Price Effects of Non-Traditionally Broker-Marketed Properties

This study investigates whether or not non-traditional marketing has an effect on the prices paid for residential real estate. Non-traditionally broker-marketed properties are defined as those properties that are sold with the aid of a real estate broker, but not marketed through a Multiple Listing Service (MLS). An analysis of properties that sold in this fashion offers further insight into the intermediation role of the real estate broker, as well as an opportunity to further investigate the efficiency of residential real estate markets. Specifically, we can assess whether MLS participation generates higher prices by determining whether like-kind properties price equivalently despite differences in their mode of marketing. The results show a significant and positive impact by non-traditionally broker-marketed properties on property price suggesting, for this sample, a premium of over 6% compared to like-kind properties marketed through the MLS. This premium may be a result of brokers intermediating a better matching of buyers and sellers. The observed premium also suggests a degree of market inefficiency.     

Fixed-percentage commissions and moral hazard in residential real estate brokerage

If home sellers cannot monitor real estate brokers' efforts on their behalf, fixed-percentage brokerage commissions can promote welfare by giving brokers an incentive to tailor their services to their clients' demands. This article shows how a competitive broker optimally allocates selling effort across clients who pay different commissions. There is an equilibrium in which clients who value brokerage services more highly offer to pay larger commissions and consequently receive more selling effort from the broker. If clients who are selling higher-priced houses tend to value brokerage services more highly, then this result helps explain the prevalence of fixed-percentage commissions in the residential real estate brokerage industry and suggests that they could emerge in a competitive setting.     

Efficiency and Incentives in Residential Brokerage

The literature on broker intermediation in residential real estate has shown positive pricing effects associated with the use of a broker and mixed results as far as the pricing effects of nonstandard commission structures. On the premise that real estate broker incentives emanate from two primary sources, factors that increase broker operating efficiency and negotiable features arising from the relationship between the listing broker and the seller, this study assesses the degree to which these incentives affect the marketing time, probability of sale, and selling price of single-family houses. Of particular interest, this study investigates efficiency and broker intermediation effects on residential property associated with a broker concentrating his listings into a service area. Empirical results show that properties within an individual broker??s GIS-determined service area are more likely to sell, sell faster, and sell with an associated price premium. These effects are more concentrated in the market for higher priced homes. Also, additional compensation favorably motivates the broker with higher-priced properties, but has no effect on the sale of lower-priced properties.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets

This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.     

The Limited-Service Brokerage Decision: Theory and Evidence

This study examines the home seller’s brokerage services decision, comparing full-service brokerage and limited-service arrangements. A model is developed which considers seller motivation and availability of effort, along with the cost of brokerage services, broker productivity and market dynamics as factors of influence in this decision. Limited-service arrangements are found to have a significant impact on price and marketing time. The popularity of limited-service arrangements is strongly influenced by the total dollar cost of brokerage services, which, in turn, is determined by housing market conditions.     

For sale by owner: When to use a broker and how to price the house

By using a broker, the owner of a house can speed up his search for buyers but must pay a percentage of the sale price as a commission. Nonstationarities inherent in the housing market may make it optimal to market a house by-owner at the outset and to retain a broker only if the house remains on the market later in the selling season. This article investigates the optimal sequence of asking prices within the by-owner phase, within the broker phase, and at the transition between the two phases. The asking price declines within each phase but may jump up at the transition to cover part of the commission. The model implicity determines the demand for broker services as a function of the commission rate. When estimated, it may be useful in investigations of price fixing among brokers.     

Real Estate Brokers and Commission: Theory and Calibrations

This paper has two goals: (a) To model an inherent conflict of interest between a seller of a house and the real estate broker hired by the seller. In this environment, the pressure brokers exert on sellers to reduce prices generates faster sales and hence reduces sellers?? expected profit. (b) To calibrate the brokers?? commission rates that would maximize sellers?? expected gain. The calibration results may hint whether the ongoing uniform commission rate reflects collusion among real estate agencies, or should be viewed as competitive.     

Applying hedging strategies to estimate model risk and provision calculation

We present an empirical study of the intertwined behaviour of members in a financial market. Exploiting a database where the broker that initiates an order book event can be identified, we decompose the correlation and response functions into contributions coming from different market participants and study how their behaviour is interconnected. We find evidence for the following. (1) Brokers are very heterogeneous in liquidity provision—some appear to be primarily liquidity providers while others are primarily liquidity takers. (2) The behaviour of brokers is strongly conditioned on the actions of other brokers. In contrast, brokers are only weakly influenced by the impact of their own previous orders. (3) The total impact of market orders is the result of a subtle compensation between the same broker pushing the price in one direction and the liquidity provision of other brokers pushing it in the opposite direction. These results enforce the picture of market dynamics being the result of the competition between heterogeneous participants, interacting to form a complex market ecology.     

金融周期对房地产价格的影响——基于SV-TVP-VAR模型的实证研究

本文利用2004-2016年的季度数据构建金融周期综合指数,用以描述金融市场景气程度;使用SV-TVP-VAR模型,围绕金融周期对我国房地产价格的影响进行实证研究。结果表明,金融周期对房地产价格的影响具有明显的时变性特征:2008年以前金融市场繁荣对房价有稳定推升作用,2008年后该影响持续弱化;与之类似,实体经济对房价的影响同样自2008年起逐渐减小。这意味着,在经济增长方式转变和经济结构调整的过程中,我国房地产价格对经济金融冲击的敏感度已经大幅下降,金融扩张可能难以再通过房地产市场有效带动实体经济的繁荣,相反,其反而可能导致银行贷款不良率的攀升,在金融系统内积累系统性风险。我国针对房地产的宏观调控政策不仅对控制贷款不良率的提高体现出积极作用,而且自2008年国际金融危机以来,产出及房价的随机波动率均呈显著下降趋势,风险得到有效控制。未来应更加重视房地产市场调控在宏观审慎政策框架中的重要地位,遏制房地产金融化泡沫化势头,防范房地产市场引发金融危机。     

中国房地产市场价格泡沫与空间传染效应

本文使用对数周期性幂律(Log Period Power Law, LPPL)模型对房地产市场价格泡沫进行测度,运用空间计量模型对我国房地产市场价格泡沫和空间传染效应进行研究。LPPL模型认为由价格泡沫产生并最终破裂的金融市场与地震系统具有很多相似之处,即金融资产的价格呈周期性变化规律,价格持续上涨到临界状态直至反转。本文采用2010年6月至2017年11月间我国100个城市的房地产市场数据对各城市房地产价格泡沫进行测度和物理/经济空间传染效应研究。研究发现,LPPL模型能够对我国100个城市房地产价格泡沫进行甄别且主要存在两种泡沫状态:正向泡沫(房价持续上升)和反转泡沫(房价整体下降却存在反转点)。各个城市(地区)房地产价格具有较强的空间传染性;存在正向泡沫区域的空间传染性相较反转泡沫区域更为明显,在考虑经济空间测度而不是物理空间测度的情况下,各城市间的空间传染性更强。与现有文献不同,我们发现反转泡沫区域的新房价格指数特别是二手房价格指数的上升对周边城市的房地产价格指数存在强烈的正向推高影响。最后,本文发现城市的房地产调控政策在一定程度上抑制了房价传统影响(比如信贷、新房、二手房价等)因素的推高影响,但各城市房地产价格之间的联动变化特征应该引起监管部门的注意。     

Agency and brokerage of real assets in competitive equilibrium

Brokerage contracts for many categories of real assets are characterizedby a common, constant commission rate payable upon sale, exclusiveagency, and contractual asking prices. For a large market insteady state, these conventional contracts produce in equilibriumno agency problem between a broker and his clients. Each brokerspends the same time or effort selling each client's asset asthe broker would spend on his own assets. As in standard agencyproblems, extra effort by a broker generates first-order stochasticallydominant distributions of bids by potential buyers. Unlike standardagency problems, each broker can allocate his time or effortbetween selling the assets of his multiple clients and searchingfor new clients in competition with other brokers. Because brokers'time spent searching for new sellers is dissipative, entry bybrokers is excessive in equilibrium.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

How broker ability affects institutional trading costs

The present paper shows that broker research and trade execution ability has a significant impact on the cost of institutional trading. The results reveal that there is significant variation in the ability of brokers to control execution costs. Trades executed by brokers with stronger research ability exhibit a higher permanent price impact, whereas those executed by brokers with better execution ability exhibit a lower temporary price impact. Brokers are also found to specialize on an industry level that gives rise to variation in ability within a brokerage house.     

Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?

The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn. The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.     

房地产税收结构与房价关系的研究

近些年,房价问题引起社会普遍关注。本文通过建立面板数据模型,研究了不同地区的房地产税收对房价的影响。研究表明房地产税收对房价有影响,但各个税种在不同地区的影响效果和贡献度不同。因此,差别化房地产税收制度结构是当前房地产市场调控的关键。     

A Pricing Model for Residential Homes with Poisson Arrivals and a Sales Deadline

We introduce a pricing model for single-family residences on the real estate market. The model considers purchase offers that arrive according to a Poisson process. The homeowner’s problem is to set a price that will maximize his net profit. The selling agent suggests a price to the homeowner that will maximize her net profit, which consists of her sales commission minus her costs. Our model accounts for a deadline to sell the home, a common feature of the housing market, beyond which fixed and variable penalty costs accrue to both the homeowner and selling agent. We demonstrate the behavior of the model and show under what conditions the owner’s and agent’s incentives are aligned. Our computational results suggest, in most circumstances, that agents should not pressure owners to substantially lower their asking prices in the presence of a deadline.     

The effect of monetary policy on real estate price growth in China

Using quarterly data from 1998:Q1 to 2009:Q4 and monthly data from July 2005 to February 2010, this paper examines the impact of key monetary policy variables, including long-term benchmark bank loan rate, money supply growth, and mortgage credit policy indicator, on the real estate price growth dynamics in China. Empirical results consistently demonstrate that expansionary monetary policy tends to accelerate the subsequent home price growth, while restrictive monetary policy tends to decelerate the subsequent home price growth. These results suggest that Chinese monetary policy actions are the key driving forces behind the change of real estate price growth in China. We also show that hot money flow does not have a significant impact on the change of home price growth after controlling for the money supply growth. Finally, a bullish stock market tends to accelerate subsequent home price growth.     

The effect of monetary policy on real estate price growth in China

Using quarterly data from 1998:Q1 to 2009:Q4 and monthly data from July 2005 to February 2010, this paper examines the impact of key monetary policy variables, including long-term benchmark bank loan rate, money supply growth, and mortgage credit policy indicator, on the real estate price growth dynamics in China. Empirical results consistently demonstrate that expansionary monetary policy tends to accelerate the subsequent home price growth, while restrictive monetary policy tends to decelerate the subsequent home price growth. These results suggest that Chinese monetary policy actions are the key driving forces behind the change of real estate price growth in China. We also show that hot money flow does not have a significant impact on the change of home price growth after controlling for the money supply growth. Finally, a bullish stock market tends to accelerate subsequent home price growth.     

The Optimal Selling Strategy of Residential Real Estate

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper studies three selling strategies of residential real estate: delegation to a broker, cheap talk with a broker and For Sale By Owner...