Advertising, Its Determinants, and Market Structure

This study derives a formal model of firm advertising behavior and applies it to the industry level to figure out the relationship between advertising and market structure. The firm advertising model shows that both consumer preference andfirm-specific advertising competence jointly determineprofit-maximizing advertising intensity. At the industry level, advertising intensity is represented multiplicatively by consumer preference and a measure of market structure, which reflects the joint distribution of the levels of advertising competence and market shares among firms. The new market structure measure suggests that those single-dimensional measures of market structure such as seller concentration and the Herfindahl index are inadequate in explaining interindustry differences in advertising intensity, and that the long-debated advertising-concentration relationship differs depending primarily on the appropriability of advertising. An empirical analysis of 426 five-digit Korean manufacturing industries shows that an inverted U-shaped relationship between the Herfindahl index and industry advertising intensity is observed for consumer goods industries but a lazy J-shaped relationship for producer goods industries.     

Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints

Motivated by a recent merger proposal in the French outdoor advertising market, we develop a model in which firms are initially endowed with some advertising capacities and compete on two fronts. First, firms compete to acquire additional advertising capacities on an upstream market; a first stage modeled as a second-price auction with externalities. Second, those firms, privately informed on their own costs, use their capacities on the downstream market to supply advertisers whose demand is random; a second stage modeled by means of mechanism design techniques. We study the linkages between the equilibrium outcomes on both markets. When a firm is endowed with more initial capacity, through the acquisition of a competitor for instance, whether it becomes more or less eager to acquire extra capacity on the upstream market depends a priori on fine details of the downstream market. Under reasonable choices of functional forms, we demonstrate that a downstream merger does not create any bias in the upstream market towards the already dominant firm.     

The Adverstising Market in a Product Oligopoly

A model is developed in which producers in a differentiated product market compete in prices and informative advertising. The model also includes commercial media, which are linked to producers through the advertising market and to consumers through the media market. We investigate how certain market parameters, such as media market differentiation or product market differentiation, affect the competitive level advertising chosen in the market. The model shows that less product differentiation or more media differentiation leads to a higher market level of advertising. In the case of sufficiently high media differentiation, levels of advertising are in excess of the social optimum.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Does purely predatory advertising exist?

"Purely predatory advertising" has been defined as advertising which redistributes market share but does not affect market demand. Purely predatory advertising is commonly assumed in the industrial economics literature; but its existence is an empirical question. Since cigarette advertising is widely considered to epitomize purely predatory advertising, we analyze firm level panel data for the United States cigarette industry to study the question of existence using an econometric procedure which corrects for autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation. Statistical tests support the hypothesis that cigarette advertising is purely predatory.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

Pricing with Endogenous Direct Advertising in a Monopoly

This paper develops a model of informative advertising in which a firm builds a database using its historical sales records in order to directly target ads on those consumers who have a high probability of purchasing its products. We show that the firm can use this type of direct advertising as a screening mechanism to identify high demand consumers. As a result, direct advertising can work essentially as a device to increase a firm's monopoly power. From a social point of view, this implies that the transition from traditional mass-advertising to direct advertising can generate a trade-off between higher advertising efficiency and greater monopoly power. We compute the model to shed light on the relative strength of these two forces, and find that while direct advertising might have a substantial negative impact on consumers, this advertising technology can only occasionally reduce welfare.     

Excess market value,market power,and inside ownership structure

This study is an empirical investigation of whether principal-agent problems do in fact significantly affect corporate managers' decision making, and hence the price of the firms' securities. If inside ownership structure of firms is reflected in firm market value, then agency theory leads one to expect that market value will be a positive function of the degree of inside ownership. This study demonstrates that rational investors recognize inside ownership and its resultant effect on market value. Furthermore, it is shown that excess market value as measured by the Tobin's Q-ratio is related to the level of advertising and R&D expenditure, the degree of market power as proxied by the Lerner Index, leverage, and firm size.     

Media substitution and economies of scale in advertising

Two important issues in the economics of advertising are media substitutability in generating sales and scale economies in advertising. If media are substitutes then partial bans, e.g., broadcast bans on cigarettes or alcoholic beverages, may be ineffective; and mergers among radio and TV firms, currently widespread in the U.S. and Mexico, are unlikely to result in market power in setting advertising rates. If there are scale diseconomies in advertising, concerns that advertising increases entry barriers may be unfounded. Using U.S. beer firm data over 1983:Q1–1993:Q4 for three media categories, we find evidence of high substitutability and diseconomies of scale.     

Informative Advertising and Optimal Targeting in a Monopoly

This paper analyzes how the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect the market outcomes. To that end, we consider a particular technology of information transmission which allows a monopolist to decide the optimal targeting strategy. From this starting point, we show that the use of targeted advertising is likely to increase the market price and reduce the level of advertising, and that the degree of media specialization chosen by the monopolist tends to exceed the socially optimal. Furthermore, our model indicates that the social loss resulting from the greater monopoly power might exceed the gain due to the lower wasting of ads, in such a way that targeting could reduce consumer surplus and, what is more important, the level of social welfare.     

Does advertising mislead consumers to buy low-quality products?

This paper investigates the interaction between consumer learning and advertising using a simulation model. Consumers use advertising to estimate the quality change, but learn advertising's trustworthiness through their consumption experience. Firms spend on not only advertising but also R&D to improve its product quality, following satisficing principles. We found that, if consumer learning is slow, an advertising-intensive firm captures most of the market in the long run despite its low product quality; in this sense, advertising misleads consumers. When learning is fast or when consumers do not rely on advertising at all, advertising is unlikely to mislead them. Easy imitation of rival products also prevents advertising from being misleading. These results are consistent with existing empirical findings on advertising-quality relationships.     

Foreign Entry and Firm Advertising Intensity: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of advertising intensity at the firm level by focusing on the role of foreign entry. In a monopolistically competitive market with heterogeneous firms, we show that foreign entry affects the expected advertising intensity of domestic firms through its impact on the cost of resources, brand image, and productivity spillovers and its impact on firms’ exit behaviour. Then, using comprehensive firm-level data from China’s manufacturing sector between 2005 and 2007, we test this hypothesis and find that foreign entry significantly affects advertising intensity.     

Sustaining superior performance in an emerging economy: an empirical test in the Indian context

We demonstrate a negative relationship between pro‐market reforms and the sustainability of superior profits in an emerging economy. The decline in sustainability of superior profits shows that pro‐market reforms bring significant threats in addition to the various opportunities such as greater availability of production factors and greater freedom to enter and operate businesses highlighted in the extant literature. Our study thus contributes to a more complete conceptual understanding of the performance consequences of pro‐market reforms in emerging economies. We also show that investment in research and development and greater investments in marketing and advertising are firm‐level resources that provide a measure of protection against the erosion in sustainability of superior profits associated with pro‐market reforms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH PECUNIARY AND PARTICIPATION EXTERNALITIES*

The existing literature on two‐sided markets addresses participation externalities, but it has neglected pecuniary externalities between platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our set‐up, differentiated platforms compete in advertising levels and offer consumers a service free of charge that is financed through advertising. We show that advertising can exhibit the properties of a strategic substitute or complement. Surprisingly, we find that platform profits can increase with market entry and that there are cases in which the level of advertising rises with entry. We also consider endogenous entry and provide a welfare analysis.     

Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Market share,advertising, R&D,and profitability: An empirical analysis of leading industrial firms in Japan

This paper develops a dynamic model of a leader firm which chooses the time paths of R&D and advertising inputs so as to maximize the present value of expected profits. From this theoretical model simultaneous-equations system for market share, advertising, R&D, and profitability is derived and estimated using the data on the leading industrial firms in Japan. Our results show that, as far as top firms are concerned, market share and demand growth have significant positive effects on profitability, and an increase in the stock of goodwill increases market share as well as profitability.This study was financially supported by the Ministry of Education in Japan. Helpful comments were provided by H. Odagiri. Also I am indebted to an anonymous referee for advice and criticism on various points.     

Market Power,Efficiency and the Dispersion of Systematic Risk

A number of studies have used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to integrate product market and financial theories of the firm. We reexamine the relationship between product market structure and systematic risk at the firm and industry level. We show that theory yields no testable implications at the firm level. We show, however, that there is a relationship between the intraindustry dispersion of systematic risk and industry concentration which depends on the causes and consequences of concentration. Estimates of the relationship between the intraindustry variance of and concentration for a 1987 cross-section of U.S. industries suggest that concentration allows larger firms to exercise market power.     

Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.     

Customer‐specific synergies and market convergence

We use an analytical model to study the effects of customer‐specific synergies, i.e., synergies that arise when firms sell multiple products to the same customers. At the firm level, we show that the profitability of a customer‐specific synergy depends upon cross‐market correlation of customer preferences, differs when the synergy is cost‐based versus differentiation‐based, and can even be negative when the synergy is kept proprietary to a single firm. We also show that returns to imitating such a synergy may decline as it strengthens. At the industry level, we find that exploiting customer‐specific synergies causes endogenous market convergence at a point that depends upon whether the synergy is cost‐based or differentiation‐based and whether it is imitated. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.