股权性质、连锁董事与公司绩效

以2005~2012年中国上市公司为样本构建面板数据,研究在不同股权结构的公司中连锁董事对公司绩效的影响,结果发现：连锁董事在董事会中所占比例与公司绩效呈正相关;具有丰富社会资源与经验的连锁董事在国有股权比例高的企业可带来较高的边际效应;国有股权所占比例高的企业,连锁董事在董事会中所占比例越高。     

终极股东控制、股权制衡以及公司价值

公司治理就其实质是指公司是由谁控制,并为谁的利益服务。在Berle和Means1930年的经典著作《现代公司与私有财产》中,第一次提到在美国的公司中普遍存在着大量所有权分散的股东,由于经理有着自     

股权集中度、股权制衡与公司绩效关系的实证研究——基于2009年中小板上市公司的经验数据

本文以中小板上市公司公开信息为为依据,基于2009年的样本数据,从股权集中度和股权制衡两个方面,对我国中小板上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的关系进行了实证分析,在公司绩效的评价上也是从盈利能力、成长性能力、股本扩张能力以及市场价值这四个方面进行综合考量。研究结果显示,前五大股东的持股比例对公司绩效的提升呈显著正相关;控股股东的持股比例与公司绩效的关系不显著;股权制衡对公司绩效的影响是不确定的,这说明当股权适度集中在几个大股东手里时是有利于公司股权结构的完善及绩效的提升,而控股股东绝对控股程度的提升却不一定能达到正向的效果,股权制衡也不是影响公司绩效的主因。     

股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效——来自深市创业板块的经验证据

本文以2010年创业板上市公司数据检验了股权结构与公司绩效的关系,发现公司绩效与股权集中度之间呈正U型关系,而股权制衡度与公司绩效之间存在正相关关系,但未通过显著性检验,说明创业板上市公司中股权制衡度的公司治理作用尚未得到有效发挥。     

股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007～2009年中小企业板块的实证检验

本文深入分析了国内外关于股权结构与公司绩效的影响因素;运用回归分析法,以ROE作为公司绩效的度量指标,考察中小企业板上市公司股权集中度、股权制衡度对公司绩效的影响因素。研究结果表明,与"壕沟防御效应"、"利益协同效应"假说一致,股权集中度与公司绩效呈显著的正U型关系;股权制衡度有助于改善公司绩效的假设也得到实证结果的验证。并据此得出构建大股东多元化、股权相互制衡的治理机制,有助于解决目前我国上市公司治理问题的结论。     

股权制衡与公司绩效关系研究——基于内外生双重视角的经验证据

以2007～2010年798家A股上市公司为样本,从股权结构外生和内生双重视角,探讨股权制衡与公司绩效的关系。结果表明,在外生性视角下,股权制衡对公司绩效有显著的促进作用,但促进作用的强弱与绩效指标的选取有关;考虑内生性的影响后,股权制衡对公司绩效的显著促进作用仍然存在,与外生性视角下的促进作用相比明显增强。研究还发现,公司绩效对股权制衡存在显著的正向反馈效应。     

机构投资者、股权制衡与公司绩效关系研究——基于沪市A股医药类上市公司的实证分析

论文以我国沪市A股医药类上市公司为研究对象,将机构投资者和股权制衡联系起来,建立有机构投资者介入的股权制衡结构模型,并以2009-2011年相关数据为研究样本,用回归模型分析有机构投资者介入的医药类上市公司股权制衡与公司绩效之间存在正相关关系.     

政府控制权、股权制衡与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据

本文考察了政府控制权、股权制衡和公司价值的关系,研究发现:(1)政府控制权比例与公司价值存在着"倒U型"关系,但政府干预动机的强弱会导致"倒U型"关系发生变化。(2)进一步将国有企业划分为中央政府控制和地方政府控制,发现"倒U型"关系主要存在于地方政府控制的国有企业中。(3)基于政府的干预动机,本文还研究了股权制衡的治理效应,发现只有当政府的干预动机较弱时,股权制衡才可能发挥正面的治理效应。     

股权结构与公司绩效的差异分析——基于产业要素密集度的视角

本文研究了不同要素密集产业上市公司股权结构和绩效的差异，以及股权结构对公司绩效的影响。方差分析表明，不同产业的绩效和股权结构存在显著差异：资本密集产业的总资产收益率高于劳动和技术密集产业，而技术密集产业的托宾Q高于其他两个产业；“股权集中，国有股一股独大”的现象在资本密集产业尤为突出。回归分析表明，股权结构和公司绩效密切相关，国家终极控制在不同产业对公司绩效影响不同：在劳动密集产业，国家终极控制不利于公司业绩；在资本密集产业，国家终极控制不利于公司财务业绩，对托宾Q却有正向影响；在技术密集产业，国家终极控制对公司绩效的影响恰和资本密集产业相反，对公司财务绩效存在正向影响，对托宾Q有不利影响。     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

商业银行董事会治理：特征与绩效——基于美国银行业的实证研究

本文以1996—2005年间美国43家商业银行为样本,实证分析了商业银行董事会治理的特征及其对绩效的影响。研究表明:平均而言,商业银行董事会的规模略大于非金融性企业的这一指标,且外部董事的比例较高;董事会规模与银行绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型曲线关系,但外部董事的比例对银行绩效的影响不显著;董事长与总经理两职合一、董事会次级委员会的数量、外部董事拥有的董事席位数均与银行绩效显著负相关;董事会会议频率对当年度银行绩效的影响不显著,但与前一会计年度的绩效之间存在显著的负相关关系;董事持股比例与银行绩效之间存在非线性的关系,而总经理任职年限对银行绩效的影响不显著。     

Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance

Abstract:   The board of directors is generally seen as an important internal governance structure. However, the empirical evidence on the board‐performance relationship is not conclusive. On the other hand, a growing literature suggests that different control mechanisms, either internal or external to the firm, can interact with each other and affect performance. One such important factor is product market competition. The objective of the study is to investigate further the board‐performance relationship taking into consideration the potential effect of market competition. More precisely, the study analyzes the combined effect of boards of directors' characteristics, and market discipline on firm performance. Overall, the results suggest that competition has a positive and significant impact on firm profitability and productivity. Moreover, this determinant factor creates the conditions for which the board‐performance relationship is supported. In other words, for boards to be effective, firms should be exposed to a competitive environment.     

The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk

Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk.     

Corporate Governance Structure and Performance of Malaysian Listed Companies

Abstract:  This study investigates the relationship between the corporate governance structure and performance of 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) between 1996 and 2000. We found board size and top five substantial shareholdings to be significantly associated with both market and accounting performance measures. In addition, we found a significant relationship between multiple directorships and market performance while role duality and managerial shareholdings are significantly associated with accounting performance. The result is robust with respect to controls for gearing, company size, industry membership and growth opportunities.     

Corporate Governance,Managers' Independence,Exporting, and Performance of Firms in Transition Economies

Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary, this paper employs Bayesian structural equation modeling to examine the relations among corporate governance, managers' independence from owners in terms of strategic decision making, exporting, and performance. Managers' independence is positively associated with firms' financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of managers' independence is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm's board. We interpret these results as indicating that concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm's internationalization and performance, but board participation of foreign stakeholders enhances the firm's export orientation and performance by encouraging executives' decision-making autonomy.     

银行股权结构、治理机制与综合绩效关系的实证研究

本文选取了具有银行特性的变量,对我国境内部分上市银行股权结构、公司治理机制与综合绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析.分析结果发现,股权结构不是影响这些银行盈利能力的重要因素,大股东们更加关注其投资的安全性和未来的盈利能力;上市银行董事会在控制银行风险方面发挥了积极的作用,但外部董事对内部董事产生的挤出效应影响到董事会决策的质量;高管人员平均薪酬对银行盈利能力和流动性控制能力有显著的正面影响,现金补偿式的低报酬一业绩敏感性激励机制发挥了积极的作用;上市银行监事会偏离了其核心职责,没有发挥风险监督的作用.     

Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence

We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital-raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from nine Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control, while controlling for other firm-level characteristics. This core finding persists after controlling for legal institutions variables.     

从公司治理角度探讨国有商业银行资金管理机制再造

建立长效的资金管理机制,对于完善商业银行内部运行机制,优化商业银行公司治理结构具有重要的现实意义.本文将国有商业银行资金管理问题置于公司治理的框架下考虑,分析了我国国有商业银行存在组织架构未能理顺、管理方式和手段落后、资金风险管理水平不高和内部转移价格体制不合理等问题.据此,提出重构资金管理新机制的基本思路,即科学设计资金营运组织架构、提高风险管理水平、全面实行资金集中管理及建立完整有效的内部资金转移价格体系,并指出对于内部资金转移价格的定价可先采取实际成本率和收益率法,再过渡到半市场化法,最终实现市场化法的定价思路.