On the demand for grandchildren: tied transfers and the demonstration effect

It is argued that parents provide help with housing downpayments in order to encourage the production of grandchildren, and that such a subsidization emanates from the “demonstration effect:” a child's propensity to furnish parents with attention and care can be conditioned by parental example. Parents who desire such transfers in the future have an incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate preferences in their children. This generates a derived demand for grandchildren since potential grandparents will be treated better by their adult children if the latter have their own children to whom to demonstrate the appropriate behavior. Empirical work indicates behavior consistent with subsidization of the production of grandchildren and the demonstration effect.     

TRANSFERS FROM MIGRANTS TO THEIR CHILDREN: EVIDENCE THAT ALTRUISM AND CULTURAL FACTORS MATTER

This paper focuses on the determinants of financial inter vivos transfers by migrants living in France in 2003 to their adult children. From a theoretical viewpoint, such transfers may be explained either by altruism or by exchange. While parents would direct their assistance to their less well off children under altruism, support should be channeled to children who live nearby their parents under the exchange motive. We assess the relevance of these two motives using the French PRI survey. Unequal sharing is frequently observed and children are more likely to receive financial transfers when they are in poor circumstance, but not necessarily when living in proximity to parents. We also emphasize the role of cultural factors as determinants of the parental allocation among children. Muslim parents, in particular, are more likely to make transfers to sons than to daughters.     

Descent rules and strategic transfers. Evidence from matrilineal groups in Ghana

Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man's heir is not his own child but rather his sister's son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behavior according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father's household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for the other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behavior can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations.     

TRUST,VALUES, AND FALSE CONSENSUS

Individuals’ beliefs about the trustworthiness of a generic member of the population are both heterogeneous across individuals and persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that the relationship between behavior and beliefs is consistent with individuals extrapolating their trust beliefs from their own trustworthiness and that this tendency continues even after substantial learning opportunities. We go on to provide evidence suggesting that one's own trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing.     

Do First‐Time House Buyers Receive Financial Transfers from Their Parents?*

Using Danish longitudinal data with information about wealth for a sample of first‐time house buyers and their parents, we test whether there are direct financial transfers from parents to children in connection with the house purchase, or in connection with unemployment spells occurring just after the purchase, when children typically hold few liquid assets. First, we document that child and parent financial resources are correlated. Then, we introduce conditioning variables and exploit the panel aspect of the data to also condition on fixed unobserved factors, which arguably govern preferences and/or productivity. We find no evidence of direct financial transfers.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?

We give an account of an overlapping–generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra–family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra–generational (inter–family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter–family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.
JEL classification : C 91; H 55     

Self-enforcing exchange among generations: Implications for consumption and mobility

A three-generation OLG model with one-directional altruism and two-directional intra-family transfers is presented. Adults invest in their children's education and make transfers to their elderly parents. However, due to lack of altruism, adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children's education. This allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility: (i) consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family, (ii) consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations, and (iii) the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution.     

私人代际转移动机研究*——基于CHARLS的实证分析

经济学家对代际的物质和时间转移的兴趣引发了人们对转移动机的研究与思考。传统的解释有两种：利他主义与交换互惠。本文利用CHARLS数据，对中国的代际转移动机进行实证研究，发现受传统文化的影响，中国的代际转移更多地表现出利他主义倾向，同时示范效应也有所体现，即个体在照顾父母的同时也在教育自己的孩子赡养父母，以期退休后得到子女的照顾。相对西方国家来说，我国养老金体系的压力较小。但随着老龄化的加剧和生育率的下降，为了缓解未来独生子女赡养双方父母的压力，应当在减少挤出私人代际转移的基础上完善社会保障体系，提高我国老年人口的生活质量。     

Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy

This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of private and public intergenerational transfers in the presence of endogenous growth. It focuses on two-sided altruism implying that individuals have both a motive to make gifts to their parents and a motive to leave bequests to their children. The growth effects of social security depend on whether children are making gifts to their parents or parents are leaving bequests to their children. Which of the transfers is operative, in turn, depends on the size of social security benefits. Social security is legislated endogenously. The introduction of a social security program which definitely reduces per capita income growth and harms future generations is contemplated by altruistic individuals even if non-altruistic individuals disapprove it.     

Gender preference and transfers from parents to children: an inter-regional comparison

This paper examines whether parents exhibit gender preference in the allocation of family resources to their adult children. Gender preference is defined in the context of an altruistic model for inter-vivos transfer from parents to children extended to include educational investment. Data from the Health and Retirement Study (United States) and the Korean Longitudinal Study of Ageing are used to show that the degree of gender preference differs across these culturally distinct regions. Among Korean families, empirical results point to male preference as sons receive larger inter-vivos transfers and attain higher levels of education compared with daughters. In contrast, the evidence pertaining to gender preference among American families points to daughter preference as inter-vivos transfers and educational investment is generally higher among female adult children.     

Parental actions and sibling inequality

This paper presents a simple model of resource allocation within the family. The model is based on two main assumptions: there are nonconvexities in human capital investments and parents cannot borrow to finance their children's education. The model shows that poor and middle-income parents will often find it optimal to channel human capital investments into a few of their children, thus creating sizable inequalities among siblings. The paper shows that the predictions of the model are consistent with the available evidence for three Latin American countries.     

A dynamic model of altruistically-motivated transfers

This paper studies a dynamic Markovian game of two infinitely-lived altruistic agents without commitment. Players can save, consume and give transfers to each other. We identify a continuum of equilibria in which imperfectly-altruistic agents act as if they were a perfectly-altruistic dynasty which is less patient than the two agents themselves. In such equilibria, the poor agent receives transfers until both effectively pool their wealth and tragedy-of-the-commons-type inefficiencies occur. We also provide a sharp characterization of strategic interactions in consumption and transfer behavior. This provides new insights relative to existing two-period models. It allows us to differentiate between the Samaritan's dilemma – e.g. a child runs down its assets inefficiently fast in anticipation of transfers – and what we refer to as the Prodigal-Son dilemma – e.g. parents do not leave an early bequest, anticipating a child's profligate behavior.     

Agricultural Roots in Intergenerational Transfers in China

Economists have been interested in the motivations of intergenerational transfers, for different motivations affect the effectiveness of anti-poverty public transfers. However, one’s motivation is largely shaped by culture and social conventions. This paper sheds light on the influence of rice cultivation in intergenerational transfers in China. This is also the first time that economists consider cultural factors in the study of intergenerational transfers. Cultivating rice requires elaborate irrigation systems and large amounts of labor input so that rice farmers have to cooperate extensively with their neighbors, which has gradually shaped people’s value to be more inter-dependent. Based on micro-level data from CHARLS and sub-national rice data from China, our empirical results show strong evidence that individuals from rice regions are more likely to provide economic support for their parents. A one-percentage point increase in the share of rice in the total grain planting area will raise transfer incidence by 0.2–0.4 percentage points, and rice region residents transfer on average 300–400 yuan more in 2011 and about 1,000 yuan more in 2013 to their parents than those from wheat regions. Meanwhile they are more inclined to rely on their adult children for elderly support. Urban citizens are less affected. Using instrumental variable estimation, we are able to prove the effect is causal. With future continued deepening of population aging in China, relying on children for old age support may become more and more unrealistic, the government needs to coordinate the relationship between public transfer and private transfer to ensure the quality of life for the elderly.     

In-school labour supply,parental transfers,and wages

In many industrialised countries, teenagers have a significant spending power, and they are important customers for specialised industries. The income of teenagers still in full time education comes from two major sources: parental pocket money and earnings from part-time jobs. Little is known about the way these sources interact, and how they depend on parental, school and family characteristics. In this paper, we analyse labour supply of 16 year old British teenagers together with the cash transfers made to them by their parents. We first develop a theoretical model, where labour supply and transfers are jointly determined. We then estimate labour supply and transfers jointly, using unique data on labour supply of teenagers, the wages they receive, and the transfers from their parents. We show how these two processes depend on each other, and how transfers and labour supply react to changes in wages. We are grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for financial support for this research, which has also benefited from support to the IFS as a Designated Research Centre of the ESRC. We thank Murali Agastya, Richard Blundell, Ian Preston, Frank Windmeijer, and two anonymous referees and the editor Bernd Fitzenberger for useful comments.     

Economic Dynasties with Intermissions

We consider a model of successive generations with a fixed proportion of selfish and altruistic members in each individual's offspring. In contrast with the others, selfish members bequeath nothing to their own children. We assume that parents cannot recognize their heirs' types and that negative bequests are forbidden. We study Markov perfect equilibria of this multistage game of incomplete information and their implications for wealth distribution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H63.     

Family Altruism and Incentives

This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding.     

The public reallocation of resources across age: a comparison of Austria and Sweden

There is a strong interdependency between public transfers and the shape of the economic lifecycle because these transfers facilitate and enable the decoupling of production and consumption over long time periods, most notably in childhood and retirement. The design of public transfers obviously influences the production and consumption and consequently also the degree of economic dependency of children and the elderly. We propose economic dependency ratios which are based on age-specific consumption and labour income or age-specific public contributions/benefits, respectively, illustrating them in a comparison of Austria and Sweden. Although these two countries are very similar economies in terms of production, income and the size of the public sector, there are remarkable differences in the design of public transfers, in their distribution over age-groups and consequently in the shape of the average economic lifecycle. Using the economic dependency ratios we show that the financial sustainability of the public transfer system depends beside the demographic developments strongly on its design: the Swedish system collects the contributions from a wider range of age groups, transfers a smaller share to the elderly and provides more support to younger generations, supporting them to invest in children of their own. These characteristics have a positive effect on the sustainability of the Swedish system: although in Sweden there is a larger share of the population in the age group 60+, the total economic dependency of elderly persons is lower.     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

Bequests,gifts, and education: links between intergenerational transfers

We study the channels parents use to make transfers to their children. First, we focus on the relationship between investments in education and property transfers. Second, we turn to how property transfers are divided between inter vivos gifts and bequests. We use a Swedish dataset that is superior to previously used data as it contains information on both gifts and inheritances received from parents. We estimate models for the probabilities of having university education, receiving gifts, and receiving inheritances. In addition, we estimate models for gift and inheritance amounts. We find that the more resources parents have, the higher the likelihood of transfers, and that the correlation between receiving inter vivos gifts and inheritances is very high. Finally, women are more likely to have university education and to receive gifts, and daughters receive gifts of larger amounts than sons, although there are no differences in terms of inheritance.