企业层对知识员工的激励—知识员工报酬机制设计

随着知识经济时代的来临,知识员工成为企业生存最具价值的资本之一。企业激励对象的角色和地位发生了质的变化与发展,探寻真正适合于知识员工的激励机制显得尤为迫切。本文主要针对企业层对知识员工激励这一问题进行探讨,研究了知识员工的报酬机制设计,运用委托——代理理论设计了一个团队剩余价值分配模型,并以此为基础对影响激励强度的因素进行了讨论,得出了兼具理论意义和现实意义的结论。     

团队断裂带与新产品研发团队创新绩效研究——团队快速信任和知识转移渠道的情境机制

基于新产品研发团队这一临时性组织情境,探讨团队断裂带对新产品研发团队创新绩效的影响,尤其是团队快速信任和知识转移渠道在其中的情境机制。通过选取本土企业内98个新产品研发团队的团队领导-团队成员配对样本,运用层级回归分析对假设进行验证。研究结果发现,团队断裂带与新产品研发团队创新绩效之间存在倒“U”字型关系,团队快速信任和知识转移渠道均显著调节这一非线性关系。即在团队快速信任水平越高或知识转移渠道越丰富的情况下,团队断裂带与新产品研发团队创新绩效之间的倒“U”字型关系越不明显。     

成员角色对小团队效能影响的实证研究

本文在贝尔宾团队角色理论的基础上,将团队角色归为四种类型,并从任务完成和成员满意度两个维度衡量团队效能.通过对60个小团队的成员角色与团队效能的实证研究,发现四种团队角色对团队效能的两个维度有不同程度的影响.最后在结果讨论的同时分析了本研究结论对于实践的建议.     

组织支持感对员工知识共享行为的影响：自我效能的中介效应

员工知识共享行为能够促进知识在组织边界内产生溢出效应,从强化内部动机的视角引入自我效能分析组织支持感与员工知识共享行为之间的关系,并构建概念模型进行实证研究具有重要的理论价值。实证结果表明：组织支持感的三个维度中工作支持、价值认同对员工的知识获取行为和知识贡献行为都具有显著的正向影响,关心利益只对员工的知识获取行为具有显著正向影响;自我效能在工作支持、价值认同与知识贡献之间和在价值认同与知识获取之间起到完全中介作用,在工作支持与知识获取之间起到部分中介作用。     

知识的重要性和知识管理

如今,西方国家主要是以服务为基础,信息和知识十分宝贵。许多公司雇用首席知识官来进行知识管理,即系统地组织、计划、调度、监控和部署人员、技术、工艺,以及一个可以一起创造、共享、鉴定的环境,以实现战略目标。本文集中解释了知识和知识管理的重要性,并就关键问题进行总结。     

知识管理视角企业内部控制监控的变化

现有内部控制监控深受工业经济背景下科层管理的影响,知识经济的到来,动摇了科层管理的存在基础,知识管理倍受青睐.在知识管理模式下,监控要素将发生很大的变化:其一,不再作为一个独立要素存在于内部控制体系中,而是成为控制活动的组成内容;其二,持续性监控活动对以流程为主的团队实施关键点监控;其三,内部控制与环境适应性将超越内部控制设计合理性和执行有效性,成为评估的首要内容;其四,随着知识活动的发展,知识审计将成为内部审计不可或缺的一部分.     

资产评估机构应引入“知识管理”的理念

作为资产评估机构,其核心竞争力就是人和人所掌握的知识,因此,有必要进行知识管理.知识管理要认识知识运动的客观规律,还要和管理学的一般原理相结合,从企业的发展战略、激励措施、组织结构、组织文化等方面着手进行.具体实施可以利用平衡计分卡等工具.创造一个好的实施环境也是必不可少的,尤其是企业高层管理者的主动引导、参与、贡献.     

知识链构建中的企业集群知识协同模型研究

企业集群通过知识链实现知识在企业集群的流动、协同与增值,最终提高整个集群的协同创新能力和核心竞争力。从知识链构建的视角考察,企业集群知识协同主要包括系统模型和过程模型,集群企业之间通过知识共享、知识转移与组织学习等互动而实现知识创造的目的,从过程、动力和环境等三个层面提出企业集群知识协同机制选择。     

商业银行内部知识转移的机制与激励因素研究

基于组织内部知识转移的理论,本文提出了商业银行建立内部知识转移机制的策略,以提高内部知识转移的效果.此外,通过对影响内部知识转移影响因素的分析,本文也探讨了利用相关激励因素的途径,对商业银行有效进行知识转移具有借鉴意义.     

知识转换能力与企业创新绩效研究——以台湾金融证券业为例

知识转化是一种最重要的知识活动,是知识管理的一项主要内容,它对企业创新的绩效有一定影响.知识转化与台湾金融证券企业创新绩效的相关性研究进一步揭示出了知识转化对企业创新绩效的激励作用,从而为企业加强知识管理,提升管理者的知识转化管理能力,进而提高企业创新绩效提供理论借鉴和实践依据.     

国有控股集团企业知识型员工激励组合实证研究

国有控股集团企业知识型员工激励组合包括薪酬激励、工作成就激励、个人成长激励、工作环境激励、知识转移与共享激励等主要方式。实证研究表明,在薪酬激励方面,固定薪酬激励效应已降至最低水平,远不及奖金、福利、股权及期权激励策略。在工作成就激励方面,工作重要性和岗位转换的激励效应已降至中等水平,工作挑战性及相关荣誉更加能够激起员工工作积极性。在个人成长激励方面,担任重要角色、规范的技术培训与开发制度的激励效应为中等水平,而拥有资源配置权、负责组建研发团队和参与决策制定具有重要激励作用。在工作环境、知识转移与共享激励方面,先进的RD设施、优秀的企业文化、有利的团队冲突、规范的团队激励机制和健全的知识共享机制对员工的激励效应水平已高于较强团队凝聚力、顺畅的沟通激励以及优秀的领导、弹性工作时间和良好的学习环境。     

非物质激励效果的问卷调查与分析

非物质激励是激励机制的重要组成部分,它可以弥补物质激励的不足,在实现员工自我发展需要的同时,实现组织的特定目标。本文设计的非物质激励评价体系由组织环境、精神激励、职业能力发展激励三个主层次与13个次级指标构成,采用李克特量表法(Likert scales)分析。问卷分析结果表明:组织环境满意度较高,与期望状态差异较小;精神激励与职业能力发展激励满意度较低,与期望状态差异较大。分析结果还表现出一定的所有权、行业等方面的特征。     

An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity,product quality,and absenteeism

Using data from three production units of a large manufacturing plant that employs production teams in its assembly operations, this paper examines how changes made to an existing team-based incentive plan affects labor productivity, product quality, and worker absenteeism. The firm switched from a piece-rates contract and an attendance bonus and instituted a two tier incentive plan comprising two different but complementary performance-based bonus schemes: one tier based on individual team performance and the other tier on plant-wide performance. The incentives were introduced concurrently with management control initiatives intended to facilitate cooperation and monitoring among the teams. I find significant productivity gains and improvements in quality and absenteeism associated with the new incentive plan. These findings underscore two important points that have not been emphasized in existing empirical studies of incentive pay: incentive contracts for teams generate superior performance using combination of incentives, and the need to introduce organizational changes to facilitate cooperation and peer monitoring in tandem with incentive pay to capture greater incentive effects in team production.     

高校教师薪酬标准与知识创新动力分析

高校教师自主知识创新不足的经济学逻辑,在于教师薪酬水平过低,没有包含沉淀的人力资本投资成本。为此,激励高校教师知识创新原则在于补偿教师身上的沉淀人力资本数量,将沉淀成本包含在教师薪酬标准中,从而使薪酬制度随着组织战略、外部环境和组织内部适应能力的变化而进行调整,创造出一个没有沉淀成本的知识创新薪酬体制。     

Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.     

An empirical analysis of the effects of monitoring intensity on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management

Prior studies suggest that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. Using three distinct proxies for earnings management we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Furthermore, using the accrual-based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecast models we find that the opportunistic financial reporting effect of equity incentives dominates the incentive alignments effect for firms with low monitoring intensity. Using proxies for real earnings management, we find that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. However, for low monitoring intensity firms the opportunistic reporting effect mitigates, but does not completely offset, the benefits of the incentive alignment effect. Overall, these findings are consistent with the level of monitoring affecting the relation between equity incentives and earnings management.     

我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励有效性研究

我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励存在一些不足,原因在于薪酬激励的自身因素和薪酬环境因素两方面。自身因素主要包括忽视长期行为激励、缺乏同业竞争优势、轻视普通员工激励;环境因素主要有银行治理结构不完善、市场非充分有效、法规制度不健全等。本文通过对商业银行高管人员及普通员工的薪酬与业绩相关性进行实证检验,认为我国商业银行薪酬激励基本上是有效的,但是其有效性并不十分理想。据此,本文提出了提升我国商业银行薪酬激励有效性的具体建议:从微观层面看,优化薪酬激励机制;从中观层面看,强化商业银行治理结构;从宏观层面看,改善外部相关环境。     

Value rules: senior management incentives in the post-option era

Big changes are in the news and on boardroom agendas. This is a good time for many companies to step back and think fundamentally about how senior management incentives are structured and how these programs should be redesigned for better business results. This article describes the main problems with current incentive structures. It then shows how "value rules" can help employers make better use of incentive plans and create a real stake in business units' long-term results, so that the overall structure of executive incentives consistently encourages value creation for shareholders.     

Teams,repeated tasks,and implicit incentives

In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.