Some Economics of Integrated and Segmented Markets

For the purposes of the discussion in this paper, whether markets are integrated or segmented is endogenous and is determined by the interaction of demand parameters, tariffs, transportation costs, and arbitrage. Given certain restrictions, it is shown, in equilibrium, that policymakers choose tariffs to segment markets. The effects of trade liberalization (reducing all tariffs to zero) in an endogenous market structure framework are determined and compared to the existing literature. The results differ substantially, highlighting the importance of explicit modeling of costly arbitrage in imperfectly competitive models.     

Consumer Ownership in Liberalized Electricity Markets. The Case of Denmark

The continuation of consumer ownership has been an important part of the Danish electricity reform from 1999. Consumer ownership refers to either a consumer co-operative or a municipal utility. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consumer ownership can be supported by solid arguments from modern economic theory of organization. These arguments are presented and confronted with both present and future situation in Denmark. The development of the electricity supply industry after the Second World War has emptied consumer ownership of much of its original content. Nowadays, most consumers consider their electric utility as the (monopoly) supplier of a good they demand and not as something they own. Therefore, obligatory consumer ownership as specified in the new Danish Electricity Act of 1999 cannot be relied on to guarantee security of supply and reasonable prices for small consumers     

The Law of One Price: A Canada/U.S. exploration

The paper examines whether arbitrage tends to equalize commodity prices for internationally traded homogenous products. It also investigates whether the increasing integration of North American markets has reduced price differences over time, and tests the validity of the so-called Law of One Price. We find that price differences for homogenous tradables between Canada and the U.S. are smaller than those for differentiated tradables and non-tradables, and are statistically insignificant over the period 1985 to 1999. We find no support for the notion that the increasing integration of North American markets due to trade liberalization has reduced price differences between Canada and the United States. Instead, the shifts in the price differences (expressed in the same currency) generally reflected fluctuations in the exchange rate. Canadian prices adapt with a lag to U.S. price changes that are brought about by changes in the exchange rate.     

International trade in genetically modified products

This paper investigates competition between two markets that sell close substitutes: a traditional product and a genetically modified (GM) product. Tightening an import quota on the GM product raises the prices of both goods and hurts consumers. Two scenarios are considered under free trade: Cournot–Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. A Stackelberg type monopolist produces more, and the competitive traditional firms produce less, than in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In the long run, an import ban on the GM product does not help competitive producers of the genetically modified organism (GMO)-free products but benefits only the landowners in Europe.     

International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage

Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand—it can use the second country to discriminate across consumers in the first country. Again, world welfare typically falls with arbitrage costs. When there is also local demand in the second country, world welfare may be increasing in arbitrage costs, even if output falls.     

Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one. The monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market, except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform, in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform. The market allocation is constraint-efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers. An increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition. As a result, the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In contrast, an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms.     

Consumer‐benefiting exclusive territories

Abstract.  I investigate the effect of exclusive territories, which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms. Using shipping spatial models, I consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets. An upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories. I find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity‐setting competition. In price‐setting competition, they raise prices in half the local markets, reduce them in other markets, and also reduce the total consumer surplus. JEL classification: L42, R32     

Market Size and Economic Integration when Labor Markets are Unionized

The paper explores the effects of economic integration on trade, wages, and welfare when market sizes differ. A duopoly model with two‐way intraindustry trade in similar products and with unionized labor markets is employed. It is confirmed that, for a wide range of different relative market sizes, integration leads to higher wages, employment, and welfare. However, where market sizes differ widely, the reduction of trade barriers leads to a reduction of wages, employment, and—in some circumstances—welfare in the country with the large market.     

An econometric assessment of telecommunications prices and consumer surplus in Mexico using panel data

We analyze telecommunications prices in Mexico by using a panel data of countries similar to Mexico to estimate demand models for mobile and fixed-line telecommunications. We find that Mexico’s actual mobile and fixed-line prices are below the predicted prices based on similar countries’ prices. Mexican consumers are paying lower prices than what one would expect based on comparisons of comparable countries. We calculate that in 2011 Mexican consumers received at least $4–$5 billion (USD) in consumer surplus from these lower mobile prices and in 2010 they received over $1 billion (USD) in consumer surplus from these lower fixed-line prices. These findings are in contrast to the general perception that concentrated telecommunications markets in Mexico are resulting in high prices and harming consumers.     

Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets

This paper studies the impact of entry of non‐banks (termed Independent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: (1) The ISO receives interchange fees and (2) the ISO charges consumers directly. We find that due to the entry of an ISO, the size of the total ATM network increases independent of the way the ISO is financed. Account fees increase if the ISO receives interchange fees and decrease if the ISO charges consumers directly. Consumers may not benefit from the entry of the ISO. If a regulator can control the interchange fee, entry by an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer surplus, while the entry of a surcharging ISO decreases consumer surplus.     

The impact of restructuring and deregulation on gas rates

This article evaluates the impact of consumer choice programs, price caps, and sliding scale plans on consumer prices of gas using a custom survey of public service commissions and data from the Department of Energy. A seemingly unrelated regressions model estimates residential, commercial and industrial prices jointly, controlling for potentially endogenous demand. Consumer choice programs are estimated to lower residential and commercial prices significantly, by bringing competition to markets with smaller consumers. Prices fall even before deregulation as utilities build consumer loyalty and fight competition. Sliding scale plans are estimated to lower prices of small consumers while raising industrial prices. Price caps lead to overall higher prices, with unclear ranking across consumer classes.      

Markets as communication systems

As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents, the quality of resource allocation depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic system. Because information is transferred through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the network of trading relations defines the channels through which it flows. In the present study, we use new computational tools to analyze the performance of two wholesale trade institutions widely used around the world: network trading and marketplace trading. Whilst network trading and marketplace trading disseminate far fewer bits of information than a perfectly transparent benchmark market, they often manage to generate an allocation of resources that is almost as good. In many cases, network trading proves more effective than marketplace trading (contrary to a common preconception). This surprising performance of network trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced by connections between networks. Implications for market design and public policy making are presented, along with prospects for further research.     

Global Integration

This article argues that there are underlying changes in the world economy due to growing integration of the national economies which are more profound than the events in particular commodity markets, and that our national economic policies should be significantly shaped by these changes. Integration is defined in terms of the convergence of prices on international markets. It is occurring in the markets for commodities, factors and technologies. The freeing of trade multilaterally and unilaterally and the formation of regional trading arrangements have all played a part in greater global integration. Global and regional integration have changed the nature of the international markets in which we trade and require corporations to change their production and marketing strategies. Governments have an increasingly important role in negotiating international and regional agreements and in providing an environment that allows the domestic producers to compete on international markets. There is, however, no need to change the unilateral trading policies of Australia.     

"裁厘改统"与民国时期市场整合-基于上海、芜湖、天津三地粮价的探讨

国民政府于1931年废除厘金、改办统税,史称"裁厘改统"。经济史学者通常认为这一政策促进了商品流通,有利于现代经济发展,但从基本经济理论与实证数据出发的讨论仍然缺乏。本文以厘金的发展历史为背景,利用民国时期的粮价数据,对厘金废除前后的市场整合程度进行了时间与空间上的对比。研究发现,厘金制度阻碍套利实现,造成市场分割,从实证数据上看,厘金废除后,远距离粮食市场间的整合程度得到了显著提升。"裁厘改统"促进了民国时期的市场整合,从而对20世纪30年代的经济发展起到了积极作用。     

Integration Among Asia‐Pacific and International Stock Markets: Common Stochastic Trends and Regime Shifts

Are stock markets in the Asia‐Pacific region integrated with each other and with the US and Japan? The paper examines a number of common stochastic trends among stock prices in the US, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. If integration exists it is a fairly recent phenomenon. Institutional and economic considerations suggest the same is true so that a single common stochastic trend among Asian and North American markets is a recent phenomenon. The reason is that the stock markets studied were only recently sufficiently liberalized to permit some form of integration to emerge. Also, not only was the 1987 stock market crash significant, but the 1991 Gulf War also signalled a turning point in the degree of stock market integration among the countries studied.     

Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers, as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behaviour of a monopolist. Several control treatments corroborate this finding.     

Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Prices*

To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains.     

Competition (sorting effect) may favour a monopolist

When there are interpersonal effects on demand, and consumer selection is not allowed, a monopolist may benefit from the entry of a competitor, which increases the value of its product, by separating consumers into different groups.     

Local martingales, arbitrage, and viability Free snacks and cheap thrills

Summary. We revisit a standard model of security prices as Ito processes, and provide some new economic insights about the role of arbitrage and credit limits within such a model. We show that the standard assumptions of a positive state prices and existence of an equivalent martingale measure exclude prices that are viable models of competitive equilibrium and that are potentially useful for modeling actual financial markets. These models have been dismissed in the past as allowing arbitrage, but in fact an agent who prefers more to less and who has limited access to credit may have an optimum. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999