Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature

We first point out that the recent property-rights literature is based on three assumptions: (1) that contracts are always subject to renegotiation; (2) that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and (3) that parties are risk-neutral. Building on Hart–Moore (1999), we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights.
We also examine the robustness of some of the literature's standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties' ex post willingness to pay for the assets (such as options or financial markets). To illustrate the issue, we revisit the Hart–Moore (1990) proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal, and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options.     

The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring ∗

In the transitional economies of East and Central Europe, privatization is widely considered essential for transforming the large state-owned enterprises. However, eager to expose the public enterprises to ‘hard budget constraints’, economists have neglected the importance of who the owners are. Studies of ownership structures and post-privatization restructuring in east Germany provide evidence that ownership matters for transformation success. The adoption of west German institutions in the east and the sale of state industrial property in concentrated shares to ‘insider’ investors seem to have created good conditions for the long-term committed investments essential for the rebuilding of tangible and intangible assets in east German enterprises. However, the control structures of a sample of enterprises reveal a wide range of investment strategies between types of corporate investors. Just as legal and financial institutions set constraints on ownership structure, the ownership structure sets constraints on the range of investment choices. Whether committed investments occur will depend on constrained strategic decisions of the new private owners.     

The Emergence of “Modern” Ownership Rights Rather than Property Rights

There are a number of analytical conundrums in the neo-classical theory of the emergence of private ownership rights, which is closely associated with Demsetz’s works. Reconsidering the internal logic of private ownership rights, the paper argues that, first, the emergence of “modern” private ownership rights should be the subject of analysis rather than ownership rights per se. Second, at least for some latecomer countries, modern ownership rights typically emerge when feudalistic multi-layered proprietary rights over land are abolished and replaced by ownership rights for the purpose of ensuring tax revenue, prompted by pressure from and/or the intrusion of a colonial power, rather than as an efficient response to changes in resource prices. Third, the socio-economic aspect of ownership rights that related to the manner of social formation tended to be concealed in the universal aspect of private property rights that focuses on the materialistic relation between a person and a thing. These arguments urge the bringing of social relations into the basic layer of analysis of ownership rights theory, as the original institutional economists such as Ely and Commons considered.     

The effect of privatization on wealth distribution in Russia

The paper considers the Russian privatization process and examines how its deviation from the competitive sale standard was likely to affect wealth inequality. (Privatization here is defined narrowly as the transfer of existing assets from government ownership to private hands.) While empirical evaluation is all but impossible due to the dearth of reliable data, it is feasible to analyze the institutional features of Russian privatization in terms of their effect on redistribution of wealth. The paper argues that the most relevant and interesting issue is to evaluate privatization's distributional consequences relative to the informal pre-reform property rights. In light of this, privatization is modelled as a rent-seeking contest with incumbency advantage of enterprise managers who initially held the greatest informal rights over assets. The rent-seeking contest is shown to strongly magnify this pre-reform wealth inequality reflected in the incumbency advantage.
In addition, the paper analyzes the distributional consequences for various wealth groups of the differences in the composition of their pre-reform informal wealth, most importantly a relatively large share of housing assets in the wealth of the poor. The effect of wealth redistribution on economic growth in Russia is also discussed.     

Institutional environment,ownership and firm taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese‐listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state‐owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.     

产权、代理成本和代理效率

本文选择政府管制较少、竞争较为充分的电子电器行业作为研究对象,考察了产权制度与代理成本和代理效率的关系,得到以下结论:(1)在代理成本上,国有产权企业普遍高于混和产权企业,混和产权企业高于个人产权企业;在代理成本差异上,混和产权企业与个人产权企业的差异小于与国有产权企业的差异。(2)长期投资率和职工人数与代理成本呈显著正相关关系,而长期投资率、财务杠杆比率、职工人数等与代理效率呈显著负相关关系。(3)企业规模越大,不同产权的代理成本差异越小;反之代理成本差异越大。(4)随着市场竞争程度的提高,各类产权企业的代理成本都呈现下降趋势,其代理效率呈现提高趋势。我们研究的启示是国有企业改革的突破口应考虑如何降低其代理成本,解决的措施之一是产权改革,尤其是产权多元化的改革,其次是完善对投资和负债及冗员的监督和控制机制,以促进代理成本的降低和代理效率的提高。     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.     

PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCES IN SLOVENIA

ABSTRACT*: Slovenia has not avoided disputes over privatization: two major concepts competed. The controversies between them resulted in a compromise, and the Law on the Transformation of Social Ownership encompassed features of both: decentralization and a gradual approach from one, and predominantly distributive privatization by ownership certificates to all citizens from the other. Insiders (workers and managers) retained majority ownership of most privatized companies by bringing their certificates to their 'own' company. Slovenia has thus encouraged a continuation of self-management. Ownership by insiders has advantages over transfer of ownership rights to formally private institutions established by the state. Actual development confirms that a normal macroeconomic framework, hardening of the soft-budget constraint, independence of companies, and managers' loyalty matter more than formal property links.     

伊春国有林权制度改革理论与实践的思考

伊春国有林权制度改革试点从其运作来看,虽然没有改变林地的国有性质,但却改变了林木的国有性质。原来的国有森林资源转为私人所有已经成为现实,其实质是国有林木私有化进程。我们坚决反对。理由有三：一是从理论到实践,都不支持私有化是提高林业效率的最佳途径;二是中国国有林业的突出问题并非产权的私有化;三是国有林权的改革并不能解决中国国有林业的长期可持续发展问题,反而在法律和制度并不匹配的情况下,会带来严重的恶果。     

Technological Change: Disaggregation and Overseas Production

The Russian economy faces serious challenges when it comes to such issues as legitimacy of property and protection of property rights. This paper considers institutional aspects of raiding, including the role of Commercial Arbitration Courts and bankruptcy procedures in Russia. It concludes that raiding in Russia has a predatory character not because raiders prey on the weakest, failing, bankrupting businesses, but because they attack healthy and profitable enterprises, firms in temporary financial distress. Raiders use unclear ownership structure of attractive firms and buy necessary decisions from corrupt bureaucrats instead of waiting for a financial crisis to come.     

民营企业融资的体制性障碍

现行的融资体制与民营经济在预算约束的性质、融资渠道和信用关系上并不兼容。民营企业的融资困境不可能通过对现行融资体制的有限调整而得到解除。支持民营经济发展的融资体制只能“内生”出来,这意味着国家应该积极推进金融领域的开放,鼓励和支持国内民营金融机构进入金融领域。在漫长的信用关系转换中,国家应坚定不移地履行产权保护职责。     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

经济共和主义视角下的地权改革—以林权改革为例

林权改革尝试始于20世纪80年代,于2003年加快了改革的步伐,具有了某种激进的色彩。本文认为,这种改革受到效率优先、市场至上、产权私有、强制变迁等信条的影响,有可能使公平和效率出现张力。作者认为在中央政府的改革思想进一步成熟的背景下,林权改革的指导理论需要实现经济共和主义的转向,并提出了四项替代性原则,即处境公平原则、产权有限原则、民主治理原则和法律平衡原则。经济共和主义并不一般地反对私有林权,也不一般地主张公有林权,而是依据具体条件和上述四项原则来形成不同的权利安排。     

Contemporary China’s Rural Landownership with Reference to Antony M. Honoré’s Concept of Ownership

This article analyses the property rights that Chinese peasants have under the present Household Responsibility System (HRS) using Antony M. Honoré’s work on ownership, especially his analysis of eleven standard incidents of the full liberal concept of ownership. It confirms Honoré’s insight that these standard incidents can be divided among two or more persons, and thus there are different types of property rights which are variants and alternatives to the liberal type of property rights. This article also confirms that the Chinese land system is a real alternative to the full liberal concept of ownership. The current Chinese land system is alleged to be “unclear and insecure” because it is not the kind of private ownership that neoliberals champion. In the tradition of the “bundle of rights” theory, it is helpful to use Honoré’s concept of ownership, rather than Harold Demsetz’s type of property rights, to understand the current Chinese system.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Evolving corporate governance and the dividends behaviour regime in Japan

This study investigates empirically the implications which the changing ownership structure and control transfers in the Japanese corporate market may have for the dividend policy of listed firms. The results show that firms with more concentrated ownership may distribute fewer dividends, as ownership concentration reduces distribution pressure from the capital market. Moreover, we show that institutional shareholding, both financial and non-financial, enables corporations to pay lesser dividends and also that the unwinding of the cross-shareholdings allows for efficiency gain and provides impetus to pay higher dividends. The recent pattern of increasing individual shareholding, both of domestic and foreign private individuals, is consistently associated with a higher dividend payment. Furthermore, managerial ownership has negative effects on dividends payouts and is not associated with the earnings of firms. The results suggest that government ownership does not have any significant impact on the payment of dividends. Moreover, our results support the principle of the dividends relevancy and the choice of an appropriate dividends policy affects the value of the firm.     

Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem

We determine the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the environmental problem exists. With regard to the ownership of the private firms, we analyze two cases: (h) the private firm is owned by domestic private investors and (f) it is owned by foreign private investors. A comparison of the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is always desirable in (h), and the optimal degree of privatization is independent of the degree of environmental damage. However, in (f), whether partial privatization is desirable or not depends on the degree of environmental damage: there are cases where full privatization or full nationalization is optimal.     

Endowment effect theory,prediction bias and publicly provided goods: an experimental study

Many studies report on a systematic disparity between the willingness to pay for a certain good (WTP) and the willingness to accept retribution payments in exchange for giving up this good (WTA). Thaler [Thaler RH (1980) J Econ Behav Organ 1:39–60] employs prospect theory to explain this disparity. The literature contains two different interpretations of his endowment effect theory. Accordingly, the disparity is caused either by the disutility from parting with one’s endowment and/or by an extra utility from ownership which is not anticipated by individuals who are not endowed with the good. So far, the empirical evidence on the applicability of endowment effect theory is limited to private goods. This paper reports on an experiment which finds a significant ownership utility effect for a publicly provided good. This result indicates that prospect theory applies to publicly provided goods even though consumers do not have exclusive property rights.      

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.