浙江民营资本跨区域流动投资集群形成机理研究

近年来民营资本跨区域流动问题引起了社会各界的高度关注。该文把民营资本跨区域流动中的"双集中"现象——资金来源的地缘集中和投资流向集中定义为投资集群效应,然后从"蚂蚁效应"的视角揭示投资集群效应的形成机制。研究发现,浙江区域经济中的企业集群老化促成了浙江民营资本跨区域流动中资金来源的地缘集中;企业集群所具有的社会关系网络则保证了投资信息的共享,促进民营资本投资流向的集中;而投资环境的制约则是"头蚁"向"蚁窝"传递投资信息的重要动因。     

台州产业集群的特色和成长机制探析

台州区域经济的发展离不开当地独具特色的产业集群,台州产业集群在发展过程中呈现了四大特色：属于内生式集群和集群内企业多为民营企业;制造业集群和流通类集群的并联耦合与联动发展;集群主要集中在传统制造业上,且各产业集群间的关联性较强;集群内企业外向型特征明显。在特色分析的基础上,进一步从体制优势、专业市场支撑、民营金融发展、企业家资源和独特的区域“文化基因”等五个方面对台州集群的成长机制问题展开了深入的研究分析。     

风险投资介入推动了资本跨区域流动吗？——基于企业异地并购的实证研究

资本跨区域流动是优化地区间资源配置、推动国内经济大循环、促进区域协调发展的重要载体,而金融要素又是促进更高水平的区域协调发展的有效推动力。为此,文章从异地并购的视角探讨了风险投资对资本跨区域流动的影响,并探讨了多维管理层特征的调节机制。研究发现:(1)风险投资参与程度的提升促使被投企业扩大异地并购规模,从而推动了资本跨区域流动;但风险投资对资本跨区域流动的促进作用更可能发生在各风险投资股东均为非大股东、主导风险投资为非国有产权属性和风险投资联合投资的情境中。(2)风险投资介入对资本跨区域流动的影响在欠发达地区企业并购发达地区企业的逆流并购的情境中更显著,且风险投资的参与也打破了地理距离障碍,激发被投企业愿意在远距离的异地并购中扩大投资规模。(3)企业管理层股权集中度的提高抑制了风险投资参与程度对异地并购规模的促进作用;CEO任期的增加强化了风险投资参与程度对异地并购规模的促进作用。文章提供了风险投资促进资本跨区域流动的经验证据,对优化企业异地并购决策以及推动区域间经济协同发展具有重要的借鉴价值。     

关于民营资本投资高技术产业的调查分析

通过实地调研和问卷调查,分析了民营资本投资高技术产业的现状和存在的问题.结果显示,我国民营资本投资高技术产业的资本来源结构单一,主要依靠过去的积累;行业选择偏好明显,主要集中在电子信息业;“产学研“结合不紧密,技术主要是独立研发.民营高技术企业普遍存在融资困难、规模偏小、研发能力不足、高素质人才缺乏等问题.多数民营高技术企业对外部环境不满意,入驻高新技术开发区的主要原因是为享受优惠政策.     

民间资本驱动下的产业集群研究——以"温州模式"为例

产业集群是形成区域竞争优势、促进区域经济发展的重要动力,历史上多为民间自发形成,但现今却更多依赖于政府引导和政策支持.本文以我国温州形成的产业集群为模式,回顾其形成背景,并以此分析由民间资本驱动的产业集群所具有的形成条件和特点.最后指出"温州模式"的启示意义.     

基于产业集群的区域品牌培植模式比较分析

产业集群是区域品牌形成和传播的基础,如何在产业集群的发展基础上培育区域品牌?本文在对温州鞋业、绍兴轻纺、嘉善木业、青岛家电、武汉光谷等5个产业集群区域品牌发展分析的基础上,总结出了地方人文资源型、市场集散推广型、外资资本带动型、名牌企业配套型和技术创新推动型5种典型区域品牌培植模式,为我国各地培植区域品牌、提高区域竞争力提供有效借鉴。     

集群视角下跨区域群体投资的成因、模式及影响

集群企业迁移倾向于群体性行动,从而产生跨区域群体投资行为.本文从产业组织的主要形式——产业集群的内外部视角分析了其产生的原因,总结了常见模式,讨论了其对迁出地产业发展的影响,最后提出促进产业群体性有序转移的建议.该研究对促进我国东部相关产业向中西部转移具有现实意义.     

我国企业集群中的社会资本

社会资本对我国企业集群发展具有重要影响。本文界定了我国企业集群中的社会资本,即信任、隐含知识和企业家网络;分析了社会资本在企业集群竞争优势形成中的积极作用;在分析社会资本形成因素的基础上,提出了增加社会资本、促进企业集群发展的对策。     

论社会资本对区域经济发展的作用机制——基于温州地区的研究

地区性资源对区域发展起着关键性的作用,较物质资本而言,社会资本在区域经济发展中的作用不容忽视.在物质资本匮乏的温州,独特的社会资本优势表现得更加明显,在其发展过程中作用的发挥也较为充分.现阶段温州经济正处于升级转型和“新温州模式”正在形成的特殊时代背景下,再次探求温州的成长轨迹就显得格外有价值.本文在社会资本理论框架内,采取社会资本从微观、中观和宏观的分析角度与温州地区的区域特征相结合,进一步分析其中哪些因素起着关键性的作用,以及温州特有的动因和特征,进而来阐明社会资本如何影响温州模式进程,增进地区的经济发展.     

基于产业集群导向的跨区域群体投资嵌入性形成机制研究

近年来，我国一些原本扎根于产业集群较为发达的东部地区的企业，纷纷携手同一供应链上的其他企业一起前往中、西部进行跨区域投资，以期获得持续发展的能力。其通过对产业集群进行异地复制，帮助投资企业克服极化效应，降低向外转移的成本，使企业获得新的发展，就本质而言是一种基于产业集群导向的跨区域群体投资。这一类型的群体投资与单体投资相比，一个明显的优势是通过迅速形成新的产业集群，获得相应的集群效应，保持甚至扩大自身的竞争优势。     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

Country terms of trade: trends,unit roots,over-differencing,endogeneity, time dummies,and heterogeneity

The debate about the Prebisch-Singer thesis has focused on primary commodities with some extensions to manufactures. We analyse trends in country terms-of-trade for goods and services rather than those for commodities according to the World Bank income classification. We find that the natural logarithm of the terms of trade for all groups except for the poorest has common unit roots, but none has individual unit roots. As low-income countries have no unit roots over-differencing is inefficient and biases significance levels in first differences against the fall in the terms of trade. For the low-income countries the terms of trade of goods and services are falling at a rate that is significantly negative without and with endogeneity treatment by system GMM. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of time dummies supports the result of falling terms of trade for low-income countries. When all coefficients are country-specific 50% of all low-income countries have falling terms of trade in a simultaneous equation estimation using the SUR method. Food and financial crisis have no effect on the number of countries with falling terms of trade, but (dis-)improve the terms of trade or the significance of the results for a very small number of countries.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.