Market Share Dispersion Among Leading Firms as a Determinant of Advertising Intensity

Previous advertising intensity models have failed toaddress adequately the rivalry effects of leadingfirms trying to protect and enhance the marketshares of their brands. We argue that the relativedegree of market share parity among leading firms inoligopolies is a crucial determinant of marketadvertising levels. This study presents a modelthat more thoroughly characterizes market structureby including the variance in the market shares ofthe top four firms along with the concentrationratio. This model is then tested using a unique1987 data set of 58 well-defined U.S. food andtobacco manufacturing markets that used private datavendors for branded product market shares and mediaadvertising aimed at household consumers. We findthat industry advertising-to-sales ratios arehighest in those industries with the highestprice-cost margins, highest concentration, and thosewith equally-sized leading firms. Oligopolists seemunable to control advertising expenses asconcentration increases and they likely overinvestin advertising rivalry when they have similar marketshares.     

The degree of competition in the advertising industry

After a merger wave began among advertising agencies in the late 1960's, the Federal Trade Commission investigated the anticompetitive effects of the mergers and concluded that the industry would remain competitive. In this paper, we employ a method suggested by Bresnahan to investigate the issue of competition in the advertising industry. The method uses industry-level data over the period 1972–87 to consider the determinants of supply and demand for advertising messages and to calculate the degree of market power on the supply side of the market. Statistical results support the hypothesis that the industry was competitive over this period.We thank Robert Coen of McCann-Erickson, Inc., for providing data on advertising costs and expenditures and W. Bradford Todd of the Richards Group for information about the industry. Lacy Glenn Thomas directed us to McCann-Erickson. We also thank James C. Murdoch, two anonymous referees, and the Editor, William G. Shepherd. Pornpong Sumanun provided research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The Welfare Effect of Advertising Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry

The welfare effect of advertisingrestrictions in the U.S. cigarette industry dependsupon the impact of advertising on consumer and producer surplus, the transfer to consumers for being exposed to utility-reducing advertising, and smoking externalities. We estimate a demand equation and a supply relation simultaneously and use the parameter estimates to generate predictions of the impact of advertising restrictions on social welfare. Our results show that advertising restrictions benefit producers by limiting competition and generating higher industry profits, and such restrictions lower social welfare if the external cost of cigarette smoking is sufficiently low.     

The Effects of Taxes and Advertising Restrictions on the Market Structure of the U.S. Cigarette Market

A dynamic oligopoly model of the cigarette industry is developed to study the effects of anti-smoking policies on the market structure of the U.S. cigarette industry. Firms are modeled as competing in price and advertising in a dynamic game. Two commonly used anti-smoking policies – advertising restrictions and tobacco tax increases – are evaluated using calibrated parameters. The simulation results show that in the long run both advertising restrictions and tax increases can successfully reduce the smoking rate. However, advertising restrictions reduce the smoking rate mainly in an indirect way through their impact on the concentration of the market, while tax increases reduce the smoking rate directly and have little effect on the concentration of the market. In addition, in the short run, advertising restrictions have a much smaller effect on reducing the smoking rate than tax increases.     

电力市场中发电商市场力的博弈分析

电力市场中市场力的存在不利于电力市场的健康发展,本文从市场力的定义出发,对影响市场力的因素进行了分析,并介绍了博弈论在竞价上网决策和降低市场力方面的应用.     

Market Power in Chinese Taipei: Laws, Policies and Treatments

The experience of Chinese Taipei shows that opening up a previously protected market to new entrants can be a more effective and reliable way to enhance competition than regulating the behavior of dominant or monopolistic firms. Moreover, when opening up the market, the liberalizing measures adopted by government should be market-structure-neutral. That is, it should not try to dictate the direction and results of market competition. A more pressure-resistant mechanism should be designed to deal with market power, taking the form of a regime that is cross-sector, independent and collective in its decision-making, such as has been the case with Chinese Taipei's Fair Trade Commission.     

The Effect of Advertising on Pharmaceutical Innovation

Although there is much controversy in the economic literature about how advertising affects market competition, little is known about the effect of advertising on product innovation. We examined the relationship between advertising expenditures and the research and development activities of pharmaceutical firms using empirical data from eight therapy areas. This study finds that detailing advertising may have a significant positive effect on the number of new products entering into clinical development. Markets of chronic disease with high levels of detailing advertising were more attractive to pharmaceutical firms. However, the effect of advertising on new product novelty remains inconclusive.     

2008年欧盟电力市场发展回顾及对我国的启示

从市场机制建设、政策法令修改、能源结构变化等3个方面,对2008年欧盟电力市场发展的重大事件包括交易所融合、欧盟跨国电网建设、能源企业产权拆分和能源供应多元化等进行了回顾和分析,结合我国目前电力市场化改革的实际情况,在逐步建立统一开放的全国电力市场、加强电网建设、研究制定我国能源多元化发展规划和政策等方面给出了几点启示。     

The Treatment of Market Power in Korea

Competitive forces have been relatively weak in Korea. Control of the chaebols' diversified expansion and conglomerate power has been a primary object of government policies. Competition law and policy has been expanded to include direct controls on chaebols, but it has been rather ineffective in resolving chaebol-related problems mainly because of insufficient attention having been paid to the problems of market power. Attempts to rein in chaebols by direct controls, without enhancing competitive forces, will be in vain, insofar as chaebol problems are really symptoms of their entrenched market potions in a non-competitive environment.     

我国电力行业发电侧市场结构变化实证分析

通过分析我国电力行业厂网分开改革的5年来五大发电集团的数据资料,以装机容量、发电量和销售收入作为市场集中度的衡量基准,对我国目前电力行业发电侧的市场结构进行测算与判定,分析其变动趋势,指出今后我国发电侧市场改革的重点是对优势发电企业的潜在垄断行为进行合理规制。     

The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test

An empirical version of the Lerner index is used to investigate the market power effects of U.S. firms seeking protection under current antidumping law. The market power consequences are examined for each of the three possible resolutions of an antidumping investigation: petition for relief accepted (and duties levied), petition rejected, or petition withdrawn. For each outcome an industry case study is presented and the market power analysis conducted. The results contained herein support the hypothesis that U.S. firms receiving protection enhance their domestic market power, while firms having their petition rejected experience a decrease in market power. The evidence is less clear for plaintiffs who withdraw their antidumping petition prior to its final resolution.     

价值规律在电力市场中的作用

通过对价值规律基本内容及表现形式的介绍,论述了电力市场运营机制中的供求机制、竞争机制和电价机制的实现,在此基础上分析了电力市场中供求机制与价格机制的相互关系,并对价值规律在国外电力市场中的研究和在国内电力市场化改革中的作用作了相应的阐述,目的是希望在我国电力市场化改革过程中,充分注意电力工业固有的特点来运用价值规律.     

Estimating Market Power in the US Copper Industry

Before 1978, most of the domestic copper production in the US and an important share of imports were traded at a price set by the major US producers. At the same time, the rest of the world was trading copper at prices determined in auction markets. This two-price system ended in 1978, when the largest US producers began using the Comex price of refined copper as a benchmark for setting their prices. Using this regime shift, I empirically test the competitive behavior of the US copper industry before 1978. The results show that copper prices were close to the levels predicted by a competitive model of the industry.     

电力市场环境下电网经营企业的风险管理

介绍了在电力市场环境下电网经营企业所面临的一系列不确定性因素,以及这些不确定性因素所带来的诸如经营风险,输电阻塞风险、电网规划风险、体制风险等等各种风险,并对各种风险的应对提出了相应的策略。     

电力行业市场主体构造的理论基础分析

摘要：基于贝尔理论和有效竞争理论,分析了在传统电力行业发输配售一体化的垄断经营主体基础上,通过电力市场化改革构造适应竞争需要的电力市场主体的理论基础。在电力市场化改革中,适用贝尔理论,核心问题是要确立传统自然垄断经营主体实行竞争性环节和垄断性相分离的原则,并构造电力行业市场主体;适用有效竞争理论,其核心问题是要解决电力行业市场主体的数量和规模问题。就有效竞争标准在电力行业市场主体构造中的适用性进行了分析,认为在我国,未来电力市场主体应当是“发电侧和售电侧”主体多元化,输配电环节实行政府监管下的单一主体垄断经营。     

垄断性产业市场结构重组后的分类管制与协调政策--以中国电信、电力产业为例

20世纪80年代以来，许多国家都采取不同方式，在不同程度上对垄断性产业实行市场结构重组政策。国内外有关经验证明，垄断性产业的这种改革效果，在相当程度上取决于市场结构重组后政府所制定并实施的分类管制与协调政策的有效性。本文以中国电信、电力产业为例，简要分析垄断性产业的市场结构重组及其面临的问题，着重讨论市场结构重组后垄断性产业的分类管制与协调政策问题。     

水电参与电力市场竞价的若干问题探讨

结合水电的特性,分析了水电参与市场竞争面临的主要问题,深入探讨了各类水电站参与的市场类型、梯级水电站的报价主体、上下游水电站中标电量不协调如何处理、水电站未中标弃水时和由于预测不准而产生电量偏差的处理等.     

城市电网建设投资机制及政策措施分析

介绍了城市电网建设投资机制的演变过程,结合国家对城市电网建设的有关规定,分析了当前城市电网建设投资的筹措渠道及面临的问题,并归纳总结了目前城市电网建设取得政府资金支持的主要政策措施。     

The Gradual Response of Market Power to Mergers in the U.S. Steel Industry

Studies of the impact of horizontal mergers on market power typically impose an immediate adjustment of market power following a merger. This paper adopts an alternative procedure to estimate the effect of four mergers on market power in the U.S. steel industry. Namely, by estimating a switching regression model that incorporates profit-maximizing behavior, the results show that mergers generally increased market power in the steel industry. However, it did take some time for market power to fully adjust after each merger.     

Market Power in the Cheese Industry: Further Evidence

The recent public disclosure of proprietary information providesinsights into the pricing conduct and performance of leadingcheese marketers. Most important, the evidence supports thehypotheses that following its acquisition by Philip Morris in1988, Kraft became particularly aggressive strategically,both byselling on the NCE to drive bulk cheese prices lower and byincreasing the selling prices and gross profit margins on theirfinished cheese. The result was significantly higher prices toconsumers and lower prices to suppliers of bulk cheese, as Kraft'sgross profit margins rose from an estimated $880 million in1989 to $1020 million in 1991.