Endogenous fluctuations in unionized economies with productive externalities

Summary. We discuss the effects of unions on steady-state multiplicity and welfare, and on the existence of endogenous fluctuations. We consider an OG economy with productive capital externalities and we focus on underemployment equilibria. We find that for wide regions in the parameter space, including an arbitrarily small degree of externalities and a Cobb-Douglas technology, unions increase steady state employment and welfare, and local indeterminacy (sunspots) emerges. Moreover with a CES technology multiplicity of steady states is only possible in the presence of unions. Our results also show that the role of unions in shaping local dynamics and bifurcations depends on technology (externalities and factors substitutability).Received: 16 January 2002, Revised: 18 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E32, J51, D60, D62. Correspondence to: Leonor ModestoThis paper is a much revised version of our former working paper Unions, Increasing Returns and Endogenous Fluctuations. Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia under the POCTI, is gratefuly acknowledged.     

Institution building and growth in transition economies

Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, we offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. We identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, we also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.     

Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs

Summary. A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through borrowing, through co-ownership, or simply because one persons consumption affects another persons wellbeing. I analyze consumption externalities from the perspective of club theory, and argue that, provided consumption externalities are limited in scope, they can be internalized through membership fees to groups. Two important applications are to rental markets and purchase clubs, in which members share the goods that they have individually purchased.Received: 2 June 2003, Revised: 8 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D62.This paper was supported by the U.C., Berkeley Committee on Research, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to Birgit Grodal for her collaboration on the theory that underlies this paper, and for her helpful and motivating comments about these particular extensions. I also thank Hal Varian, Doug Lichtman, Steve Goldman, Karl Vind, anonymous referees, and members of the Berkeley Microeconomics Seminar for discussion.     

Information design,externalities, and government interventions

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.     

Economic reforms and human development: evidence from transition economies

Do market-oriented economic reforms result in higher levels of human well-being? This article studies the impact of macro-level institutional and infrastructure reforms on the economic, educational and health dimensions of human well-being among 25 transition economies. We use panel data econometrics based on the LSDVC technique to analyse the effects of market-oriented reforms on the human development index (HDI), as a measure of human well-being, from 1992 to 2007. The results show the complexity of reform impacts in transition countries. They show that institutional and economic reforms led to positive economic effect and significant impacts on other dimensions of human development. We find some positive economic impacts from infrastructure sectors reforms. However, not every reform measure appears to generate positive impacts. Large-scale privatizations show negative effects in health and economic outcomes. The overall results show the importance of the interaction among different reform measures and the combined effect of these on human development.     

Optimal product strategies in the presence of network externalities

A network externality exists when a user’s benefit from a product increases with the number of other users in the same network. We examine the possibility that a software firm may exploit network externalities by introducing a limited feature version of its commercially available software into the market. The two versions need not be perfectly compatible and network externalities are allowed to decline as the difference between the versions increases. We obtain conditions under which introducing a limited feature version is optimal.     

Geography,geopolitics, and policy in the performance of transition economies

The economic performance of the transition economies as of 2015 is well explained by three variables: (1) years of membership in the EU; (2) physical distance from the heart of the EU economy, taken to be Dusseldorf; and (3) annual revenues from oil and gas production, reflecting natural resource deposits. These three factors account for around 86 percent of the variation in per capita income across the 28 transition economies, and reflect the interplay of domestic policy, geopolitics, geography and natural resources.     

Agglomeration externalities: Marshall versus Jacobs

The literature remains inconclusive as to whether Marshallian specialization or Jacobian diversification externalities favor regional innovativeness. The specialization thesis asserts that regions with production structures specialized towards a particular industry tend to be more innovative in that particular industry, as it allows for knowledge to spill over between similar firms. The diversification thesis argues that knowledge spills over between different industries, causing diversified production structures to be more innovative. A closely related debate evolves around local competitiveness hypotheses. Using an original database of innovation counts, both these issues are addressed for the Dutch context. The results show that the Marshallian specialization thesis holds, though more pronounced for R&D intensive and small firms. Fierce local competition within an industry negatively affects innovativeness in that particular industry.JEL Classification: O18, O31, R10Gerben van der Panne: The author wishes to thank Fia Wunderink, Wilfred Dolfsma and Alfred Kleinknecht for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Biased managers with network externalities

In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities

This paper describes a model involving two interconnected networks offering different degrees of quality. In these networks, there are call externalities enabling consumers to assess the quality of the calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two-part tariffs. Our aim is to show that the “profit neutrality” result no longer applies due to network asymmetry and call externalities. In the case of non reciprocal access charges, call externalities generate private incentives enabling each competitor to charge low access prices. This reduces the risk of tacit collusion as competitors are free to negotiate their access charges.      

Financial market development and trade openness: evidence from emerging economies

International trade is said to be the engine of economic growth. Despite an enormous effort to explain this phenomenon, the relationship between financial market development and trade openness and integration into the world economy is still an enigma. This article investigates the relationship between financial market development and trade openness. To do this, we develop a long-run and short-run model (a bounds testing approach to cointegration) for 18 emerging economies over the period 1980 to 2011. Estimates from all models show that financial market development, including both the stock market and the banking sector, has significant effect on trade openness in both short-run and long-run phenomena in the majority of countries. Despite many similarities among emerging economies, additional evidence suggests that the link between either stock market development or banking sector development with trade openness works via each country’s specific structure.     

Banking sector development and interest rate volatility in emerging economies

Over the last decades, macroeconomic stability is said to be one of the major concerns of emerging economies. Financial sector as a core of macroeconomic stability has been under close consideration of policy makers. The relationship between interest rate uncertainty and banking sector development as one of the most important indicators of financial sector development, especially for emerging economies, has not received enough attention in the literature. Perhaps this article is the most comprehensive study that investigates the relationship between interest rate uncertainty and banking sector development for a large group of emerging economies. To do this, the short-run and long-run models using a bounds testing approach to cointegration for 12 emerging economies over the period 1980–2011 have been developed. Estimated results from all models indicate that interest rate uncertainty has significant effect on banking sector development in both short-run and long-run phenomena in the majority of countries. The findings indicate that the link between interest rate uncertainty and banking sector development in each country depends on each country’s specific structure.     

Convergence speed and preference externalities in a one-sector model with elastic labor supply

In a one-sector model with elastic labor supply where consumption and leisure externalities are incorporated, we examine the impact of preference externalities on convergence speed.     

Negative externalities and welfare improving preference changes

When the over-consumption of open access resources and congestible public goods generate negative externalities and social welfare losses, many individuals and environmental advocacy organizations offer as an alternative nongovernmental solution the adoption of new ecology sustaining preferences. This paper shows that exogenously inducing a change in preferences and the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences, which increase an individual's marginal rate of substitution between a private good and a good whose consumption imposes external costs on others, not only reduces the aggregate output of the negative externality but also produces an economic state that is socially superior to the initial state. Because it is based on both the initial and new preferences, the social superiority welfare criterion makes possible meaningful welfare comparisons of economic states generated by preference changes. A computational general equilibrium model is then used to simulate preference changes and to calculate the resulting allocative and welfare effects. The computer simulations reveal that important factors in the attainment of a socially superior state include (i) the particular characteristics of an individual's negative externality reaction function, (ii) the magnitude of the preference change, and (iii) the number of individuals changing preferences.     

An endogenous equilibrium game on traffic congestion externalities

Traffic congestion and road tolls are familiar economic concepts for most undergraduates; however, students often have difficulty explaining exactly how theoretical principles like externalities and social welfare are related to their real-world experiences, such as driving. The authors present a classroom exercise to demonstrate how congestion externalities are generated, the effects on private and social welfare, and how appropriately priced tolls can address congestion externalities. Students are asked to evaluate outcomes in five different driving scenarios, with and without congestion or tolls. The authors offer discussion questions to make the activity engaging and informative. They report the results of their efforts to administer the exercise. This 75-minute exercise is appropriate for introductory or intermediate microeconomics, political economy, or environmental economics classes of various sizes.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.