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目前在众多上市公司普遍施行的股权激励,主要针对高管和其他核心员工.但就管理层的股权激励探讨还停留在简单的相关分析和描述对比,不足以全面揭示问题本质.基于股权激励微观研究的不足,本文在回顾心理所有权内涵及其对员工态度和行为影响基础上,进一步说明关注高管心理所有权是股权激励获得实效的关键. 相似文献
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近年来,我国上市非金融企业金融化趋势越来越明显,现有研究表明“脱实向虚”不利于企业的长期发展。高管的决策影响着企业金融化程度,而股权激励作为一种公司治理的方式,能够影响高管的行为。文章以2007—2019年沪深A股上市公司的数据为样本,对高管股权激励对非金融企业金融化进行了实证检验,研究发现:高管股权激励对我国上市非金融企业的金融化具有一定的抑制作用,同时研发投入在两者的关系中起到部分中介效应。 相似文献
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为了解决企业内部的委托代理问题,企业股东会对高管制定薪酬激励方案来缓解二者的利益冲突。文章以2009—2020年A股中对高管采取股权激励的上市公司为研究对象,考察上市公司高管股权激励对外部审计费用的影响。研究结果表明,对高管的高股权激励会显著增加外部审计费用,而高质量的内部控制能够有效抑制二者之间的正相关关系。机制检验表明,较高的股权激励诱发了上市公司的违规行为,其舞弊风险发生的可能性会增大,从而增加审计师收取的审计费用。进一步研究表明,当上市公司的客户集中度较高时,高管的股权激励与其外部审计费用呈负相关关系;高质量外部审计能够发挥其监督和治理作用,弱化高管股权激励对外部审计费用的正效应。 相似文献
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《商业经济(哈尔滨)》2015,(6)
通过对2010年上证A股及深圳主板A股股票观察值为样本进行研究,对上市公司的会计稳健性及高管股权激励程度进行估计分析,结果发现高管股权激励与会计稳健性呈倒U型关系,即股权激励对会计稳健性的影响呈现先增高后降低的趋势。这说明现阶段我国高管激励政策实施中不仅存在利益的趋同,亦存在利益背离现象。这种利益背离,导致企业高管对盈余指标的操纵。为进一步提高企业的会计稳健性,可在股权激励方面做适当调整。 相似文献
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《中国商贸:销售与市场营销培训》2016,(22)
现如今越来越多的企业为了提高公司的绩效对高管及员工采取股权激励的方式,但与此同时带来的往往是一系列公司利益主体的变动。从理论分析来看,股权激励可作为稳定公司高管人员的一种长期激励方式,通常被认为是解决委托—代理矛盾的首要机制。在我国资本市场体系不断完善的背景下,已有越来越多的公司在经济管理过程中采用高管股权激励的方式来对管理层与公司股东之间的利益矛盾进行协调。本文基于上述背景,结合实例,对高管股权激励对公司高管的行为以及公司绩效的影响作了分析,以期能为公司管理提供借鉴。 相似文献
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企业价值是上市公司有序运营的核心概念,其受到多重因素的影响,例如企业规模、股权性质等。本文选取2018年~2020年的创业板上市公司为样本,研究企业价值是否受到股权集中度的影响。实证结果发现,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值呈负相关关系,而前五大股东持股比例与企业价值呈正相关关系。当管理层激励作为调节变量之后,前五大股东持股比例对企业价值的影响更为显著。针对研究结果,提出相关政策建议。 相似文献
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在当前全球竞争日益激烈的背景下,管理层在企业研发投入上的决策与企业未来的生存和发展息息相关.股权激励能有效影响管理层对企业研发投入的决策.本文以2010年至2018年A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,考察管理层股权激励与研发强度之间的关系.研究发现,管理层股权激励与研发强度显著正相关.进一步发现,股权集中度对股权激励与研... 相似文献
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Fan Yu 《International Review of Finance》2020,20(3):701-736
This paper finds that a CEO who is better monitored tends to have smaller wealth‐performance sensitivity (WPS). The results are consistent with the optimal contracting view and are robust to different measures of WPS. The findings suggest caution in drawing conclusions when researchers use WPS as an observable outcome of monitoring to test the effectiveness of monitoring. The association of monitoring and WPS is not necessarily positive, as assumed by prior corporate governance research. 相似文献
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将股权激励、所有权结构、代理成本与投资效率纳入一个统一的分析框架,使用产权属性作为调节变量,代理成本作为中介变量,实证检验股权激励是否影响投资效率,以及股权激励、所有权结构、代理成本与投资效率之间的关系。结果表明:股权激励能够抑制上市公司的非效率投资,代理成本的中介效应显著,但所占比重很小,非国有企业的抑制作用大于国有企业,非国有企业的中介传导机制畅通;国有企业"期权激励"方式能够显著抑制非效率投资,非国有企业的非效率投资通过实施"股票激励"方式能够得到显著抑制;实施股权激励计划能够显著抑制上市公司的投资不足,非国有企业的抑制作用大于国有企业,非国有企业的代理成本中介效应机制畅通,国有上市公司的代理成本中介效应不显著。 相似文献
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利用WTO关税数据库、中国工业企业数据库、海关贸易数据库和世界银行投资环境调查数据库等方面的数据,实证研究了进口竞争对企业绩效工资和激励强度的影响。研究结果表明,进口竞争的加剧会促使企业调整内部薪酬结构,提高绩效工资的比重,加大对员工的激励强度;生产率水平高的企业、加班制度健全的企业、市场化程度高的民营企业会更加注重改善企业薪酬体系,提高劳动者绩效工资比重与对其激励强度;同时,企业年龄对绩效工资和激励强度的影响有所不同,成长阶段企业倾向采用绩效工资的薪酬激励政策,成熟企业倾向采用奖金激励政策;此外,融资难、融资贵不利于企业薪酬体系完善,从而对企业员工绩效工资和奖金激励强度产生不利影响。 相似文献
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Betty H.T. Wu 《Journal of Small Business Management》2016,54(4):1099-1125
This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms. 相似文献
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Douglas Cumming Grant Fleming Sofia Johan Mai Takeuchi 《Journal of Business Ethics》2010,97(2):173-188
Although trustworthiness has been described as a source of competitive advantage, its value extends to organizational governance
and wealth creation. We identify the importance of the commitment–compliance continuum in the decision to trust and note that
trustworthiness is a subjective perception viewed through each person’s mediating lens. That lens and each person’s interpretation
of the social contract impact one’s commitment to cooperate. We suggest five propositions that integrate trustworthiness,
governance, and wealth creation. 相似文献
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In this paper, we examine the relationship between CEO power, CEO age and the efficiency of policy implementation in listed corporations controlled by each province’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in China. We find that CEOs with more power implement policy are more efficiently. We also find that younger powerful CEOs will act more effectively than their older competitors. The reason for the difference is that younger powerful CEOs in state-owned companies are incentivized to implement their policy tasks to gain promotions or political capital. Our results are important to future SOE reform and to understanding the characteristics of SOEs as policy instruments. 相似文献
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Valerie Rosenblatt 《Journal of Business Ethics》2012,111(2):237-251
This article uses social dominance theory (SDT) to explore the dynamic and systemic nature of the initiation and maintenance of organizational corruption. Rooted in the definition of organizational corruption as misuse of power or position for personal or organizational gain, this work suggests that organizational corruption is driven by the individual and institutional tendency to structure societies as group-based social hierarchies. SDT describes a series of factors and processes across multiple levels of analysis that systemically contribute to the initiation and maintenance of social hierarchies and associated power inequalities, favoritism, and discrimination. I posit that the same factors and processes also contribute to individuals?? lower awareness of the misuse of power and position within the social hierarchies, leading to the initiation and maintenance of organizational corruption. Specifically, individuals high in social dominance orientation, believing that they belong to superior groups, are likely to be less aware of corruption because of their feeling of entitlement to greater power and their desire to maintain dominance even if that requires exploiting others. Members of subordinate groups are also likely to have lower awareness of corruption if they show more favoritism toward dominant group members to enhance their sense of worth and preserve social order. Institutions contribute to lower awareness of corruption by developing and enforcing structures, norms, and practices that promote informational ambiguity and maximize focus on dominance and promotion. Dynamic coordination among individuals and institutions is ensured through the processes of person-environment fit and legitimizing beliefs, ideologies, or rationalizations. 相似文献
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