浅议有限责任公司股东资格的认定

股东资格是取得和行使股东权利、承担股东义务的基础。股东资格的认定是公司法案件审理中经常涉及的问题，正确认定公司的股东资格是正确解决此类纠纷的前提。然而由于我国的公司法律制度不够完善，虚名、冒名股东在现实生活中屡见不鲜，股东资格的认定依然很难。在我国加入WTO的新形势下，应选择有利于公司制度的标准来认定股东资格。     

浅析公司股东资格取得的条件

股东资格的取得涉及股东权益的行使与保护。学界对确认股东资格取得所应采取的标准有多种不同的看法;股东资格取得的条件也有许多,各个条件之间的效力也有所不同。如何确立股东资格取得条件之间的效力以及在欠缺有效要件下如何确立股东的资格成为讨论的焦点。目前我国就股东资格确认而引起的诉讼越来越多,但是《公司法》及相关司法解释并没有一个明确的规定。     

股东资格司法确认的标准问题探讨

股东资格确认是公司实践中炙手可热的话题,但在我国由于公司法未有明确规定,相关公司法理论远未成熟,司法实践中又缺乏统一的执法标准,因此该问题已成为实践中的一大热点和难点.而"确认"型问题的关键天然地在于其标准的界定,由此,对股东资格确认的标准问题加以研究,不仅具有深远的理论价值,更具有紧迫的现实意义.本文拟以分析股东资格确认问题产生的根本原因-利益冲突为逻辑起点,进而引入公司法中的利益平衡理论,通过对形式要件与实质要件,公司章程、股东名册、工商登记、实际出资等主要形式要件的效力分析,分别从宏观的理论基础层面、中观的司法原则层面、微观的具体标准层面等三个层次,逐一递进探讨解决之道,以期为早日统一司法实践中的股东资格司法确认标准,提供些许参考.     

应收账款质押的权利竞存顺位适用困境与解决路径

应收账款质押制度,是消费性担保向投资性担保过渡下的产物.为求融资便利,需明确应收账款上竞存担保权利的顺位.民商合一的体例下,传统的民事担保以登记公示的顺序确定权利顺位,但延及商事融资领域则不合时宜.应收账款质押融资属于商主体交易的范畴,宜从商主体的风险担责能力视角,对优先权利顺位进行考量,视各主体是否履行权利公示义务,是否履行合理注意义务以及是否容忍他人权利存在,以之为标准,确认先履行登记公示义务、已尽合理注意义务的质权人优先于抵销权人和受让人.反之,若抵销发生在先,质权人因未尽合理注意义务而劣后于抵销权人.若让与发生在先,其未作登记情形之下仍以质权为先.     

论权利之放弃与权利之不行使

在民事实务中债务人于一审中未主张债权已罹于消灭时效,于二审中是否仍的主张其时效抗辩权的问题法律并没有做出明文规定,对这一问题的研究对于解决民事实务中的问题具有积极意义。本文引入权利之放弃与权利之不行使的概念,并对具体问题作了具体分析,本文对权利失效理论也有很详细的阐述,应该来说比较圆满的解决了这一问题。     

股东权利辨析

股东权利是股东基于股东资格而享有的在公司获取经济利益和参加公司管理的权利,它包含财产性质的权利和公司经营管理权利。关于股东权利的性质在学界争议颇多,有所有权说、债权说、社员权说、独立民事权利说等学说。本文在简要介绍股东权利的内分类方面后,又论述了一些与股东权利相关的问题,如隐名出资的股东权利问题,中小股东的股东权利问题等。探索股东权利,有助于股东增强法律意识,学会用法律武器维护自己权利。     

股东权利辨析

股东权利是股东基于股东资格而享有的在公司获取经济利益和参加公司管理的权利,它包含财产性质的权利和公司经营管理权利。关于股东权利的性质在学界争议颇多,有所有权说、债权说、社员权说、独立民事权利说等学说。本文在简要介绍股东权利的内分类方面后,又论述了一些与股东权利相关的问题,如隐名出资的股东权利问题,中小股东的股东权利问题等。探索股东权利,有助于股东增强法律意识,学会用法律武器维护自己权利。     

论涉外股东知情权的行使及其限制

随着新<公司法>的实施,有关股东知情权的诉讼案件明显增多.股东知情权是公司股东的一项重要权利,公司股东享有及时、充分了解公司经营情况及相关信息的权利,这是股东正常行使各项股东权的前提,但是股东知情权的行使应有一定的限制.     

税务机关行使代位权、撤销权若干问题探析

税务机关是国家税务行政机关，代表国家征收税款；欠税是纳税人对国家的纳税义务，不同于一般民事债权；税务机关行使代位权、撤销权，在性质、方式、程序上与一般民事主体行使代位权、撤销权具有明显的区别。     

海洋环境损害赔偿主体研究

海洋环境损害赔偿主体分为权利主体和义务主体,两者共同构成了海洋环境损害赔偿关系人。文章具体分析了海洋环境损害赔偿权利主体和义务主体的权利义务。最后得出的结论是,确定海洋环境损害赔偿的民事权利主体,应以海洋环境损害所造成的权利损害后果为依据;侵权民事义务主体的确定,依赖于其所实施的行为。     

保护规范理论反思与本土化修正

近年来,我国宏观流动性投放逐步由以前的被动投放（外汇占款）向主动投放转变,银行业资产配置结构更趋多元化,金融创新更加活跃,这些都在一定程度上改变了金融体系流动性传导的渠道和机制,迫使我们重新审视流动性在金融体系中消长、转移的内在逻辑,探讨新形势下流动性管理的合理方式和路径。本文运用动力系统模型来分析和论证银行资产配置结构变化对市场流动性状况的影响机制,以及中央银行流动性管理工具的有效性。研究表明,银行资产配置趋势的同质化容易导致市场流动性状况的恶化;中央银行需要进一步完善利率传导机制,强化货币政策与宏观审慎评估政策的协同配合,以提升流动性管理的有效性。     

保护规范理论的引入抑或误用——刘广明诉张家港市人民政府行政复议案再检讨

刘广明案引入保护规范理论,为原告资格的利害关系判断标准提供了新思路,但也反映出最高人民法院对保护规范理论的适用前提和作用范围仍不明确。在利害关系的判断层次中,保护规范理论用于查明主观公权利以排除反射利益,而不用于确定被诉行政行为对既存权益的侵害可能性;前者关注私益保护指向的规范解释,后者关注因果关系确定性与紧迫性的事实判断。当起诉人诉请保护的合法权益已获得法律规范或司法实践的承认,则保护规范理论无适用必要。     

The United Shareholders Association Shareholder 1000 and firm performance

From 1989 through 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) published its Shareholder 1000 report, which ranked 1000 firms on several dimensions of corporate performance, including shareholder rights and management compensation. We examine two measures reported by the USA of the alignment between managers' and shareholders' interests: a shareholder rights score and a management compensation rating. The associations between these measures and measures of operating performance and investment levels are analyzed. We find evidence that the USA shareholder rights and management compensation scores are significantly and positively associated with measures of operating performance and investment spending. Further tests indicate that USA management compensation scores proxy for aspects of corporate behavior that have significant valuation implications not reflected in financial statements.     

The impact of shareholders and creditors rights on IPO performance: An international study

This paper examines the impact of cross-country variation in shareholders' and debt holders' rights on post-IPO performance and survival of newly listed stocks across the globe. Using a sample of 10,490 initial public offerings (IPOs) in 40 countries between 2000 and 2013, we find that post-IPO performance and survival is better in countries with stronger shareholder protection, but the impact of creditor protection is negative i.e. stronger creditor protection leads to poor post-IPO performance and survival. This effect is driven by rules requiring creditors’ consent for company reorganization and the mandatory replacement of incumbent managers. Reputable IPO advisors exacerbate the positive impact of shareholder rights and the negative impact of creditor rights.     

Shareholder Conflict as a Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility Commitment for Shared Growth

In this study, we seek to explore shareholder conflicts as a determinant of large firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitment for shared growth with subcontractors. Using a sample of 232 firms in the Korean chaebols during 2006'12, we find that CSR commitment is negatively related to controlling shareholders' cash flow rights but positively related to control-ownership disparity. We also find that foreign blockholders mitigate the positive relationship between CSR commitment and control-ownership disparity. This study offers a view of how controlling shareholders and blockholders protect their interests while enhancing their reputations as good citizens through CSR commitment.     

THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BY-LAW IN DELAWARE: PRESERVING THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Just as some lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the invention of the poison pill in the 1980s, others are now about to reinvigorate it with another legal invention. The “shareholder rights bylaw,” which promises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate control, aims to eliminate the current ability of target company boards of directors to block changes of control by keeping their poison pill defenses in place. The new bylaws require the poison pill (and other defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives an allcash offer for 100% of the firm's stock at a price at least 25% above the prebid market price. The firm can keep its poison pill, but only if shareholders vote to keep it after receiving the offer. Although the legality of the share-holder rights bylaw has been challenged as an undue infringement on boards of directors' power to run companies, this article argues that their legality will be upheld for three reasons:

• ? First, shareholder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's responsibility to manage the firm to maximize shareholder value.
• ? Second, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the specific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation; and the shareholder rights by-law is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to shareholders.
• ? Third, the adoption of shareholders rights by-law does not prevent the board of directors from advising share-holders to vote to reject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving management the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison pill.

As the article concludes, upholding this right of shareholders to choose whether a poison pill is used to block a takeover is critical to the vitality of the takeover market and, hence, to the preservation of the agency relationship between directors and shareholders. Upholding this right may also prove critical to Delaware's ability to maintain its predominance in the market for corporate chartering.     

Debt,Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications

We extend here our prior work, which focused on equity decoupling ( Hu and Black, 2006, 2007, 2008 ), by providing a systematic treatment of debt decoupling and an initial exploration of hybrid decoupling. Equity decoupling involves unbundling of economic, voting, and sometimes other rights customarily associated with shares, often in ways that may permit avoidance of disclosure and other obligations. We discuss a new U.S. court decision which will likely curtail the use of equity decoupling strategies to avoid large shareholder disclosure rules. Debt decoupling involving the unbundling of the economic rights, contractual control rights, and legal and other rights normally associated with debt, through credit derivatives and securitisation. Corporations can have empty and hidden creditors, just as they can have empty and hidden shareholders. ‘Hybrid decoupling’ across standard equity and debt categories is also possible. All forms of decoupling appear to be increasingly common. Debt decoupling can pose risks at the firm level for what can be termed ‘debt governance’? the overall relationship between creditor and debtor, including creditors' exercise of contractual and legal rights with respect to firms and other borrowers. Widespread debt decoupling can also involve externalities and therefore create systemic financial risks; we explore those risks.     

Non-controlling large shareholders in emerging markets: Evidence from China

Non-controlling large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance in emerging markets where controlling shareholder expropriation is a major concern. We argue that non-controlling large shareholders are faced with two non-conflicting incentives: to take advantage of their information advantage and obtain positive abnormal returns when they trade company shares, and to serve as effective monitors and minimize controlling shareholders' appropriation of company wealth. Using a sample of large shareholders' selling events upon the expiration of the lockup period following the split-share structure reform in China, we find that non-controlling large shareholders successfully time the market, as shown by their positive abnormal returns when selling their shares. Their returns are higher if they have a greater information advantage. Furthermore, the positive returns of the controlling large shareholder are negatively related to non-controlling large shareholders' ownership, suggesting that non-controlling large shareholders play a monitoring role and prevent controlling shareholders from looting the company. We also show that large shareholders affiliated with the controlling shareholders are not subject to as high a level of monitoring as those controlling shareholders are. Furthermore, both firm opaqueness and the severity of agency cost affect the quality of non-controlling large shareholders' monitoring.     

Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?

I investigate the role of voting power – the ability to influence a vote's outcome – in the voting behavior of institutional shareholders. Using hand-collected data from Israel, an environment with concentrated ownership, I employ a power index borrowed from the political science literature to examine the voting power wielded by institutional shareholders and the voting patterns they display. I find that institutional shareholders' voting power is negatively related to their tendency to vote against management: the stronger the shareholder, the higher the probability they will vote in favor of a management-sponsored proposal. Based on evidence obtained here, this behavior is attributable to pre-vote negotiations as well as to the voting strategy of “counting on my vote not counting.” Next, I use detailed data on shareholders' votes to identify the channel through which a voting rule affects minority shareholder protection. I find that powerful institutional shareholders almost never use their voting power to vote against management, not even when signals of poor governance are discernible. I conclude that the effect of a voting rule on minority shareholder protection operates through proposal selection, rather than through direct voting.     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.