所有权、负债与大股东利益侵占——来自中国控制权转移公司的证据

负债的公司治理作用是公司财务研究的重要问题。已有文献探讨了负债在股权分散公司中的公司治理作用,而在股权集中公司中负债对大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题的影响,已有的经验证据相当有限。本文以我国国有控制权转移上市公司为样本,研究了负债在股权集中公司中的治理作用。研究发现,负债与大股东的利益侵占存在显著正相关关系;相对于国有控股公司来说,私有公司的负债水平更高,其原因在于私有大股东通过负债对中小股东利益的侵占程度高于国有大股东。本文提供了负债与大股东利益侵占之间关系的直接证据,揭示了大股东通过负债侵占中小股东利益的行为,以及所有权性质对大股东通过负债侵占小股东利益行为的影响。     

大股东掠夺还是债权人治理?——基于上市公司债务期限结构的视角

为了检验企业的债务期限结构是大股东掠夺债权人的手段还是债权人监督大股东的方式,利用上市公司2005—2013年的非平衡面板数据,对上市公司债务期限结构与股权结构的相互关系进行实证分析。结果表明,中国上市公司的债务期限与控股股东现金流权呈显著的正相关关系,与控股股东两权分离度呈显著的负相关关系,这说明中国上市公司以短期债务为主的期限结构特征是债权人对大股东掠夺行为发挥监督治理作用的体现。据此进一步从企业是否处于财务困境、企业信息不对称程度以及其他大股东监督能力这三个方面对债务期限结构的大股东掠夺效应和债权人监督治理机制进行分类分析,结果表明在大股东掠夺激励较强的情况下,债权人可通过提供更短的债务合约来监督大股东,这不仅进一步验证了债务期限结构的监督治理效应,而且检验了其他债务期限结构理论。     

非公开发行折价、大小股东利益冲突与协同

本文以2006年2月到2007年6月15日实施非公开发行的105家上市公司为样本,结合我国上市公司股权集中的制度背景,考察发行折价与大股东利益动机的关系。发现大股东财富转移动机越强,上市公司发行折价越大,表现出壕沟效应和大小股东的利益冲突;大小股东之间的利益协同程度越高,发行折价越低;实际控制人类型,特别是国有与民营之间的发行折价没有显著差别。非公开发行折价影响大小股东之间的利益分配,值得监管部门和市场主体关注,警惕大股东侵占中小股东的利益。     

市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占

股权分置改革后,市值管理在公司治理与资本市场监管中的重要性日益突出。本文以上市公司控股股东的股权质押行为为切入点,研究控股股东市值管理动机下的融资行为及其治理效应。以2006-2011年的沪深A股上市公司为样本,本文发现市值管理有助于控股股东进行外部融资,并减少其对上市公司的利益侵占行为,表明市值管理存在治理效应。进一步研究发现,控股股东持股比例越高,市值管理对其利益侵占行为的治理效应越强。本文在国内首次对市值管理的治理效应进行了大样本的实证检验,丰富和深化了公司治理文献中基于大股东行为的研究。     

控股股东担保、债务融资与资金侵占

以控股股东担保为切入点,在考虑担保的连带责任风险的基础上,构建控股股东通过担保进行资金侵占的理论模型,并以2010-2014年上证A股上市公司为样本进行实证研究.研究显示:控股股东对上市公司担保显著提高了上市公司债务规模,并通过债务融资加大了资金侵占程度;现金流权在担保对债务规模和资金侵占程度影响中具有正向的调节作用,表现为控股股东向较高现金流权公司提供了更多的担保债务从而进行资金侵占.     

现金股利政策与会计稳健性

本文以沪深两市2007年-2010年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了现金股利政策与会计稳健性之间的关系。经验证据表明:实施新会计准则后,我国上市公司财务报告具有显著的会计稳健性;相比未分配现金股利的上市公司,分配了现金股利的上市公司的会计稳健性要低;受短期借款的刚性约束,上市公司并不能大肆分配现金股利,其现金股利支付水平与会计稳健性正相关,并且不受控股权性质的影响。通过充分发挥债务尤其长期借款的治理功能以提高会计稳健性,能有效缓解大股东与中小股东、债权人之间的利益冲突。     

股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本

本文从我国证券市场的特点和上市公司治理结构的特点出发,分析了在股权分置下和存在控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占时股权融资活动对控股股东股权价值的影响,然后对融资成本的定义进行拓展,计量出我国上市公司控股股东的股权融资成本和债务融资成本,指出控股股东的股权融资成本远远低于其债务融资成本是我国上市公司存在强烈股权融资偏好的重要原因。     

政治联系、债务融资与企业研发投入——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2009~2012年连续四年披露研发投入的中国上市公司为样本,实证检验政治联系、债务融资对企业研发投入行为的影响。结果表明,企业的研发投入面临债务融资约束,债务融资比例(银行借款)与研发投入强度之间呈现负相关关系,长期借款对研发投入强度的债务制约作用比短期借款更大,政治联系对企业的研发投入产生了"挤占"效应,抑制了RD投资,虽然给企业带来了一定的长期债务资源,但并未能如预期产生显著的"资源效应",扭转企业债务融资困境。     

安徽省民营上市公司融资结构与公司治理绩效的研究

本文以安徽省民营上市公司研究样本,用样本公司2007-2011年的面板数据对资本结构、债务结构和股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行研究,研究结果表明:安徽省民营上市公司第一大股东持股比例对公司绩效影响不显著,社会公众股持股比例、资产负债率以及短期借款比例与公司绩效成反比。据此提出完善安徽民营上市公司治理机制有效途径。     

安徽省民营上市公司融资结构与公司治理绩效的研究

本文以安徽省民营上市公司研究样本,用样本公司2007-2011年的面板数据对资本结构、债务结构和股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行研究,研究结果表明：安徽省民营上市公司第一大股东持股比例对公司绩效影响不显著,社会公众股持股比例、资产负债率以及短期借款比例与公司绩效成反比.据此提出完善安徽民营上市公司治理机制有效途径.     

Do investors want politically connected independent directors? Evidence from their forced resignations in China

Prior studies document that politically connected independent directors (“political IDs”) bring both benefits (e.g., easier access to long-term debt financing) and costs to firms (e.g., greater minority shareholder expropriations), but the observed relationship may be spurious because board composition is endogenously determined. Moreover, no direct evidence shows how minority shareholders value these political IDs. Using an exogenous shock that forces firms to lose their political IDs, we investigate the value of political IDs for Chinese listed companies. Specifically, using a difference-in-difference methodology, we find that the mandated departures of political IDs lead to reduced long-term debt financing and decreased government subsidies for nonstate-owned listed companies. Nonstate-owned listed companies that experience the sudden loss of political IDs adapt to the shock and improve their minority shareholder protections by engaging in fewer self-dealing activities and by enhancing investment efficiency. Although minority shareholders experience greater levels of expropriation in the presence of political IDs, they react negatively to the forced departure of political IDs. This evidence suggests that minority shareholders weigh the loss of political ties over the potential gain of corporate governance improvement. Our study provides direct evidence on how political IDs affect firms' strategic decisions. The study also sheds light on political IDs' roles in facilitating rent-seeking by controlling shareholders.     

Do shareholder protection and creditor rights have distinct effects on the association between debt maturity and ownership structure?

This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by country-level governance factors that enhance outside monitoring by minority shareholders and debtholders. Our investigation is based on a dataset of 50,599 firm-year observations from 38 countries. We use a propensity-score matching approach and find that the effect of ownership concentration on debt maturity is conditional to country-level governance attributes. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on debt maturity in countries where both shareholder protection and creditor rights are weak. Ownership concentration, however, tends to lengthen debt maturity as protection increases, and this positive effect on the length of debt maturity is stronger in countries enhancing protection towards debtholders (instead of shareholders). We also explore other characteristics of ownership structure, such as the identity and presence of controlling shareholders. These results corroborate the view that entrenched shareholders may use debt maturity opportunistically. Our study provides new insights into the interplay between firm- and country-level governance mechanisms and a deeper understanding of cross-country differences in the association between ownership structure and debt financing.     

中国民营上市公司债务融资破产威胁功效的实证研究

以2002～2007年陷入财务危机的民营上市公司（ST公司）为研究样本．通过相关分析实证检验了中国债务融资的破产威胁功效.研究发现,中国民营上市公司债务融资总体上对财务状况恶劣的公司起到了债务治理作用,发挥了破产威胁功效。短期债务能够对陷入财务危机的民营上市公司起到改善业绩的作用,较好地发挥破产威胁功效,而长期债务未能发挥破产威胁作用。银行贷款能够促进陷入财务困境的民营上市公司改善业绩,发挥破产威胁功效,而商业信用却没能发挥破产威胁功效。     

境外股东持股对大股东利益侵占约束——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

依据2006~2011年沪深两市上市公司数据,考量不同类型的外资持股对中国上市公司大股东侵占的约束影响。结果表明,外资持股未能有效制约大股东侵占行为,不同性质的境外投资者对抑制大股东侵占的作用存在差异。QFII能够一定程度上抑制大股东对小股东利益的侵占,而银行、保险和证券公司持股均不能对上市公司大股东侵占形成有效监督和制约,不仅未减轻大股东对小股东的利益侵占,反而加重了上市公司大股东和中小股东的利益冲突。     

金字塔股权结构、股权制衡与终极股东侵占

上市公司终极股东行为深受金字塔股权结构形态和内部权力配置及结构的影响。我国上市公司的经验数据表明上市公司终极股东侵占行为选择与金字塔股权结构形态特征正相关,与两权分离程度负相关。金字塔股权结构的内部制衡机制不仅直接影响股东侵占行为,并能够强化金字塔基本形态的影响作用。为保护中小股东的权益不受侵占,应完善公司治理结构,规范信息披露制度,并加强对上市公司大股东的监管。     

控制权竞争和公司债务期限结构研究

基于2004-2015年中国上市公司数据,实证检验控制权竞争是否影响公司债务期限结构。结果发现：控股股东持股比例与债务期限显著负相关;多个大股东并存会提高公司长期债务比例;股权竞争性越强,长期债务比例越高。这些结论与理论假设相符,既证实了内外部公司治理的密切联系,也说明控制权竞争有助于形成更为合理的债务期限结构。     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.     

债务融资行为对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动研究

文章研究了债务融资行为的三种特征(债务融资期限、债务融资方式和债务融资规模)对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动路径和驱动机理。实证结果表明,债务融资期限结构对亏损上市公司的财务价值同时存在侵害和治理两种效应,并且随着流动负债比例的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值表现出先升后降的趋势;从债务融资方式来看,银行借款的债务融资方式对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在侵害效应和治理效应,但利用商业信用和临时性占用款进行债务融资的方式对亏损上市公司财务价值产生明显的反向驱动效应;债务融资规模对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在正向和反向两种驱动效应,同样,随着负债比率的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值也表现出先升后降的趋势。