Firms,agency, and evolution

A recent (though controversial) trend in economics has been to appeal to evolutionary theory when addressing various open questions in the subject. I here further investigate one particular such appeal to evolutionary biology: the argument that, since markets select (in a standard biological sense) firms as coherent units, firms should be seen to be genuine economic agents. To assess this argument, I present a model of firm/office selection in a competitive market, and show that there are cases where markets can select for firms/offices as collective units – and thus, as agents of their own – but also that there are cases where they do not. In this way, I try to make the evolutionary argument for the agency-based view of the firm more precise.     

Analysis of evolutionary game in structural formation of market power in remanufacturing supply chains

It is normal for enterprises to engage in remanufacturing nowadays. Nevertheless, the concern of enterprises and researchers is whether remanufacturers should compete for leadership in supply chains. Considering the WTP for new and remanufactured products differs, this article the evolutionary game theory model in three structures of leadership in supply chains. It investigates the processes of market evolution and choices of strategies when manufacturers and retailers compete or do not compete for leadership in the market. It has been shown in the case of market evolution, according to the 12 conditions formed from different prices that manufacturer and retailer have to pay for competing for leadership, there are five types of ultimate evolutionary stability about the choices of strategies. Further analyses show that these five different evolutionary stability results include nine different evolutionary paths. Analyses of examples further show the evolutionary processes and results in distinct circumstances. This article extends the application of the evolutionary game in remanufacturing supply chains in theory and provides some guidance for enterprises to make decisions when they consider whether they compete for leaders in remanufacturing supply chains in reality.     

演化、转轨与市场过程理论视角的渐进改革

文章认为,基于主流经济学的激进改革思路,无法解释制度演化的多样性与开放性。渐进式改革强调路径渐进、演化、零碎的特征,与更适合解释现实世界的演化经济学、转轨经济学以及市场过程理论的逻辑一致。考虑非正式制度的内生渐进演化特征,迄今为止的渐进改革模式具有理论与现实的合理性。     

期货市场价格操纵行为与监管——基于演化博弈理论

从演化博弈理论的视角,基于微分方程的稳定性理论,通过分析中间参数的变化对博弈系统的最终演化均衡的影响,论证了期货市场联合操纵行为演化的方向和路径,并结合"有限理性"个体的假设进行模拟。最后,对期货市场价格操纵行为的监管提出了相关建议。     

Knowledge and markets

An economy is a coordinated system of distributed knowledge. Economic evolution occurs as knowledge grows and the structure of the system changes. This paper is about the role of markets in this process. Traditionally, the theory of markets has not been a central feature of evolutionary economics. This seems to be due to the orthodox view of markets as information-processing mechanisms for finding equilibria. But in economic evolution markets are actually knowledge-structuring mechanisms. What then is the relation between knowledge, information, markets and mechanisms? I argue that an evolutionary theory of markets, in the manner of Loasby (1999), requires a clear formulation of these relations. I suggest that a conception of knowledge and markets in terms of a graphical theory of complex systems furnishes precisely this.     

企业主流与新流创新演进机理研究

激烈的市场竞争使人们意识到，企业既需要维持创新发展优势而抢占主流市场，又需要创造新的企业发展优势而赢取未来主流市场。着眼于这一关键任务，实现主流与新流创新演进成为企业持续发展的重点。因此，基于生物进化理论、企业进化理论和企业DNA理论，提出主流与新流创新演进经过了生成、变异、选择、协同阶段。深入研究主流与新流创新的生成、变异、选择、协同机理，并与企业创新发展实践相结合，为企业未来主流创新提供具体路径指导。     

信息非对称性框架下市场的分化与演化--以天津市自行车市场变迁为例

本文对天津自行车市场进行实证分析,详细地分析天津自行车市场的分化与演化过程,从信息不对称的角度说明天津品牌由少到多,档次由单一到多样化的变化机制.指出逆向选择理论中逆向选择模型中的预期假设不符合理性预期的现实,引进理性预期假设来解释市场得到发展并分化成几个不同层次等级的产品市场的原因.进而揭示了这个转轨时期市场结构变迁的特征,并提出了演化经济学研究的一个新的视角.最后针对实证提出相应的政策建议.     

Alfred Marshall's Mecca: Reconciling the Theories of Value and Development*

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary nature and content of Marshall's theory of value and the relation it bears to his theory of growth and development. In Marshall's work the two theories are inextricably linked, and the subsequent attempt to separate them has not only marginalised Marshall's rich analysis but also made it impossible to appreciate the role he gave to innovation, and its corollary the growth of knowledge and organisation, in the workings of a market economy. At its core is the relation between the growth of firms and the growth of markets, but this is not steady‐state growth theory; rather, it is the different, mutually determined and ever changing growth rates of different groups of firms that is at the centre of attention. Quite how variation is linked to progress is the central topic of this essay, and the elucidation of its central role necessarily means that we must resurrect the representative firm. We conclude that Marshall was correct in stating that ‘the tendency to variation is a chief source of progress’ (Principles, V, 4, p. 355). We develop a set of evolutionary tools to show how and why this is so. But evolution is more than variation; it requires the organisation of firms and the market process to generate that correlation between differential knowledge and economic advance. Most importantly of all, the concept of a representative firm is re‐established as an indispensable element in a Marshallian evolutionary analysis.     

Is market liberalism adaptive? Rethinking F. A. Hayek on moral evolution

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system.     

Innovation diffusion,employment and wage policy

Contrary to most writings in the field of evolutionary economics which have a strong microeconomic flavor, here amacroeconomic evolutionary model will be presented in order to deal with themacroeconomic employment effect of technical change where there is just one old and one new technology. Several authors who favour an evolutionary approach to the theory of technical change share an optimistic view with respect to the macroeconomic employment effect of technical change. In the paper we are dealing with the question of whether this optimistic view is a necessary result of an evolutionary approach to technical change or rather of some other characteristic of the models used. It is shown that the evolutionary approach to technical change is not inherently optimistic or pessimistic with respect to the employment effects. Rather it is the labour market behaviour that will decide, whether the employment effects of technical change are positive, negligible or even negative.     

Contemporary Economic thought. The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics

This article examines the historical developments of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise since the early 1900s in order to demonstrate its distinctive characteristics that are often overlooked or belittled by some institutional-evolutionary economists and most mainstream economists. I argue that the institutionalist theory is an evolving and emergent theory, which bears a reciprocal, evolutionary, and cumulative relationship between the business enterprise and society. The institutionalist theory is, therefore, suitable for the understanding of the real-world business enterprise as it can be modified and refined along with the evolution of capitalism. The article begins with a discussion of the present state of the institutionalist theory. The following section is devoted to the major contributions to the institutionalist theory situated in the evolution of U.S. capitalism. The penultimate section provides a critical discussion of new institutional and evolutionary approaches to the firm. The article concludes with a brief discussion as to what should be done for the further development of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise.     

A corporation’s culture as an impetus for spinoffs and a driving force of industry evolution

We offer a theory of spinoffs that explains some salient aspects of these important market entrants. In infant industries, a great share of new market opportunities is depleted by firms that spinoff from incumbents. A model emphasizing the relation between incumbents’ evolving corporate cultures and the generation of spinoffs explains this regularity in industry evolution. By doing so, we capture different patterns in firm development that finally will help explain the evolutionary paths that industries may follow. We show that organizations reach a critical size that entails the collapse of a cooperative culture and triggers the exodus of personnel founding own firms. Thereby, organizations with a cooperative culture active in a dynamic business environment provide ideal training grounds for potential founders. Moreover, we argue that cooperative firm cultures and processes of “entrepreneurial imprinting” are important sources of spinoffs’ superior capabilities concerning their later market performance. We relate our findings to empirical evidence on developmental patterns in industries, such as genealogies and performance of spinoffs.     

Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism

In this paper, I provide a defence of Robert Sugden’s contribution to evolutionary game theory against Donald Ross’s accusation of eliminating the individual’s autonomy by denying the explanatory role of rationality, utility maximization and rational beliefs. In this regard, I claim that Sugden’s methodological remarks on evolutionary game theory do not imply a characterization of real agents as automata. On the methodological level, Sugden claims that it is not correct to conceive the empirical phenomenon of social evolution in terms of normative concepts, whose empirical status is not obvious. However, Sugden proposes a theory that explains the agent’s behaviour in terms of inductive reasoning, adaptive beliefs, salience and pattern recognition. The latter are psychological features that describe the way agents manage to self-determine their own actions. From these clarifications, I draw the conclusion that Ross’s critique misunderstands Sugden’s contribution both on the methodological and empirical level.     

Evolutionary Theory and Economic Policy with Reference to Sustainability

Synopsis The policy recommendations of most economists are driven by a view of economic reality embodied in Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Ironically, the Walrasian system has been all but abandoned by leading economic theorists. It has been demonstrated to be theoretically untenable, its basic assumptions about human decision making have been empirically falsified, and it consistently makes poor predictions of economic behavior. The current revolution in welfare economics offers opportunities on two related fronts for an evolutionary perspective on human behavior to reshape economic theory and policy. The first opportunity is to incorporate empirically-based information about human behavior to the study of human wants and their formation. This includes information about the evolution of the genetic component of decision making as well as the cultural dimensions of behavior. Expanding the role of economic analysis beyond stylized market behavior to focus on well-being (real utility) has far-reaching consequences for microeconomic policy. Secondly, abandoning the Walrasian model also means rethinking the microfoundations approach to the economic analysis of sustainability. This opens the door for economists to engage with the growing body of research on the evolution of whole societies. One link between the evolution of human behavior and the evolution of human societies is the psychological phenomenon of considering sunk costs. Understanding and overcoming the sunk cost fallacy may be the key to creating a sustainable society.     

Demand competition and investment heterogeneity in industries based on systemic technologies: evidence from the US long-distance telecommunications services industry, 1984–1996

Industries based on systemic technologies are often characterized by a dynamically evolving market structure. The market structure that provides the context for firms’ investment choices itself evolves due to the feedback effect of firms’ investments. In such cases, analyses of investment-performance relationship, purporting to explain sustainable competitive advantages, should ideally account for the endogeneity of the determinants of market structure—technology, demand, and policy—and firms’ investment choices. This paper focuses on the endogeneity of the demand-side determinants of market structure and firms’ demand-side investments under the assumed conditions of constant technology and policy environment. In doing so it contradicts the extant depiction of the evolution of industrial market structure in the above context as primarily caused by the evolution of underlying technological system in response to firms’ endogenous technological investments that generate sustainable competitive advantage for the dominant firms. A dynamic evolutionary model of demand competition captures the competition in the downstream market for basic industry product and its complements in an industry based on systemic technology during its post-interoperability stage. A natural experiment drawn from the US Long-distance telecommunications services industry during 1984–1996 allows testing the hypotheses drawn from the above model in a panel data setting.     

Schumpeter's theory of economic evolution: a Darwinian interpretation

A general Darwinian framework is employed to arrive at an interpretation of Schumpeter's work that brings out clearly its specific evolutionary aspects. Schumpeter's theory of economic evolution is seen to be still highly relevant to evolutionary economics, because it sheds light on some fundamental issues: the relationship between evolutionary theory and equilibrium analysis, the usefulness of Darwinian theory for economics, and the precise nature of the evolutionary forces at work in economic systems.     

The origins,development, and fate of Clower's “stock-flow” general-equilibrium programme

Before becoming the hallmark of macroeconomics à la Wynne Godley, the “stock-flow” analysis was already developed in microeconomics and general-equilibrium theory. The goal was to study the formation of economic plans and the determination of market prices when individuals were supposed to consume, produce, and hold commodities. I show that since the early 1950s, Robert W. Clower used the “stock-flow” price theory to offer microfoundations to a Keynesian business cycle model. I analyse the origins of this microfoundation programme, trace its development, and discuss its fate.     

Free banking as an evolving system: The case of Switzerland reconsidered

Selgin and White (Economic Inquiry 25:439–457, 1987) argue that during its evolution a free banking system can be expected to reach certain stages of development. This paper uses their conceptual framework to investigate the free banking era in 19th century Switzerland and makes three contributions to the literature on free banking. First, I find that the development of the Swiss banking system closely matches the stylized evolutionary path depicted by Selgin and White. Second, I argue that after the introduction of the federal banknote law in 1882, the Swiss banking system can no longer be characterized as one of free banking. Third, I maintain that the evolutionary approach offered by Selgin and White opens the door to a better explanation of inter-bank note exchange complications during the 30 years preceding the introduction of a Swiss central bank in 1907 than alternative approaches.