systematic differences in average earnings levels of airline carriers, depending on whether or not the industry was regulated, and that these strategies would operate over and above firms' ability to pay higher wages. It appears that business strategies may be linked to their human resource outcomes even in a heavily unionized environment.     

Policy Implications of the Effects of Concentration and Multimarket Contact in China’s Airline Market

Unlike many other mergers in developed countries, which might have been assessed and their effects estimated by antitrust authorities before being granted antitrust immunity, the airline mergers that swept China’s airline industry in 2002 occurred with no antitrust challenge. These mergers provide the opportunity to study important market power issues in China’s airline markets. Given that increased concentration and multimarket contact are the main legacies of an airline merger, the effects of mergers on these variables can raise the potential for the exercise of market power. However, an examination of the period 2002–2004 during which the Chinese airline mergers occurred shows that the resulting increased concentration and enhanced multimarket contact did not have important consequences for airfares in Chinese city-pair markets. The presence of Hainan Airlines appears to have played an important role in suppressing the airfares charged by China Eastern and China Southern.