The Debreu private ownership economy with complementary commodities and prices

Let E_p be a Debreu private ownership economy in which there are some complementary commodities. It means that all commodity bundles are contained in the proper subspace V   of commodity–space [R]l(l∈{1,2,…})${\mathfrak{[R]}}^l\left(l\in \left\{1,2,\dots \right\}\right)$. The production plans maximizing the producers' profits do not have to satisfy the dependency in the qualities of commodities seen in the consumers' plans. It may cause no-existence an equilibrium in economy E_p. The competitive leads, however, to adjustment the production plans to improve the consumers' satisfaction. The procedure of change the production system covering the consumers' requirements is presented. As a result, the model of the private ownership economy with complementary commodities and prices, being the simplification of the initial model, is elaborated. Consequently, the necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the economy E_p is proved.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Business groups in a market economy

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and significance of the interfirm relationship called the business group. First, the nature of the Japanese business group is discussed. It is then pointed out that the business group is not a phenomenon unique to Japan, and an effort is made to explain the significance of the business group in the context of a market economy, using the Williamsonian approach to questions of internal organization and the market. Finally, the relationship between the input-output relationship of the firms and their group affiliation is tested.     

The phenomenon of equifinality in innovative development of the monetary private ownership economy —An axiomatic set-up

The phenomenon of the equifinality can be understood as a possibility to achieve a given final state in many potential ways, regardless of the initial state. The study of this phenomenon is particularly relevant in today's world, where one of the main problems is the transformation of post-communist countries' economies so that they reach the states close to the economic systems of developed countries. This transformation takes place in the process of economic development stimulated by innovation, with the active role of the banking sphere.Thus, the main purpose of this study is to define the concept of equifinality achieved in a finite time, in an innovative development of the economic system controlled by the banks and the analysis of its properties. For this purpose the possible trajectories of development are studied here in a space of innovative extensions of private ownership economy with money, for which the target state is an innovative extension of a given model.This analysis uses the apparatus of an Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium theory and the theory of dynamical systems. Simultaneously, the work presented is a development of earlier studies in modeling of the Schumpeter's vision of the economic development (Ciałowicz and Malawski, 2007, 2011).     

Structure of distortion equilibria and welfare in a multiregional economy

Summary We consider a convex economy with multiregions, each region facing different specific tax-subsidies. The model reduces to a model of a closed economy with an aggregate production set when there is a single region. It can also represent a model of an international economy through a reinterpretation of variables. We show that there is a unique path of allocations from a distortion equilibrium to the optimum that can be followed by proportionate changes of price distortions. Welfare monotonically increases as one follows the path towards optimum. The information on the structure of equilibria reduces multidimensional comparative statics into a one dimensional problem. The global Newton method of Smale can be used to follow the path in the direction of increasing welfare, allowing us to do comparative statics computationally. Global considerations directly show that, under a sign condition of the Jacobian of a tax function, piecemeal proportional reductions of price distortions improve welfare. A variation of the condition unifies other such conditions in the literature.I would like to thank William Brock, Takashi Fukushima, Tatsuo Hatta, Michael Jerison, Taesung Kim and referees of this Journal who provided me with many constructive comments and references. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society, the Midwestern Mathematical Economics Conference, and the International Conference of Korean Economists. I wish to thank the participants of these conferences for many nice comments. I also wish to thank Bruce Dieffenbach, Thad Mirer and editors of this journal who helped to streamline exposition.     

Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy

Consider a finite exchange economy first as a static, 1 period, economy and then as a repeated economy over T periods when the utility of each agent is the mean utility over T. A family of strategic games is defined via a set of six general properties the most distinct of which is the ability of agents to move commodities forward in time. Now consider Pareto optimal allocations in the T period economy which are also Nash equilibria in this family of strategic games. We prove that as T becomes large this set converges to the set of competitive utility allocations in the one period economy. The key idea is that a repetition of the economy when agents can move commodities forward in the time acts as a convexification of the set of individually feasible outcomes for player i holding all other strategies fixed.     

Local coordination and market equilibria

We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure of the market game to converge back to equilibrium. We analyse a simultaneous move and a sequential move version of the market game and explore the link with local rationalizability.     

Labour contracts in a stock market economy

In this paper, labour contracts are examined in the context of a general stock market economy where all shareholders are risk averse, and firms act in shareholders interest. The problem considered is whether some firm can offer a wage contract that will make all its shareholders better off. We show by example that, contrary to the arguments in the partial equilibrium framework, it is possible that no such contract will exist, even when there are potential gains to risk sharing. A sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible pareto improving contract is given. It is shown that contract trading will arise provided some firm has no large shareholders.     

Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring

Summary. In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players receive payoffs and privately observe signals which depend on the players' actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely held belief, such games admit a recursive structure. More precisely, I construct a representation of the original sequential problem as a sequence of static games with incomplete information. This establishes the ground for a characterization of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-decision settings where private information is present. Finally, the representation is used to give a recursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set, by means of a multi-player generalization of dynamic programming. Received: February 11, 2002; revised version: July 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am very grateful to In-Koo Cho, Larry Epstein, Denis Gromb, Stephen Morris, Paolo Siconolfi, Lones Smith and Max Stinchcombe for several insights and suggestions. A referee's comments helped improving the exposition. Finally, I wish to thank the participants to the seminars at MEDS, NYU, Columbia University, Caltech, UCLA, University of Rochester, University of Texas-Austin, Northwestern Summer Microeconomics Conference 98, Summer in Tel Aviv 98, and NASM98.     

An equilibrium model of a second economy market in a centrally planned economy

We study a CPE in which an identical good is sold on the official market (OM) and a “second economy” market (SEM ). Planners set parameters. Managers divide inputs between markets to maximize expected utility of wealth. Consumers are expected utility maximizers who purchase the good on the OM or SEM. On the OM, excess demand exists at the non-Walrasian price; delivery date is stochastic. The SEM offers immediate availability. Our solution concept involves the rational expectations of managers, the consistency of consumers' decisions, and a market-clearing SEM. We solve for SEM price and supply and investigate various comparative statics.     

Creditworthiness and thresholds in a credit market model with multiple equilibria

Summary. The paper studies creditworthiness in a model with endogenous credit cost and debt constraints. Such a model can give rise to multiple candidates for steady state equilibria. We use new analytical techniques such as dynamic programming (DP) with flexible grid size to find solutions and to locate thresholds that separate different domains of attraction. More specifically, we (1) compute present value borrowing constraints and thus creditworthiness, (2) locate thresholds where the dynamics separate to different domains of attraction, (3) show jumps in the decision variable, (4) distinguish between optimal and non-optimal steady states, (5) demonstrate how creditworthiness and thresholds change with change of the credit cost function of the debtor and (6) explore the impact of debt ceilings and consumption paths on creditworthiness.JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C63, D91, D92, E51, G12, G32.An earlier version of this paper has been prepared for the 1998 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, January 1998, Chicago. We want to thank Jess Benhabib, Buz Brock, Gustav Feichtinger, Franz Wirl, Michael Woodford, Wolf-Jürgen Beyn and Thorsten Pampel for helpful discussions and comments on various versions of the paper. We also want to thank participants in a workshop at the University of Technology, Vienna, the Macroeconomic Workshop at Columbia University, and the SCE conference, at Yale University, June 2001. We are also grateful for comments from a referee of the journal.     

Foreign exchange controls in a black market economy

An investigation of the impact of foreign exchange controls in a black market economy is undertaken within the context of a choice-theoretic cash-in-advance general equilibrium model. While such controls may improve a ‘distortion-free’ economy's trade balance and balance of payments they are found to increase the domestic price of imports and lower the country's welfare. The ramifications of black market for economic welfare turn out to be ambiguous, depending crucially on the government's reaction to the leakage of foreign exchange into the economy via illegal activity.     

Foreign exchange market regularities in a developing economy

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the ‘empirical regularities’ observed for exchange rates in the major foreign exchange markets apply equally to the case of a developing economy such as Singapore.     

Real indeterminacy of equilibria in a sunspot economy with inside money

Summary In a two-period sunspot economy with inside money andS possible realizations of the sunspot, we prove that, genetically in the space of utility functions, there areS — 1 degrees of real indeterminacy. This result generalizes the previously known result for sunspot models that, generically in endowments, there is at least one degree of real indeterminacy. The proof involves showing that generically the equilibrium allocation is different across states for some household. This property allows us to perturb the utility function in a simple way and to apply standard transversality arguments to prove our main theorem.We would like to thank David Cass, Atsushi Kajii, Michael Mandler and Paolo Siconolfi for helpful discussions.     

A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy

We examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders (N) is varied. The core first splits into two pieces at N=5 and then splits a second time into three pieces at N=12. Both of these splits occur not at a point but as a contiguous gap. We find that the speed of convergence of the core toward the three competitive equilibria is not uniform but when N is large, the convergence rate is approximately of the order 1/N.     

Rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria in an overlapping-generations economy

There are two theories for the treatment of market uncertainty: rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria. This paper shows how the game-theoretic solution concept of rationalizable expectations can be applied to an overlapping-generations exchange economy. Some general properties of these equilibria are discussed. It is shown that rationalizable-expectations equilibria are the predictions yielded by considering sunspot equilibria in which probability beliefs may differ across individuals. This result allows for a new interpretation of sunspot equilibria and helps to understand their relevance.     

A proposal for a democratic market economy

A type of market socialism is proposed for the United States both as a means of attaining more social equality than private ownership of corporate business makes politically and economically feasible, and of advancing a whole range of liberal purposes by undermining direct and indirect political power of the conservative business community. It is proposed to transfer ownership of corporate business to a system of local-government investment funds under specified national regulation. Such a system could retain all the economic advantages of capitalism, while facilitating better control of inflation, and would have genuine political feasibility in the United States.