High-frequency trading and stock liquidity: An intraday analysis

This paper studies the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on intraday liquidity of CAC40 stocks listed on Euronext. Spreads display an intraday L-shaped pattern, while quoted depth follows an inverse pattern: low at the open and increasing towards the end of the trading day. When liquidity demand is particularly high, there is a high rate of order cancellations attributable to high-frequency traders who use frequent order cancellations to strategically manage their limit orders and close positions near the market close. Using the generalized method of moments estimator, we generate strong evidence that greater intensity of HFT is associated with lower spreads and higher depth. The positive effect of HFT on liquidity is due mainly to decreased adverse selection costs arising from asymmetric information among market participants.     

Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality

Facing increased competition over the last decade, many stock exchanges changed their trading fees to maker‐taker pricing, an incentive scheme that rewards liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders. Using a change in trading fees on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we study whether and why the breakdown of trading fees between liquidity demanders and suppliers matters. Posted quotes adjust after the change in fee composition, but the transaction costs for liquidity demanders remain unaffected once fees are taken into account. However, as posted bid‐ask spreads decline, traders (particularly retail) use aggressive orders more frequently, and adverse selection costs decrease.     

Slow-moving capital and execution costs: Evidence from a major trading glitch

We investigate the impact of an exogenous trading glitch at a high-frequency market-making firm on standard measures of stock liquidity (spreads, price impact, turnover, and depth) and institutional trading costs (implementation shortfall and volume-weighted average price slippage). Stocks in which the firm accumulates large long (short) positions increase (decrease) by about 4% during the glitch and become substantially more illiquid. It takes one day for prices and spread-based liquidity measures to revert. Institutional trading costs, however, remain significantly higher for more than one week. Both liquidity measures are also weakly correlated outside the glitch period, suggesting they capture different aspects of liquidity.     

Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.     

Liquidity Provision and the Organizational Form of NYSE Specialist Firms

We examine the influence of NYSE specialist firm organizational form on the nature of liquidity provision. We compare closely held firms whose specialists provide liquidity with their own capital to widely held firms whose specialists provide liquidity with diffusely owned capital. We argue that specialists using their own capital have a greater incentive and ability to reduce adverse selection costs, but face a greater cost of capital. Differences in the proportion of spreads due to adverse selection costs, large trade frequency, the sensitivity between depth and spreads, and price stabilization support this argument.     

Do firms’ earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?

This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and equity liquidity, positing that as incentives arise for the manipulation of firm performance through earnings management (due partly to conflicts of interest between firm insiders and outsiders), greater earnings management may signal higher adverse selection costs. If earnings manipulation reveals aggressive accounting practices, liquidity providers tend to widen bid-ask spreads to protect themselves. The empirical results indicate that companies with higher earnings management suffer lower equity liquidity.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.     

Liquidity and risk sharing benefits from opening an ETF market with liquidity providers: Evidence from the CAC 40 index

This article examines how the introduction of an ETF replicating a stock index impacts on the liquidity of the underlying stocks when the ETF market involves liquidity providers (LPs). We find that index stock spreads decline, relative to those of non-index stocks, after the introduction of the ETF but this liquidity improvement is not driven by changes in adverse selection costs or recognition effects. By contrast, we show that it is mainly explained by a decrease in order processing and order imbalance costs. This most probably results from additional risk sharing capacities provided by increased cross-market trading and LPs' liquidity provision in low-liquidity times.     

Latency,liquidity and price discovery

The speed of trading is an important factor in modern security markets, although relatively little is known about the effect of speed on liquidity and price discovery, two important aspects of market quality. On April 23, 2007, Deutsche Boerse made an important upgrade to their trading system. With the 8.0 release of Xetra, system latency was reduced from 50 ms to 10 ms. Subsequently, both quoted and effective spreads decreased, which are mainly concentrated in small- and medium-sized stocks. This increase in liquidity is due to dramatically lower adverse selection costs that were only partially translated into higher liquidity. We interpret this as a decrease in the competition between liquidity suppliers who are able to increase their revenues by more than 90 million euros. The contribution of quotes to price discovery doubles to 90% post upgrade, indicating that prices are more efficient.     

An analysis of depth behavior in an electronic, order-driven environment

The purpose of this study is to investigate inter-temporal and cross-sectional depth patterns in an electronic, order-driven environment. Although many exchanges operate in this environment, little is known about the liquidity dynamics induced by such trading mechanisms. The findings, based on over six million observations, reveal an inverted U-shaped pattern that mirrors the commonly reported U-shaped spread pattern. An important implication is that earlier spread results understate the strength of inter-temporal liquidity variations. Cross-sectional analysis, based on adverse selection-sorted portfolios, demonstrates that corporate depth is negatively related to information asymmetry. The adverse selection impact on liquidity and cost of capital is stronger than previously believed since information costs are realized through both spreads and depths.     

Initial evidence on the market impact of the XBRL mandate

In 2009, the SEC mandated that financial statements be filed using eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL). The SEC contends that this new search-facilitating technology will reduce informational barriers that separate smaller, less-sophisticated investors from larger, more-sophisticated investors, thereby reducing information asymmetry. However, if some larger investors can leverage their superior resources and abilities to garner greater benefits from XBRL than smaller investors, information asymmetry is likely to increase. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find evidence of higher abnormal bid-ask spreads for XBRL adopting firms around 10-K filings in the year after the mandate, consistent with increased concerns of adverse selection. We also find a reduction in abnormal liquidity and a decrease in abnormal trading volume, particularly for small trades. Additional analyses suggest, however, that these effects may be declining somewhat in more recent years. Collectively, our evidence suggests that a reduction in investors’ data aggregation costs may not have served its intended purpose of leveling the informational playing field, at least during the initial years after mandatory adoption.     

What Explains the Bid‐Ask Spread Decline after Nasdaq Reforms?

This paper examines whether the decrease in bid‐ask spreads on Nasdaq after the 1997 reforms is due to a decrease in market‐making costs and/or an increase in market competition for order flows. Unlike previous studies, we jointly examine how competition and trading costs affect bid‐ask spreads. In addition, we separate the effects of informed trading and liquidity costs on bid‐ask spreads. Informed trading cost is directly estimated for each Nasdaq stock using a Bayesian theoretic model. Empirical results show that market‐making costs and competition significantly affect bid‐ask spreads. The post‐reform decrease in bid‐ask spreads is largely due to both an increase in competition and a decrease in informed trading and liquidity costs on Nasdaq.     

Market Quote and Spread Component Cost Behavior Around Trading Halts for Stocks Interlisted on the Montreal and Toronto Stock Exchanges

We use intraday quotes and transactions on halted securities that interlisted on the Toronto Stock Exchange and Montreal Exchange to decompose the spreads and examine quote depths. Our results show that order‐processing costs differ for trading halts at the open compared to halts during the rest of the trading day. We find that the adverse‐selection cost component of the spread is higher around trading halts and highest at the trading halt. We also find that print‐media articles that appear within the four‐day window centered on the halt have no impact on the time‐series behavior of the spread cost.     

A tale of two time zones: The impact of substitutes on cross-listed stock liquidity

This article examines how the market quality of European cross-listed stocks is affected by the partial-day availability of close substitutes, i.e., shares of the same companies that are traded in their home markets but are not fully fungible with the cross-listed shares. Our findings suggest that narrower spreads and more competitive liquidity provision during overlapping trading hours reflect a significant impact from the availability of more substitutes in addition to the enhanced information environment and liquidity externalities when home markets are open. Our results also provide a richer picture of specialists’ intraday activities and offer new evidence of market integration.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Providing liquidity in an illiquid market: Dealer behavior in US corporate bonds

We examine market making behavior of dealers for 55,988 corporate bonds, many of which trade infrequently. Dealers have a substantially higher propensity to offset trades within the same day rather than committing capital for longer periods for riskier and less actively traded bonds. Dealers’ holding periods do not decline with a bond's prior trading activity and in fact are lowest for some of the least active bonds. As a result, cross-sectional estimates of roundtrip trading costs do not increase as prior trading activity declines. Our results suggest that dealers endogenously adjust their behavior to mitigate inventory risk from trading in illiquid and higher risk securities, balancing search and inventory costs in equilibrium such that observed spreads can appear invariant to expected liquidity.     

Investor protection, adverse selection, and the probability of informed trading

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection, adverse selection, and the probability of informed trading. Previous research has established a direct relation between investor protection and firm liquidity, measured by bid-ask spreads and depths. In this study, we test the hypothesis that adverse selection is the mechanism through which poor investor protection leads to higher costs of liquidity. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare adverse selection differences across distinct investor protection environments, holding constant the trading platform and currency. Using various bid-ask spread decomposition models and probability of informed trading estimates, we confirm the hypothesized relation between investor protection quality and adverse selection costs. These findings contribute to the literature by establishing one of the links in the chain connecting investor protection to firm valuation.

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Examining the relationship between earning management and market liquidity

The main purpose of this paper is to argue the extent that earnings management lowers liquidity. It should increase information asymmetry and impair trading liquidity. Using a sample of French firms from 2008 to 2011, we find that firms that manage earnings have wider bid-ask spreads. Our results are robust for both of two well-established measures of market liquidity. Therefore, the empirical results indicate that firms that exhibit greater earnings management are associated with lower market liquidity. These findings are in line with adverse selection and shed light on the role corporate governance devices can play in the consideration of shareholder interest’s protection, which leads to improved stock market liquidity levels.     

Why effective spreads on NASDAQ were higher than on the New York stock exchange in the 1990s

Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain why spreads on NASDAQ were substantially higher than those on the NYSE in the 1990s: “collusion” and “preferencing and payment for order flow.” We present data on all actively traded stocks in these markets of relative effective spreads (RES), aggregated monthly over 1987–1999 and advance a third hypothesis: NASDAQ “SOES-day-trading.” We estimate NASDAQ and NYSE informed-trade losses and gains to market makers and other liquidity providers on six trade sizes, and find that losses on trades we ascribe to SOES day traders were substantially greater than those on other trades, offset somewhat by gains from small-trade-size investors. NASDAQ market makers' response to these losses and additional operations costs incurred to reduce the losses resulted in greater RES and increased trading within the best quotes, predominantly on larger trade sizes. The data are consistent with the “SOES-day-trading” hypotheses, but not with the other two. Furthermore, the mandatory SOES “experiment” provides insights into the negative effects of automated trading systems (such as ECNs, which now dominate NASDAQ) when their design does not adequately consider opportunistic traders.