Does Credit Competition Affect Small‐Firm Finance?

While relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion permitted banking organizations to expand across state lines, it allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion. These differences in states' branching restrictions affect credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Firms in open states also are more likely to borrow from banks. Despite this evidence that interstate branch openness expands credit supply, we find no effect of variation in state restrictions on branching on the amount that small firms borrow.     

The Puzzle of Persistently Negative Interest‐Rate–Growth Differentials: Financial Repression or Income Catch‐Up?

The interest‐rate–growth differential (IRGD) plays a critical role in determining the sustainability of government debt. Yet it is striking that IRGDs are correlated with income levels, and are generally negative in emerging and developing economies, which contradicts standard economic theory. Negative IRGDs constitute a powerful debt‐stabilising force, driving down debt ratios or keeping them stable even in the presence of persistent primary deficits. Motivated by the puzzling facts, this paper examines the IRGDs for a large panel of advanced and non‐advanced economies by utilising a newly assembled data set. The evidence shows that large negative IRGDs in emerging and developing economies are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium – stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets – whereas the income catch‐up process plays a relatively modest role. Therefore, the IRGD in non‐advanced economies is likely to rise with financial market development and financial global integration, perhaps even before their GDP per capita converges to advanced‐economy levels.     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.     

A Special Breed?– A Longitudinal and Cross‐Sectional Study of Norwegian Budgeting and Financial Civil Servants

Abstract: This paper focuses on civil servants in the central Norwegian civil service whose main tasks are budgeting, supervision and accounting. The main research questions are: (a) What is their typical demographic profile? (b) How has their demographic profile changed over time? (c) What are the effects of having budgeting, supervising and accounting as a main task on civil servants’ attitudes and behaviour? The main findings are that they have a specific profile. There are significant differences between ministries and central agencies as well as changes over time and also marked differences with other civil servants regarding their attitudes and behavior.     

Do Small‐Group Health Insurance Regulations Influence Small Business Size?

State small‐group health insurance reforms, implemented in the 1990s, aimed at controlling the variability of health insurance premiums and to improve access to health insurance. These reforms only affected firms within a specific size range, and as a result, they may have affected the size of small firms around the legislative threshold and may also have affected the propensity of small firms to offer health insurance. We examine the relationship between small‐group reform and firm size and find evidence that small firms just below the regulatory threshold that were offering health insurance grew in order to bypass reforms.     

Can tail risk explain size,book‐to‐market,momentum, and idiosyncratic volatility anomalies?

We examine the impact of tail risk on the return dynamics of size, book‐to‐market ratio, momentum and idiosyncratic volatility sorted portfolios. Our time‐series analyses document significant portfolio return exposures to aggregate tail risk. In particular, portfolios that contain small, value, high idiosyncratic volatility and low momentum stocks exhibit negative and statistically significant tail risk betas. Our cross‐sectional analyses at the individual stock level suggest that tail risk helps in explaining the four pricing anomalies, particularly size and idiosyncratic volatility anomalies.     

Can Language Predict Bankruptcy? The Explanatory Power of Tone in 10‐K Filings

We examine whether the language used in 10‐K filings reflects a firm's risk of bankruptcy. Our sample contains 424 bankrupt U.S. companies in the period 1994–2015 and we use propensity score matching to find healthy matches. Based on a logit model of failing and vital firms, our findings indicate that firms at risk of bankruptcy use significantly more negative words in their 10‐K filings than comparable vital companies. This relationship holds up until three years prior to the actual bankruptcy filing. With our investigation, we confirm the results from previous accounting and finance research. 10‐K filings contain valuable information beyond the reported financials. Additionally, we show that 10‐Ks filed in the year of a firm's collapse contain an increased number of litigious words relative to healthy businesses. This indicates that the management of failing firms is already dealing with legal issues when reporting financials prior to bankruptcy. Our results suggest that analysts ought to include the presentation of financials in their assessment of bankruptcy risk as it contains explanatory and predictive power beyond the financial ratios.     

Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro‐prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time‐varying, bank‐specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK‐owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one‐third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.     

A Comparative Analysis of Anglo‐Australian Pre‐packs: Can the Means Be Made to Justify the Ends?

Whereas pre‐packaged administrations have been prevalent in the UK for years, Australia's voluntary administration regime has been more restrictive of the practice. This article analyses the evolution of UK pre‐packs, why UK‐style pre‐packs are not prevalent in Australia and the challenges for UK and Australian lawmakers in striking the right balance with pre‐packs in their respective administration regimes. Building upon this analysis, the article proposes a mechanism that might make ‘connected‐party’ pre‐pack business sales work more fairly for stakeholders—that is, by obligating a connected‐party purchaser to make a future‐income contribution in favour of the insolvent company whose business has been ‘rescued’ by a pre‐packaged sale in administration. Copyright © 2012 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Company duplication – plain fraud or a ‘poor man's’ bankruptcy? A case study in the financial distress of small businesses

Two possible solutions to corporate financial distress are traditionally considered: commencing a formal bankruptcy proceeding or arranging an out‐of‐court capital restructuring. Corporate bankruptcy scholarship has largely ignored a third solution occasionally undertaken by small businesses, that is, resorting to self‐help measures. The purpose of this paper is to start filling the gap using a unique case study. The paper describes and analyses an existing phenomenon among small firms in Israel experiencing financial distress – company duplication. A typical scenario unfolds as follows. An entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers a new Company B in an attempt to avoid a complete shutdown of her creditors' disturbed business. The assets of Company A are transferred to Company B in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the original business is kept running. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. Israeli law regulates company duplication in an ambivalent manner. On the one hand, conventional wisdom considers company duplication to be tantamount to fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Accordingly, company duplication has been recently denounced by the Israeli Supreme Court as an illegitimate way of conducting business. The Court held that notwithstanding the principle of limited liability, an entrepreneur resorting to company duplication is personally liable to pay any debt of Company A that was not serviced by it. On the other hand, company duplicators do not face criminal charges. To the extent that company duplication is practiced by insolvent entrepreneurs, deterrence is therefore suboptimal, as insolvent duplicators are not sanctioned at all. Against this backdrop, this paper advances two normative arguments. First, a more sympathetic explanation should be considered to account for company duplication. An entrepreneur resorting to company duplication might actually be arranging for a ‘home‐made’ bankruptcy proceeding (i.e. buying time which could help the business establish its viability and regenerate). According to this narrative, the duplication mimics the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, thus suggesting that company duplication serves as ‘a poor man's’ bankruptcy proceeding. Second, this new explanation of company duplication, combined with the current level of suboptimal deterrence, mandates a re‐evaluation of this business pattern to assess its relative efficacy. I argue that at least in the Israeli context because of its special features, company duplication should be tolerated with regard to small businesses, assuming that the entrepreneur is not defrauding creditors or attempting to rescue a business that has failed due to economic rather than merely financial factors. To that end, company duplicators should be held personally liable to debts of the duplicated companies and be pursued with criminal sanctions only selectively, as explained in the paper. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis,Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks

Previous research uses negative word counts to measure the tone of a text. We show that word lists developed for other disciplines misclassify common words in financial text. In a large sample of 10‐Ks during 1994 to 2008, almost three‐fourths of the words identified as negative by the widely used Harvard Dictionary are words typically not considered negative in financial contexts. We develop an alternative negative word list, along with five other word lists, that better reflect tone in financial text. We link the word lists to 10‐K filing returns, trading volume, return volatility, fraud, material weakness, and unexpected earnings.     

Business risk auditing: A regressive evolution?—A research note

Business risk auditing (BRA) has been much publicised as revolutionary. The essence of the phenomenon, and the actual impact on practice, however, are unclear. This note revisits some pre-BRA interview evidence investigating auditor engagement with business risk. The evidence suggests that, pre-BRA, big-six auditors were already familiar with concepts of business risk although they were uncertain as to how precisely business risk informed the audit process. This suggests that BRA was evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change and that the engagement of recent international standards with business risk is not significantly different from that of big-six auditors pre-BRA. The BRA era in audit methodology might be conceptualized as one of regressive evolution.     

Material Misstatement of What? A Comment on Smieliauskas et al., ‘A Proposal to Replace “True and Fair View” with “Acceptable Risk of Material Misstatement” ’

This comment explores theoretical and practical aspects of the Smieliauskas et al. (2008 ), ‘A Proposal to Replace “True and Fair View” With “Acceptable Risk of Material Misstatement”, and develops the ideas outlined there. It is argued that these proposals are helpful, but theoretically incomplete. Theoretical developments relating to accounting aspects are offered, and proposed for others to take further. The pragmatic implications suggest difficulties in the operationalization of the ideas of the original paper in a world of multiple and inconsistent user needs.     

Risk‐Sharing or Risk‐Taking? Counterparty Risk,Incentives, and Margins

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk‐sharing, can breed risk‐taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers' expected liability and undermines their risk‐prevention incentives. This limits risk‐sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers' incentives and in turn enhance risk‐sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk‐prevention incentives.     

Time dollars, work and community: from ‘why?' to ‘why not?'

Conventional notions of work and economics are failing our communities. We need to rethink how we can provide a chance for every member of society to secure work and have a minimally decent standard of living. This essay describes an innovative strategy that generates social capital by using a system of bartering time. Time Dollars schemes transform jobless individuals in communities from a burden into assets. People earn Time Dollars by helping others and then use them to buy essential services, purchase goods, and thus play an invaluable part in building and strengthening community. By freeing communities to ask ‘Why not?', Time Dollars mobilise human resources in a host of beneficial ways and open up a whole variety of hitherto unimagined possibilities.     

Who drives whom ‐ sukuk or bond? A new evidence from granger causality and wavelet approach

Sukuk is a highly appealing alternative instrument of conventional bond in the financial market over the last two decades. To a certain extent, the market players assume sukuk as the same as bond. However, sukuk has its own fundamental asset backed principles, whereas bond is backed by debt. The objective of the study is to examine the Granger‐causality and lead–lag relationship between sukuk and bond by using the data of the Malaysian Government securities return for both conventional and Islamic instruments. The data for every working day of 7 years covering the period from January 31, 2007 to December 31, 2013 were collected from Bloomberg database. The yield returns of both securities have been plotted for each six months of a year. This study applied both Granger‐causality and dynamic co‐movement techniques such as, continuous wavelet transforms (CWT) coherence for analyzing the temporal evolution of the frequency content of both securities by decomposing each period into different time scales. The empirical findings of the paper reveal that with a bit of exception, there is a causal relationship between sukuk securities and conventional bonds for a given period of time. For robustness, this study applied the wavelet coherence approach and found that bond is led by sukuk in the long term investment horizon rather than in the short term. Our findings relating to the lead‐lag relationship between sukuk and bonds have important implications in terms of policy regulations and investment management. Future research and market practices could reinvestigate the differences between these two securities across different markets and types.     

Can short selling improve internal control? An empirical study based on the difference‐in‐differences model

Based on pilot margin trading in China, this study examines how short selling affects internal control quality in listed firms. Using the difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that compared with control firms, firms that are eligible for short selling significantly improve their internal control after they are designated as underlying securities. We consider the effects of state ownership and external auditors. The improvement in internal control is only significant for non‐state‐owned firms and firms audited by non‐Big 4 auditors. These findings indicate that short selling can improve firms’ internal control and play a role in their corporate governance.